In his study of William Cobbett, Chesterton makes the paradoxical remark that poor Tom Paine really believed that the Age of Reason was just beginning when in fact it was just ending. For once, Chesterton is entirely wrong. The Age of Reason did begin at the close of the eighteenth century, and, like the nineteenth century, it has gone on ever since. The two preceding centuries had paved the way. Bacon gave it a definite start by holding out the dream of escaping, by the help of Intellect, from the “mera palpatio” (mere feeling our way) which had so far been our only mode of action in politics and all human affairs. The discoverers of the seventeenth century followed, with their shining proof of what Intellect could do to dissipate darkness and substitute certainty for mere groping, in our attempts to understand the world we live in. Astronomy, chemistry, physics were in turn illuminated by an almost dazzling light; and the very genuine triumphs of Intellect in its proper sphere predisposed the political and social thinkers of the eighteenth century (who believed that they too were intelligent) to have visions of a complete reign of Intellect in all departments of thought and activity.

Bentham's disastrous philosophy was a cold attempt to realize these visions. Hope was turned into apparent certitude by the hedonistic calculus and an intellectually enlightened Democracy, for which there need be no more groping in the dark. Auguste Comte carried the claim of Intellect farther. The realm of Science—with its proved motto of “Savoir, pour prévoir, pour pouvoir”—was definitely extended to all existence, including the whole life of human society. The intelligentzia of the British world, who had already proved their intelligence by swallowing as final truth a political economy which was much less than half true, embraced the new vision with enthusiasm. The Age of Reason had arrived.

It is a current fashion among economists of certain schools to spend a great deal of time and energy in attempting to ascertain the incidence of a given protective tariff upon some particular fraction of the total area at whose borders it is collected. This is not at all surprising, for economists are nothing if not obliging, and when they find a demand they are usually ready to supply it, just as lawyers when they find a case are usually ready to plead it; and there happens to be a keen demand at the moment for arguments which will support the claims of sections—Canadian provinces, Australian states, innumerable other sorts of local organisms within greater organisms—for better treatment by, or for separation from, their respective central authorities. Those economists who are not busy calculating this tariff incidence as felt by the village of Podunk or the Eastern Townships or the Peace River Valley are equally busy denouncing the methods employed by the other economists in their calculations. And I must say that I think the denouncers are doing the more useful job of the two.

The legislation of the past session of the Canadian Parliament is of particular interest for three reasons. Firstly, it was a pre-election session; secondly, it witnessed further “anti-depression” efforts; and thirdly it indicated the nature of Mr. Bennett's “reform” programme. The purpose of the present article is to review the legislation passed at this session of Parliament and to attempt a brief analysis of it. Some sixty-six public Acts were passed but not more than twenty will be mentioned by name here, and only a few of these twenty require any detailed discussion. The forty or more undiscussed Acts consist of Supply Bills, minor Acts, and minor amendments to existing statutes. Although it is difficult to draw a precise line between “reform” legislation and any other kind, the analysis here will be in terms of “reform” Acts and of other general Acts. This division allows some general discussion on a topical basis.

In his radio broadcasts in January, 1935, Mr. Bennett announced a programme of “reform” legislation including certain general proposals then outlined, and other legislation arising out of the recommendations shortly to be made by the Price Spreads Commission. The report of the Royal Commission was presented in April, 1935. The legislation originating from these two sources will be discussed under the general heading of “reform”.

First in the “reform list” come the Acts whose constitutionality—because their subject matter is assigned to provincial jurisdiction—depends upon the treaty-making power of the Dominion. The specific Acts so passed are the Employment and Social Insurance Act, the Minimum Wage Act, the Limitation of Hours of Work Act, and the Weekly Rest in Industrial Undertakings Act. The preambles of these Acts indicate clearly that their constitutionality is tied to the treaty-making powers of the Dominion government.

In the brief for the Province of Nova Scotia, presented to the provincial Royal Commission inquiring into Nova Scotia's disabilities under the Canadian federal system, Professor Rogers includes an estimate of the regional incidence of the customs duties. This is the first study of its kind to be made in Canada. It may be expected to give rise to a good deal of controversy on account of the complexity of the problem and because other provinces are already beginning to make parallel estimates which do not altogether agree with those made for Nova Scotia. Professor Rogers's discussion of the burden of the tariff was condensed into a single chapter, owing to the large amount of general historical and argumentative material which it was necessary to include. It is therefore desirable to quote from the unpublished minutes of evidence in order to do full justice to the reservations which Professor Regers made in putting forward his estimates. In Halifax on August 13, 1934, he said:

This report naturally falls into two separate and almost completely unrelated parts. The final chapter, “Proposals and Remedies”, is wholly admirable. For the judgments expressed in it the writer has the greatest respect. The first four chapters are another matter. They contain some useful information, a great deal of banal comment on facts already known, some statements which are plainly false, and others which, while not altogether wrong, are likely to give a wholly distorted impression of the facts which they are supposed to report. It is the purpose of this article to cite some of these statements, to give the facts which they are supposed to summarize, to show that these facts were brought to the attention of the Commission, and thus to prove that this condemnation is justified.

All of the statements to which exception is taken are, with one exception, concerned with the relative operating efficiency of the Canadian National and Canadian Pacific Railways. (The exception charges, by implication, the Canadian National with extravagance in branch-line construction costs.) The form of railway operating accounts has been worked out in the very greatest detail by the Interstate Commerce Commission of the United States. They are designed to show the costs of performing particular functions, maintenance of way and structures, maintenance of equipment, conducting transportation, etc. Every general rate case and many of the cases involving rates on particular commodities have turned on the question of costs, and on the significance of such factors as density of traffic and length of haul in causing variations in unit costs.

I have read Professor Jackman's very long criticism of my two articles with the greatest of interest and with some relief. In each I tried to say things which appeared badly in need of expression. If this is the worst criticism I must face, then I feel very much more confident of the soundness of my general position. I can find very little in the above article which is not answered in what I have already written. In the main my answer is to ask those readers who may be interested to refer to my previous articles, but there are one or two points which may be dealt with briefly below.

The main assumptions which seem to underlie Mr. Jackman's criticisms of my article in the University of Toronto Quarterly are: (a) that all political and sectional pressures upon railway management would instantly cease if the Canadian National lines were turned over to the Canadian Pacific for administration; (b) that the continuous decline in gross revenues from 1928 through 1933 is, relatively, a factor of minor importance, the more permanent factor of competition between the two railways completely overshadowing it; (c) that a fruitful discussion of the present situation of the railways can be carried on without reference to the general economic balance of the country. In the light of our past history the first of these assumptions rises to heights of optimism to which I dare not aspire. If the millenium is to arrive after the Canadian Pacific and Canadian National lines are operated as one, far be it from me to stand against it.

We form a new and distinct political organization for promoting by a joint endeavour, the national interest upon a particular principle on which we are agreed.” So ran the “Address of the Canadian National Association to the People of Canada” in January, 1874. The Canada First movement of the early 1870's represents the first intrusion of intellectuals as such into the discussion of Canadian public problems. Its story has been surrounded with a romantic halo by our Canadian bourgeois political historians, prone as they are to fall an easy prey to the rhetoric of nationalism wherever they run across it. But the moral which really emerges from a study of the young idealists of Canada First is the difficulty of defining “the national interest” as something which comprehends and transcends those particular group interests whose competition with one another has ever since Confederation formed the subject matter of our day-to-day federal politics.

There are here presented charts and tables of the prices of seven agricultural commodities, namely wheat, oats, barley, rye, eggs, butter, and cheese, which were assembled in the course of a study of comparative prices in Canada and the United States for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Notes on the major influences determining the general trends of these prices are given by way of preface. It is hoped that the price data will prove of interest and value to other investigators. No discussion of the difficulties of compiling and comparing such price series is included; these difficulties are, of course, very great.

The five years 1850-5 may be taken as the turning point of the long decline in prices after the Napoleonic Wars. From 1840 to 1850 this decline had been particularly severe, the price level in Great Britain falling 28 per cent, and in the United States, 15.5 per cent. From various scattered records we may be certain that a similar drastic decline was experienced in Canada. The panic of 1847, followed by abundant harvests in Great Britain and the United States sent down prices for wheat sharply: in England from 50s. 6d. per quarter in 1848 to 38s. 6d. in 1851; in Canada from $0.875 per bushel in 1848 to $0.737 in 1852; and in the United States, from $0.85 to $0.708 in the same period. Poor harvests in 1852 and 1853, and the outbreak of the Crimean War in March, 1854, sent up the price of all foodstuffs, both in Canada and the United States.

Between 1867 and 1934 over 136 constitutional cases have faced the Privy Council with the task of saying what the Canadian constitution means. Despite those cases, or because of them, it is still quite certain that unless legislation falls clearly within one of the specific heads of s. 91 or s. 92 of the B.N.A. Act, it is virtually impossible to guess where legislative authority over any question will finally be found to reside. In practice this depends not only on the Act and the cases but in part on the way the issue is raised and presented and in part on each judge's personal inclination towards federal or provincial authority. The further circumstances that the form of the proposed reform legislation has not been finally settled at the time of writing increases the difficulty of even describing fairly the constitutional issues raised by the government's social legislation which is the subject of this paper. It is like guessing what attitude the Privy Council in England will take to a series of constitutional earthquakes that have not yet happened.

In all this uncertainty one thing at least appeared to be certain. This was that everything proposed in Mr. Bennett's policy of social reform was beyond the powers of the Dominion. Out of all those who considered the question before the current session of Parliament, only four authorities seem to have thought it possible that the Dominion might have jurisdiction. The situation was recognized by Mr. Bennett last August when he wrote to the provinces indicating his intention to call a Conference to discuss, among other matters, the question: “Are the provinces prepared to surrender their exclusive jurisdiction over legislation dealing with such social problems as old-age pensions, unemployment and social insurance, hours and conditions for work, minimum wages, etc., to the Dominion Parliament? If so, on what terms and conditions?” But the provinces' cool response to this letter led to the proposed Conference being abandoned, and in January Mr. Bennett in five radio speeches broadcast the policy of reform. In introducing the Employment and Social Insurance Act on January 29, 1935, Mr. Bennett set under way the coach and four he was starting to drive through current conceptions of the constitution, if not through the constitution itself. It might almost seem that his reading of the speeches of the Fathers of Confederation led him into the error of thinking that the constitution was what they intended it to be.

The great economic depression from which we still suffer to-day has dealt a severe blow to individualistic thought, and a social or collectivist tendency has set in. The individual producer is no longer left to decide for himself what he wants to export and how much and at what price. Restrictions are put upon him under the Natural Products Marketing Act with regard to quantity, quality, and prices, to which he must submit in the interests of industry as a whole, although it may be to his own individual disadvantage. These restrictions originate as a rule from a voluntary agreement among producers. As soon, however, as the state recognizes the importance of such a regulation in the interests of national economy, it enforces it by a law, so as to protect the producing community and the general public against such producers as are not sufficiently farsighted to fall into line of their own accord. But the state must go only so far in exercising this influence and control over production and commerce as is necessary in the interests of the community, without limiting too much the private initiative which is essential for commercial success. Those aims are by no means incompatible, but are complementary to one another, like authority and freedom in the purely political sphere.