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The Externalist's Demon

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Clayton Littlejohn
Clayton Littlejohn*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy and Classics, University of Texas at San Antonio, San Antonio, TX78249, USA
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Extract

Let's say that two individuals are epistemic counterparts iff they happen to be in precisely the same (non-factive) mental states. If one has a veridical experience, her counterparts will undergo a subjectively indistinguishable conscious experience. If she remembers something, her counterparts will seem to recall the same event or fact. If she knows something to be true, her counterparts will believe it to be true. Counterparts always find the same things intuitive. Any difference between those who know a great deal about the external world and their systematically deceived counterparts is a difference the deceived counterparts could never appreciate.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 39 , Issue 3 , September 2009 , pp. 399 - 434
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2009

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