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Spinoza: A Response to De Vries
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2020
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The most devastating objection against Spinoza's thesis that there is only one substance in the universe is that raised by his contemporary Simon De Vries: If substance has an infinite number of distinct essences and substance is identical to its essence, how can there be only one substance?
The majority of Spinoza scholars have considered De Vries’ objection an insoluble problem. Joachim, for example, has stated:
We must therefore admit that there is a serious defect in Spinoza's general theory of the nature of Reality. The unity of Substance which seemed so absolute — the unity which was more than the unity of a system — resolves itself into a mere ‘togetherness’ of an infinite multiplicity. The Reality falls apart into a substratum without character …
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References
1 Joachim, H. A Study of the Ethics of Spinoza (New York: Russell and Russell 1964) 104.Google Scholar
2 Martineau, J. A Study of Spinoza (London: MacMillan 1882) 185.Google Scholar
3 Spinoza, B. Correspondence, trans. Elwes, R.H.M. (New York: Dover 1955) 312.Google Scholar
4 Ibid.
5 Spinoza, B. Ethics, trans. Elwes, R.H.M. (New York: Dover 1955) 63.Google Scholar
6 Spinoza, B. Correspondence, 312.Google Scholar
7 Ibid., 315-316.
8 Donagan, A. ‘Essence and the Distinction of Attributes,’ in Spinoza: A Collection of Critical Essays (New York: Anchor Books 1973) 168.Google Scholar
9 Spinoza, B. Ethics, 45.Google Scholar
10 Plantinga, A. ‘World and Essence,’ Philosophical Review, 79 (1970) 461-92.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
11 Ibid., 474. Plantinga (465) gives the following examples of what he calls ‘trivially essential properties’: having a color if red, being unmarried if a bachelor. They are trivially essential properties since they are true of every object in every possible world. Examples of non-trivial essential properties are: being prime is essential to seven, being a number is essential to six. Plantinga (476) offers the following example of an essence or haecceity: ‘Socrates-identity is an essence of Socrates … for … anything distinct from Socrates in this or any world is nowhere identical with him.’
12 Spinoza, B. Ethics, 82.Google Scholar
13 Ibid., 50.
14 Ibid., 62.
15 Ibid., 47.
16 Ibid., 55.
17 It should be mentioned that it is not clear that Spinoza holds that modes have attributes or essences. There is, however, textual support that could be presented pointing to the fact that he does hold this. See for example, Spinoza, Correspondence, 315,Google Scholar where he states:‘ … nothing is plainer to us, than that every being may be conceived by us under some attribute.’
18 Powell, E. Spinoza and Religion (Chicago: Open Court 1966) 138.Google Scholar
19 Spinoza, B. On the Improvement of the Understanding, trans. Elwes, R.H.M. (New York: Dover 1955) 35.Google Scholar
20 Ibid., 8.
21 Spinoza, B. Ethics, ed. Wild, John (New York: Charles Scribner's Son's 1930) 262.Google Scholar
22 Spinoza, B. Improvement of Understanding, 19.Google Scholar
23 Spinoza, B. Correspondence, 277.Google Scholar
24 Someone might object and claim that interpretation Ill is conveniently made up to solve the De Vries problem and hence begs the question of whether Spinoza was consistent. My response to this is that a strong case has been given for the plausibility of interpretation Ill. It conforms with Spinoza's thought, and hence the burden of proof again lies with those who hold his thought inconsistent to show why Ill is not to be considered the most plausible interpretation. Further, De Vries and others thought that they had presented an insoluble problem for Spinoza's claim that there is only one substance. Interpretation Ill shows that this is not an insoluble problem.