The doctrine of “fundamental term” has been recently invoked in yet another case concerned with the hire-purchase of a car in order to enable the borrower to obtain damages despite the presence in the agreement of an exemption clause. In this case, Charterhouse Credit Co., Ltd. v. Tolly a new point of law was decided. It may be said to be established law that a party to a contract who commits a breach of a fundamental term cannot escape liability for such breach by reliance on an exemption clause. But is the position altered if the innocent party, notwith-standing discovery of the breach, acts in a manner consistent with the continuance of some contractual relations? In the Charterhouse case the borrower of the car on discovering the breach, instead of returning the car, retained it, and indeed entered into negotiations about the time of payment of instalments.

On March 7, 1958, the Brighton watch committee decided to dismiss their chief constable; on March 14, 1963, the House of Lords ruled that this decision was ineffective. Among the conclusions of the majority of the House was that natural justice required a hearing to have been given to the chief constable before his dismissal and that in the absence of a hearing the dismissal was invalid. In attempting an assessment of Ridge v. Baldwin, which concerns what has since been called “a doctrine of the highest constitutional value,” it seems necessary (a) to examine the dispute against its administrative background, in particular the intertwining pattern of statute and ministerial regulation governing police dismissal; (b) to consider in detail a number of difficult points of principle raised by the arguments on natural justice; and (c) to set the decision within the broad context of the development of administrative law. It will be suggested that although the House of Lords may have restored to favour a once classic principle of interpretation, this in itself helps but little in the search for a fruitful relationship between the courts and the administration. The interpretation of statutory powers may well be important in particular situations, but the judge's ability to do justice in this way necessarily depends on the words of the statute he is interpreting and thus may stand or fall on the vagaries of legislative history. Had Mr. Ridge been the chief constable of a county force and not of a county borough force, although he could still have invoked the Police Regulations, the rules of natural justice would almost certainly have helped him but little—simply because the County Police Act, 1839, is phrased differently from the Municipal Corporations Act, 1882.

The value of hire-purchase transactions has remained at a fairly steady level during the past few years, and it would be pleasant to think that the law affecting them has reached a comparable stage of maturity and stability. This is unfortunately not the case. Instead, the number of legal problems continues to multiply and some aspects of the law of hire-purchase have reached a state of complexity which must baffle even the most expert lawyer. Of these none is more confusing than the law relating to the so-called “minimum payment clause.”