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The Principles of Majority and Proportionality

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 January 2009

Jürg Steiner
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Extract

It is only in connection with electoral law that the terms ‘majority principle’ and ‘proportionality’ are widely used. It seems to us meaningful to apply the two concepts also to the political decision-making process as a whole. In this broadened sense ‘majority principle’ and ‘proportionality’ denote certain models of conflict regulation. The majority model then denotes the regulation of conflict through majority decisions. The proportional model is much more difficult to describe: its basic characteristic is that all groups influence a decision in proportion to their numerical strength. Proportional conflict regulation is easiest to apply when a decision is concerned with several units, all of which are perceived as equivalent to one another. The classical case of this is the parliamentary election, for the parliamentary seats are perceived as equivalent to one another, so that by means of an appropriate electoral law they can relatively easily be distributed on a proportional basis among the different political groups. In Switzerland the election of the government by the parliament gives rise to an analogous situation, in that the seven seats in the Bundesrat (Federal Council) are perceived as equivalent to one another, so that they can likewise be relatively easily distributed on a proportional basis. In most other political systems the application of the rules of proportionality at the level of the government would entail greater difficulties, since the individual governmental posts are perceived as being of different value. The greatest difficulty presents itself when only a single office is to be filled, for example that of President. Here the application of proportional rules is only possible if rotation of office (i.e. proportionality in the temporal dimension) is brought into the reckoning, or if the disadvantage imposed on one group can be compensated by preference given to it in another decision.

Type
Articles
Information
British Journal of Political Science , Volume 1 , Issue 1 , January 1971 , pp. 63 - 70
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1971

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References

1 Lehmbruch, Gerhard, Proporzdemokratie. Politisches System und politische Kultur in der Schweiz und in Oesterreich (Tubingen, 1967).Google Scholar

2 Lehmbruch, Gerhard, ‘Konkordanzdemokratie im politischen System der Schweiz. Ein Literaturbericht’, Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 9. Jahrgang (1968), Heft 3.Google Scholar

3 See my book: Gewaltlose Politik und kulturelle Vielfalt. Hypothesen entwickelt am Beispiel der Schweiz (Bern-Stuttgart: Verlag Paul Haupt, 1970).Google Scholar For a summary of this book see my article: ‘Nonviolent Conflict Resolution in Democratic Systems: Switzerland’, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, XIII, no. 3 (09 1969) pp. 295–304.Google Scholar

4 A particularly rich source in this respect was: Dahl, Robert A., ed., Political Oppositions in Western Democracies (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1966).Google Scholar

5 Homans, George Caspar, Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms (New York: Harcourt Brace and World, 1961).Google Scholar

6 The hypothesis put forward here, that small groups tend to avoid majority strategies, can also be found in Riker, W. H., The Theory of Political Coalitions (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), p. 51Google Scholar: ‘Especially in small groups… considerations of maintaining the solidarity of the group and the loyalty of members to it dominate considerations of maximum victory on particular decisions.’

7 Cf. for example Homans, Social Behavior.

8 Lehmbruch, , Proporzdemokratie, pp. 34 ff.Google Scholar

9 Val R. Lorwin, ‘Belgium: Religion, Class, and Language in National Politics’ in Dahl, ed., Political Oppositions.

10 For the concept of segmentation compare: Steiner, Gewaltlose Politik.

11 The first two hypotheses presented here can also be found, partly with similar explanations, but limited to electoral law, in: Rokkan, Stein, ‘The Structuring of Mass Politics in the Smaller European Democracies: A Developmental Typology’, Comparative Studies in Society and History, x, no. 2 (1968), 189 ff.Google Scholar

12 Deutsch, Karl W., The Nerves of Government. Models of Political Communication and Control (New York and London: Free Press, 1966).Google Scholar

13 For this point see my book: Bürger und Politik (Meisenheim: Verlag Anton Hain, 1969).Google Scholar

14 Steiner, Cewaltlose Politik.

15 For this point cf. for example: Schätzungen der Einnahmen und Ausgaben des Bundes 1966–74. Bericht der Eidgenössischen Expertenkommission zur Bearbeitung der Grundlagen und Methoden einer langfristigen Finanzplanung im Bunde (Bern 1966).

16 Steiner, , ‘Aspekte des Referendums’, Schweizer Monatshefte, XLVIII (1969), Heft 12.Google Scholar

17 Imboden, Max, Helvetisches Malaise (Zurich 1964).Google Scholar

18 Cf. Steiner, Gewaltlose Politik.

19 Cf. my article: ‘Conflict Resolution and Democratic Stability in Subculturally Segmented Political Systems’, Res Publica. Revue de l'lnstitut Beige de Science Politique, XI, no. 4 (1969).Google Scholar