Set theory is an autonomous and sophisticated field of mathematics, enormously successful not only at its continuing development of its historical heritage but also at analyzing mathematical propositions cast in set-theoretic terms and gauging their consistency strength. But set theory is also distinguished by having begun intertwined with pronounced metaphysical attitudes, and these have even been regarded as crucial by some of its great developers. This has encouraged the exaggeration of crises in foundations and of metaphysical doctrines in general. However, set theory has proceeded in the opposite direction, from a web of intensions to a theory of extension par excellence, and like other fields of mathematics its vitality and progress have depended on a steadily growing core of mathematical structures and methods, problems and results. There is also the stronger contention that from the beginning set theory actually developed through a progression of mathematical moves, whatever and sometimes in spite of what has been claimed on its behalf.

What follows is an account of the development of set theory from its beginnings through the creation of forcing based on these contentions, with an avowedly Whiggish emphasis on the heritage that has been retained and developed by current set theory. The whole transfinite landscape can be viewed as the result of Cantor's attempt to articulate and solve the Continuum Problem.

§1. Introduction. This paper deals with aspects of my doctoral dissertation which contributed to the early development of model theory. What was of use to later workers was less the results of my thesis, than the method by which I proved the completeness of first-order logic—a result established by Kurt Gödel in his doctoral thesis 18 years before.

The ideas that fed my discovery of this proof were mostly those I found in the teachings and writings of Alonzo Church. This may seem curious, as his work in logic, and his teaching, gave great emphasis to the constructive character of mathematical logic, while the model theory to which I contributed is filled with theorems about very large classes of mathematical structures, whose proofs often by-pass constructive methods.

Another curious thing about my discovery of a new proof of Gödel's completeness theorem, is that it arrived in the midst of my efforts to prove an entirely different result. Such “accidental” discoveries arise in many parts of scientific work. Perhaps there are regularities in the conditions under which such “accidents” occur which would interest some historians, so I shall try to describe in some detail the accident which befell me.

A mathematical discovery is an idea, or a complex of ideas, which have been found and set forth under certain circumstances. The process of discovery consists in selecting certain input ideas and somehow combining and transforming them to produce the new output ideas. The process that produces a particular discovery may thus be represented by a diagram such as one sees in many parts of science; a “black box” with lines coming in from the left to represent the input ideas, and lines going out to the right representing the output. To describe that discovery one must explain what occurs inside the box, i.e., how the outputs were obtained from the inputs.

Here, we analyse some recent applications of set theory to topology and argue that set theory is not only the closed domain where mathematics is usually founded, but also a flexible framework where imperfect intuitions can be precisely formalized and technically elaborated before they possibly migrate toward other branches. This apparently new role is mostly reminiscent of the one played by other external fields like theoretical physics, and we think that it could contribute to revitalize the interest in set theory in the future.

This is an exposition of Lambek's strengthening and generalization of the deduction theorem in categories related to intuitionistic propositional logic. Essential notions of category theory are introduced so as to yield a simple reformulation of Lambek's Functional Completeness Theorem, from which its main consequences can be readily drawn. The connections of the theorem with combinatory logic, and with modal and substructural logics, are briefly considered at the end.

§1. Introduction. Natural sets that can be enumerated by a computable function (the recursively enumerable or r.e. sets) always seem to be either actually computable (recursive) or of the same complexity (with respect to Turing computability) as the Halting Problem, the complete r.e. set K. The obvious question, first posed in Post [1944] and since then called Post's Problem is then just whether there are r.e. sets which are neither computable nor complete, i.e., neither recursive nor of the same Turing degree as K?

Let be the r.e. degrees, i.e., the r.e. sets modulo the equivalence relation of equicomputable with the partial order induced by Turing computability. This structure is a partial order (indeed, an uppersemilattice or usl)with least element 0, the degree (equivalence class) of the computable sets, and greatest element 1 or 0′, the degree of K. Post's problem then asks if there are any other elements of .

The (positive) solution of Post's problem by Friedberg [1957] and Muchnik [1956] was followed by various algebraic or order theoretic results that were interpreted as saying that the structure was in some way well behaved:

Theorem 1.1 (Embedding theorem; Muchnik [1958], Sacks [1963]). Every countable partial ordering or even uppersemilattice can be embedded into .

Theorem 1.2 (Sacks Splitting Theorem [1963b]). For every nonrecursive r.e. degreeathere are r.e. degreesb, c < asuch thatb ∨ c = a.

Theorem 1.3 (Sacks Density Theorem [1964]). For every pair of nonrecursive r.e. degreesa < bthere is an r.e. degreecsuch thata < c < b.

§1. Introduction. By and large, definitions of a differentiable structure on a set involve two ingredients, topology and algebra. However, in some cases, partial information on one or both of these is sufficient. A very simple example is that of the field ℝ (or any real closed field) where algebra alone determines the ordering and hence the topology of the field:

In the case of the field ℂ, the algebraic structure is insufficient to determine the Euclidean topology; another topology, Zariski, is associated with the ield but this will be too coarse to give a diferentiable structure.

A celebrated example of how partial algebraic and topological data (G a locally euclidean group) determines a differentiable structure (G is a Lie group) is Hilbert's 5th problem and its solution by Montgomery-Zippin and Gleason.

The main result which we discuss here (see [13] for the full version) is of a similar flavor: we recover an algebraic and later differentiable structure from a topological data. We begin with a linearly ordered set ⟨M, <⟩, equipped with the order topology, and its cartesian products with the product topologies. We then consider the collection of definable subsets of Mn, n = 1, 2, …, in some first order expansion ℳ of ⟨M, <⟩.

Apologies. The purpose of the following talk is to give an overview of the present state of aims, methods and results in Pure Proof Theory. Shortage of time forces me to concentrate on my very personal views. This entails that I will emphasize the work which I know best, i.e., work that has been done in the triangle Stanford, Munich and Münster. I am of course well aware that there are as important results coming from outside this triangle and I apologize for not displaying these results as well.

Moreover the audience should be aware that in some points I have to oversimplify matters. Those who complain about that are invited to consult the original papers.

1.1. General. Proof theory startedwithHilbert's Programme which aimed at a finitistic consistency proof for mathematics.

By Gödel's Theorems, however, we know that we can neither formalize all mathematics nor even prove the consistency of formalized fragments by finitistic means. Inspite of this fact I want to give some reasons why I consider proof theory in the style of Gentzen's work still as an important and exciting field of Mathematical Logic. I will not go into applications of Gentzen's cut-elimination technique to computer science problems—this may be considered as applied proof theory—but want to concentrate on metamathematical problems and results. In this sense I am talking about Pure Proof Theory.

Mathematicians are interested in structures. There is only one way to find the theorems of a structure. Start with an axiom system for the structure and deduce the theorems logically. These axiom systems are the objects of proof-theoretical research. Studying axiom systems there is a series of more or less obvious questions.

We consider the informal concept of “computability” or “effective calculability” and two of the formalisms commonly used to define it, “(Turing) computability” and “(general) recursiveness”. We consider their origin, exact technical definition, concepts, history, general English meanings, how they became fixed in their present roles, how they were first and are now used, their impact on nonspecialists, how their use will affect the future content of the subject of computability theory, and its connection to other related areas.

After a careful historical and conceptual analysis of computability and recursion we make several recommendations in section §7 about preserving the intensional differences between the concepts of “computability” and “recursion.” Specifically we recommend that: the term “recursive” should no longer carry the additional meaning of “computable” or “decidable;” functions defined using Turing machines, register machines, or their variants should be called “computable” rather than “recursive;” we should distinguish the intensional difference between Church's Thesis and Turing's Thesis, and use the latter particularly in dealing with mechanistic questions; the name of the subject should be “Computability Theory” or simply Computability rather than “Recursive Function Theory.”

The aim of this paper is to describe (without proofs) an analogue of the theory of nontrivial torsion-free divisible abelian groups for metabelian groups. We obtain illustrations for “old-fashioned” model theoretic algebra and “new” examples in the theory of stable groups. We begin this paper with general considerations about model theory. In the second section we present our results and we give the structure of the rest of the paper. Most parts of this paper use only basic concepts from model theory and group theory (see [14] and especially Chapters IV, V, VI and VIII for model theory, and see for example [23] and especially Chapters II and V for group theory). However, in Section 5, we need some somewhat elaborate notions from stability theory. One can find the beginnings of this theory in [14], and we refer the reader to [16] or [21] for stability theory and to [22] for stable groups.

§1. Some model theoretic considerations. Denote by the theory of torsion-free abelian groups in the language of groups ℒgp. A finitely generated group G satisfies iff G is isomorphic to a finite direct power of ℤ. It follows that axiomatizes the universal theory of free abelian groups and that the theory of nontrivial torsion-free abelian groups is complete for the universal sentences. Denote by the theory of nontrivial divisible torsion-free abelian groups.

§ 1. Introduction. Perhaps the most surprising recent development in complexity theory is the discovery that the class NP can be characterized using a form of randomized proof checker that only examines a constant number of bits of the “proof” that a string is in a language [6, 5, 31, 3, 4]. More specifically, writing ∣x∣ for the length of a string x, a language L in the class NP of languages recognizable in Nondeterministic polynomial time is traditionally given by a polynomial p and a polynomial-time predicate P such that a string x is in L iff there is some string y satisfying P(x, y), where ∣y∣ ≤ p (∣x∣). Intuitively, we can think of a string y as a possible proof that x ϵ L, with the predicate P some kind of proof checker that distinguishes good proofs from bad ones. A string x is therefore in a language L ϵ NP if there is a short proof that x ϵ L, and not in L otherwise. The surprising discovery is that the deterministic proof checker that reads the entire input and proof can be replaced by a probabilistic verifier that on input x and possible proof y, where y is presented in a certain way, flips at most O (log ∣x∣) coins and reads at most a constant number of bits of x and y. Obviously, a probabilistic verifier that does not read the whole proof will sometimes make mistakes. However, the surprising and essentially non-intuitive mathematical fact is that for each language L in NP, it is possible to find a polynomial q and verifier V flipping a logarithmic number of coins and reading a constant number of bits such that, for any x ϵ L, there exists y with ∣y∣ ≤ q(∣x∣) and with V (x, y) accepting with probability 1 and, for x ∉ L, there is no y with ∣y∣ ≤ q(∣x∣) and with V (x, y) accepting with probability ≥ 1/4. This idea canalsobeextended to PSPACE [10, 9], using a game that alternates between two players instead of a proof presented by a “single player.”

Introduction. Il est bien connu que la correspondance de Curry-Howard permet d'associer un programme, sous la forme d'un λ-terme, à toute preuve intuitionniste, formalisée dans le calcul des prédicats du second ordre (voir, par exemple [3]). Cette correspondance a été étendue, assez récemment, à la logique classique moyennant une extension convenable du λ-calcul (voir [1, 4, 5, 6]). Chaque théorème formalisé en logique du second ordre correspond donc à une spécification de programme.

Il se pose alors le problème, en général tout à fait non trivial, de trouver la spécification associée à un théorème donné; autrement dit, de déterminer le comportement opérationnel commun aux λ-termes associés aux diverses démonstrations formelles du théorème considéré.

Cette question est résolue ici pour le théorème de complétude de la logique classique.

La première étape consiste à formaliser convenablement ce théorème en logique du second ordre. Ce travail est fait complètement dans la section 1. Il a comme sous-produit, peut-être inattendu, de montrer que ce théorème est prouvable en logique intuitionniste du second ordre (section 2). Ceci, toutefois, à condition d'introduire une légère variante de la notion de modèle, en admettant un modèle supplémentaire trivial, où toute formule est satisfaite.

On notera, à ce sujet, que des preuves intuitionnistes du théorème de complétude de la logique intuitionniste, utilisant des variantes de la notion de modele de Kripke, ont été données par H. Friedman [7] et W. Veldman [8]. On remarquera également qu'un argument de G. Kreisel [2] montre que le théorème de complétude habituel de la logique intuitionniste n'a pas de preuve intuitionniste.

The Loeb space construction in nonstandard analysis is applied to the theory of processes to reveal basic phenomena which cannot be treated using classical methods. An asymptotic interpretation of results established here shows that for a triangular array (or a sequence) of random variables, asymptotic uncorrelatedness or asymptotic pairwise independence is necessary and sufficient for the validity of appropriate versions of the law of large numbers. Our intrinsic characterization of almost sure pairwise independence leads to the equivalence of various multiplicative properties of random variables.

§1. Introduction. Ideals and filters of subsets of natural numbers have been studied by set theorists and topologists for a long time. There is a vast literature concerning various kinds of ultrafilters (or, dually, maximal ideals). There is also a substantial interest in nicely definable (Borel, analytic) ideals—these by old results of Sierpiński are very far from being maximal— and the structure of such ideals will concern us in this announcement. In addition to being interesting in their own right, Borel and analytic ideals occur naturally in the investigations of compact subsets of the space of all Baire class 1 functions on a Polish space (Rosenthal compacta), see [12, 18]. Also, certain objects associated with such ideals are of considerable interest and were quite extensively studied by several authors. Let us list here three examples; in all three of them I stands for an analytic or Borel ideal.

1. The partial order induced by I on P(ω): X ≥I Y iff X \ Y ϵ I ([16]) and the partial order (I, ⊂)([18]).

2. Boolean algebras of the form P(ω)/I and their automorphisms ([6, 5, 19, 20]).

3. The equivalence relation associated with I: XEI Y iff X Δ ϵ I ([4, 14, 15,9]).

In Section 4, we will have an opportunity to state some consequences of our results for equivalence relations as in 3.

§0. Preface. There has been an expectation that the endgame of the more tenacious problems raised by the Los Angeles ‘cabal’ school of descriptive set theory in the 1970's should ultimately be played out with the use of inner model theory. Questions phrased in the language of descriptive set theory, where both the conclusions and the assumptions are couched in terms that only mention simply definable sets of reals, and which have proved resistant to purely descriptive set theoretic arguments, may at last find their solution through the connection between determinacy and large cardinals.

Perhaps the most striking example was given by [24], where the core model theory was used to analyze the structure of HOD and then show that all regular cardinals below ΘL(ℝ) are measurable. John Steel's analysis also settled a number of structural questions regarding HODL(ℝ), such as GCH.

Another illustration is provided by [21]. There an application of large cardinals and inner model theory is used to generalize the Harrington-Martin theorem that determinacy implies )determinacy.

However, it is harder to find examples of theorems regarding the structure of the projective sets whose only known proof from determinacy assumptions uses the link between determinacy and large cardinals. We may equivalently ask whether there are second order statements of number theory that cannot be proved under PD–the axiom of projective determinacy–without appealing to the large cardinal consequences of the PD, such as the existence of certain kinds of inner models that contain given types of large cardinals.

We introduce a new framework for classifying logics on finite structures and studying their expressive power. This framework is based on the concept of almost everywhere equivalence of logics, that is to say, two logics having the same expressive power on a class of asymptotic measure 1. More precisely, if L, L′ are two logics and μ is an asymptotic measure on finite structures, then L ≡a.e.L′ (μ) means that there is a class C of finite structures with μ(C) = 1 and such that L and L′ define the same queries on C. We carry out a systematic investigation of ≡a.e. with respect to the uniform measure and analyze the ≡a.e.-equivalence classes of several logics that have been studied extensively in finite model theory. Moreover, we explore connections with descriptive complexity theory and examine the status of certain classical results of model theory in the context of this new framework.

We announce and explain recent results on the computably enumerable (c.e.) sets, especially their definability properties (as sets in the spirit of Cantor), their automorphisms (in the spirit of Felix Klein's Erlanger Programm), their dynamic properties, expressed in terms of how quickly elements enter them relative to elements entering other sets, and the Martin Invariance Conjecture on their Turing degrees, i.e., their information content with respect to relative computability (Turing reducibility).

The prepositional μ-calculus is an extension of the modal system K with a least fixpoint operator. Kozen posed a question about completeness of the axiomatisation of the logic which is a small extension of the axiomatisation of the modal system K. It is shown that this axiomatisation is complete.