An efficient allocation of talents through occupational choice is central to modern economic growth. Removing developmental barriers unfavorable to entrepreneurship and artificially imposed for political reasons (i.e., the cage theory) might be a plausible channel for China's superb economic performance. Using a newly compiled dataset on China's Super Rich Persons, the regression kink design reports supportive evidence on the politically induced structural change in the social composition of entrepreneurs using Deng Xiaoping's Southern Talks as an event shock. Consistent with a pro-market talent allocation framework, this article finds that (1) the share of super-rich entrepreneurs with state sector experience and a college degree declined, suggesting that the period of the Southern Talks opened a window of opportunity for venturing, and (2) the effects on the attributes of the parental father of the entrepreneurs are somewhat limited.

Why are politicians selective in granting investment incentives to foreign direct investment (FDI) projects? One understudied reason is that politicians want to minimize backlash from voters. In this article, I present the first study to systematically analyze voter preferences toward investment incentives. I theorize that voters should be more likely to support investment incentives for FDI projects that they perceive as “high quality”—that is, projects that voters perceive to be highly effective in improving the living standards of their communities. As a result, I expect that politicians who support low-quality FDI projects with incentives will lose voter support. A factorial survey experiment in the United States provides evidence in favor of this argument. Voters reward politicians only if they provide investment incentives to high-quality projects. An additional conjoint survey experiment highlights the importance of project characteristics that indicate high quality in increasing the approval of investment incentives. To demonstrate the external validity of these experimental results, I present descriptive evidence that illustrates the consistencies between the determinants of investment incentives for FDI projects and voter preferences.

While most literature on federal climate change policies has focused on failures to adopt broad policies, this article describes and explains successes in two important sectors. Regulations to improve the fuel economy of motor vehicles and efficiency standards for appliances and equipment have produced substantial reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, although they largely have other goals and hence can be considered implicit climate policies. We synthesize the existing literature with our analyses of case studies to offer three explanations for the adoption of effective policies in these two sectors. First, the policies delivered politically popular co-benefits, such as reducing consumers’ energy bills, enhancing energy security, and promoting public health. Second, they gained business acceptance because they were narrow in their scope, avoided long-term economic costs, and helped industry cope with state-level regulations; industry often strategically tried to influence these policies rather than resist them. Third, the legislation that initiated and expanded these policies received bipartisan support, which was aided by co-benefits and business acceptance; more recently, these laws have been strengthened through the actions of Democratic administrations. We conclude by comparing these policy areas to the passage of the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022.

What factors contribute to the differences in foreign direct investment (FDI) levels in environments characterized as high risk? While research shows that armed conflict influences foreign investment decisions, it remains unclear how conflict dynamics, specifically the relative power capabilities of warring parties, affect FDI. This study explores the effects of rebel strength relative to government forces on FDI. We argue that there is a reduction in foreign investments in civil conflict countries as rebels gain a military advantage relative to the government. Stronger insurgents send a signal that the government is losing its strength in the conflict, creating uncertainty regarding conflict outcomes and posing economic and security risks for investors. To avoid facing economic and property losses due to increasing rebel strength, investors are incentivized to decrease their investment in the conflict state. Using data on insurgent troop size relative to government forces and FDI, our findings show that higher military capabilities of rebel forces relative to the government are associated with less FDI inflows in conflict-affected countries.

What explains the variation in countries’ propensity to engage in austerity policy? Economic and political country-level factors are the paramount explanations in the literature. Nevertheless, variation in fiscal preferences at the executive level remains underexplored, except for ideology. Moreover, budget decisions are endogenous to the state of the economy, thus casting doubt on standard measures based on the debt and/or deficit ratio. This article contributes to the literature in two ways. First, I turn to the individual level of analysis and suggest that leaders with business experience are more likely to pursue a balanced budget and tend to implement fiscal consolidation policies based on spending cuts. Second, I ease concerns about individuals’ self-selection into office by relying on fiscal adjustments that are weakly orthogonal to the economic cycle. The statistical analysis of a panel of 17 OECD countries between 1978 and 2014 confirms the theoretical expectations. The results are robust to a variety of specification and statistical methodologies and hold for a subset of as-if random leadership transitions following close elections. A case study of Brian Mulroney's governments in Canada (1984–93) further illustrates the argument.