Insurance is a business in which trust is the corollary of risk taking. One problem for the insurance industry in eighteenth and early nineteenth-century Britain was how to bridge the gap between the world of business based upon personal trust, and the emergence of new commercial relations where moral hazard was mass produced and where a commanding knowledge of personal reputations was virtually impossible. This paper examines the imperfect methods devised by early life and fire insurance offices to assess both physical and moral hazard and postulates a relationship between the two. The responses to two particular moral hazard “problems” identified by contemporary underwriters–insurance by the Jews and the Irish–are explored.

A review of theories of competition and business strategy over the last half-century reveals a fairly linear development of early work by academics and consultants into efforts to understand the determinants of industry profitability and competitive position and, more recently, to add a time or historical dimension to the analysis. The possible implications of the emergence of a market for such ideas are also discussed.

The Electric Vehicle Company (EVC) and its affiliated operating entities (1897–1912), along with similar electric taxicab ventures in London and Paris, figured prominently in the early history of the automobile industry. Long dismissed as a quintessential instance of business failure resulting from the choice of inferior technology, the picture of EVC that emerges from new archival evidence suggests a different view. Seen within the continuing electrification of urban transit, traditional centralized approaches to transportation management, and genuine uncertainty about future automotive technology, EVC constituted a significant, if incremental, extension of traditional, service-based concepts of transportation. The goal of the owners of EVC was to offer an integrated, all-electric urban transportation service that included road- and rail-based components. The failure of EVC represented not simply the victory of internal combustion over electric propulsion but also the triumph of a decentralized, product-centered view of mobility, in which individuals owned and operated their own vehicles.

I want to begin with a question. Why did the historical study of entrepreneurship take such a decidedly “organizational turn” during the 1950s? One might have thought that a Research Center in Entrepreneurial History would have stimulated work on the individual entrepreneur; that it might have encouraged a focus on such questions as exactly why and how individual entrepreneurs created and sustained new businesses.