“Health and Human Rights,” edited by Doris Schroeder, welcomes contributions on all areas outlined below. Submitted papers are peer-reviewed (short discussion papers will be reviewed by at least one, full papers by at least two reviewers). To submit a paper or to discuss suitable topics, please e-mail Doris Schroeder at dschroeder@uclan.ac.uk.I thank Professor Solomon Benatar (Center for Bioethics, University of Cape Town), Dr. Walter Robinson (Department of Social Medicine, Division of Ethics, Harvard Medical School, Boston), Dr. Carolyn Hayes (Brigham and Women's Hospital, Harvard Medical School, Boston), and Professor Patricia Illingworth (Department of Philosophy, Northeastern University, Boston) for reading the manuscript and for their valuable critical comments.

These CQ Sources were compiled by Bette Anton.

These CQ Sources were compiled by Bette Anton.

These CQ Sources were compiled by Bette Anton.

“Dissecting Bioethics,” edited by Tuija Takala and Matti Häyry, welcomes contributions on the conceptual and theoretical dimensions of bioethics.

The section is dedicated to the idea that words defined by bioethicists and others should not be allowed to imprison people's actual concerns, emotions, and thoughts. Papers that expose the many meanings of a concept, describe the different readings of a moral doctrine, or provide an alternative angle to seemingly self-evident issues are therefore particularly appreciated.

The themes covered in the section so far include dignity, naturalness, public interest, community, disability, autonomy, parity of reasoning, symbolic appeals, and toleration.

All submitted papers are peer reviewed. To submit a paper or to discuss a suitable topic, contact Tuija Takala at tuija.takala@helsinki.fi.I would like to thank research seminar members at the Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics at the University of Melbourne, Australia, Armin Schmidt, Julie Lucas, and Tuija Takala for their helpful comments.

It is still remarkably difficult for public health officials charged with developing and implementing pandemic influenza preparedness plans at the community level—where care is delivered—to obtain clear, concrete, and consistent guidance on how to construct plans that are both ethical and actionable. As of mid-2007, most of the federal and state pandemic plans filed with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, describing how public health officials will coordinate public agencies and private entities in the event of an outbreak, failed to include ethical guidance for first responders responsible for providing essential services and making fair decisions during a public health emergency.

“Dissecting Bioethics,” edited by Tuija Takala and Matti Häyry, welcomes contributions on the conceptual and theoretical dimensions of bioethics.

The section is dedicated to the idea that words defined by bioethicists and others should not be allowed to imprison people's actual concerns, emotions, and thoughts. Papers that expose the many meanings of a concept, describe the different readings of a moral doctrine, or provide an alternative angle to seemingly self-evident issues are therefore particularly appreciated.

The themes covered in the section so far include dignity, naturalness, public interest, community, disability, autonomy, parity of reasoning, symbolic appeals, and toleration.

All submitted papers are peer reviewed. To submit a paper or to discuss a suitable topic, contact Tuija Takala at tuija.takala@helsinki.fi.

“Dissecting Bioethics,” edited by Tuija Takala and Matti Häyry, welcomes contributions on the conceptual and theoretical dimensions of bioethics.

The section is dedicated to the idea that words defined by bioethicists and others should not be allowed to imprison people's actual concerns, emotions, and thoughts. Papers that expose the many meanings of a concept, describe the different readings of a moral doctrine, or provide an alternative angle to seemingly self-evident issues are therefore particularly appreciated.

The themes covered in the section so far include dignity, naturalness, public interest, community, disability, autonomy, parity of reasoning, symbolic appeals, and toleration.

All submitted papers are peer reviewed. To submit a paper or to discuss a suitable topic, contact Tuija Takala at tuija.takala@helsinki.fi.

The Principle of Double Effect has been with us since the Middle Ages and has sanctified actions that might otherwise be viewed as morally wrong. What I wish to show in this brief perspective is that an overlooked element in the discussions of this principle raises a serious question about its applicability.

An evaluation of mental capacity is critical to a clinician's judgment about whether or not persons can make medical treatment decisions on their own behalf, and uncertainty about their ability to meaningfully participate in that process is one of the more common reasons an ethics consult is requested. The care of decisionally incapable patients—particularly those who lack advance care documents and no living relative who can speak for them—presents a quandary to healthcare personnel attempting to plan care in their best interest, especially when options are multiple but none are ideal. These situations can be further complicated if involving a patient with a dual diagnosis of mental retardation and mental illness living in a community group home.I acknowledge the support of Mark G. Kuczewski, Professor of Medical Ethics and Director of the Neiswanger Institute for Bioethics & Health Policy Stritch School of Medicine, Loyola University of Chicago, for his guidance and support in the preparation of this manuscript.

In a recent set of papers, Aaron Spital has proposed conscription or routine recovery of cadaveric organs without consent as a way of ameliorating the severe shortage of organs for transplantation. Under the existing consent requirement, organs can be taken from the bodies of the deceased if they expressed a wish and intention to donate while alive. Organs may also be taken when families or other substitute decisionmakers decide on behalf of the deceased to allow organ procurement for the purpose of transplantation. When patients or families do not consent to organ procurement, many transplantable organs are lost. This is a tragic yet avoidable situation. The dead are beyond any benefit or harm, and their organs could be used to prevent harm by saving and improving the lives of many people suffering and dying from end-stage organ failure.

Many transplant programs are willing to provide a contrived medical excuse for potential organ donors who wish to say no but feel unable to do so publicly. The availability of these excuses is thought to facilitate freedom of choice—a necessary component of informed consent—by allowing donor candidates to bow out gracefully. In a recent editorial, Simmerling et al. discuss possible harms raised by this practice and note that there is no empirical evidence to support it. Given the importance of this issue for transplant centers that accept living donors, a review of the authors' concerns is in order. After careful consideration, I conclude that although some of their points are valid, much of their analysis is flawed.

Walter Glannon argues that our proposal for routine recovery (also known as conscription) of transplantable cadaveric organs is unacceptable “even if the consequence of [continuing to require consent] would be fewer organs for transplantation and fewer lives saved.” After carefully reviewing his counterarguments, we conclude that, although some of them have merit, none are sufficiently strong to warrant abandoning this plan. Below we respond to each of Glannon's concerns.

In his response to our treatment of the medical excuse, Spital claims that we offer a flawed analysis of the practice of offering excuses to potential living organ donors. Spital's criticisms help sharpen our position and more clearly lay out the issues. In what follows, we address each of his concerns and replies and clarify our earlier analysis.The authors acknowledge Matthew Devitt for his contributions to this reply.

Readers are invited to contact Greg S. Loeben in writing at Midwestern University, Glendale Campus, Bioethics Program, 19555 N. 59th Ave., Glendale, AZ 85308 regarding books they would like to see reviewed or books they are interested in reviewing.

This section is meant to be a mutual effort. If you find an article you think should be abstracted in this section, do not be bashful—submit it for consideration to feature editor Kenneth V. Iserson care of CQ. If you do not like the editorial comments, this will give you an opportunity to respond in the letters section. Your input is desired and anticipated.

Bioethics and Armed Conflict: Moral Dilemmas of Medicine and War, by Michael Gross. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2006. 384 pp. $26.00.

To the uninitiated, the phrase “military medical ethics” probably signals triage (methods for sorting casualties) and the neutrality of medical personnel in battle zones. There is, however, a lot more to it than that, as this excellent book by Michael L. Gross shows. Gross is a professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Haifa and has published extensively in bioethics and the ethics of war.

This section is meant to be a mutual effort. If you find an article you think should be abstracted in this section, do not be bashful—submit it for consideration to feature editor Kenneth V. Iserson care of CQ. If you do not like the editorial comments, this will give you an opportunity to respond in the letters section. Your input is desired and anticipated.

This section is meant to be a mutual effort. If you find an article you think should be abstracted in this section, do not be bashful—submit it for consideration to feature editor Kenneth V. Iserson care of CQ. If you do not like the editorial comments, this will give you an opportunity to respond in the letters section. Your input is desired and anticipated.