This article provides an explanatory framework of the spontaneous lawmaking (“SL”) process in the area of private law. To illuminate the process of the spontaneous emergence of private law, this paper focuses on three issues: (1) the conditions under which SL is likely to generate efficient norms, (2) the mechanisms that explain the emergence of norms in the absence of centralized enforcing institutions, and (3) the comparative advantages and disadvantages in terms of the efficiency of SL compared to public centralized lawmaking processes. This discussion is organized as follows. Section I defines the scope of the analysis. Section II introduces the relevant analytical tools offered by game theory and transaction-cost economics. Section III identifies the conditions for the spontaneous emergence of efficient norms. Section IV identifies three alternative mechanisms that explain the spontaneous emergence of norms. Section V examines the limitations of SL processes. Finally, Section VI provides examples of SL in the area of private law to demonstrate concretely the analytical potential of the proposed framework.

This two-part article addresses the “Who?” question in the hate speech debate: namely, which characteristics, social identities or statuses should or should not be treated as protected characteristics within a body of hate speech laws? Using United Kingdom incitement to hatred laws as a focal point, the article outlines and critically appraises five broad approaches to specification. Part 1 deals with consistency specification, which highlights norms of consistency both within incitement to hatred law itself and in relation to other laws, practical specification, which focuses on the ostensible goals or apparent aims of incitement to hatred laws, and formal specification, which looks at the formal qualities of the characteristics themselves and to the different forms of people’s relationships with those characteristics. And Part 2 considers functional specification, which concentrates on the underlying or real functions, purposes or objectives of incitement to hatred laws, and democratic specification, which appeals to democratic procedures as well as to democratic values, norms and principles that speak to the proper scope of incitement to hatred laws. Along the way I shall also critically assess a range of substantive arguments about which particular characteristics should or should not be covered by incitement to hatred laws given the aforementioned approaches. My main conclusion shall be that each of the approaches has its strengths and weakness and that, partly because of this, no single approach is adequate by itself as a tool for specifying the proper scope of incitement to hatred laws, but also, by the same token, no approach should be ruled out entirely. Instead, the best strategy is one that combines together all five approaches in reasonable ways given the law, the characteristic and the context.

This article challenges hierarchical and binary thinking in constitutional theory, and offers an alternative basis that draws on multidimensionality. The recognition that constitutionalism is a collection of ingrained tensions between competing forces and conceptual bases is applied in a study of the executive branch, a field that is especially lacking in general theory. The existing research of the executive is almost entirely concerned with specific legal systems and is typically normative; descriptively, references to puzzles and ambiguity offer an inadequate, a-theoretical basis for the understanding of the nature of the executive. Rejecting three alternative models, two of them hierarchical, the third, binary, I reach the internal tension model, which acknowledges the internal irresolvable tension between the executive’s subservience to law and its dominance beyond law, which underlies executive action. The article addresses the ways law can, and does, maintain this internal tension, and ends with some comments on future research directions.

This article revisits Hegel’s writings on punishment to reconstruct from them a justification for the imposition of real-world penal sanctions. Tracing Hegel’s argumentative path from a bare retributive principle to his mature justification of state punishment, it argues that Hegel offers us convincing reasons for endorsing, in broad shape, the distinctive penal institutions and practices of a modern nation-state. Hegel is also right to stress that punishment is – not merely conceptually, but also in the reality of our social world – a recognition of an offender’s status as a bearer of rights and participant in a system of mutual recognition that allows us to collectively build and maintain an order of freedom. This understanding of punishment sets significant limits to punishment’s permissible forms, particularly – but not only – with regard to the death penalty. By focusing on what it means to honour an offender through punishment and by drawing attention to what legal punishment has in common with reactions to transgressions by the will more generally, I question whether the infliction of penal suffering can, as such, be a legitimate aim of penal agents. In conclusion, I argue that only a commitment to penal minimalism, developable from Hegel’s thought, can give those subjected to real-world penal sanctions a complete answer to the question why they should accept their punishment as justified.

The concept of humanity takes up a prominent place in the discourse on international (criminal) law. It remains, however, unclear what exactly is meant by an invocation of humanity. In this article, I aim to contribute to an elucidation of this concept. For this purpose, I will first analyse how the concept of crimes against humanity and the related notions of dehumanization and rehumanization are employed in the case of Duch, the chairman of the infamous Cambodian S-21 prison which functioned under the Khmer Rouge. Second, I will put these findings in a philosophical context. Building on the work of Hannah Arendt, I will devise a conceptual framework to analyse crimes against humanity, dehumanization and rehumanization in order to tease out what is at issue in the concept of humanity in international (criminal) law.

Ronald Dworkin was an outspoken critic of pragmatism, and engaged in extensive and at times virulent disagreements with Richard Posner and Richard Rorty. Yet, I argue here, that Dworkin himself had a number of deeply pragmatist commitments. I examine how we can square these two aspects of Dworkin’s thought. I suggest that part of the answer lies in seeing that there are different strands of pragmatism, and that Dworkin falls on the more objective, Peircean side of the divide, while Rorty and Posner belong more in the skeptical, Jamesian camp. But even with this distinction in mind, we should note the substantial overlap between the views of Dworkin and his pragmatist interlocutors—in particular, their anti-archimedeanism and their rejection of metaphysics. Attentiveness to this shared perspective is helpful in illuminating Dworkin’s disagreements with legal positivists. The more foundational divide, I argue, is between analytic legal philosophers who aim to provide an account of the metaphysics of law, and those, like Dworkin and the pragmatists, who reject such a project. I conclude by discussing the implications of Dworkin’s pragmatism for legal philosophy. I argue that it may lead to what some have recently called ‘eliminativism’, and engage with some new and prominent work on this current topic in legal philosophy.

One of the central arguments against redistribution through private law is its inefficiency due to the double-distortion phenomenon that accompanies it. I argue that in a subset of cases—in which there is uncertainty regarding the fairness principle that should be accepted in the realm of private law—it may be required to take into account redistributive considerations even if one generally accepts the double-distortion argument. I assert that while side-constraints may apply to direct redistribution, they do not apply to the role of redistributive considerations in determining which of the fairness principles should be accepted in the realm of private law. As a consequence, some distributive patterns could be achieved only by taking into account redistributive considerations in the realm of private law. I argue that redistributive considerations may tilt the scales toward accepting the fairness principle with the lower credence of being true.

Corporations are subject to criminal law and sentencing provisions in most legal jurisdictions in the world. This article considers how leading punishment theories apply to corporations. Corporations are, this article argues, group agents with the capacity to make moral judgments. It follows from this that retributivism, the dominant theory of punishment for moral agents, ought to be understood as a component justification of corporate punishment. However, a more fundamental problem arises in the attempt to apply punishment theory to corporations: punishment involves suffering, and corporations cannot suffer in the relevant sense. This means that corporations cannot be punished, though they can be harmed. I explore the possibilities of simply abandoning the word ‘punishment’ and creating sentences that are not at the same time punishments. This has the drawback of limiting what the criminal law can accomplish when it comes to addressing corporate malfeasance. I find that at least one practical consequence for corporate sentencing follows from this theoretical distinction: sentencers have more legitimate authority to raise upper limits for sentences for corporations than they do for individuals, though there are still principles that dictate the need for upper limits. Despite the impossibility of true punishment, the theories of retributivism, deterrence and rehabilitation are still relevant when sentencing corporations.

Our conversations about punishment have been constrained by the presumption that crimes ought to be punished. This presumption does not entail that crimes must be punished, but rather that punishment occurs as a natural response to wrongdoing instead of as a conventional creation. As a consequence, the challenges for punishment’s justification have been reduced to the problems of purpose, opportunity and form, leaving unaddressed the question of the authority of a certain polity to impose this form of treatment on a given individual. In order to present and criticize this presumption, the article traces its origins by revisiting the debate about the nature of punishment that took place during the emergence of liberal political philosophy. After evaluating the main arguments of this debate the article concludes by arguing that liberal theories of punishment should give up this presumption.

The division of powers between Federal and State governments and its interpretation by constitutional courts are fundamental elements of a federal system and of Federal-State power relations. The exclusivity or concurrence of powers, supremacy, and the problem of implied powers are some of the issues that appear in the constitutional law of most federations, and indeed stem from the very logic of a federal structure. However, the theoretical literature on federalism has not produced any satisfactory explanation of this logic. This article shows how W.N. Hohfeld’s fundamental legal conceptions may be used to analyse Federal-State relations, and how they are directly applicable in the context of ‘intergovernmental immunities’. The article then elaborates a theory of ‘tertiary’ legal relations, i.e., those arising when the two levels of government act in their regulatory capacity; these relations flow from the triangular nature of the relationship between the two governments and those subject to legislation. The correlations identified between Federal and State powers provide a conceptual framework within which different constitutional questions may be analysed. Adopting Hohfeld’s method of highlighting legal concepts in extracts from judicial decisions, the article uses examples from the case-law of several different federal countries.

A corrective justice account of a private law remedy attempts to the explain the remedy as giving back to the plaintiff something to which the plaintiff had a prior right that was breached by the defendant's receipt of that thing. It has proven challenging to explain how disgorgement for breach of contract is consistent with corrective justice. This remedy gives to the plaintiff any profit that a defendant received from a third party by breaching a contract with the plaintiff. In this paper, I critique two leading attempts to show how disgorgement for breach of contract is consistent with corrective justice. I argue that these attempts fail, and I suggest that a plausible corrective justice account of disgorgement should be based on something other than the nature of the contractual rights borne by a plaintiff. I then develop an alternative account based on an analogy between disgorgement for breach of contract and disgorgement for breach of fiduciary duty. To do so, I draw on recent scholarship on the consistency of disgorgement for breach of fiduciary with corrective justice and analyze the leading judicial decision on disgorgement for breach of contract by the UK House of Lords in Attorney General v. Blake. I argue that the fiduciary-based account can provide a plausible explanation for how disgorgement effectuates corrective justice by giving back to a plaintiff something to which he had an antecedent right that the defendant violated by profiting from a breach of contract.

Many argue that the problems encountered in and after today’s armed conflicts demonstrate the need for norms to govern the aftermath of war. Therefore, jus post bellum is welcomed as a ‘new’ branch of just war theory, complementing the theory’s two traditional branches—jus ad bellum and jus in bello. Jus post bellum is meant to function as moral compass, offering the needed guidance in the aftermath of war. While many agree on the importance of a third branch, an important question is often overlooked: After war, how should we distribute post war duties? This question deserves more attention, because uncertainty about specific duty bearers might lead to a situation in which no one will properly acquit these duties, and the critique could be raised that jus post bellum is in fact merely empty rhetoric. Two specific questions need answering. First: Which conditions can serve as the foundation for post war duties? Second: How to weigh these conditions when they clash or when they point to different actors? This article directly addresses the foundation for responsibility after war, using David Miller’s and H.L.A. Hart’s theories on responsibility, with an eye to developing a system for assigning post war duties in concrete situations. Only with such a system in place is there a realistic prospect that jus post bellum functions as a useful tool in the creation of a just and stable peace.

During his career, Ronald Dworkin wrote extensively on an impressive range of issues in moral, political, and legal philosophy, but, like many of his contemporaries, international law remained a topic of relative neglect. His most sustained work on international law is a posthumously published article, “A New Philosophy for International Law” (2013), which displays some familiar aspects of his views in general jurisprudence, in addition to some novel (though perhaps surprising) arguments as well. This paper argues that the moralized account of international law we might have expected is conspicuously missing from this posthumous article; with Dworkin advancing an argument based on a form of political realism instead.

Dworkin advances the view that judges decide legal cases according to constructive interpretation. The aim of constructive interpretation is to justify the coercion of the State. A trivial implication of this view is that officials and citizens will comply with the law because of the justification that has been advanced by judges in their exercise of constructive interpretation. Consequently, neither officials nor citizens comply with the law because they have been coerced or because they have been simply told to do so. But then, it seems that constructive interpretation cannot really provide any guidance since officials and citizens have been asked to accept the interpretation of the law that has been put forward by the judges since arguably, it is the best possible interpretation of what the law is in this particular case. However, why they ought to do so?

I will argue that the mistake of the theory of constructive interpretation lies in a misleading and implausible conception of action that believes that action is raw behavioural data and that therefore we need to ‘impose meaning’, ‘value’ or ‘purpose’ on them. I will defend a more plausible conception of action along the classical tradition that understands practice as originating in agency and deliberation. The outcome is that constructive interpretation and its conception of ‘imposing meaning’ on practice is a theoretical perspective that neglects and misunderstands action and practical reason.

In free speech theory ‘speech’ has to be defined as a special term of art. I argue that much free speech discourse comes with a tacit commitment to a ‘Subtractive Approach’ to defining speech. As an initial default, all communicative acts are assumed to qualify as speech, before exceptions are made to ‘subtract’ those acts that don’t warrant the special legal protections owed to ‘speech’. I examine how different versions of the Subtractive Approach operate, and criticize them in terms of their ability to yield a substantive definition of speech which covers all and only those forms of communicative action that—so our arguments for free speech indicate—really do merit special legal protection. In exploring alternative definitional approaches, I argue that what ultimately compromises definitional adequacy in this arena is a theoretical commitment to the significance of a single unified class of privileged communicative acts. I then propose an approach to free speech theory that eschews this theoretical commitment.

Familiar legal theories are epistemologically and politically stato-centric theories; they aim to rationalize intra- and inter-national legal systems. If this Westphalian approach were to be abandoned, then its replacement might be called Global Law, which invites theorizing that is not stato-centric. When that change happens, one would talk about a Global Turn in legal theory. Describing this turn is the aim of the paper.

This description is articulated around two ideas about the history and geography of the globalizing of Law, and three intuitions about the fate of legal theory itself once this Global Turn is taken. Namely, how theorizing Law from this perspective leads to focus on what is emerging and circulating, how the aesthetics of legal thinking shifts towards perspectivism and dissociation, and how more pluralistic, eclectic and pragmatic modes of reasoning and arguing about Law become dominant. What follows is neither a substantial or positivistic analysis, nor a prediction or a wish, but an attempt to point out tendencies which might be essential features of contemporary legal thinking.

Is it feasible and useful to articulate a general theory of transnational legality? In the book Transnational Legality: Stateless Law and International Arbitration, Thomas Schultz replies yes and argues, furthermore, that we need such a theory. In this Critical Notice I suggest otherwise. The overarching theme of my critique is a plea for thinking seriously on why we still insist on building general theories of legality. As I try to show, by engagement with Schultz’s main claims, those general theories face unsurmountable conceptual and normative problems. Here are some questions. Which theory of society do we endorse? Are transnational society and law different in nature from their domestic and regional counterparts? Why should we adopt a concept of complex legal system rather than focusing on the looser “community”? Should a concept of transnational legality be as inclusive as possible or narrowly-tailored? In virtue of which normative principles are we to make such a decision? How can we decide which elements from our state tradition are we to preserve and which ones are we to let go? Why devising a concept of legal system that does not see the connections to other legal and normative orders? How do Fuller’s legality criteria meet the expectations we attach to law? And whose expectations are we speaking of? Why undergoing all these headaches to conclude that after all legality is a matter of clarity and we are not provided any tools on how to proceed empirically? All things considered why is this sort of enterprise worth it?

In this article, I test predominant normative approaches to CAH against the notion’s deployment in law. Embarking on this cross-disciplinary project is needed because those the predominant literature fail to address (or were just articulated before) the waves of cases brought before international criminal courts throughout the last decade. I start by examining how international criminal courts have specified the core elements of the definition and then assess if and how the predominant philosophical literature can account for it. I then argue that this legal-empirical inquiry leads to both refining the structure and revisiting the relevant jurisdiction of CAH.

As far as structure is concerned, I distinguish a third but neglected element in the structure of CAH, which I identify as the preparatory conditions of the crimes (the ‘PCs’). In relying on Joseph Raz’ concept of authority, I argue that reconstructing the PCs help to specify what it is about states that those crimes deeply pervert. While the PCs strikingly mirror the systematic and pre-emptive role of the state, those patterns are established to massively persecute, terrorize and finally odiously attack. As far as jurisdiction is concerned, I infer that the agent of CAH and the state in which those crimes occur become ‘answerable’ to the normative community of responsible states (following Anthony Duff’s accountability model). By establishing international trials, this normative community does justice not only to the victims by proving the crimes but also to the perpetrators by treating them as responsible members.

Alon Harel’s Why Law Matters articulates a powerful and neglected approach for justifying legal institutions.  Pushing back against the instrumentalist approach that dominates contemporary legal theory, he argues that legal institutions are not simply tools for realizing extrinsic values, but are themselves constitutive features of a just society.  On this view, law is not an instrument for bringing about something that matters; rather, law itself matters and Harel elaborates a series of rich and insightful arguments to explain why.  In this brief review, I will sketch the connection between Harel’s non-instrumental methodology and his account of (1) the nature of rights, (2) the distinctiveness of state authority, and (3) the justificatory basis of constitutional governance.  I close with some critical comments about the non-instrumental justifications that Harel develops.