¹ American Foreign Policy, Current Documents, 1961 (Washington, Department of State, Historical Office), p. 300. Address by President Kennedy to the American Society of Newspaper Editors, April 20, 1961.

² New York Times, April 29, 1961, 1. The record, as revealed in published Senate documents, indicates that there was a period after the Bay of Pigs episode when covert operations were diminished, if not stopped altogether. Prodded by Attorney General Robert Kennedy, however, the administration’s covert apparatus soon began the development of new conspiratorial approaches under the general name “Operation Mongoose”. These were, of course, just as violative of OAS obligations as previous CIA activities that had culminated in the Bay of Pigs. See Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, an Interim Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, 44th Congress, 1st Session, Senate Report No. 94–465 (Washington, Government Printing Office), pp. 136–137, (hereafter referred to as Alleged Assassination Plots).

³ Congressional Record, 87th Congress, 1st Session, Vol. 107, Part 6, pp. 7983–7986, May 15, 1961, House Concurrent Resolution 226.

⁴ Personal recollection. My efforts to obtain access to the Department of State records covering the period of this study were unavailing even though I was, during much of the time, Director of the Department’s office responsible for OAS affairs and either prepared personally or approved many of the documents on file. It would have been helpful, for example, to read again the message that was sent from the Department and the responses that were received, but that documentation is not, I believe, indispensable to the accuracy of this account.

⁵ I am indebted to former President Alberto Lleras Camargo of Colombia for calling my attention to and sending me a copy of the document he prepared for President Kennedy. It was published in a book by Hernando Agudelo Villa, Minister of Economy in the Lleras government and later one of the “Nine Wise Men” who contributed to formulating the Alliance for Progress program. The book is La Revolución del Desarrollo (Bogotá, Editoriál Roble, 1966) and the Lleras documents appear on pp. 100–116. The translations are my own. There were actually three memoranda, the second and third having to do with procedural aspects of the matter. Hereafter referred to as Lleras Memorandum.

⁶ Kennedy’s statement outlining the “Alliance for Progress” as he conceived it had been made in March shortly before the Bay of Pigs operation. For details on the program and its antecedents see Dreier, John C. (Editor), The Alliance for Progress, Problems and Perspectives (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962)Google Scholar and the same author’s The Organization of American States and the Hemisphere Crisis (New York, Harper and Row, 1962).

⁷ Lleras Memorandum, p. 105. Lleras was inclined to believe at the time, however, that it would be better not to proceed if the consultations did not reveal that at least two of the three OAS members of greatest population, prestige and importance—Brazil, Mexico and Argentina—concurred.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ I doubted then, however, and still doubt that the real meaning of the Lleras Memorandum was fully comprehended by the President’s White House advisers, some of whom had become “overnight experts” on Latin America. His criticism of previous United States reliance on the unilateral approach may have been too subtle for such activists as the Attorney General.

¹¹ Considerable public attention was directed during this period to the maneuver, proposed by Castro, under which prisoners captured at the Bay of Pigs would be traded for tractors, a deal which finally went through after extensive haggling over details.

¹² Cuba, The U.S. and Russia, 1960–63 (New York, Facts on File, Inc., 1964) p. 59.

^l3 New York Times, May 9, 1961, 1.

¹⁴ Alleged Assassination Plots, pp. 191–216.

¹⁵ Kane, William Everett, Civil Strife in Latin America: A Legal History (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967), pp. 213–220.Google Scholar

¹⁶ Hispanic American Report, 14 (September, 1961), 622 and 14 (October, 1961), 713. I found this monthly review of events in Latin America extremely helpful, the only published source that dealt with developments in more than an episodic manner. Fortunately, most of the issues of the periodical are available in the Library of Congress.

¹⁷ See Berle, Adolf A., Navigating the Rapids, 1916–1971 (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1973)Google Scholar for an account of the rapid disillusionment of some of the democratic Latin American leaders with Castro.

¹⁸ Mexico introduced a resolution in the United Nations General Assembly that was clearly intended as a rebuke to the United States, but it did not receive the required two-thirds majority. New York Times, April 22, 1961: Department of State Bulletin, 44 (May, 1961)685.

¹⁹ Berle, , Navigating the Rapids, p. 736:Google Scholar New York Times, May 11, 1961 and May 14, 1961. Brazilian President Quadros displayed publicly his government’s rejection of even the thought of OAS sanctions, but that did not affect United States economic support for Brazil which, on May 17, received the benefits of a 648 million dollar program of economic assistance from the United States and the World Bank. New York Times, May 18, 1961.

²⁰ Frondizi received an unusual amount of White House attention during those weeks. He had two personal meetings with Kennedy, Ambassador Stevenson made a hurriedly arranged trip to Trinidad to confer with him as the President’s representative, and Frondizi’s emissaries had special sessions with Kennedy’s close adviser, Richard Goodwin. The Argentine President’s efforts to appear “constructive” in seeking a solution for the Cuban problem were probably aimed at keeping on good terms with Kennedy, but also, more importantly to him, at appeasing Argentine military leaders. He failed in the latter purpose, and was deposed early in 1962.

²¹ Halpern, Maurice. The Rise and Decline of Fidel Castro (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1972), pp. 117–119.Google Scholar Goodwin’s account of his conversation of Guevara appeared in The New Yorker, May 25, 1968, pp. 93–114. See also Morrison, De Lesseps, Latin American Mission (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1965), pp. 101–105.Google Scholar Ambassador Morrison was the United States Representative on the Council of the Organization of American States; his account of these and other events is interesting but it does not always reflect full knowledge of what was going on.

²² Ambassador Stevenson concurred in Lleras’ view on this after his return from a “good will” trip to Latin America in June. New York Times, June 23, 1961, 8.

²³ Skidmore, Thomas E., Politics in Brazil, 1930–64 (New York, Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 205–213 Google Scholar: Halperin, , Rise and Decline, p. 119.Google Scholar

²⁴ Department of State Bulletin, 14 (May 22, 1961), 760: New York Times, May 3, 1941, 1,4.

²⁵ Cynicism about the OAS role was expressed with particular vehemence during this period by Adolf Berle, who seems to have been groomed, or groomed himself, to be Kennedy’s principal adviser on Latin America but who was already beginning to reveal his ineffectiveness. See his Navigating the Rapids, pp. 738–756.

²⁶ United States Department of State, The Castro Regime in Cuba, August 1, 1961.

²⁷ Council of the Organization of American States, Acta de la Sesión Extraordinaria, 16 octubre 1961 (OEA/Ser G/II,c-a-417).

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Undersecretary of State Chester Bowles, who was presiding over a meeting of United States ambassadors to South America in Lima, was informed there in general terms of the prospective action by the Peruvian Foreign Minister, but was apparently unaware of its significance or paid it little attention. Word that the request had been formalized reached Bowles and his party a few days later when they had moved on to San Jose, Costa Rica for a similar meeting of ambassadors to Central American countries. As Alternate United States Representative on the OAS Council, attending the San Jose meeting, I was hastily despatched to Washington to make certain that an authorized representative, informed of what was going on, would attend the OAS Council session in which the Peruvian petition was considered.

³⁰ COAS, Acta de la Sesión Extraordinaria, 25 octubre 1961 (OEA/Ser. G/III, c-a-419). Lack of any consensus on what should be done was reflected in the October 25 decision to refer the Peruvian initiative to the COAS General Committee. Four weeks later, on November 25, the General Committee decided unanimously that the Peruvian request should be dealt with by the Inter-American Peace Committee, and this was approved by the Council on November 22. See American Foreign Policy, Current Documents, 1961, p. 319.

³¹ COAS. Acta de la Sesión Extraordinaria, 14 noviembre 1961 (OEA/Ser. G/II, c-a-422). The reference is to the OAS Foreign Ministers’ Meeting held in San Jose, Costa Rica in August, 1960.

³² See above.

³³ COAS, Acta de la Sesión Extraordinaria, 4 diciembre 1961, (OEA/Ser. G/II, c-a-422). On November 11, Venezuela broke diplomatic relations with Cuba, charging “… violent and unjustified attacks on the political order and institutions of Venezuela”. Facts on File Yearbook, 1961, 419.

³⁴ At a press conference on November 17, Secretary of State Rusk indicated United States support for both the Peruvian and Colombian initiatives. Department of State Bulletin 45 (December 4, 1961), 920. Ambassador Morrison consistently reflected the pressures from Congress for strong OAS action, with which he agreed.

³⁵ American Foreign Policy, Current Documents, 1961, p. 319. The Inter-American Peace Committee proposed that, among other things, it undertake a fact-finding trip to Cuba, a proposal that found no echo in Cuba. The report the committee prepared eventually emerged as the basic background document for the Punta del Este Meeting.

³⁶ Alleged Assassination Plots, pp. 135–140. On November 30, 1961, President Kennedy apparently gave his blessing to “Operation Mongoose” which authorized use of “ … all available assets to help Cuba overthrow the communist regime”.

³⁷ American Foreign Policy, Current Documents, 1961, pp. 320–323; Matthews, Herbert L., Revolution in Cuba, an Essay in Understanding (New York, Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1975), p. 155 Google Scholar and pp. 231–240; Berle, , Navigating the Rapids, p. 757 Google Scholar; Dinerstein, Herbert S., The Making of the Missile Crisis, October, 1962 (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), pp. 118–119 Google Scholar; Halpern, , Rise and Decline, p. 120.Google Scholar

³⁸ COAS, Acta de la Sesión Extraordinaria, 4 diciembre 1961 (OEA/Ser G/II, c-a-427). See also Morrison, , Latin American Mission, pp. 157–158.Google Scholar Uruguayan Ambassador Clulow stated that he had come to the meeting prepared to support convocation of an MFM under the OAS Charter, but decided to go along with the majority favoring the Rio Treaty procedure when assured there would be no compromise of the non-intervention principle. He was said to have been rebuked by his Foreign Minister and offered to resign his post, but he continued to serve in it. Furthermore, the episode did not keep the Uruguayan government from subsequently agreeing to serve as host to the meeting.

³⁹ COAS. Acta de la Sesión Extraordinaria. 4 diciembre 1961 (OEA/Ser G/II, c-a-427).

⁴⁰ Smith, Arthur K., Mexico and the Cuban Revolution: Foreign Policy in Mexico Under López Mateos (Ph.D. diss. Cornell University, 1970), pp. 87–169 Google Scholar; de Brody, Olga Pellicer, México y la Revolución Cubana (México, D.F., E. Colegio de Mexico, 1972), p. 73.Google Scholar These two works are remarkably similar in their treatment of this extraordinary episode.

⁴¹ COAS. Acta de la Sesión Extraordinaria, 22 diciembre, 1961 (OEA/Ser G/II, c-a-430).

⁴² Schlesinger, Arthur M. Jr., A Thousand Days, John F. Kennedy in the White House (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965);Google Scholar Morrison, Latin American Mission. Both of these accounts bring out the rather devious game Frondizi continued to play up to the opening of the Foreign Ministers Meeting. Both authors assert, and the Argentines have claimed, that Argentina originated the idea of excluding Castro’s regime from OAS participation, even though that government ultimately refused to support the action. It is conceivable that the concept may have emerged during the endless round of talks with the Argentines, but it was by no means original with them. It was simply part of the logic of a situation which found a member government of the OAS claiming the rights of membership while dedicating itself to actions that were inconsistent with its obligations. The formula which actually resulted in exclusion was that worked out by Assistant Secretary of State Robert F. Woodward, as will be shown below.

⁴³ New York Times, January 13, 1962, 1.

⁴⁴ New York Times, December 15–19, 1961, passim. The President’s visit to Colombia also provided an opportunity for direct consultation on the Cuban matter between Kennedy and Lleras and their aides, but no formula that seemed likely to win over the governments resisting action was devised.

⁴⁵ New York Times, January 16, 1962, 1.

⁴⁶ Schlesinger, . A Thousand Days, p. 780.Google Scholar Absence of a consensus was not limited to Latin Americans. The United States Delegation included members of the Congress who had been most vehement in their demands for OAS anti-Castro action. Kennedy’s political ambassador to the OAS, de Lesseps Morrison—former Mayor of New Orleans—was a persistent “hard-liner”. On the other hand, those closest to Kennedy were still hoping to find a formula to which Argentina and Brazil, and perhaps others, would agree.

⁴⁷ COAS, Acta de la Sesión Extraordinaria, 4 enero 1962 (OEA/Ser G II, c-a-431); New York Times, January 18 and 19, 1962.

⁴⁸ This is my own conclusion based on close observation and consultation with others in a position to know. With one possible exception, described later, there was little if any of the “… arm-twisting, horse trading, and bribery” that “… reached unusual proportions …”, which is alleged by Halperin, (Rise and Decline), p. 120.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ Octava Reunión de Consulta de Minístros de Relaciones Exteriores, Punta del Este, 22–31 enero 1962, Actas y documentos (OEA/Ser F/III 8), pp. 77-83. This official record of the Punta del Este meeting, which is available at the Columbus Memorial Library of the OAS, in Washington, D.C., is referred to hereafter as Actas y Documents, 8th MFM.

⁵⁰ There is no satisfactory translation into English of convivencia interamericana, which means literally “inter-American living together”. Franklin D. Roosevelt’s definition of the Good Neighbor Policy probably comes closest to expressing its meaning briefly, but only one who has really seen it in action can truly understand the term.

⁵¹ Actasy Documentos, 8th MFM, pp. 87–88.

⁵² de Brody, Pollicer, México y la Revolucíon Cubana, p. 29 Google Scholar and p. 73; Smith, Mexico and the Cuban Revolution. Both of these authors note the enthusiasm in Mexican financial and business circles caused by Tello’s statement at Punta del Este. This was in sharp contrast with the alarms sounded from the same sources in December when the Mexican ambassador to the OAS was the only one to vote with Cuba against convocation of the meeting.

⁵³ This is my personal reaction, one which I had as I listened with astonishment to the Foreign Minister’s statement, with its unmistakable definition of the incompatibility thesis. Another listener who had a similar reaction was Walt E. Rostow, a member of the delegation who was principally concerned with Alliance for Progress aspects. See Rostow, W. W., The Diffusion of Power (New York, Macmillan, 1972), p. 214.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ Actas y Documentos, 8th MFM, p. 149.

⁵⁵ Ibid., and Schlesinger, , A Thousand Days, p. 782.Google Scholar

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Actas y Documentos, 8th MFM, Document 29. The significance of a decision to apply the Rio Treaty sanctions lay in the fact that approval by a ⅔ vote would legally obligate all OAS members to put them into effect.

⁵⁸ Actas y Documentos, 8th MFM, pp. 174–194. Dorticós charges of U.S. planning for further exploits against the Cuban revolution were not unfounded, but there may be doubt that either he or Secretary Rusk knew of them at that time. (See Alleged Assassination Plots, pp. 136 ff.).

⁵⁹ See footnote 42, above.

⁶⁰ My version of this episode is based on information from Ambassador Woodward, who was a direct participant in the conversations with Price Mars and the United States officials in Washington. It differs from that of Slater, Jerome, The OAS and United States Foreign Policy (Columbus, Ohio State University Press, 1967), p. 154,Google Scholar which implies that the loan was a new idea dreamed up for the occasion to obtain the Haitian vote. To those familiar with the early stages of the Alliance for Progress procedures, it is not at all strange that loans approved in principle should have encountered bureaucratic log-jams. Nor is it difficult to understand why the Haitians would use the leverage they had to get things unstuck. The remarkable aspect of implementation of the very large grant and loan program of the Alliance for Progress in those days was the absence of its use to apply political pressure, especially on an issue to which such importance was attached.

⁶¹ Schlesinger, , A Thousand Days, pp. 782–783.Google Scholar

⁶² My recollection, confirmed by Ambassador Woodward, of the consultation between him and Uruguayan Foreign Minister Martinez Montero, at which Martinez’ adviser, Felix Pollen, and I were present. It was actually Polleri who recognized immediately that the small but significant change in wording would solve the Uruguan legalistic problem, and so advised his chief. See Schlesinger, , A Thousand Days, p. 784,Google Scholar who recognizes Woodward’s accomplishment but doesn’t explain it.

⁶³ Personal recollection of a late afternoon effort to track down the Venezuelan Ambassador to the OAS and reach an understanding.

⁶⁴ Actasy Documentos, 8th MFM, pp. 228–264.

⁶⁵ Ibid. p. 238.

⁶⁶ Inter-American Relations, pp. 232–233.

⁶⁷ Ibid. pp. 227–234.

⁶⁸ American Foreign Policy, Current Documents, 1962; Morrison, , Latin American Mission, p. 197.Google Scholar

⁶⁹ Department of State Bulletin, 46 (February 19, 1962), 283–4.

⁷⁰ Kenner, and Petras, , Fidel Castro Speaks (New York, Grove Press, 1969), p. 105 Google Scholar; American Foreign Policy, Current Documents pp. 336–338.

⁷¹ Acta de k Sesión Ordinaria del Consejo de la OEA, 14 febrero 1962, (OEA/Ser G/II, c-a-433).