1 Richard H. Smith, Sung Hee Kim and W. Gerrod Parrot, ‘Envy and Jealousy: Semantic Problems and Experiential Distinctions,’ Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 14 (1988) 401-9

2 See Aaron Ben-Ze'ev, ‘The Nature of Emotions,’ Philosophical Studies 52 (1987) 393-409.

3 See also George M. Foster, The Anatomy of Envy: A Study in Symbolic Behavior,’ Current Anthropology 13 (1972) 165-86, 168. 4 Daniel M. Farrell, ‘Jealousy,’ The Philosophical Review 89 (1980) 527- 59

5 Jerome Neu, ‘Jealous Thoughts,’ in Amelie 0. Rorty, ed., Explaining Emotions (Berkeley: University of California 1980) 425-63 6 G.W. Allport, The Nature of Prejudice (Cambridge: Addison-Wesley 1954)

7 Neu, 435

8 Farrell

9 Peter van Sommers, Jealousy (London: Penguin 1988)

10 In principle, there can be less strict types of exclusiveness. A woman in a polygamous marriage may not be jealous of any of the other women married to her husband, but she may be jealous of women outside the marriage (see van Sommers). In this case, sexual jealousy still involves exclusiveness, though a less strict variety. Similarly, one may allow one's mate to have one short affair- say once every three years- or to have an affair with people the agent does not know, without considering it as abrogation of their exclusive relation, and hence without giving any cause for jealousy. These types of less strict exclusivity are not typical. They are practical arrangements for not losing the mate, but they do not necessarily abolish jealousy. It is plausible to expect that when these less strict types of exclusiveness are abrogated, jealousy would be less intense than when the typical all-or-nothing exclusiveness is abrogated.

11 An exception to this claim exists when one believes that the amount of good in the world is limited; see George M. Foster, ‘Cultural Responses to Expressions of Envy in Tzintzuntzan,’ Southwestern Journal of Anthropology 21 (1%5) 24-35, 26; Nancy Friday, Jealousy (New York: Perigord Press 1985), 105- 6.

12 Peter Salovey and Judith Rodin, ‘Envy and Jealousy in Oose Relationship,’ in Oyde Hendrick, ed., Close Relationships (Newbury Park: Sage 1989) 221-46, 242

13 Ibid., 229

14 Ibid., 232

15 See also Gregory L. White and Paul E. Mullen, jealousy: Theory, Research, and Clinical Strategies (New York: Guilford Press 1989).

16 Salovey and Rodin, 235

17 This is not to say that egalitarianism is necessarily connected with envy; such a mistaken assumption stems, as Robert Young argues, from thinking that egalitarians must believe that equality is intrinsically valuable; see Robert Young, ‘Egalitarianism and Envy,’ Philosophical Studies 52 (1987) 261-76.

18 Neu

19 White and Mullen, 219

20 For some empirical evidence concerning the emotional strands associated with envy and jealousy see Smith, et al.; see also White and Mullen.

21 See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky. ‘Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk,’ Econometrica 47 (1979) 263-91; Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice,’ Science 211 (1981) 453-8.

22 See, e.g., Salovey and Rodin.

23 Daniel Montaldi, ‘Envy,’ unpublished manuscript

24 Helmut Schoeck, Envy A Theory of Social Behavior (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World 1970), 62

25 This is contrary to Young's prediction that an egalitarian society will contain less envy; see also Montaldi. It is interesting to note that the kibbutz's ideology, which tries to reduce the importance of material possessions, succeeds in actually reducing the material differences among the various members. However, the ideology could not abolish the more basic emotional concerns regarding these differences. And although the material differences are indeed small, their emotional importance has not been reduced.

26 Kingsley Davis, ‘Jealousy and Sexual Property,’ Social Forces 14 (1936) 395-405

27 Neu 28 For further divisions of the various types of envy and jealousy see Gabriele Taylor, ‘Envy and Jealousy: Emotions and Vices,’ Midwest Studies in Philosophy 13 (1988) 233-49.

29 See also William Lyons, Emotion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1980), 82-3. 30 The same is true of pity and other emotions; see Aaron Ben-Ze'ev, ‘Why Did Psammenitus Not Pity his Son?’ Analysis 50 (1990) 118-26.

31 See Neu. 32 See also Beverley Fehr and James A. Russell, ‘Concept of Emotion Viewed from a Prototype Perspective,’ Journal of Experimental Psychological: General113 (1984) 464-86. 33 See van Sommers. 34 See White and Mullen, 2, and ch. 8.

35 For further defense of envy, see Patricia S. Greenspan, Emotions and Reasons (New York: Routledge 1988), 115-28; for further criticism of envy and jealousy- especially of envy - see Taylor. 36 See J. Dressler, ‘Rethinking the Heat of Passion: A Defense in Search of a Rationale,’ The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 73 (1982) 421-70; also, Salovey and Rodin.

37 Ben-Ze'ev, ‘The Nature of Emotions'