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Candidate Filtering: The Strategic Use of Electoral Manipulations in Russia

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 March 2021

David Szakonyi Open the ORCID record for David Szakonyi [Opens in a new window]
David Szakonyi*
Affiliation:
George Washington University, Washington, DC, USAand Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russian Federation
*
E-mail: dszakonyi@email.gwu.edu
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Abstract

Incumbents have many tools to tip elections in their favor, yet little is known about how they choose between strategies. By comparing various tactics, this article argues that electoral malpractice centered on manipulating institutions offers the greatest effectiveness while shielding incumbents from public anger and criminal prosecution. To demonstrate this, the study focuses on a widespread institutional tactic: preventing candidates from accessing the ballot. First, in survey experiments, Russian voters respond less negatively to institutional manipulations, such as rejecting candidates, than to blatant fraud, such as ballot box stuffing. Next, using evidence from 25,935 Russian mayoral races, the article shows that lower societal and implementation costs enable incumbents to strategically reject candidacies from credible challengers and then reduce their electoral vulnerability. In all, the technology behind specific manipulations helps determine when and how incumbents violate electoral integrity.

Keywords

electionsauthoritarianismelectoral fraudRussiademocracyballot accesspublic opinion
Type
Article
Information
British Journal of Political Science , Volume 52 , Issue 2 , April 2022 , pp. 649 - 670
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s) 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press

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Supplementary material: Link

Szakonyi Dataset

Dataset

https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/RR6BRU
Link
Supplementary material: PDF

Szakonyi supplementary material

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