In previous issues of this Review Professor Wambaugh and the late Judge McClain have summarized the decisions of the Supreme Court on constitutional questions from 1909 to 1914. It is the purpose of this and a succeeding paper to deal in like manner with the decisions of the last three years. Owing to the number of cases decided during the triennium, the writer must content himself with the rôle of annalist and refrain from assuming that of analyst. For the benefit of those who desire fuller comment or criticism, references are given to articles and notes in various legal periodicals discussing the more important cases.

Since the expiration of the October term of 1913, three changes have occurred in the personnel of the bench. Mr. Justice Lurton died July 12, 1914, and his successor, Mr. Justice McReynolds, took his seat October 12, 1914. Illness prevented Mr. Justice Lamar from participating in any of the decisions of the October term of 1915. He died on January 2, 1916. The commission of Mr. Justice Brandeis, who succeeded him, was not recorded until June 5, 1916, so that during the 1915 term only eight justices participated in the work of the court. Mr. Justice Hughes resigned June 10, 1916, to accept the Republican nomination for the presidency, and his successor, Mr. Justice Clarke, took his seat on October 9, 1916. The bench as at present constituted consists of Chief Justice White, appointed associate justice by President Cleveland and chief justice by President Taft; Mr. Justice McKenna, appointed by President McKinley; Justices Holmes and Day, appointed by President Roosevelt; Justices Van Devanter and Pitney, appointed by President Taft; and the three new justices appointed by President Wilson.

On October 14, 1935, the Conservative party, which had been in power in Canada since the general election of July, 1930, was resoundingly defeated. The Conservatives had carried 137 seats in 1930. In 1935 their numbers were reduced to 40. The 93 Liberal seats of 1930 were increased in 1935 to 179—a majority of 113 in a house of 245. Such a majority is without precedent in Canadian history. Even the Unionist government in the war election of 1917 received only 153 seats to the opposition's 82. The Liberal sweep was almost Dominion-wide. The Liberals carried all but one of the 26 constituencies in the three Maritime Provinces, 60 of the 65 Quebec constituencies, 56 out of 82 in Ontario (more than they have obtained in that province in any election since 1874), 14 out of 17 in Manitoba, 16 out of 21 in Saskatchewan, 7 out of 16 in British Columbia. Only in Alberta did they suffer a crushing defeat. There, only one Liberal was returned; 15 of the remaining 16 seats were carried by the new Social Credit party; the other seat went to the leader of the Conservative party, Mr. R. B. Bennett.

“A treaty entering the Senate is like a bull going into the arena; no one can say just how or when the final blow will fall—but one thing is certain—it will never leave the arena alive.” When John Hay put this in his diary he had been secretary of state for six years. During this period he had seen seventeen treaties borne from the Senate, lifeless or so mutilated by amendments that they could not survive. We can pardon the harassed secretary's earlier statement. “The fact that a treaty gives to this country a great, lasting advantage, seems to weigh nothing whatever in the minds of about half the Senators. Personal interest, personal spites, and a contingent chance of petty political advantage are the only motives that cut any ice at present.”

It is, however, with the objective aspect of Secretary Hay's statement that we are primarily concerned. Statesmen, as others, may occasionally express impatience, but if the practical function of the Senate in treaty making is that of the matador at a bull fight, there are more serious grounds for concern. If its duties resemble those of picadors or banderilleros, the matter is serious enough, and of its goading tactics we have early evidence. Thus, John Quincy Adams writes in his diary: “Mr. Crawford told twice over the story of President Washington's having at an early period of his Administration gone to the Senate with a project of a treaty to be negotiated, and been present at their deliberations upon it. They debated it and proposed alterations, so that when Washington left the Senate-chamber he said he would be damned if he ever went there again. And ever since that time treaties have been negotiated by the Executive before submitting them to the consideration of the Senate.”

May 20,1936, was a date of importance in Cuban history. Not only was it the thirty-fourth anniversary of the birth of the Cuban Republic; it marked the first time in seven years (as many Cubans maintain) that a completely constitutional government had control of the island's political destinies. On May 20 of this year occurred the inauguration of Miguel Mariano Gómez y Arias, sixth “regularly elected” president of Cuba, son of the Republic's second president, and the man who, at least nominally, will be at the helm of the Cuban ship of state in the immediate future.

Nominally, the English became a nation in the eighth century but did not achieve political integration until the seventeenth century, a thousand years later. During the millennium, the English “nation” was the scene of recurring internal wars, the last ending with the acceptance of the Bill of Rights by William III and Mary in 1688. What was the process leading to cessation in the use of armed conflict as a technique of domestic politics in England?

Nominally, Mexico was an independent nation in 1821 but did not see the end of its internal wars until the 1940's. What political process led to domestic “arms control” in Mexico?

Although taking place in different centuries and in nations with distinct political cultures, were there common elements in the two transitions to internal arms control? What were critical factors in the integrative process? May the same factors, or analogous ones, be identified and controlled in contemporary efforts related to regional and international arms control? What may be learned from the English, the Mexican, and other national cases that is generalizable to the problem of international political integration and arms control?

The present theory sketch views arms control as an aspect of the integration of political organizations. Political integration, in turn, is the consequence of a process of political transactions among principal political actors over time.