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The Expropriation of Pious and Corporate Properties in Costa Rica, 1805-1860: Patterns in the Consolidation of a National Elite

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 December 2015

Lowell Gudmundson*
Affiliation:
Florida International University, Tamiami Trail, Miami, Florida

Extract

Conflicts between Church and State, and between liberals and conservatives over the role of the Church, were a constant feature of nineteenth-century Mesoamerican history. These struggles eventually stripped the Church of much of its wealth, with a consequent decline in its political influence. However, the timing of this disinvestiture, the composition of liberal and conservative factions, and the role of the Church varied substantially throughout Mexico and Central America.

In Mexico, Guatemala, and El Salvador, the Church survived the turmoil of the Independence period, to continue as a major holder of wealth and an important political actor. Notwithstanding repeated royal attacks upon Church prerogatives, and innumerable forced loans levied by both colonial and national authorities against Church wealth, the decisive confrontation between the Church and the Liberal-dominated State in these nations awaited the second half of the nineteenth century.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Academy of American Franciscan History 1983

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References

1 Useful sources for the Consolidation and general Church-State relations in late colonial Mexico include: Farriss, N.M., Crown and Clergy in Colonial Mexico, 1759–1821: The Crisis of Ecclesiastical Privilege, (London, University of London Press), 1968 Google Scholar; Costeloe, Michael, Church Wealth in Mexico, 1800–1856: A Study of the “Juzgado de Capellanías” in the Archbishopric of Mexico, (London, Cambridge University Press), 1967 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Brading, David, Miners and Merchants in Bourbon Mexico, 1763–1810, (London, Cambridge University Press), 1971 Google Scholar; Hamnett, Brian, “The Appropriation of Mexican Church Wealth by the Spanish Bourbon Government—the ‘Consolidación de Vales Reales’, 1805–1809”, Journal of Latin American Studies, 1,2, (1969), pp. 85113 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and, Lavrin, Asunción, “The Execution of the Law of ‘Consolidación’ in New Spain: Economic Aims and Results”, Hispanic American Historical Review, 53, 1, (February 1973), pp. 2749.CrossRefGoogle Scholar For late colonial and early independent Central America see: Cabat, Geoffrey A., “The Consolidation of 1803 in Guatemala,” The Americas, 28, 1 (July 1971), pp. 2038 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Rodríguez, Mario, The Cádiz Experiment in Central America, 1808 to 1826, (Berkeley, 1978)Google Scholar; Wortman, Miles, “Government Revenue and Economic Trends in Central America, 1787–1819,” Hispanic American Historical Review, 55, 2(May 1975), pp. 251286 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and his doctoral thesis, “La Fédération d’Amérique Central: 1823–1839” (Diss., L’Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes, Paris, 1973); Peláez, Severo Martínez, La patria del criollo: Ensayo de interpretación de la realidad colonial guatemalteca (San José, EDUCA, 4th edition 1976).Google Scholar Standard works on the mid-century Mexican Reform are those of Bazant, Jan, Alienation of Church Wealth in Mexico: Social and Economic Aspects of the Liberal Revolution, 1856–1875, (London, Cambridge University Press, 1971)Google Scholar; and Knowlton, Robert, Church Property and the Mexican Reform, 1856–1910, (Dekalb, Illinois, Northern Illinois University Press, 1976).Google Scholar For the Liberal movements in Guatemala and Salvador see: Burgess, Paul, Justo Rufino Barrios, (San José, EDUCA, 1972)Google Scholar; García Laguardia, Jorge Mario, La reforma liberal en Guatemala: Vida política y orden constitucional, (San José, EDUCA, 1972)Google Scholar; Menjívar, Rafael, Acumulación originaria y desarrollo del capitalismo en El Salvador, (San José, EDUCA, 1980)Google Scholar; Woodward, Ralph Lee Jr., Central America, a Nation Divided, (New York, Oxford University Press, 1976)Google Scholar; Cardoso, Ciro and Pérez, Héctor, Centroamérica y la economía occidental, 1520–1930, (San José, Universidad de Costa Rica, 1977).Google Scholar

2 Bazant, Jan, A Concise History of Mexico from Hidalgo to Cardenas, 1805–1940, (London, Cambridge University Press, 1977), p. 50.Google Scholar

3 The clearest exposition of this thesis can be found in Woodward, Ralph, “Economic and Social Origins of the Guatemalan Political Parties,” Hispanic American Historical Review, 45, 4, (November 1965), pp. 544566.CrossRefGoogle Scholar See, also, Floyd, Troy, “Salvadorean Indigo and the Guatemalan Merchants: A Study in Central American Socio-Economic History, 1750–1800,” unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1969 Google Scholar; and Browning, David, El Salvador: Landscape and Society, (Oxford, Clarendon Press. 1971).Google Scholar

4 Traditionally, the liberal reforms have been identified with the Presidency of Justo Rufino Barrios in Guatemala, in the period 1871–1885. Certainly the legislative high points of liberalism are the Guatemalan and Salvadorean Constitutions of 1879 and 1886, respectively. However, Salvadorean liberalism had an earlier flourish under the leadership of Gerardo Barrios (1859–1863), and the Costa Rican case would escape any such periodization. Military rule by Tomás Guardia (1870–1882) and the Constitution of 1871 are often seen as the local equivalent of triumphant liberalism, but the local roots of this phenomenon go much farther back in time. See Cardoso and Perez, Centroaméricay la economía occidental…and, Cardoso, Ciro, “Características básicas de la economía latinoamericana (siglo XIX): Algunos problemas de la transición neo-colonial,” Revista de Historia (Heredia, Costa Rica), 3, 4, (1977), pp. 4776.Google Scholar

5 Cardoso, , “Características básicas…”, p. 66.Google Scholar

6 Excellent sources exist for both these economic cycles. See: Acuña Ortega, Victor Hugo, “Historia económica del tabaco, época colonial,” (unpublished Licenciatura Thesis, University of Costa Rica, 1974)Google Scholar; Alvarado, Carlos Roses, “El cacao en la economía colonial de Costa Rica, siglos XVII y XVIII”, (unpublished Licenciatura Thesis, Universidad de Costa Rica, 1975)Google Scholar; MacLeod, Murdo, Spanish Central America: A Socioeconomic History, 1520–1720, (University of California, Berkeley, 1973).Google Scholar

7 Standard modem works on this period of political experimentation and disintegration include: Fació, Rodrigo, Trayectoria y crisis de la Federación Centroamericana, (San José, 1949)Google Scholar; Karnes, Thomas L., The Failure of Union: Central America, 1824–1960, (Chapel Hill, North Carolina, University of North Carolina Press, 1961)Google Scholar; and Wortman, “La Fédération d’Amérique Central…”

8 A purely descriptive account of the development and expropriation of the cofradía goods in colonial Costa Rica can be found in, Marroto, Alberto Sáenz, Historia agricola de Costa Rica, (San José, 1970), pp. 302303.Google Scholar

9 Fernández, León, Documentos para la historia de Costa Rica, Vol. 9, (Barcelona, 1909), pp. 596599, 607, 613.Google Scholar

10 Figures and estimates are based on the following sources: Archivos Nacionales de Costa Rica (hereafter cited as ANCR), Complementario Colonial, No. 6496, (“cuentas de la cofradía de Asunción y Soledad de Barva, 1767–1806”); Sección Cartago, No. 537, (“criadores de ganado en el Valle de Barba, 1759”); Complementario Colonial, No. 422, (“criadores de ganado mayor en Villahermosa o Alajuela, 1778”).

11 Sources for the Guanacaste brotherhoods include the census records: ANCR, Complementario Colonial, No. 3544, (Nicoya, 1785); No. 1390, (“hacendados de ganado mayor en Bagaces, 1800”); and the following inventories: ANCR, Complementario Colonial, No. 497 (“El Viejo, 1783–1800”); No. 499 (“Concepción, 1783–1816”); No. 501 (“Rosario, 1783–1797”); No. 842 (“Santísimo Sacramento, 1788–1827”); No. 1276 (“Nuestro Padre Jesús Nazareno, 1798–1815”).

12 The disastrous impact of the withdrawal of currency from New Spain was pointed out by nearly all contemporary observers. Their judgment is born out by most modern day authors.

13 There is a slight difference of opinion between Hamnett and La win as to the total revenue extracted from New Spain. We are citing the letter's lower estimate.

14 Merchant protests are frequently cited in both the Central American and Mexican literature. Moreover, Farriss shows how large sections of the lower clergy were led toward rebellion by this drastic curtailment in their wealth and income. See, Farriss, , Crown and Clergy…, pp. 243244.Google Scholar

15 Rodríguez, , The Cádiz Experiment…, pp. 38.Google Scholar

16 Martínez, , La patria del atollo…, pp. 185195.Google Scholar This author very generously characterized such Consulado reformism as “a utopia, a good but unrealizable wish.”

17 Cabat, “The Consolidation of 1803 in Guatemala…”. Wortman’s figures for Central American government receipts during the period 1787-1819 may or may not have taken the consolidation extractions into account. In any event, these funds were expressly separated from regular revenues by the officials involved, and surely contributed, here as in Mexico, to the long term decline in revenue which the author documents.

18 Cabat, , “The Consolidation of 1803 in Guatemala…”, p. 28,Google Scholar for distribution of revenue; p. 35, for mechanisms by which the influential postponed payment. The author estimated that only 1/5 of the revenue came from the sale of cofradía properties, the reverse of the situation in Costa Rica.

19 Cofradía goods at auction brought in about 22,000 pesos, with only 5,000 collected from the over 20,000 pesos in outstanding debt in capellanía funds. See, ANCR, Complementario Colonial, No. 3672, (July 16, 1805-June 14, 1809), 78 folios.

20 Auction prices were usually reduced to only two-thirds of appraised value on the strength of the “sole bidder” rational, repeatedly employed one might add. A striking example of this practice of selective collection can be seen in the case of Juan Francisco Bonilla of Cartago, who acquired land and cattle for cash, but was unable to pay more than one-third of his chaplaincy mortgages.

21 ANCR, Complementario Colonial, No. 3840, (October 24, 1808), fol. 39.

22 Ibid, fols. 46f-47v.

23 A long list of both liberal and conservative priests can be cited as major businessmen in early nineteenth century Costa Rica. For a general discussion of priests and their surprising receptiveness to liberalism see, Segura, Ricardo Blanco, Historia eclesiástica de Costa Rica, (San José, 1967), pp. 293305.Google Scholar

24 ANCR, Protocolos de Heredia, No. 768, (May 15, 1844), fols. 17f-19v. Pochet, Carlos Araya, “La minería en Costa Rica: 1821–1843,” Revista de Historia, 1, 2, (1975), p. 114.Google Scholar

25 ANCR, Protocolos “Lara y Chamorro”, No. 133, (July 5, 1887), fols. 1–9. The estate was then valued at 36,000 pesos, measuring 105 “manzanas.”

26 ANCR, Congreso, No. 5425 (census of Heredia, March 22, 1844), 38 fols.

27 ANCR, Protocolos de Cartago, No. 1120 (December 9,1844), fols. 58f-60f; No. 1125 (January 21-August 12, 1845), fols. 9f-20f, 28f-30f, 74v-75v; No. 1132 (March 19, 1846), fols. 8f-10f.

28 ANCR, Congreso, No. 742 (March 10, 1828), fol. 5v. For an early survey of the ecclesiastical question in newly independent Central America, see Williams, Mary W., “The Ecclesiastical Policy of Francisco Morazán and the Central American Liberals,” Hispanic American Historical Review, 3, 2, (May 1920), pp. 119143.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

29 For fuller details see, Gudmundson, , Estratificación socio-racial y económica de Costa Rica, 1700–1850, (San José, 1978), pp. 81125.Google Scholar For the Conservative decree ordering the Guanacaste consolidation see: ANCR, Congreso, No. 3389, (May 3–17, 1833). Early legislative reaction and commentary can be found in, Congreso, No. 1644, (May 10, 1833); No. 1699, (May 1, 1833).

30 Giralt, the new owner of the El Viejo ranch, actually offered to renounce his claims due to popular opposition (ANCR, Gobernación, No. 24, 852, (November 4, 1846), but his heirs later pressed the issue and eventually received “what was left of the property some twenty years later. See ANCR, Protocolos ‘Lara y Chamorro,’ No. 847, (April 4, 1868), fols. 4f-6v, 1 If.

31 For further detail on late nineteenth and early twentieth century Guanacaste see, Gudmundson, , Hacendados, precaristas y políticos: La ganadería y el latifundismo guanacasteco, 1800–1950 (San José, forthcoming).Google Scholar

32 Braulio Carrillo was virtual dictator from 1838 to 1842, and had been Chief of State since 1835. Paradoxically, he was identified with the anti-Morazán forces internationally. His brother, the priest Nicolás, may have claimed a conservative inspiration, but what was to be conserved locally could only be considered liberal in the Central American context. For a contrary view, one which claims the Carrillo brothers represented antagonistic class interests see, Cerdas, Rodolfo, Formación del Estado en Costa Rica, (San José, Universidad de Costa Rica, 2nd edition, 1978), p. 28.Google Scholar

33 Meléndez, Carlos, Dr. José María Montealegre, (San José, 1968)Google Scholar; and Cardoso, and Pérez, , Centroamérica y la economía occidental…, p. 238.Google Scholar

34 Meléndez, , Dr. José María Montealegre…, pp. 4951 Google Scholar (citing The New York Times’; report of Street protests by affected peasants in San José province). For a protest on the part of displaced common lands tillers in Alajuela see, ANCR, Congreso, No. 7010, (May 7–10, 1860), fols. lf-3f, in which they refer to the Mora regime as representative of the “oligarchy.” Mora’s self-interest had been apparent in his earlier purchase, through third parties, of the pious lands auctioned on a neighboring plot (ANCR, Protocolos ‘Lara y Chamorro,’ No. 380, Juez de Ministerio Nacional, July 6,1858, fols. 45v-47f) and in his creation of a State liquor monopoly which depended upon his estate’s sugar production (Meléndez, pp. 56–58).

35 For the Church-State polemic under Mora see, Meléndez, Dr. José María Montealegre…,pp. 51–54.

36 Ricardo Fernández Guardia, cited in Cerdas, , Formación del Estado…, p. 85.Google Scholar

37 Bazant, , A Concise History of Mexico…, pp. 57, as well as the studies cited in note 1.Google Scholar

38 Safford, Frank, “Bases of Political Alignment in Early Republican Spanish America,” pp. 71111,Google Scholar in Graham, Richard and Smith, Peter, eds., New Approaches in Latin American History, (Austin, Texas, 1974), quoting pages 9294.Google Scholar