Under the present judicial interpretation of federal securities law, an individual is prohibited from trading on non-public information that has been misappropriated in contravention of a fiduciary duty. Trades made using non-public information that has not been misappropriated are not prohibited by Rule 10b-5, promulgated under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. The current requirement of misappropriation to trigger Rule 10b-5 liability creates a gap that permits transactions that are both ethically and economically undesirable. Judicial or legislative reforms are recommended to close the gap and help ensure the fairness and efficiency of securities markets.

In their article, “Shrewd Bargaining on the Moral Frontier,” J. Gregory Dees and Peter C. Crampton challenge us with a puzzle about deception in bargaining. How can the practice of misleading others about our settlement preferences—the terms on which we are willing to come to an agreement —possibly be justified? On any standard ethical theory, they claim, Brer Rabbit's trick of professing fear of the briar patch in order to avoid being eaten by the fox would seem to be wrong, and yet we read this tale to our children for their moral edification. The discussion by Dees and Crampton of this apparent inconsistency is penetrating, instructive, and well-informed. It is also a delight to read.

Robert Solomon has suggested that we now have collectively moved beyond the point of treating the notion of “business ethics” as oxymoronic. If the possibility of business ethics were indeed a settled question, then there would be little point in offering yet another investigation into the character of business practice and norms. But if the “we” of this claim refers to philosophers, other writers and the community as a whole, then Solomon's claim appears false. For we remain very much concerned about the morality of business. Our doubts regarding business legitimacy have been brought into ever sharper focus by the trend of the past twenty years to assimilate business to the so-called “liberal” or “learned” professions of medicine, the ministry and the law. For, as Paul Camenisch has noted, while the three liberal professions all aim at readily identifiable goods and display an “atyptical moral commitment,” it is far from clear that the end of business is good. Since prof its can be made through the distribution of products many would regard as immoral, using labor practices of equally dubious morality (e.g., slave labor), it is hard to see how business can lay claim, like the other professions, to a legitimating moral commitment. Business legitimacy has been further undermined by research suggesting that business managers’ “expertise” creates more problems than it solves; and that the much-touted science of managerial effectiveness is a sham since no such science of controlling human behavior either does or can exist.

The study assesses how a social desirability (SD) bias influences the relationship between several independent and dependent variables commonly investigated in ethics research. The effect of a SD bias was observed when a questionnaire was administered under varying conditions of anonymity and with different measurement techniques for the SD construct. Findings reveal that a SD bias is present in the majority of relationships studied, and it most frequently plays a moderating role. While the measure of SD influences the strength and type of relationship, condition of anonymity has relatively little effect on the level of SD.

A growing number of organizational theorists have become skeptical about some of the more hallowed ideas of their field. They sense that there is a serious divergence between the nature of organizational life as it is described in theory and as it is experienced in practice. And they believe, therefore, that some corrective efforts are in order to redress this problem.

This article considers the principles that underlie the claim that some contracts are unconscionable and that such contracts should not be enforceable. It argues that it is much more difficult to explain unconscionability than is often supposed, particularly in cases where the contract is mutually advantageous or Pareto superior. Among other things, the article considers whether unconscionability is a defect in process or result, whether the gains in an unconscionable contract are disproportionate, whether there is a strong link between the use of standard forms and unconscionability, and whether the principle of inequality of bargaining power can account for unconscionability. After rejecting several standard explanations of unconscionability, I consider several alternative ways in which it might be explained.

Robert Solomon has usefully set forth the outlines of an ontology of ethics for the employee. I seize upon three of the insights in his paper—specifically, relating to employee role, social nature, and virtue— and develop them along Aristotelean lines, showing along the way how classic “dilemmas” of the business ethics literature can be recast as problems of employee character and virtue.

Virtually every empirical inquiry of issues relevant to applied business ethics involves the asking of questions that are sensitive, embarrassing, threatening, stigmatizing, or incriminating. Accordingly, questions of this sort are likely to result in unsatisfactory outcomes: 1) many individuals will not respond; and/or, 2) many individuals will not respond candidly. An obvious objective, then, is to use a method to collect information which increases participation, provides absolute anonymity, and does not jeopardize subjects’ privacy. The randomized response technique (RRT) is a method designed to realize this promise. We provide here an overview of RRT approaches and applications which may be effectively used in empirical examinations of potentially sensitive issues in business ethics.

Michael Lewis’ book, Liar's Poker, presents a scary picture of behavior within the investment community. While this portrayal is interesting in its own right, it presents us with an opportunity to subject real business behavior to analysis and suggestions for reform. As such, the issues raised here transcend a mere review of the book's plot and prose. Real business behavior, described in gory detail by Lewis, will provide the basis for a moral analysis. Machiavelli's The Prince will provide the framework for most of this analysis.

Alan Wertheimer's paper on “Unconscionability and Contracts” presents an enlightening discussion of a complex and contentious legal concept. His primary objective is not to contribute to legal scholarship, but to use the law to shed light on the ethics of exchange relationships. Specifically, he wants to “use the doctrine of unconscionability in contracts as a lens through which to get a clearer understanding of exploitation—its essential characteristics and moral force” (p. 480). It is apparent that he sees exploitation (and unconscionability) as closely linked to a more general notion of fairness.

Michael Rion’s The Responsible Manager provides a distinctive contribution to the field of business ethics. A short text written primarily for the business practitioner, it embodies the rare combination of focused attention to the context and practice of management as well as careful and thoughtful attention to distinctions and tools of ethical analysis. As such, it might serve as one of the most effective primers yet available for the practitioner who desires to benefit from the field of business ethics, without the jargon and flights to linguistic abstraction that characterize much of the academic field. As a resource for managers, teachers of managers and prospective managers the book avoids two pitfalls typical within the literature. It is superior to many texts written by academic theorists (e.g., philosophers) for whom ethics in business proceeds at high levels of theoretical abstraction and with little explicit attention to managerial practice and organizational context. It also succeeds where texts such as Ken Blanchard's The Power of Ethical Management fail—in being sensitive to management practice but lacking in ethical sophistication and theoretical clarity. Indeed, Michael Rion's academic training in ethics (Yale University) and his extensive experience in corporate practice both as resident corporate ethicist (Cummins Engine Company) and as external ethics consultant provide a unique combination rare to the field.

Business ethics is an eclectic blend of intellectual traditions that seeks to exam ine the question of “what should I do in my business relationships.” This paper attempts to widen this discussion by proposing an alternative view of the nature of ethical behaviour: ethical behaviour as a situated social accomplishment. From an ethnomethodological perspective, norms and rules have the status of interpretive aids which are used to negotiate an acceptable meaning for a situation; norms and rules are constituted by, and in part constitute, the situations in which they occur. While most work in business ethics has tended to reify ethical practices, this paper stresses the contingent and situational nature of ethical decision making. In addition to presenting an ethnomethodological perspective, this paper discusses the methodological ramifications of this perspective through an examination of three ethnographic studies of situated rule usage.

This book has two purposes: first, to state what it means to have a right; and second, to state which rights human beings have. Because Thomson believes that the first question is prior to the second, she begins by asking why it is morally significant that human beings have rights. Her answer to this question is that rights are a kind of moral constraint such that, other things being equal, one's rights ought to be accorded. As to the second question, Thomson distinguishes rights human beings have qua human beings from rights they have by participating in private transactions or living under a legal system. The former category includes the right not to be killed or harmed; the latter category includes rights related to promise keeping and private property. By explaining what in general makes the attribution of a human or social right true, Thomson seeks to provide a foundation for the notion that the interests of human beings are worthy of respect.

For those who, like myself, are enthusiastic advocates of normativelydriven empirical studies of business ethics and values, a display of expert knowledge concerning methods of the sort we see here is occasion for large measures of professional satisfaction. With all of their imperfections and qualifications, all of the tentativeness attached to the truths they yield, these methods (and similar others not included here) open vistas not accessible by other modes of inquiry. For these gains, scholars everywhere should be grateful.

Yet, questions nag at the back of one's mind, even as the positive accomplishments are registered.

“Greed,” says Gordon Gekko, “Greed is good.” At this point in the movie Wall Street he is acting as the spokesman for the American Dream, so he naturally emphasizes financial greed. Yet he is willing to include, “Greed in all of its forms,” including greed for life and greed for happiness. Since greed almost always means trying to grab too much, even when what is sought is undeniably worth having, he must believe that MORE is ALWAYS better. Michael Slote's counterpoint: moderation is generally preferable.