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Narrative Explanation and The Theory of Evolution

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Michael Ruse
Michael Ruse*
Affiliation:
University of Guelph
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Extract

A common complaint of biologists is that their subject receives poor treatment from philosophers—it gets but a fraction of the attention accorded to physics and chemistry, and what little it does receive, is usually of the type where ‘All swans are white’ is taken to be a paradigmatic example of the state of biological thinking. It cannot be denied that this complaint is, to a great extent, justified; however, there are some notable breaches in the wall of ignorance and silence, amongst which must be numbered The Ascent of Life by T.A. Goudge. In this book, starting from what is obviously a very wide knowledge of biology, Goudge attempts a careful and thorough analysis of one of the major achievements of biological thought, evolutionary theory. The conclusions that Goudge draws are many; nevertheless, one can discern running through them a common theme, namely that whilst evolutionary theory is indeed a legitimate branch of science, to assume that it is a science of the same nature as physics and chemistry would be a grave error. Goudge argues that, despite certain similarities to other branches of science, the essential aims, methods and results of evolutionary theory are peculiar unto itself.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 1 , Issue 1 , September 1971 , pp. 59 - 74
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1971

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References

1 For such a complaint see Mayr, E. “Footnote on the Philosophy of Biology”, Philosophy of Science, 36, 1969, pp. 197–202.CrossRefGoogle Scholar A prime example of the kind of philosophizing which makes biologists see red is Manser, A. R. “The Concept of Evolution”, Philosophy, 40, 1965, pp. 18–34.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

2 Toronto; University of Toronto Press, 1961.

3 Laws and Explanations in History, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1957.

4 Strictly speaking one should draw a distinction between the explanans, the thing doing the explaining, and the explanans-statements, the words which tell one about the explanans. Similarly for the explanandum and the explanandum-statement. Since no confusion will arise, this distinction will be ignored in this paper.

5 See for example Brodbeck, M. “Explanation, Prediction, and ‘Imperfect’ Knowledge”, in Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, ed. Feigl, H. and Maxwell, G. Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1962, pp. 231–272.Google Scholar

6 See for example Hempel, C. G. Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science, New York: Free Press, 1965.Google Scholar

7 In the above mentioned work, Hempel tries to deal more formally with the idea of conditions which are nearly (but not quite) sufficient.

8 For a much more detailed discussion of the nature of scientific laws see my paper “Are there Laws in Biology?” Australasian Journal of Philosophy. August, 1970. Also to be found in this paper are examples of biological covering-law type explanations where both explanans and explanandum are spelt out in detail.

9 Goudge, pp. 70-71.

10 Goudge, p. 71, quoting Romer, A. S. Man and the Vertebrates. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1941.Google Scholar

11 Goudge, pp. 74-75.

12 Goudge, p. 77.

13 Goudge, p. 73.

14 See for example J, Huxley. Evolution. The Modern Synthesis, London: Allen and Unwin, 1942.Google Scholar

15 A detailed analysis of natural selection and of the evidence for it can be found in my paper “Natural Selection in The Origin of Species”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, February 1971.

16 Goudge, pp. 74-75.

17 Goudge, p. 77.

18 This example is taken from Hempel, C. G. Philosophy of Natural Science, Englewood Cliffs: PrenticeHall, 1966, p. 57.Google Scholar

19 The following classification of the senses of ‘unique’ is indebted to Gruner's, R. “Uniqueness in Nature and History”, The Philosophical Quarterly, 19, 1969, pp. 145–154.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

20 If one denied this fact, then it would seem that one would have to justify one's position by some kind of ontological argument in reverse—an argument showing the necessary non-existence of other combinations of the required conditions. Despite the recently revived interest in ontological arguments, I do not think anyone would want to go quite this far.

21 Philosophical Analysis, ed. Black, M. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1950, p. 312.Google Scholar