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Was Aristotle Named ‘Aristotle’?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Anne C. Minas*
Affiliation:
University of Waterloo

Extract

Yes, Aristotle was named ‘Aristotle’. I want to show that since ‘Aristotle’ is a proper name, this is true by definition. My theory of proper names is a version of Russell's, a theory that a name is equivalent in meaning to definite description(s) which single out the individual, if there is one, to which the name refers. (“When I say,e.g. ‘Homer existed’, I am meaning by ‘Homer’ some description, say ‘the author of the Homeric poems’ .”) Braithwaite at one time said that the proper name ‘Aristotle’ meant the description ‘the individual named “Aristotle” ’. This theory, which makes it contradictory to suppose that Aristotle was not (the individual) named ‘Aristotle’ I will argue is the correct one. This will involve some explanation of what naming is, which I will carry out in the first two sections. My contention is that naming is an activity that can be done either explicitly or non-explicitly. And names can be conferred either (a) on the basis of acquaintance or (b) by associating the name with descriptions.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1976

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References

1Lectures on Logical Atomism” in Logic and Knowledge, Marsh, Robert C. ed. (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1956) p. 252.Google Scholar

2 Symposium: “Imaginary Objects” with Ryle, G. and Moore, G.E. Aristotelian Society Proceedings,Supplementary Volume 12, 1933, pp. 4454.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

3Proper Names and Descriptions” in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edwards, Paul J. ed. Vol. VI, p. 490.Google Scholar

4 “Proper Names” in Mind, 67, 1958, p. 171. N.L. Wilson holds a view similar to Searle's and thus, I believe, suffering from the same defects, in ‘Substances without Substrata’ in The Review of Metaphysics, 1958, pp. 521–539. “We might say the designatum [of ‘Caesar’] is that individual which satisfies more of the asserted matrices containing the word ‘Caesar’ than does any other individual.” (p. 532)

5 Chapter V, “On Denoting” of The Principles of Mathematics (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd. 1964).

6 “Proper Names and Identifying Descriptions” in Synthese, 21, 1970, and “Speaking of Nothing” in The Philosophical Review, LXXXII (1974), pp. 3–31.