Rural France is often seen as culturally isolated and politically uninvolved. Using a combination of community studies and survey evidence, one can show that the lack of declared interest in politics of rural Frenchmen seems to mean an absence of involvement in the party system rather than a passivity toward public life. Nevertheless rural France produces higher voting turnouts in local and national elections than are found in other sections or population groups.

The weakness of partisan involvement, as opposed to citizen involvement, seems to bespeak not merely apathy, but actual hostility, toward party politics. This political hostility is widespread among French workers but is politically more important among French peasants. Thus voting choices are less party-oriented precisely where urban-based campaign organizations are least effective. Local non-party notables therefore probably play a greater brokerage role in national election campaigns, and election results are less predictable than in the rural sectors of many other societies. The degree of antipartisanship in rural constituencies also seems to encourage candidates to avoid national party labels in election campaigns.

Three kinds of factors are suggested to account for both the high citizen involvement and the low partisan involvement: First, historically, the extension of the suffrage to the rural periphery long before the French party system was capable of the same kind of penetration may have habituated rural Frenchmen to the exercise of the vote in a non-partisan context. Second, the achievement of stable landholding for most peasants removes visible class conflict as a legitimizing factor for party organization, while an extensive interest group structure increases the tendency to keep informed, to participate, and to run for local office. Third, the political ecology of the French village both encourages high citizen involvement and discourages partisan involvement. While many of these factors are universal among peasant societies, the particular historical, sociological, and ecological configuration of the French village seems to produce a rural resident who is more informed and active than our inherited wisdom would suggest, but less partisan than are urban citizens with similar levels of involvement.

In an examination of responses to public opinion poll questions designed to assess the degree of generalized support for the wars in Korea and Vietnam, popular support for the two wars was found to follow highly similar patterns. Support was high initially but declined as a logarithmic function of American casualties, a function remarkably similar for both wars. While support for the war in Vietnam did finally drop below those levels found during the Korean War, it did so only after the fighting had gone on considerably longer and only after American casualties had greatly surpassed those of the earlier war. These trends seem to have been fairly impervious to particular events in either of the wars.

It is suggested that the greater vocal opposition to the Vietnam War reflects mainly a shift of opinion within the intellectual left on the wisdom of the two wars. Armed with new techniques of protest learned in its identification with the civil rights movement, the intellectual left has been able effectively to garner great attention for its cause during the Vietnamese War.

Also noted was the presence of a rather large body of opinion inclined to follow the President on war policy, giving him considerable room for maneuver, at least in the short run, and making public opinion in this area highly sensitive to current policy.

A crude comparison with data from World War II suggests that, while the earlier war was unquestionably more "popular" than the wars in Korea and Vietnam, support was less consensual than might be expected. The popularity of the Korean War rose slowly after its conclusion, but this sort of retrospective support for World Wars I and II may have declined as time went by and, at any rate, was quite sensitive to current events,

In repeated instances, differences in question wording were found to alter substantially the response generated to poll questions about the wars.

In seeking a basis for political obligation in the “facts” of human nature, Hobbes has created a major problem for students of political theory. Recent scholarly debate has suggested that we understand Hobbes either as a descriptive and analytic theorist, or as a normative theorist. While this logical distinction has didactic value, it is apt to produce a misunderstanding of the dynamics of political thinking. All discourse does not rest upon logic: we must distinguish political argumentation, which often goes beyond the confines of logic by manipulating our factual perceptions, from disinterested philosophical debate, which aims at clarity.

Hobbes manipulates his readers' perceptions in such a manner as to preclude a number of assumptions underlying traditional moral arguments for political disobedience. While moral argument (at least of a sort) is possible, it is not necessary to the argument of the Leviathan. Hobbes grounds political obligation on one situational and two psychophysiological postulates: man's most fundamental concern is self-preservation; his passions lead him into situations of conflict which give rise to intense feelings of fear; this fear has an “enlightening value,” transforming human behavior from the merely reflexive to the contrived. Terror hence provides a strategy of fear-avoidance, a logic of survival to which the individual must conform in order to avoid future encounters with death.

Thus, while Hobbes's answer to the problem of political obligation is nonmoral in the traditional sense, it is more than merely prudential. Hobbes's conception of homeostasis as informed by fear is, like morality, both universal and imperative. The natural law binds not because it is “good” but because its violation is too frequently accompanied by an all-consuming terror which the ordinary man cannot withstand.

A number of leading studies of voting behavior in recent years have concluded that specific issues are not a salient element in the electoral decision. These studies have indicated not only that voters are unfamiliar with most issues, but also that the electorate is generally unable to detect differences between Republican and Democratic positions on issues. Using the same Survey Research Center interviews upon which these previous findings were based, this article modifies these previous evaluations. This study concentrates on data from the 1964 election —a campaign that was notable not for the issues it raised, but rather for the public's strong reactions to the candidates. The findings in this article show that, even in 1964, most people were concerned with a number of specific issues and that these issue concerns had a very measurable effect on voting choice. Furthermore, large proportions of people were able accurately to perceive the differences between the parties on those issues that were salient to them. The major reason these findings are so different from previous results is that new measures and a different approach were used—particularly open-ended interview material that for the first time allowed the researcher to discover the issues that were salient to the voter.

Research has shown that political attitudes spring from diverse sources. This paper focuses on isolationism, a set of beliefs that can stem from social factors (e.g., economic deprivation, poor education, social or geographic isolation) and from psychological factors (e.g., n. aggression, inflexibility and low self-esteem). The purpose is not to demonstrate again that there is a connection between personality and political belief. Instead, the authors ask whether or not it matters if a political attitude—in the present case, isolationism—stems from personality influences rather than from some other sources, for example, education, group memberships, or ideology. Isolationists low in self-esteem are shown to differ from those high in self-esteem on a range of values and beliefs: liberalism-conservatism, extreme political values, and specific foreign policy questions. Thus, those who hold common beliefs on one set of issues are likely to differ in the opinions they hold on other political questions depending on whether they owe their convictions to their personality characteristics or to some other influence.

Changes in political decision-making outputs and trading activities in the European Economic Community are examined around three quasi-experimental events (formation of the EEC in 1958, first agricultural package in 1962, and the agricultural crisis in 1965–66). On the basis of a preliminary analysis, nine variables were selected for inclusion in the study (three political decision variables and six trade indicators); these were then subjected to “interrupted time-series analysis,” through which the quasi-experimental effects of the three events were assessed for statistical significance (t-tests and autocorrelation measures) and theoretical validity (through the elimination of plausible rival interpretations).

Political integration in the EEC is viewed as (1) positive growth in system indicators, and (2) increased mutual responsiveness among the major components or subsystems of the EEC. Results of the quasi-experimental analyses suggest that despite high positive growth in the selected variables, mutual responsiveness among system parts remains quite low; therefore, the principal conclusion drawn is that the EEC is a “weakly” integrating system—a collection of structures growing rapidly in many directions, with each structure very imperfectly responsive to the behavior of others.

The paper urges and attempts to demonstrate the methodological usefulness of applying the logic of experimentation to ex-post-facto research. This approach entails the demonstration that non-random variation in independent and dependent variables has occurred, that these variables are related in some way, and that the relationship is nonspurious—that is, that the important confounding variables have been controlled by eliminating plausible rival hypotheses through statistical and analytical procedures.

This investigation is based on an experimental study of voting behavior in what the author terms a minimal-information election. This type of election is characterized by a dearth of public information about election issues and partisan considerations, so that the campaign is waged primarily on the basis of the voters' attitudes toward the candidates as personalities. In general, the minimal-information election most often characterizes local nonpartisan contests.

The experiment examined changes in voting that appeared to result from electioneering strategies designed to elicit “bandwagon” or “underdog” responses. These strategies consisted of presenting the “electorate” with the results of pre-election preferential polls, as well as qualitative information explicitly aimed at arousing the emotions of the voters.

The experiment clearly demonstrated that mere poll results are insufficient to impel would-be bandwagon or underdog identifiers to switch their votes. Rather, this type of behavior does not appear until a strong qualitative stimulus sensitizes or cues bandwagon or underdog tendencies among the voters.

The effect of party activities on the vote, while a fundamentally important question for any understanding of party operations, has received little research attention. This neglect has come about partly because the analysis is difficult to conceptualize and because the data have to be generated principally by the investigator. In addition, structural variables relevant to the nature of the environment in which the parties compete must be introduced into the analysis, and the canvas must be broad enough to permit comparative assessments within a controlled research design.

The present study sets out to deal with precisely these problems. It analyzes the contribution of the competing parties' efforts to the final vote in elections for five levels of office, from local to national, in 100 North Carolina counties.

Multiple correlation analysis was used to judge the association between the final vote and three sets of independent variables: demographic, institutional (specifically the extent of competition between the contending parties), and political, with emphasis on those associated with campaigning. The variance explained by each is described, as well as the total contribution of all to understanding the outcome of the election.

The variables proved quite successful in explaining the final vote. The strength of the associations increased as one proceeded from the local to the national level, and party output measures proved more impressive contributors to explaining the votes in competitive as against non-competitive areas. Overall, the variables relating to party effort were found to add significantly to the under-standing of the election outcomes.

This paper uses statistical analysis to consider what factors influence the way senators vote and how important these influences are. The answers are specific statements about individual senators' decision processes, and quantitative estimates of the weights applied to the different variables in these models. The form of the voting models and the variables in them were developed from hypotheses about individual decision-making and descriptions of the legislative process. Examples of the variables are the preferences of the senator's constituency, the opinions of his party leader, and the views of the President. Quantitative measures of the variables were obtained from state demographic characteristics and by Guttman-scaling the votes on passage of the amendments to specific bills considered in 1961 and 1962. Linear regression analysis of these Guttman scales was then used to test the hypotheses and estimate the coefficients in each senator's voting model. After the results from these analyses are discussed, the explanatory power of these models on individual bills is evaluated by comparing the vote they estimate with those predicted using two alternative models.

This project attempts to relate a large number of potential predictors to voting data generated at the United Nations. Numerous associations were found when the predictors, 77 in all, were related to 13 different kinds of voting scores. Because of considerable redundancy in both sets of data, national attribute and voting, the results were factor analyzed and the original variables were reduced to 14 sets of factor scores representing the national attribute data, and 4 representing the voting data. Several significant associations emerged from the intercorrelation of these two sets of factor scores, with the independent variables “Economic Development,” “Democracy,” and “U.S. Relations” exhibiting considerable predictive power. When the overall relationships between the two sets of data were assessed by use of the canonical correlation technique, “Economic Development” received the greatest weight on the national attribute side, and “Eastern Voting” on the voting (dependent variable) side. These findings accord well with previous research, in that “Economic Development” seems to predict negativism as revealed by voting. Thus “Economic Development” appears to be fundamentally related to certain schisms at the United Nations, with the representatives from the most developed states appearing the most “negative” as evidenced by questionnaire responses and voting behavior. Such orientations are likely to have a significant impact on the evolution of the organization.

At a theoretical level, the present findings may have considerable relevance for both Social Field theory and Attribute theory.