This article examines privacy threats arising from the use of data mining by private Australian health insurance companies. Qualitative interviews were conducted with key experts, and Australian governmental and nongovernmental websites relevant to private health insurance were searched. Using Rationale, a critical thinking tool, the themes and considerations elicited through this empirical approach were developed into an argument about the use of data mining by private health insurance companies. The argument is followed by an ethical analysis guided by classical philosophical theories—utilitarianism, Mill’s harm principle, Kant’s deontological theory, and Helen Nissenbaum’s contextual integrity framework. Both the argument and the ethical analysis find the use of data mining by private health insurance companies in Australia to be unethical. Although private health insurance companies in Australia cannot use data mining for risk rating to cherry-pick customers and cannot use customers’ personal information for unintended purposes, this article nonetheless concludes that the secondary use of customers’ personal information and the absence of customers’ consent still suggest that the use of data mining by private health insurance companies is wrong.

This article deals with the question as to what makes bioethics a critical discipline. It considers different senses of criticism and evaluates their strengths and weaknesses. A primary method in bioethics as a philosophical discipline is critical thinking, which implies critical evaluation of concepts, positions, and arguments. It is argued that the type of analytical criticism that restricts its critical role to critical thinking of this type often suffers from other intellectual flaws. Three examples are taken to demonstrate this: premature criticism, uncritical self-understanding of theoretical assumptions, and narrow framing of bioethical issues. Such flaws can lead both to unfair treatment of authors and to uncritical discussion of topics. In this context, the article makes use of Häyry’s analysis of different rationalities in bioethical approaches and argues for the need to recognize the importance of communicative rationality for critical bioethics. A radically different critical approach in bioethics, rooted in social theory, focuses on analyses of power relations neglected in mainstream critical thinking. It is argued that, although this kind of criticism provides an important alternative in bioethics, it suffers from other shortcomings that are rooted in a lack of normative dimensions. In order to complement these approaches and counter their shortcomings, there is a need for a bioethics enlightened by critical hermeneutics. Such hermeneutic bioethics is aware of its own assumptions, places the issues in a wide context, and reflects critically on the power relations that stand in the way of understanding them. Moreover, such an approach is dialogical, which provides both a critical exercise of speech and a normative dimension implied in the free exchange of reasons and arguments. This discussion is framed by Hedgecoe’s argument that critical bioethics needs four elements: to be empirically rooted, theory challenging, reflexive, and politely skeptical.

In our book Unfit for the Future and a number of papers, we have argued that there is a dangerous mismatch between, on the one hand, the tremendous power of scientific technology, which has created societies with millions of citizens, and, on the other hand, our moral capacities, which have been shaped by evolution for life in small, close-knit societies with primitive technology. To overcome this mismatch before it results in the downfall of human civilization, human beings stand in acute need of moral enhancement, not only by traditional means but also by biomedical means, should this turn out to be possible. After summarizing this argument, we respond to two critics, Michael Hauskeller and Robert Sparrow.

In this article, we present three necessary conditions for morally responsible animal research that we believe people on both sides of this debate can accept. Specifically, we argue that, even if human beings have higher moral status than nonhuman animals, animal research is morally permissible only if it satisfies (1) an expectation of sufficient net benefit, (2) a worthwhile-life condition, and (3) a no-unnecessary-harm/qualified-basic-needs condition. We then claim that, whether or not these necessary conditions are jointly sufficient for justified animal research, they are relatively demanding, with the consequence that many animal experiments may fail to satisfy them.

The end of the last century was a particularly vibrant period for feminist bioethics. Almost two decades on, we reflect on the legacy of the feminist critique of bioethics and investigate the extent to which it has been successful and what requires more attention yet. We do this by examining the past, present, and future: we draw out three feminist concerns that emerged in this period—abstraction, individualism, and power—and consider three feminist responses—relationality, particularity, and justice—and we finish with some thoughts about the future.

The control of risk and harm in human research often calls for the establishment of upper limits of risk of pain, suffering, and distress that investigators must not exceed. Such upper limits are uncommon in animal research, in which limits of acceptability are usually left to the discretion of individual investigators, institutions, national inspectors, or ethics review committees. We here assess the merits of the European Directive 2010/63/EU on the Protection of Animals Used for Scientific Purposes and its accompanying instruments, such as guides and examples. These documents present a body of legislation governing animal research in the European Union. We argue that the directive supplies a promising approach, but one in need of revision. We interpret the directive’s general conception of upper limits and show its promise for the establishment of high-quality policies. We provide a moral rationale for such policies, address the problem of justified exceptions to established upper limits, and show when causing harm is and is not wrongful. We conclude that if the standards we propose for improving the directive are not realized in the review of research protocols, loose and prejudicial risk-benefit assessments may continue to be deemed sufficient to justify morally questionable research. However, a revised EU directive and accompanying instruments could have a substantial influence on the ethics of animal research worldwide, especially in the development of morally sound legal frameworks.

The consequences of using publicly available social media applications specifically for healthcare purposes are largely unaddressed in current research. Where they are addressed, the focus is primarily on issues of privacy and data protection. We therefore use a case study of the first live Twitter heart operation in the Netherlands, in combination with recent literature on social media from other academic fields, to identify a wide range of ethical issues related to using social media for health-related purposes. Although this case reflects an innovative approach to public education and patient centeredness, it also illustrates the need for institutions to weigh the various aspects of use and to develop a plan to deal with these on a per case basis. Given the continual development of technologies, researchers may not yet be able to oversee and anticipate all of the potential implications. Further development of a research agenda on this topic, the promotion of guidelines and policies, and the publication of case studies that reveal the granularity of individual situations will therefore help raise awareness and assist physicians and institutions in using social media to support existing care services.

Several lines of reasoning have been employed to both approve and disapprove two of Nicholas Agar’s positions: his argument that the creation of postpersons (based on moral status enhancement) is imaginable and possible and his inductive argument disfavoring the creation of postpersons. This article discusses a number of these lines of reasoning, arguing that

1. 1) The creation of postpersons is imaginable if they are envisaged as morally enhanced beings.

2. 2) The creation of postpersons is justified, subject to the condition that we create morally enhanced postpersons.

The reason given for the first point is that it is possible to imagine postpersons who are morally enhanced, provided that we consider moral enhancement as an augmented inclination to act in line with how we believe we ought to act. There are two reasons offered for the second point: the first indicates probability, and the second offers proof. That is, if we assume that the higher moral status of postpersons implies their enhanced morality, we can conclude, inductively, that (morally enhanced) postpersons will not be inclined to annihilate mere persons. For if mere persons have moral inhibitions against obliterating some species of a lower moral status than their own, morally enhanced postpersons will be even less likely to do the same to mere persons. In fact, they might consider it their moral duty to preserve those beings who enabled them to come into existence. Moreover, even if morally enhanced postpersons decide to annihilate mere persons, we can conclude, deductively, that such a decision is by necessity a morally superior stance to the wish of mere persons (i.e., morally unenhanced persons) to continue to exist.

One debate in contemporary bioethics centers on whether the development of cognitive enhancement technologies (CETs) will hasten the need for moral enhancement. In this article we provide a new argument in favor of pursuing these enhancement technologies together. The widespread availability of CETs will likely increase population-level cognitive diversity. Different people will choose to enhance different aspects of their cognition, and some won’t enhance themselves at all. Although this has the potential to be beneficial for society, it could also result in harms as people become more different from one another. Aspects of our moral psychology make it difficult for people to cooperate and coordinate actions with those who are very different from themselves. These moral failings could be targeted by moral enhancement technologies, which may improve cooperation among individuals. Moral enhancement technologies will therefore help society maximize the benefits, and reduce the costs, associated with widespread access to cognitive enhancements.

Questions have been raised regarding participants’ safety and comfort when participating in e-health education programs. Although researchers have begun to explore this issue in the United States, little research has been conducted in low- and middle-income countries, where Internet and social media use is rapidly growing. This article reports on a quantitative study with Peruvian men who have sex with men who had previously participated in the Harnessing Online Peer Education (HOPE) program, a Facebook-based HIV education program. The survey assessed participants’ ethics-relevant perspectives during recruitment, consent, intervention, and follow-up.

In this article, postmodernism is presented as posing a challenge to the role of philosophy within bioethics. It is argued that any attempt to develop a postmodern bioethics must respond to arguments concerning power, relational responsibility, and violence. Contemporary work on the topic of relational autonomy and naturalized bioethics is interpreted as engaging with the postmodern challenge. This article proposes that the role of philosophy in bioethics should be not to provide moral guidance but rather to adopt a critical approach to the possible consequences of privileging any position or understanding over others.

This article discusses the use of animals for the safety testing of chemicals, including pharmaceuticals, household products, pesticides, and industrial chemicals. It reviews changes in safety testing technology and what those changes mean from the perspective of industrial innovation, public policy and public health, economics, and ethics. It concludes that the continuing use of animals for chemical safety testing should end within the decade as cheaper, quicker, and more predictive technologies are developed and applied.

The problems of poor or biased information and of misleading health and well-being advice on the Internet have been extensively documented. The recent decision by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers to authorize a large number of new generic, top-level domains, including some with a clear connection to health or healthcare, presents an opportunity to bring some order to this chaotic situation. In the case of the most general of these domains, “.health,” experts advance a compelling argument in favor of some degree of content oversight and control. On the opposing side, advocates for an unrestricted and open Internet counter that this taken-for-granted principle is too valuable to be compromised, and that, once lost, it may never be recovered. We advance and provide evidence for a proposal to bridge the credibility gap in online health information by providing provenance information for websites in the .health domain.

Current regulations and widely accepted principles for animal research focus on minimizing the burdens and harms of research on animals. However, these regulations and principles do not consider a possible role for assent or dissent in animal research. Should investigators solicit the assent or respect the dissent of animals who are used in research, and, if so, under what circumstances? In this article we pursue this question and outline the relevant issues that bear on the answer. We distinguish two general reasons for respecting the preferences of research participants regarding whether they participate in research—welfare-based reasons and agency-based reasons. We argue that there are welfare-based reasons for researchers to consider, and in some cases respect, the dissent of all animals used in research. After providing a brief account of the nature of agency-based reasons, we argue that there is good reason to think that these reasons apply to at least chimpanzees. We argue that there is an additional reason for researchers to respect the dissent—and, when possible, solicit the assent—of any animal to whom agency-based reasons apply.

This article examines the relationship between philosophy and culture in global bioethics. First, it studies what is meant by the term “global” in global bioethics. Second, the author introduces four different types, or recognizable trends, in philosophical inquiry in bioethics today. The main argument is that, in order to make better sense of the complexity of the ethical questions and challenges we face today across the globe, we need to embrace the universal nature of self-critical and analytical philosophical analysis and argumentation, rather than using seemingly philosophical approaches to give unjustified normative emphasis on different cultural approaches to bioethics.

This article examines the concept of moral enhancement from two different perspectives. The first is a bottom-up approach, which aims at identifying fundamental moral traits and subcapacities as targets for enhancement. The second perspective, a top-down approach, is holistic and in line with virtue ethics. Both perspectives lead to the observation that alterations of material and social conditions are the most reliable means to improve prosocial behavior overall.

Moral enhancement as a preventive measure invokes Gnostic narratives on the allegedly fallen status of human nature, its search for salvation, and the dependence of the laity on heteronomous salvific interventions. The allure of the preventive kind of enhancement is attributable to its religious hues.

Owing to the absence of clarity regarding moral enhancement and of metrics to evaluate its progress, humanity is at risk of prioritizing unclear and unsubstantiated measures of preventive diminishment at the expense of celebrating human capacities and joys.

Pharmaceuticals or other emerging technologies could be used to enhance (or diminish) feelings of lust, attraction, and attachment in adult romantic partnerships. Although such interventions could conceivably be used to promote individual (and couple) well-being, their widespread development and/or adoption might lead to the ‘medicalization’ of human love and heartache—for some, a source of a serious concern. In this essay, we argue that the medicalization of love need not necessarily be problematic, on balance, but could plausibly be expected to have either good or bad consequences depending upon how it unfolds. By anticipating some of the specific ways in which these technologies could yield unwanted outcomes, bioethicists and others can help to direct the course of love’s medicalization—should it happen to occur—more toward the ‘good’ side than the ‘bad.’

This article analyzes a neat conjuring trick employed in bioethics, that is, the immediate conversion of a philosophical conclusion into a policy prescription, and compares it to the “grand leap of the whale up the Niagara Falls” mentioned by Benjamin Franklin. It is shown that there is no simple and easy way to achieve the conversion, by considering arguments falling under four headings: (1) reasonable disagreement about values and theories, (2) general jurisprudential arguments, (3) the differences between policymaking and philosophy, and (4) the messy world of implementation. The particular issue used to illustrate the difficulties in moving from philosophical conclusion to policy description is infanticide of healthy infants, but the analysis is general, and the conclusion that the immediate move to policy is illegitimate is quite general.

Some of the debates around the concept of moral enhancement have focused on whether the improvement of a single trait, such as empathy or intelligence, would be a good in general, or in all circumstances. All virtue theories, however, both secular and religious, have articulated multiple virtues that temper and inform one another in the development of a mature moral character. The project of moral enhancement requires a reengagement with virtue ethics and contemporary moral psychology to develop an empirically grounded model of the virtues and a fuller model of character development. Each of these virtues may be manipulable with electronic, psychopharmaceutical, and genetic interventions. A set of interdependent virtues is proposed, along with some of the research pointing to ways such virtues could be enhanced.