¹ Refer to Thompson, I.A.A. “Castile: Polity, Fiscality and Fiscal Crisis,” in Hoffman, Philip T. and Norberg, Kathryn eds., Fiscal Crisis, Liberty, and Representative Government 1450–1789 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), pp. 140–180.Google Scholar Gelabert, Juan “Castille, 1504–1808,” in Bonney, Richard, ed., The Rise of the Fiscal State in Europe c. 1200–1815 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 201–241.Google Scholar Also see Bonney, Richard “Revenues,” in Bonney, Richard, ed., Economic Systems and State Finance (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 422–505.Google Scholar

² For imperial finances in the eighteenth century refer to Marichal, Carlos La Bancarrota del Virreinato. Nueva España y las Fiananzas del Imperio Español, 1780–1810 (Mexico: Fideicomiso Historia de las Américas & Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1999).Google Scholar Also, Barbier, Jacques “Peninsular Finance and Colonial Trade: The Dilemma of Charles IV's Spain,” Journal of Latin American Studies 12.1 (May, 1980): pp. 21“37;CrossRefGoogle Scholar Artola, Miguel La Hacienda del Antiguo Régimen (Madrid: Alinaza, 1982);Google Scholar Tedde, Pedro, “Crisis del Estado y Deuda Pública a Comienzos del siglo XIX,” Hacienda Pública Española (1987).Google Scholar

³ From 1750s to 1780, New Spain sent on average one million pesos annually to the metropolitan treasury while, in the same period, it sent about three million pesos annually to the military situados in the Caribbean. In the 1790s, both transfers increased to five million pesos annually. Mexican viceroys frequently requested loans and donativos as the ordinary revenues did not yield enough funds for keeping up with those transfers. Marichal, Carlos , “Las Guerras Imperiales y los Prestamos Novohispanos, 1781–1804,” Historia Mexicana 39. 4 (1990): 881–907.Google Scholar In the late eighteenth century, taxation in England represented 24 percent of per capita income, 12 percent in France, and 20 percent in Mexico. Marichal, La Bancarrota del Virreinato, chapter 2. Evidence for stressing the compulsory aspects of loans and donativos comes primarily from donativos collected in the 1780s when King Charles III stipulated the precise amount he expected to receive from his subjects. Indians and castas were expected to contribute one peso per hearth and nobles and Spaniards two pesos. Marichal, La Bancarrota del Virreinato, appendix 3. The same applied to New Granada in 1781. Phelan, John L. The People and the King. The Comunero Revolution in Colombia, 1781 (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1978), p. 29.Google Scholar

⁴ Refer to Domínguez Ortiz, Antonio, “La Desigualdad Contributiva en Castilla durante el Siglo XVII,” Anuario de Historia del Derecho Español (1951–52): pp. 1222–1272.Google Scholar See also Garzón Pareja, Manuel La Hacienda de Carlos II (Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Fiscales, Ministerio de Hacienda, 1980), pp. 331–393 Google Scholar and Canga Argüelles, José, Diccionario de Hacienda, 2 volumes (Madrid: Atlas, 1968).Google Scholar

⁵ The Spanish crown traditionally relied on German, Dutch, Genoese, and Portuguese bankers for managing its debt. In the 1640s, the crown lost access to important international lines of credit due to the Dutch revolt, the separation of the Portuguese territories, and the persecution of Portuguese Jewish bankers by the Inquisition. Donativos and advanced payments from Castilian tax farmers and municipal institutions shifted credit to Castilian private and corporate hands. I.A.A. Thompson, “Castile: Polity, Fiscality.” For the role of municipalities as sources of public credit stressing both the political and financial aspects, see Ruiz Martin, Felipe “Procedimientos Crediticios para la Recaudación de los Tributos Fiscales en las Ciudades Castellanas en los siglos XVI y XVII: El Caso de Valladolid,” in Otazu, Alfonso, ed., Dinero y Crédito (siglos XVI al XIX): Actas del Coloquio Internacional de Historia Económica (Madrid, s.n., 1978), pp. 37–47 Google Scholar and Martinez Ruiz, José I. “Donativos y Emprestitos Sevillanos a la Hacienda Real (Siglos XVI y XVII),” Revista de Historia Económica, 2. 3 (1984): pp. 233–244.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁶ For instance, in the seventeenth century several Castilian towns requested to be promoted to the status of villa in exchange of their donations. Additionally, in 1638, the commissioners in charge of collecting donativos issued pardons and remissions of criminal sentences (including homicide) to several contributors. In 1643, a donor demanded that the crown issued a written assurance that no other taxes would be imposed upon all donativo contributors and in 1679, the previous administrator of the ice monopoly offered to donate a substantial sum in order to end a pending trial with the crown and recover his right to manage the monopoly. Dominguez Ortiz, “La Desigualdad Contributiva en Castilla”; Garzón Pareja, La Hacienda de Carlos II; Thompson, “Castile: Polity, Fiscality.” In 1629, the encomenderos from Quito obtained from the king the right to inherit their encomiendas from to two to three successive generations in exchange of a substantial donativo. Phelan, , The Kingdom of Quito, p. 109.Google Scholar

⁷ For the Spanish foreign policy from the 1780s onwards see Bakewell, Peter J. A History of Latin America: Empires and Sequels 1450–1930 (Maiden: Blackwell Publishers, 1997).Google Scholar Also, Anes, Gonzalo, El Siglo de las Luces (Madrid: Alianza, 1994), chapters 6 and 8.Google Scholar

⁸ Treasury officials in Buenos Aires recorded these donations in the royal account books as well as in the Libros de Tomas de Razón. Additionally, viceroys made a detailed list of donors, which was also sent to the king through the official correspondence. For my doctoral research on the topic, I compiled from these sources databases for each collection of loans and donativos and divided the contributions into regions following the boundaries of the intendencias. Within each intendencia, I allocated donations according to the social, ethnic, and occupational categories stated in the donativos. Primary sources for this database include, Archivo General de la Nación Argentina (AGNA), Sala IX, Tomas de Razón, Libro 60 (AGNA IX-8-7-12, 1793-1801). I found additional rosters at the Archivo General de Indias (AGI) in the volumes of viceregal correspondence including, AGI, Buenos Aires 85, Duplicado 154; AGI, Buenos Aires 88 Duplicado 235; AGI, Buenos Aires 90, Duplicado 55; AGI, Buenos Aires 93, Duplicado s/n; AGI, Buenos Aires 94, Duplicados 1 and 2; AGI, Buenos Aires 96 Duplicado s/n and 45; AGI, Buenos Aires 97, Duplicados 49, 50, 54, 78 and 80. AGI, Buenos Aires 109, Duplicado 8. Donativos for the English Invasions of Buenos Aires were primarily collected through the Cabildo and were recorded in Acuerdos del Extinguido Cabildo de Buenos Aires, Serie IV, Tomo II, 1805–1807 (Buenos Aires: Archivo General de la Nación, 1926). Contributions not expressed in pesos fuertes were converted into that currency following the guidelines provided by Burzio, Humberto, Diccionario de la Moneda Hispanoamericana, 2 vols. (Buenos Aires: Jose Toribio Medina, 1958)Google Scholar. Four or more reales were rounded off to the next peso. For example, a donativo of 16 pesos 3 reales was computed as 16 pesos while one of 16 pesos 5 reales was computed as 17 pesos.

⁹ Klein, Herbert, “Structure and Profitability of Royal Finance in the Viceroyalty of Rio de la Plata,” The Hispanic American Historical Review 53.3 (August, 1973): pp. 440–469.CrossRefGoogle Scholar For loans and donativos in the viceroyalty of New Spain refer to Marichal's, Carlos work especially, “Las Guerras Imperiales y los Prestamos Novohispanos, 1781–1804,” Historia Mexicana 39. 4 (1990): pp. 881–907 Google Scholar and for a summary of his important contributions to this topic see Marichal's book, La Bancarrota del Virreinato.

¹⁰ AGI, Buenos Aires 120, Duplicado num. 282. For the correspondence between the porteño merchants and their agent refer to Archivo General de la Nación Argentina. Consulado de Buenos Aires. Antecedentes, Actas, Documentos. Volume 1, 1785–1795 (Buenos Aires, 1936). Also, Socolow, Susan M. The Merchants of Colonial Buenos Aires, 1778–1810 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1978),CrossRefGoogle Scholar chapter 6 and Tjarks, German, El Consulado de Buenos Aires y sus Proyecciones en la Historia del Rio de la Plata, 2 vols. (Buenos Aires: Universiad de Buenos Aires, Facultad Filosofía y Letras, 1962).Google Scholar

¹¹ AGI, Buenos Aires 120, Duplicado 282. Similar financial operations and the political opportunities associated with them have been studied primarily for the consulado of Mexico City. Refer to Valle Pavón, Guillermina del, “El Apoyo Financiero del Consulado a las Guerras Españolas del siglo XVIII,” in Cano, Maria del Pilar Martinez López and Pavón, Guillermina del Valle, eds., El Crédito en Nueva España (Mexico: Instituto Mora El Colegio de Michoacan, El Colegio de Mexico, Instituto de Investigaciones Historicas, 1998)Google Scholar. Germán Tjarks argues that revenues as well as loans and donativos channeled through the consulado were a burden that violated the institution's charter as they were shipped to Spain instead of being invested locally in charity and public works. Tjarks does not seem to fully grasp the financial and political significance of these transactions in a society in which credit was scarce and expensive. Tjarks, , El Consulado de Buenos Aires, vol.1 Google Scholar, chapters II and VI.

¹² The French Bourbons also borrowed from corporate bodies (the clergy, the parlements, venal office holders, and provincial estates) as an alternative to expensive credit. Although this choice was financially attractive it was also politically costly as these groups demanded concessions in return for financial services. Paradoxically, in old regime France those who enjoyed fiscal immunities and were politically powerful (and potentially obstructive) aided the king in two essential functions: borrowing and tax collection. As opposed to the case of England where the parliament controlled the budget and increases in taxation, in France there was no need for such national representative institution as those issues were negotiated at the local and corporate levels. For England refer to Brewer, John, The Sinews of Power. War, Money and the English State, 1688–1783 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1989)Google Scholar and the discussion that followed his work in Lawrence Stone, ed., An Imperial State at War: Britain from 1689–1815 (London: Routledge, 1994). For France, see Hoffman, Philip T., “Early Modern France, 1450–1700,” in Hoffman, and Norberg, , eds., Fiscal Crisis, pp. 226–252;Google Scholar Booney, Richard, “France, 1494–1815,” in Booney, , The Rise of the Fiscal State, pp. 122–176.Google Scholar Norberg, Kathryn, “The French Fiscal Crisis of 1788 and the Financial Origins of the Revolution of 1789,” in Hoffman, and Norberg, , eds., Fiscal Crisis, pp. 253–298.Google Scholar Collins, James B., The State in Early Modern France (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).CrossRefGoogle Scholar Booney, Richard, “The Eighteenth Century II: The Struggle for Great Power and Status and the End of the Old Fiscal Regime,” in Booney, , ed., Economic Systems, pp. 315–390.Google Scholar Kwass, Michael, Privilege and the Politics of Taxation in Eighteenth-Century France: Liberté, égalité, fiscalité (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).Google Scholar

¹³ For information on Gaspar de Santa Coloma and other porteño merchants and their wives refer to Socolow, The Merchants.

¹⁴ First, the crown issued bonds for nine million pesos and through the second issue it added five million more. The Banco de San Carlos was a relatively successful financial institution. By 1788, the bonds had recovered their face value. However, the existing vales reales were worth 23 million pesos and servicing them required setting aside from the budget almost 900,000 pesos per year. The devaluation of bonds in 1792 significantly disrupted the economy as vales reales circulated as paper money. The wars of the 1790s and the Napoleonic wars forced the crown to issue even more bonds. Refer to Wobeser, Gisela Von, Dominiación Colonial: La Consolidación de Vales Reales en Nueva España, 1804–1812 (Mexico: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Instituto de investigaciones Históricas, 2003).Google Scholar

¹⁵ The consolidación was followed by two decrees that put the properties of the Colegios Mayores on the market and ordered the owners of all entailed properties to sell them wholly or in part. The consolidación affected not only real estate property but also the liquid capital either possessed by or invested through the institutions included in the decree. The crown did not actually seize estates but rather forced their sale in order to raise funds for the fondo de amortización. The liquid capital possessed by lay or religious institutions affected by the decree was also channeled towards the same fund. In both cases, the owners received three percent annual interest for the funds deposited in the amortization fund. Thus, through this measure, the crown exchanged expensive debt for a relatively cheap one. Gisela Von Wobeser, Dominiación Colonial.

¹⁶ For the impact of the French and Haitian revolutions see Johnson, Lyman, “Juan Barbarin: The 1795 Conspiracy in Buenos Aires,” in Andrien, Kenneth, ed., The Human Tradition in Colonial Latin America (Wilmington: SR Books/ Scholarly Resources Inc., 2002), pp. 259–277;Google Scholar and Geggus, David P. (ed.), The Impact of the Haitian Revolution in the Atlantic World (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina, 2001).Google Scholar

¹⁷ The royal ordinance issued on 20 June 1798 and the royal decree of 27 May 1799 were inserted and quoted by Viceroy Avilés in a letter sent to Minister Soler on 5 June 1799. AGI, Buenos Aires, Legajo 126. Duplicado num. 13. The tone and wording of these documents was at odds with the royal order issued in March of 1793 through which the king kindly requested, in addition to the donativo, the celebration of masses and prayers in support for the Spanish Armies.

¹⁸ For trade disruptions during the 1790s refer to Fisher, John, “The Imperial Response to ‘Free Trade’: Spanish Imports from Spanish America, 1778–1796,” Journal of Latin American Studies 17.1 (May, 1985): pp. 35–78 and “Commerce and Imperial Decline: Spanish Trade with Spanish America, 1797–1820,” Journal of Latin American Studies 30.3 (Oct., 1998): pp. 459–479.CrossRefGoogle Scholar For prices in the eighteenth century refer to Tandeter, Enrique and Johnson, Lyman, eds., Essays of Price History of Eighteenth-Century Latin America (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1990).Google Scholar

¹⁹ Socolow, Susan M., The Bureaucrats of Colonial Buenos Aires, 1769–1810: Amor al Real Servicio (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1987).Google Scholar

²⁰ It was recorded on the 31 January 1799 meeting that “ … despite its current financial burdens [the consulado] agreed to donate another 100,000 pesos to profess its love for the king and its zeal for the wellbeing of the state.…” The same document established that the consulado would back the loans taken at an interest rate of five percent with its own revenues. Consulado de Buenos Aires. Antecedentes, Actas, volume 4, p. 63.

²¹ Socolow, , The Merchants, chapter 6.Google Scholar

²² Bernarda Lezica belonged to one of the most powerful and successful merchant families of colonial Buenos Aires. As in the case of Josefa Lajorrota, she was a widow who managed her late husband's state.

²³ AGI, Buenos Aires, Legajo 120, Duplicado 288 and AGNA, Sala IX, Tomas de Razón, Libro 60, p. 245.

²⁴ For military operations during the English Invasions refer to Fortin, J.L.R., Las Invasiones Inglesas (Buenos Aires: Editora Cía. Lamsa, 1967)Google Scholar and Beverina, Juan, Las Invasiones Inglesas al Rio de la Plata (1806–1807) (Buenos Aires: Circulo Militar, 1939).Google Scholar After capturing the city, General Beresford negotiated the capitulation with those authorities he found at the fortress: the military commanders, the cabildo, the audiencia, and the bishop of Buenos Aires. Early in July of 1806, the royal funds Sobremonte had taken to Cordoba were shipped back to Buenos Aires and a week later most of them were sent on to England. Instituto de Estudios Históricos sobre la Reconquista y Defensa de Buenos Aires, La Reconquista y Defensa de Buenos Aires, 1806–1807 (Buenos Aires, 1947); Roberts, , Las Invasiones, p. 155 Google Scholar; La Reconquista y Defensa, p. 211. For a discussion of the changing attitudes of the British government towards South America in general and the Rio de la Plata in particular see Gallo, Klaus, Great Britain and Argentina. From Invasion to Recognition, 1806–1826 (New York: Palgrave, in association with St. Anthony's College, Oxford, 2001), chapters 2 and 3.Google Scholar

²⁵ Refer to the Acuerdos held on 26 August 1806 and 26 January 1807. Archivo General de la Nación Argentina. Acuerdos del Extinguido Cabildo de Buenos Aires, Series IV, vol. II.

²⁶ For the militarization of the city of Buenos Aires see Donghy, Tulio Halperín, Revolución y Guerra, formacíon de una élite Dirigente en la Argentina Criolla (Buenos Aires: Siglo Veintiuno Argentina, 1972),Google Scholar and Guerra y Finanzas en los orígenes del Estado Argentino (Buenos Aires: 1982); “Militarización Revolucionaria en Buenos Aires, 1806–1815,” in Donghi, Tulio Halperin and Klein, Herbert, eds. El Ocaso del Orden Colonial en Hispanoamérica (Buenos Aires, 1978), pp. 123–158.Google Scholar Also, refer to Berlnaldo's, Pilar González works, “Producción de una Nueva Legitimidad: Ejército y Sociedades Patrióticas en Buenos Aires entre 1810 y 1813,” Cuadernos Americanos 17 (1989): pp. 134–156;Google Scholar “La Revolución Francesa y la emergencia de Nuevas Prácticas de la Política: La Irrupción de la Siciabilidad Política en en Rio de la Plata Revolucionario, 1810–1815,” Boletín del Instituto de Historia Argentina y Americana “Dr. E. Ravignani” 3rd Series, 3 (1991): 7–28; “Las Pulperías de Buenos Aires: Historia de una Expresión de Sociabilidad Popular,” Siglo XIX 7.13 (1993): pp. 27–54; “La ‘Identidad Nacional’ en el Rio de la Plata Post-Colonial. Continuidades y Rupturas con el Antiguo Régimen,” Anuario IHES 12 (1997): pp. 109–122.

²⁷ The roster for the 1806 donativo was published in Instituto de Estudios Históricos sobre la Reconquista y Defensa de Buenos Aires, La Reconquista, pp. 271–276. For the regional origin for the donations collected in 1807 and 1808 see, Acuerdos del Extinguido Cabildo de Buenos Aires, series IV, vols. II and III.

²⁸ The term comerciante referred to those engaged in the import and export of goods. Almaceneros were the wholesalers and tenderos were retailers. The categories were not mutually exclusive as there were merchants who expanded their business into the wholesale and retail trades. Additionally, each category included businesses of wide-ranging sizes.

²⁹ In the 1806 roster, with the exception of city councilors and bureaucrats, donors were listed without making any reference to their occupation. I was able to identify merchants, tenderos, and almaceneros by searching for their names in the following sources: AGNA, IX-4-7-5, Expediente sobre exceptuar del Servicio de Milicias al Comercio (1798) and the Almanak Mercantil o Guia de Comerciantes published in Madrid from 1801 through 1807.

³⁰ The new excise tax collected two reales per arroba on domestic sugar and six reales per arroba imported sugar. Domestic and Spanish liquor paid 12 reales per barrel while imported liquor was charged with four pesos per barrel. Domestic and Spanish wines were taxed at six reales per barrel and two pesos for the imported ones. Acuerdos del Extinguido Cabildo, series IV, vol. 2. Ensink, Oscar, Proprios y Arbitrios del Cabildo de Buenos Aires, 1580–1821 (Madrid, 1990).Google Scholar

³¹ After the first English Invasion, the cabildo's minutes recorded frequent requests of funds coming from royal treasurers. When Viceroy Sobremonte delegated his military and political authority to Santiago Liniers and the Audiencia, both of them relied on the cabildo's funds to pay for their increased expenses.

³² Unfortunately, there are no records accurately itemizing the cabildo's expenses for 1806–1808. The cabildo's propios y arbitrios only provide yearly totals and the Acuerdos, although making note of the individual expenses the municipality agreed to pay for, in many cases did not record the amounts nor did the date the disbursement actually took place. However, it is evident that the city councilmen agreed to pay for an unusual number of bills associated with the military campaigns such as dowries for the orphan daughters of solders, pensions for the veterans' widows and salaries and uniforms and supplies for the troops. Refer to the Acuerdos celebrated between 15 August and 30 December 1806. Acuerdos del Extinguido, vol. 2, series IV.

³³ The cabildo's treasury did not record the collection of this donativo. However, a roster of donors and their pledges was found in AGI, Buenos Aires 96.

³⁴ In 1804, the crown reopened trade with neutral nations for six years. Merchants profiting from it were requested to donate 20,000 pesos to the crown. As it was impossible for the consulado to establish in advance which merchants would benefit from the measure, it took a loan to pay for that sum. On 14 July 1805, in addition to the avería, the consulado was ordered to collect an import and export duty of 1.5 percent on all merchandise traded in Buenos Aires and a tax of 0.5 percent on the silver exported through the viceroyalty. These revenues were destined to boost the funds of the consolidación and for that purpose they had to be transferred to the royal treasury every month. Consequently, the consulado lost a portion of its own revenue and, unsurprisingly, when the following year it was ordered to solicit a loan, there were hardly any investors willing to contribute. Tjarks, , El Consulado de Buenos Aires, chapter 6.Google Scholar

³⁵ For a discussion of the political divisions within the consulado during this period see González, Julio C., El Real Consulado de Buenos Aires durante las Invasiones Inglesas (1806–1807) (Buenos Aires, 1941).Google Scholar

³⁶ Cordoba proved to be a poor choice as there were neither units of the regular army stationed in the area (only militia) nor sufficient resources for quickly financing his military campaign. Furthermore, by surrendering the royal treasury to the British, Sobremonte gave away the only funds at his disposal to pay an army.

³⁷ After negotiating with Beresford, vecinos and authorities cooperated with the aggressor. However, as soon as it became known that the English only had a small number of troops (1,641 men) to hold a city of 40,000 people, they began to draft various plans to expel them. Viceroy Sobremonte planed to recapture the city. Porteño residents fashioned daring plots to kidnap and/or kill General Beresford. In the end, the plan that succeeded was that of Captain Santiago de Liners's who, supported by Ruiz Hiudobro (Montevideo's Governor), gathered the remaining professional troops in the area and, with the help of volunteers recruited in Montevideo and in the surroundings of Buenos Aires, recovered the capital on 12 August 1806. Beverina, , Las Invasiones, chapter XII.Google Scholar

³⁸ While organizing his military campaign in Cordoba, Sobremonte requested that Ruiz Huidobro send soldiers, weapons, and funds. The governor of Montevideo withheld his men and resources arguing that he needed them to defend his city. Beverina, , Las Invasiones, vol.1, pp. 337, 366–377.Google Scholar Also see Roberts, , Las Invasiones, p. 178.Google Scholar

³⁹ Acuerdos del Extinguido Cabildo, Serie IV, vol. 2, pp. 264–269.

⁴⁰ Beverina, , Las Invasiones, vol. 2, chapter 3.Google Scholar Meanwhile, on 1 January 1807, the Cabildo of Buenos Aires elected its new members and submitted the results to Viceroy Sobremonte for his approval. The viceroy disapproved the new election arguing that the critical situation demanded the continuation in office of the 1806 city councilmen. The Cabildo rejected the viceroy's position and pushed for the approval of the election. However, as it had not received a response from the viceroy (who was fleeing the English) by 26 February, the newly elected city councilmen began their term in office after receiving the endorsement of the Audiencia. Acuerdos del Extinguido, vol. 2, series IV, pp. 389, 396, 402, 407.

⁴¹ The rise of Liniers and the popular militias were discussed by Halperin Donghi and González Bernaldo, see footnote 26. For the disputes between the cabildos of Montevideo, and Buenos, Aires refer to Acuerdos del Extinguido, series IV, vol. 2, pp. 283–286;Google Scholar also Beverina, Las Invasiones, chapter 1.

⁴² Acuerdos del Extinguido Cabildo, series IV, vol. 2, pp. 462–471.

⁴³ The royal ordinance of 23 October 1806 established that, in the absence of the viceroy, the officer holding the highest military rank, automatically becomes the interim viceroy. The royal ordinance of 3 March 1807 conferred the rank of Brigadier to Captain Liniers. This ordinance arrived in Buenos Aires in June of 1807.

⁴⁴ Socolow, The Merchants, chapter 6.

⁴⁵ Acuerdos del Extinguido.

⁴⁶ The dynamism experienced by cabildos at the end of the eighteenth century was discussed by John Lynch. He stated that cabildos cooperated with rather than confronted the intendants and developed more efficient collection of taxes, which allowed them to expand their involvement in municipal public works. Refer to Lynch, “Intendants and Cabildos.” The leadership of the city of Buenos Aires and its long term consequences for the region has been pointed out by Tulio Halperin Donghi in Guerra y Finanzas.

⁴⁷ Acuerodos del Extinguido, series IV, vol. 2, pp. 264–265.

⁴⁸ The community was made up of the corporations and prominent individuals of the old regime which were those that the cabildo invited to participate including, the bishop and cathedral chapter, the audiencia, royal treasurers, members of the regular clergy, military commanders, and prominent vecinos. The general congress of 16 August 1806 was a variation of the cabildo abierto which was a city-council meeting open to the other prominent members of the community and therefore representative of the community as a whole. These meetings always claim to better understand the priorities of the community and therefore they appeared as the “defenders of the common good.” Phelan, John Leddy, The People and the King and MacLachlan, Colin M., Spain's Empire in the New World: The Role of Ideas in Institutional and Social Change (Berkley: University of California Press, 1988).Google Scholar Unlike the cases of the Quito Rebellion of 1765 and the Comunero Rebellion of 1781 the congress held in Buenos Aires upheld the monarch's authority. McFarlane, , “Rebellions in Late Colonial Spanish America: A Comparative Perspective,” Bulletin of Latin American Research 14.3 (1995): pp. 313–338.CrossRefGoogle Scholar The quote comes from Acuerdos del Extinguido, series IV, vol. 2, p. 438.

⁴⁹ At the beginning of the nineteenth century, liberty and representation were ambiguous terms referring to contradictory political realities. Liberty meant individual freedom and equality before the law as well as the right to freely exercise the privileges enjoyed by the corporate bodies of the old regime. Refer to Annino, Antonio, ed., Historia de las Elecciones en Iberoamérica, Siglo XIX: De la Formación del Espacio Político Nacional (Buenos Aires: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1995);Google Scholar Guerra, François-Xavier, Modernidad e Independencias: Ensayos sobre las Revoluciones Hispánicas (Madrid: MAPFRE, 1992);Google Scholar “‘Voces del pueblo’: Redes de Comunicación y Orígenes de la Opinión en el Mundo Hispánico, 1808 – 1814,” Revista de Indias 62.225 (2002): pp. 357–383; “El Apogeo de los Liberalismos Hispánicos: Orígenes, Lógicas y Límites,” Bicentenario 3.2 (2004): pp. 7–40; “La Ruptura de la Monarquía Hispánica: Vivencias y Discursos Americanos,” Jahrbuch für Geschichte Lateinamerikas 37 (2000): pp. 73–99; Guerra, FX and Lempérière, Annick, eds., Los Espacios Públicos en Iberoamérica. Ambigüedades y Problemas. Siglos XVII-XIX (México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1998).Google Scholar