The doctrine of “fundamental term” has been recently invoked in yet another case concerned with the hire-purchase of a car in order to enable the borrower to obtain damages despite the presence in the agreement of an exemption clause. In this case, Charterhouse Credit Co., Ltd. v. Tolly a new point of law was decided. It may be said to be established law that a party to a contract who commits a breach of a fundamental term cannot escape liability for such breach by reliance on an exemption clause. But is the position altered if the innocent party, notwith-standing discovery of the breach, acts in a manner consistent with the continuance of some contractual relations? In the Charterhouse case the borrower of the car on discovering the breach, instead of returning the car, retained it, and indeed entered into negotiations about the time of payment of instalments.

It is only fitting that the issue of the Cambridge Law Journal that marks the eightieth birthday of its former Treasurer should contain an article on legal history, and the recent case of Letang v. Cooper provides an occasion for returning to the forms of action on which Professor Hollond lectured to generations of Cambridge undergraduates. It is not, however, the purpose of this article to consider Letang v. Cooper itself, but to attempt to trace the evolution of the rule in Williams v. Holland (1833) and thereby to answer the question why plaintiffs in running-down actions preferred to sue in case rather than trespass. Winfield and Goodhart asked themselves this question, but their answer was directed primarily to the period after 1833, by which time the rule had contributed very substantially to the “handsome balance in favour of an action for negligence as against one for trespass.”

On March 7, 1958, the Brighton watch committee decided to dismiss their chief constable; on March 14, 1963, the House of Lords ruled that this decision was ineffective. Among the conclusions of the majority of the House was that natural justice required a hearing to have been given to the chief constable before his dismissal and that in the absence of a hearing the dismissal was invalid. In attempting an assessment of Ridge v. Baldwin, which concerns what has since been called “a doctrine of the highest constitutional value,” it seems necessary (a) to examine the dispute against its administrative background, in particular the intertwining pattern of statute and ministerial regulation governing police dismissal; (b) to consider in detail a number of difficult points of principle raised by the arguments on natural justice; and (c) to set the decision within the broad context of the development of administrative law. It will be suggested that although the House of Lords may have restored to favour a once classic principle of interpretation, this in itself helps but little in the search for a fruitful relationship between the courts and the administration. The interpretation of statutory powers may well be important in particular situations, but the judge's ability to do justice in this way necessarily depends on the words of the statute he is interpreting and thus may stand or fall on the vagaries of legislative history. Had Mr. Ridge been the chief constable of a county force and not of a county borough force, although he could still have invoked the Police Regulations, the rules of natural justice would almost certainly have helped him but little—simply because the County Police Act, 1839, is phrased differently from the Municipal Corporations Act, 1882.

The value of hire-purchase transactions has remained at a fairly steady level during the past few years, and it would be pleasant to think that the law affecting them has reached a comparable stage of maturity and stability. This is unfortunately not the case. Instead, the number of legal problems continues to multiply and some aspects of the law of hire-purchase have reached a state of complexity which must baffle even the most expert lawyer. Of these none is more confusing than the law relating to the so-called “minimum payment clause.”

Is fitness for purpose a fundamental term in hire-purchase contracts?

The need for clarification of concepts and propositions in the area of the position of exemption clauses has already been demonstrated by the discussion of the difference between “fundamental terms” and “fundamental breach”. In the Charterhouse case we have seen one variety of judicial approach arising from this difference. But there is a further conflict of judicial opinion in the case which calls for further clarification of doctrine. The three members of the Court of Appeal agree that apart from the limited provision of the Hire-Purchase Acts there is to be implied in all hire-purchase agreements a fitness for purpose term. But while Ormerod L.J. describes such a term as fundamental, Upjohn L.J. denies that it possesses this character. Donovan L.J. is probably in accord with the view of Upjohn L.J. though he makes no explicit statement. Upjohn L.J. envisages hire-purchase agreements as containing a fundamental “correspondence with description” term in addition to a non-fundamental “fitness for purpose” term. These judicial opinions are derived from the precedents. These are few in number and can be examined separately. This examination, it is submitted, will show that much of the conflict is terminological and that the subject is in need of further theoretical analysis.

Within the nice, sharp and narrow quillets of the law in Temple Hall where the lawyers' argument had been loud and long over a pedigree question between Somerset and Plantagenet, as within academic bowers, within the broad and rigorous questions of philosophy and jurisprudence, there is opportunity for the application and operation of “Ramsey's Maxim”. This maxim claims that where there is a prolonged and persistent dispute between two persons, it is often the case that the disputants, while they are at odds about the conclusions and arguments derived from or urged in support of premises, are really in agreement about an assumption, hypothesis, premise, fundamental to their argument, which is false. They share a common but false premise.