¹ Cf. Appleby, Paul H., Big Democracy (New York, 1945)Google Scholar; Kingsley, J. Donald, Responsible Bureaucracy (Yellow Springs, 1945)Google Scholar; Burnham, James, The Managerial Revolution (New York, 1941)Google Scholar; Macmahon, Arthur W. and Millett, John D., Federal Administrators (New York, 1939)Google Scholar.

² Gaus, John M., in Anderson, William and Gaus, J. M., Research in Public Administration (Chicago, 1945), p. 131Google Scholar.

³ See Key, V. O., “Politics and Administration,” in White, Leonard D., The Future of Government in the United States (Chicago, 1942), pp. 146 ff.Google Scholar

⁴ For an excellent analysis of the problematical relationship between rationality and democracy in politics, see Sabine, George H., Democracy and Preconceived Ideas (Columbus, 1945)Google Scholar. Charles S. Hyneman has presented a keenly critical review of the literature advocating a stronger executive prerogative in federal management: “Bureaucracy and the Democratic System,” Louisiana Law Quarterly, Vol. 6 (1945), pp. 309 ff.Google Scholar

⁵ Cf. Macmahon, Arthur W., “The Future Organizational Pattern of the Executive Branch,” in this Review, Vol. 38 (1944), pp. 1188 ff.Google Scholar

⁶ Smith, Harold D., The Management of Your Government (New York, 1945), pp. 29–36Google Scholar; Appleby, Paul H., “Administration in Big Business,” Public Administration Review, Vol. 5 (1945), p. 255CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁷ See the Senate debates on the reorganization bills of 1939 and 1945, Cong. Rec., Vol. 84, pp. 3024–25 (Mar. 21, 1939)Google Scholar; Vol. 91, pp. 10427–10432 (Nov. 1, 1945).

⁸ This procedure was provided in the Economy Act of 1932 (47 Stat. 413) until amended by 47 Stat. 1517 on March 3, 1933, and by the Senate Judiciary Committee draft of the 1945 bill (S. 1120, 79th Cong., 1st Sess.). See Senate Rep. No. 638, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., for an analysis of past legislation on executive reorganization.

⁹ Cf. White, Leonard D., “Legislative Responsibility for Administration,” in New Horizons in Public Administration (University, Ala., 1945), pp. 1 ff.Google Scholar

¹⁰ Not in connection with the issue of flexibility in policy formulation, but in relation to the ability of administrative agencies to adopt the most efficient methods of job performance, the general indifference of Congress to mere efficiency comes to the fore. Thus to the congressional mind during the 1937–38 debates over the status of the General Accounting Office, nothing was more irrelevant than the argument that the Comptroller-General was interfering with the administrative responsibilities of the executive agencies. The initial reaction of a congressman is that the agencies ought not to be doing anything they aren't supposed to do—with the burden of proof against the agency.

¹¹ See Brownlow, Louis, “Reconversion of the Federal Administrative Machinery from War to Peace,” Public Administration Review, Vol. 4 (1944), p. 322CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Millett, John D. and Rogers, Lindsay, “The Legislative Veto and the Reorganization Act of 1939,” Public Administration Review, Vol. 1 (1941), pp. 176 ffCrossRefGoogle Scholar. The exceptions were the Overman Act of 1918, the amendment to the Economy Act of 1932, passed the day before President Roosevelt took office in 1933, and Title I of the First War Powers Act of 1941.

¹² The clearest examples of such issues of principle may be found in Sec. 5 of the Reorganization Act of 1945, which provides general limitations on the President's reorganization power and imposes specific exceptions. Even there, the explanation is not always “pure” congressional interest. The power to create a new department is undoubtedly a constitutional prerogative of Congress. While Congress has always regarded the General Accounting Office as an agency responsible to it, it no longer seems so certain that the independent regulatory agencies are exclusively agencies of the legislature. Of the 26 such agencies identified by the Joint [Byrd] Committee on Reduction of Non-Essential Federal Expenditures (as of November 1, 1944), the act of 1945 exempted only six from the President's reorganization power.

¹³ The most cogent defense of what Professor Corwin has called this “pluralistic” scheme of responsibility over executive reorganization, on twin grounds of congressional supremacy and defense of liberty against arbitrary or capricious executive action, is contained in Meriam, Lewis and Schmeckebier, Laurence F., Reorganization of the National Government (Washington, 1939)Google Scholar. See also Senate Rep. No. 1275, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937), especially chs. I–II.

¹⁴ In view of these relationships, it is significant that the agencies exempted from the President's reorganization power in the Reorganization Act of 1945 are so few. Only seven are practically excepted, and any proposals affecting four others are required to be submitted as separate plans. House Rep. No. 1378, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (December 12, 1945).

The act establishes three categories:

(1) Agencies which Congress refuses to consider appropriate for any reorganization: Civil Functions of the United States Army Corps of Engineers.

(2) Agencies for which Congress refuses to consider reorganization plans except transfers to them of other functions: Interstate Commerce Commission; Federal Trade Commission; Securities and Exchange Commission; National Mediation Board; National Railroad Adjustment Board; Railroad Retirement Board.

(3) Agencies for which Congress desires separate consideration in any plan: Federal Communications Commission; Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; United States Tariff Commission; Veterans Administration.

In the last group, it would be interesting to know what considerations led the conference committee to substitute the FDIC for the Civil Service Commission in the final stages of the bill.

¹⁵ President Truman's veto of the $52 billion Rescission Bill in 1945 was a reorganization action in reverse. The Dirksen amendment to the bill had provided for a rescission of all funds to the War Manpower Commission for Employment Service field offices and facilities, and reappropriated $30,000,000 for disbursement to the states for the same purposes by the Social Security Board. In this case, the executive veto thwarted an attempt of the governors of several states and the Association of State Unemployment Compensation Commissioners to use congressional appropriation procedure to effect a reorganization which had important implications for national reconversion policies.

¹⁶ See Senate Doc. No. 8, part 4, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., Joint Committee on Government Organization, Hearings on Reorganization of the Executive Departments (1937), pp. 4, 40–41, 131–137Google Scholar; Senate Select Committee on Executive Reorganization, Hearings on S. 2700 (1938).

¹⁷ Cf. Merriam, Charles B., “The National Resources Planning Board; A Chapter in American Planning Experience,” in this Review, Vol. 38 (1944), pp. 1084–1085Google Scholar.

¹⁸ Public Law No. 458, 78th Cong., 2nd Sess. Cf. Brownlow, loc. cit. above note 11, pp. 312–316.

¹⁹ The flood-control project was provided for in House Doc. No. 475, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., and H.R. 4485. The nine-foot channel for navigation was provided for in a separate bill, H. R. 3961. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Commerce, part 6 (May 10–18, 1945).

²⁰ Senate Doc. No. 191, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. For the grass-roots background of this fight, see Howard, Joseph K., “The Golden River,” Harper's, Vol. 190 (May, 1945), pp. 511 ffGoogle Scholar.

²¹ Senate Doc. No. 247, 78th Cong., 2d Sess.; Hearings before a Subcommitt the Committee on Commerce on S. 655, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 149–158, 323–337 (April 18–20, 1945)Google Scholar.

²² Flood Control Act of 1944, Public Law No. 534 (Dec. 22, 1944); River and Harbors Act of 1945, Public Law No. 14 (Mar. 2, 1945). There is no better case study in the workings of American government than the legislative proceeding with respect to these bills: H.R. 3961 and H.R. 4485, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., and S. 555, 79th Cong., 1st Sess.

²³ Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Irrigation and Reclamation on S. 555, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 4–9, 338–444 (Sept. 18–28, 1945)Google Scholar. The President had approved the agency agreement on November 27, 1944, but had recommended that the projects provided in it be developed and administered by a Missouri Valley Authority (House Doc. No. 784, 78th Cong., 2d Sess.).

²⁴ Cf. Hearings before the Select Committee on Postwar Military Policy pursuant to H. Res. 465, 78th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1944); Hearings before the Senate Committee on Military Affairs on S. 84 and S. 1482, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945), esp. pp. 241–268, 515–536Google Scholar.

²⁵ Cf. Hardin, Charles M., “The Bureau of Agricultural Economics under Fire,” Journal of Farm Economics, Vol. 28 (1946), pp. 635 ff.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²⁶ Constitutional Government in the United States (New York, 1908), pp. 220–221Google Scholar.