Few peculiarly American political devices have so perennial an interest, it seems, as our guardianship of the Constitution through the power of the judiciary. How unusually strong that interest is to day is well attested by the numerous examinations, chiefly within the past two years, of the sanctions for this much debated function. Especially significant is it, however, considering all that a long succession of legalists, historians, and political scientists have written upon the origin of judicial control, that so much fresh matter can be added to the elucidation of this problem. Yet it must be admitted that real contributions to various aspects of the topic may be found in the recent studies by Prof. A. C. McLaughlin, Prof. E. S. Corwin, Prof. C. A. Beard, Dr. C. G. Haines, and Mr. H. P. Dougherty, not forgetting also such late articles as those by Mr. Hampton L. Carson, Mr. C. H. Burr, Mr. Herbert Pope, Mr. W. M. Meigs and others.

Although the events of the recent Mexican tragedy cannot be seen today in as clear light as that which will be thrown on them for the next generation, still the political history of the communities established by Spain in America furnishes a certain measure of enlightment. This history seems to indicate that the Spanish colonies were unfortunate in that the government of the United States, in its early decades, appeared to them as a desirable model for the Spanish-American states that were created after the war of independence. The English colonies, left to themselves, had a normal development along lines determined by their environment and their inherent social forces. The Spanish colonies, founded by authority, were developed under a protective system designed to subserve the interests of Spaniards. The disappearance of the Indians before the invading English cleared the field for the democracy that was produced by the colonial conditions of the frontier. The incorporation of the Indians as a subordinate class in the colonial society of Spanish America, and the creation, by royal authority, of a titled nobility made democratic states impossible.

While there are many noteworthy and liberal provisions in the constitution of Massachusetts, there is one of particular interest, especially at the present time, because of the wide discussion accorded the subject with which it deals. This is a provision relating to the removal of judges, and declares that a judge of any court in Massachusetts may be removed by the governor and council on an address of the legislature. When Colonel Roosevelt said in his famous speech before the Ohio Constitutional Convention at Columbus, in speaking of the recall of judges, that he favored such a drastic method of removal as was embodied in the Massachusetts constitution, many people opened their eyes in amazement. Few, of course, had ever heard of removal by address, and fewer still, if they had heard of it, understood what was meant. Their surprise was entirely natural inasmuch as no case of removal by address has taken place in Massachusetts for more than a generation.

An obscure member of a legislative body dictates to his stenographer a document called a bill and submits it to the legislature. The bill goes through all the various stages provided, receives on its way more or less desultory discussion, mostly of an ex parte character, is adopted by a legislature, of whose members a majority have but the slightest, if any, acquaintance with its contents; is signed by the governor, and now has become a part of the law of the land.

In some law report, I find that a learned and famous judge, speaking on behalf of his brethren of the bench, with whom he has first consulted, enunciates a certain unfamiliar rule as being the law of the land. The court has come to this conclusion, not hastily nor without a serious attempt to understand the rule in all its possible bearings, but after careful study, assisted by the written and oral arguments of able counsel, who on their part have made an elaborate and profound study of the question, from differing points of view. Moreover, the question had already been considered, with hardly less thoroughness, in the court from which the case was appealed.