Few peculiarly American political devices have so perennial an interest, it seems, as our guardianship of the Constitution through the power of the judiciary. How unusually strong that interest is to day is well attested by the numerous examinations, chiefly within the past two years, of the sanctions for this much debated function. Especially significant is it, however, considering all that a long succession of legalists, historians, and political scientists have written upon the origin of judicial control, that so much fresh matter can be added to the elucidation of this problem. Yet it must be admitted that real contributions to various aspects of the topic may be found in the recent studies by Prof. A. C. McLaughlin, Prof. E. S. Corwin, Prof. C. A. Beard, Dr. C. G. Haines, and Mr. H. P. Dougherty, not forgetting also such late articles as those by Mr. Hampton L. Carson, Mr. C. H. Burr, Mr. Herbert Pope, Mr. W. M. Meigs and others.

There is an unwritten and unformulated, but none the less coercive principle that governs the conduct of learned societies when assembled in full council which imposes certain limitations upon the president's address. One of these limitations is that the address shall deal in broad outline with some comprehensive or fundamental topic rather than attempt a detailed examination of a special subject. It is in conformity with this requirement that I have selected my subject for this evening. I shall speak of the various interpretations which the relation of the individual to the state has received.

This topic has furnished material for political and social speculation since the time when men began to be curious regarding their own rights and responsibilities. It may seem, therefore, futile to attempt to shed any new light upon such an ages-old inquiry. In truth, however, new conditions of life and new modes of thought give an altered significance to the question, and, therefore, justify, from time to time, its fresh examination.

A study of the history of China would serve to reveal the fact that notwithstanding the great duration of Chinese political life there has been comparatively speaking little change in the political organization of the country. With the exception of the abolition of, to use a European expression, the “feudal system” which existed for several centuries before about 200 B. C., Chinese history presents no instance of any important change in political forms.

The character of the political organization which existed both prior and subsequent to the abolition of this “feudal system” was absolute monarchy, what is sometimes called autocracy. In this respect China differed little if any from other Asiatic peoples, whose great contribution to the political development of the human race has been the conception of an all powerful king or monarch in whom all the functions of government were concentrated.

The general opinion among English and American political writers is that the French system of cabinet government is very nearly a régime of “parliamentary anarchy.” In recent years it has also been the object of severe attack by many French scholars, notably by Professors Duguit, Moreau, Barthélemy and Faguet, and by public men like Charles Benoist, Raymond Poincaré and others, who assert that while the cabinet system has been established by law, it does not exist in fact, but in its place is to be found a poor imitation of the true cabinet sytem of England, upon which that of France was supposed to have been modeled.

One undoubted reason why cabinet government in France has not worked smoothly is to be found in the fact that it is not an indigenous institution. It was transplanted from the country of its origin where it had taken deep root and had developed to a high state of efficiency through a long process of evolution, and was suddenly introduced into one where the historical traditions, political habits and mental aptitudes of the people were very unlike those of the English.

The march of events has vindicated the reasoning of those who, for many years, in innumerable books and magazine articles, have been warning the western world of the perils lurking in the “danger zone of Europe,” and the present European war is nothing more nor less than the Armageddon which has at last been removed from the realm of obscure apprehension to that of pitiless reality.

The Balkan question cannot be finally settled by the outcome of military operations alone, however decisive they may appear. If the solution imposed by military force is also the solution dictated by justice, it may be reasonably relied on for permanency. If on the contrary it merely represents the triumph of might over right the decision will be sure to be contested and we must look forward to future wars. Consequently the powers which will determine the form of the treaty of peace should seek a solution in harmony with justice first of all, in a steadfast desire to secure the peace and stability of Europe.

In a previous paper the attempt was made to state Vattel's system of municipal and international jurisprudence, and to show in a general way the authority attributed to his treatise on international law. It remains for us to consider the technical rules of international law proposed by Vattel and thus to lay the basis for a critical estimate of the position to which his treatise is entitled among the classics of international law.

The rules of conduct which nations have voluntarily adopted for themselves, and which therefore constitute the law between them, may be divided, with regard to their intrinsic character, into two general classes: first, rules which define certain principles of moral conduct or which embody the recognition of certain fundamental rights of states, and secondly, rules which define the concrete application of principles to the practical relations of states. Chief of the rules defining principles of moral conduct is the rule of good faith between nations, which in its many applications pervades the whole field of international law. This rule of good faith is not merely an a priori conception deduced from the analogy between sovereign states as members of an international community and private persons as members of society; it is a rule of positive international law, accepted by nations as properly controlling their conduct, and appealed to by them in their diplomatic relations.

Careful study of any period will reveal that back of all the complex happenings marking such period there have been certain fundamental impulses, certain human strivings, of which the happenings themselves have been, in great part, but the manifestations, or expression in concrete action. It is the prime function of the historian to discover, explain the rise, trace the development and make known the results of these forces which have dominated mass action in the past. Only as this is done do the myriad of events going to make up the body of historical data assume a real meaning, and historical narrative become other than a dry tabulation of detail.

A distinguished historian, E. A. Freeman, has well said that if history is past politics, politics is present history. If it is of value for the historian to trace out and place in their true light those great movements of the past, how much more important it is that the student of present-day politics should, by a similar examination of current events and efforts, seek to make known, and interpret the forces and aspirations now dictating the collective action of peoples.

Although the events of the recent Mexican tragedy cannot be seen today in as clear light as that which will be thrown on them for the next generation, still the political history of the communities established by Spain in America furnishes a certain measure of enlightment. This history seems to indicate that the Spanish colonies were unfortunate in that the government of the United States, in its early decades, appeared to them as a desirable model for the Spanish-American states that were created after the war of independence. The English colonies, left to themselves, had a normal development along lines determined by their environment and their inherent social forces. The Spanish colonies, founded by authority, were developed under a protective system designed to subserve the interests of Spaniards. The disappearance of the Indians before the invading English cleared the field for the democracy that was produced by the colonial conditions of the frontier. The incorporation of the Indians as a subordinate class in the colonial society of Spanish America, and the creation, by royal authority, of a titled nobility made democratic states impossible.

The rise of Japan within the span of one generation from the condition of a weak feudalized state, shut off from all contact with the western nations, to the position of a world power dominated by a desire to shape the destinies of Eastern Asia and ready to dispute with other powers the control of the Pacific, constitutes one of the most dramatic stories in the whole range of history. The rapid assimilation of western ideas and the successful appropriation of all the material elements of western civilization are without a parallel.

Dr. Nitobé, whom we are glad to recognize not only as a great scholar but as a great writer of English, in his remarkable book, Bushido, the Soul of Japan, describes with great power and beauty the idealism of the Samurai, or gentlemen of Japan of a generation ago, but while the old spirit still flashes out occasionally as in the spectacular, and to us meaningless, suicide, on the occasion of the funeral of the late Emperor, of one of his most distinguished subjects, General Nogi, we cannot help believing that the Japanese have outgrown their idealism; that they cast it aside when they discarded their mediaeval weapons and abandoned their self-complacent exclusivism. The Japanese are the greatest materialists in the world today, for it is the material elements of western civilization that they have appropriated and to which they owe their success in two wars. A nation of materialists, fired with ambition and military ardor, are going just as far in their aggressiveness as sheer force will carry them. That is why Japan with her present ambitions is so generally regarded as a menace to the peace of the world.

It is a long time since any serious student of history has proceeded on the assumption that whenever our forefathers wanted to shape or re-shape their governments, local or national, they sat down and drawing forward a sheet of paper said, “Lo, now we will make ourselves a constitution.” Our whole conception of history is nowadays shot through with theories of evolution, of the adoption and incorporation of the old into the new. Yet the process by which the institutions of the past have been wrought into those of the present is often neglected; a general statement, an indistinct impression is frequently allowed to stand unverified for lack of consultation of easily available records. For instance, no student of our constitutional history today lets Gladstone's remark as to the genesis of our federal Constitution go unchallenged; it is accepted as a fact that that instrument is at once a summary and the culmination of colonial and confederate legislative experience. Moreover, the part that the ineffective Articles of Confederation played in the formation of our federal Constitution, negative as it was, has been clearly and incontrovertibly set forth.

War has marked the year 1913; and charges and countercharges as to alleged atrocities by belligerents have been rife. Treaties were drawn to be promptly torn up; and solemn declarations of intention and policy often proved futile. The existence of internal disorder and the outbreak of domestic revolutions in several countries have also exerted disturbing influences on international relations. The result was economic loss and diplomatic tension even well beyond the field of military operations. And these conditions have led to renewed activity in the struggle for concessions and investment in renascent communities. Racial and religious sentiments have also aroused bitter feeling; while political leaders in several countries compel renewed consideration of the weight of individuals in the determination of the world's affairs.

In large part the problems of 1913 were historic; but in part they were affected by apparently impending changes which we cannot as yet define. Thus the influence of socialism and of various forms of radical thought on international relations is a factor. The adoption of oil as a naval fuel, the opening of the Panama Canal, the plans for administrative reorganization of Turkey, and its capitalistic development, the renewed debate as to the Monroe doctrine, and the problem of China are all matters whose future significance scarcely concern us here; but their influence in the past year has been unquestionably great. We cannot estimate as yet the true value of many recommendations touching various fields of international coöperation; and the value of delay in international action still remains in dispute. So on the whole the year 1913 has apparently been the year of the cynic.

While there are many noteworthy and liberal provisions in the constitution of Massachusetts, there is one of particular interest, especially at the present time, because of the wide discussion accorded the subject with which it deals. This is a provision relating to the removal of judges, and declares that a judge of any court in Massachusetts may be removed by the governor and council on an address of the legislature. When Colonel Roosevelt said in his famous speech before the Ohio Constitutional Convention at Columbus, in speaking of the recall of judges, that he favored such a drastic method of removal as was embodied in the Massachusetts constitution, many people opened their eyes in amazement. Few, of course, had ever heard of removal by address, and fewer still, if they had heard of it, understood what was meant. Their surprise was entirely natural inasmuch as no case of removal by address has taken place in Massachusetts for more than a generation.

Scarcely have we become accustomed to the thought that commission government for American cities, unknown fifteen years ago, has taken a permanent and important place in our municipal development when we hear on all sides discussion of a still newer form called the city manager plan. To judge from present indications it seems not unlikely that the phenomenal spread of the commission form will be repeated in the case of this latest development. It becomes a matter of interest therefore to examine into this innovation in American municipal government and to see what elements of strength and weakness it may show and how it is related to our other forms.

If we regard as the essential characteristics of commission government the union of all powers of the city, legislative and administrative, in the hands of a small body of men, each one charged with the responsibility for the proper administration of one of the departments, we may characterize the city manager form by stating that the immediate duty of directing the administration of the city's affairs is imposed upon a single, professional official chosen by the representative body of the city.

Since this is the first time that the great majority of male adults have had the opportunity of exercising the franchise, the recent Italian elections constitute an event of considerable significance, and were watched with much interest in Europe.

According to the new electoral law of 1912–13, practically all adult male Italians were given the right to vote at Parliamentary elections. More specifically, this right of suffrage may now be exercised by three classes of citizens: (1) all literate male Italians who are twenty-one years old; (2) illiterates who have reached the age of thirty; (3) all who have served in the Italian army or navy, even though they have not attained the age of twenty-one. Thus the number of possible voters has been increased from less than 3,500,000 to more than 8,500,000—an addition of over 5,000,000 illiterates.

County government in New York, as in every other State, is more or less of a mystery to the average citizen. It is questionable whether, outside of the district attorney, and possibly the sheriff, very many people have any clear notion of the duties of any of the county officers. The activities of the counties are largely invisible and such as to attract very little interest or attention. On the other hand, counties use up a great deal of hard earned money and county officers loom up large on the political horizon at the general election.

For this prevailing ignorance, the nature of the county itself is largely to blame. It is an anomaly, and its anomalous character is due to the perpetuation of an historical institution through the manifold changes of the last two centuries. The county assumed a logical and practical form in its beginnings in the seventeenth century. In later times as the State developed, the interests of the people became diversified and they distributed themselves in some sections sparsely like the people of the southern States and sometimes into compact communities, as, for instance, in Onondaga, Monroe and Broome Counties. The form of local government which was made to fit the Hudson settlements was extended westward.

An obscure member of a legislative body dictates to his stenographer a document called a bill and submits it to the legislature. The bill goes through all the various stages provided, receives on its way more or less desultory discussion, mostly of an ex parte character, is adopted by a legislature, of whose members a majority have but the slightest, if any, acquaintance with its contents; is signed by the governor, and now has become a part of the law of the land.

In some law report, I find that a learned and famous judge, speaking on behalf of his brethren of the bench, with whom he has first consulted, enunciates a certain unfamiliar rule as being the law of the land. The court has come to this conclusion, not hastily nor without a serious attempt to understand the rule in all its possible bearings, but after careful study, assisted by the written and oral arguments of able counsel, who on their part have made an elaborate and profound study of the question, from differing points of view. Moreover, the question had already been considered, with hardly less thoroughness, in the court from which the case was appealed.