A central tenet to much ethical argument within medical law is patient autonomy.1 Although we have seen a welcome move away from a system governed by largely unchecked paternalism, there is not universal agreement on the direction in which medical law should advance.2 Competing concerns for greater welfare and individual freedom, complicated by an overarching commitment to value-pluralism, make this a tricky area of policy-development.3 Furthermore, there are distinct understandings of, and justifications for, different conceptions of autonomy.4 In this paper, we argue that in response to these issues, there has been a failure by the courts properly to distinguish political concepts of liberty and moral concepts of autonomy.

This article is concerned with the extent of a fiduciary's obligation to account for profits that have been made in breach of fiduciary duty. In particular, it responds to suggestions made recently by some senior judges that the courts ought to have a wide-ranging discretion to alter the degree to which a fiduciary must account for profits. It is well-settled that a fiduciary must account for profits that have been generated from his fiduciary position or in circumstances involving a conflict between the fiduciary's duty and his interest. The fiduciary need not account if the profit or conflict was properly authorised, in which case there was no breach of fiduciary duty. But in the absence of such authorisation, the fiduciary must account for all of the profit that has been made in breach of fiduciary duty, other than insofar as the court grants an equitable allowance to the fiduciary for work done in generating that profit. The question addressed here is whether the court ought to have a wider discretion to award an account of only part of the profits that a fiduciary has made in breach of fiduciary duty, leaving the remainder of the profits in the fiduciary's hands?

The 1925 property statutes, particularly the Settled Land Act 1925 and the original sections 30 to 36 Law of Property Act 1925, were premised on a fairly narrow view of the prevalence and purpose of co-owned land. Successive interests either fell within the awkward provisions of the Settled Land Act 1925 or were organised under a trust for sale within the ambit of the Law of Property Act 1925. Concurrent co-ownership could exist, also under a trust for sale, but the Law of Property Act 1925 was premised on the assumption that such trusts would be expressly created, with readily identifiable beneficiaries, holding in defined shares, often for investment purposes and primarily in respect of larger land holdings. That is why the original scheme was a trust for sale, why sections 34 and 36 Law of Property Act 1925 appear not to contemplate the implied trust of land at all,1 why interests behind trusts originally were not regarded as proprietary,2 why statutory overreaching is so powerful and why sections 2 and 27 Law of Property Act 1925 stipulate a requirement of at least two trustees or a trust corporation before overreaching can occur.3 Concurrent co-ownership was, essentially, a financial not a residential matter, and the ready conversion of land to liquid asset was regular and expected. The position today is virtually the reverse, with concurrent co-ownership being the normal way by which the family home4 is owned and with the expectation that it will be retained as that home. Realisation of its capital value is intended to be postponed until the family's needs have changed.

This article is about the implication of terms into contracts based upon the presumed intention of the parties. It is particularly concerned with the decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Attorney General of Belize v. Belize Telecom Limited,1 a number of recent Court of Appeal decisions thereafter, and whether there has been any change in the law. Before getting to Belize, it is necessary to consider, as briefly as possible, what went before.

Historically, English and Irish Law were both distinctly protective of marriage (still understood as an exclusively heterosexual institution)1 as compared to other forms of adult relationship. In the 1950 English case of Gammans v. Ekins, it was famously deemed an “abuse of the English language” to say that an unmarried couple “masquerading” as husband and wife were members of the same family.2 In its Constitution, meanwhile, the Irish state “pledges itself to guard with special care the institution of Marriage, on which the Family is founded, and to protect it against attack”.3 The powerfulness of this “pledge” can be seen from the fact that divorce was not possible in Ireland until a 1995 referendum resulted in a constitutional amendment.4

In 1951, an argument that schools should be charitable only if they offer free or reduced tuition was dismissed by the court as a “startling proposition”.1 Yet, in 2010, an independent school was assured of its charitable status only when it agreed to offer means-tested bursaries.2 So did the law change with the Charities Act 2006 (‘the Act’)?