Lieutenant-General Sir John Bagot Glubb ends his work on The Great Arab Conquests with the following words:

“The relations between Christianity and Islam today justify a brief comment. As Muhammad himself declared, Judaism, Christianity and Islam are three related religions. If we consider them alone, their differences may appear profound, but when compared to Hinduism, Buddhism or Communist atheism, they appear by contrast closely connected with one another. Yet many people regard Christianity and Islam as the great rival religions. This illusion takes its origin, I believe, from political rather than religious causes.

“As our narrative has shown, the first Arab conquerors regarded Byzantium as their principal enemy. In the subsequent Arab conquests of North Africa and Spain, in the Crusades, in the invasion of the Balkans by the Turks, and in their long hostilities with Czarist Russia, nearly all Muslim wars have been directed against Christians. Conflicts between Hindus and Muslims in India have been on an altogether smaller scale and Muslims have scarcely ever been involved in hostilities against Jews except in the last forty years in Palestine.

“This long-standing rivalry between Christians and Muslims has been due to political and geographical accident rather than to basic religious differences. Now that materialist atheism is challenging all spiritual values, the two religions might well make common cause against those who deny the existence of God altogether. There is, I believe, an immense field in which the two could co-operate.

“The Arabic-speaking world, after four centuries of obscurity, is once again playing its part in history.

“It seems to me…... that, as with a criminal offence, so in the case of cruelty there must be an element of mens rea.” Thus spoke Willmer L.J. in the recent case of Williams v. Williams, raising thereby a fundamental problem in the law of matrimonial cruelty, and providing incidentally an invitation to attempt an investigation of this difficult (and unsavoury) subject. It is proposed there-fore (I) to inquire in general what intention, if any, is needed in order to be cruel to one's spouse; (II) to ask in particular what is the relevance of mental disorder or illness suffered by an allegedly cruel spouse; and (III) to explore some lines along which this branch of the law might advantageously be reformed.

There are but a few days—of who shall say what importance—between the Julian and Gregorian calendars, considered as schemes for the interpretation of recurrent movements in our solar system. And yet, from the point of view of each, the other seems somewhat out in respect of the characterisation of nearly every year, month, week and individual day. The gap between the legal theories of John Austin and Professor Hart—between their models of the legal universe—is somewhat more than this. Its demonstration provides the foundation for Professor Hart's new book. But there may here be some analogy to what divides the concept of law, as elucidated by Professor Hart in terms of rules, from the concept of law as a system of action constructed by the writer in earlier numbers of this Journal. If Professor Hart now reveals himself as conceptual pragmatist as well as linguistic philosopher the writer's gratitude to Professor Hart in the latter capacity is only tinged with regret that he does not display greater boldness in the former.

In an earlier article it was suggested that fiduciary relationships could be classified under four heads, in accordance with the different principles which govern each class. It would, of course, be pedantic to insist that these rules, necessarily among the most flexible in equity, should be regarded as rigidly codified and invariably applied strictly and to the letter; but for some purposes it is important to keep the differences between the categories clearly in mind. This is particularly the case with the classes which were referred to in the previous article as categories I and II: in the first group the beneficiary has the advantage of all the proprietary equitable remedies against a trustee, and the fiduciary has comparable duties, while in the second, the beneficiary's remedies (apart from the remission of contracts) are based on equitable obligation only. We shall now examine in more detail the principles governing fiduciaries in these two categories.