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ALVIN I. GOLDMAN Epistemology and Cognition (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press 1986). Pp. viii + 437.

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ALVIN I. GOLDMAN Epistemology and Cognition (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press 1986). Pp. viii + 437.

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Bruce Freed
Bruce Freed*
Affiliation:
University of Western Ontario, LondonON, CanadaN6A 3K7
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Type
Critical Notice
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 18 , Issue 1 , March 1988 , pp. 125 - 145
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1988

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