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Unification of the Armed Forces—The First Year
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 September 2013
Extract
Somewhat more than a year has passed since James Forrestal took the oath of office as first Secretary of Defense on September 17, 1947. While it is still too early to pass final judgment on the effectiveness of the National Security Organization, sufficient time has elapsed to take some measure of the vast scope of problems it faces, and of the soundness of the foundations upon which it rests.
The National Security Act of 1947, under which the new organization was created, was one of the most thoroughly studied pieces of legislation to come out of the war. In that act, Congress indicated its purpose as being “to provide a comprehensive program of the future security of the United States.” The act did not merge the Army and Navy into a single Department of Defense as many had hoped, but it did provide administrative machinery for establishing integrated policies and procedures for those agencies of the federal government primarily concerned with the national security.
The most important single fact about the National Security Act was that it did much more than merely reorganize the Armed Forces. Indeed this was the essential difference between the two reorganization plans sponsored during 1945–47 by the Army and the Navy. The Army's plan, drafted by Lt. General J. Lawton Collins and his staff, and frequently referred to as the “Collins Plan,” proposed a single “Department of the Armed Forces” with a Secretary at its head. The Navy's proposal went much farther. A brief description of the two plans may not be amiss, since they explain some of the problems that the National Security Organization has encountered during its first year of operation.
- Type
- American Government and Politics
- Information
- Copyright
- Copyright © American Political Science Association 1949
References
1 61 Stat. 495.
2 Ibid., Sec. 2.
3 Hearings on Department of Armed Forces (S. 84), Committee on Military Affairs, Senate, 79th Cong., 1st sess., Oct.-Dec., 1945.
4 Ibid., p. 158.
5 Report to James Forrestal on Unification of the War and Navy Departments, Committee on Naval Affairs, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., Senate print, Oct. 22, 1945.
6 The act did not formally establish an “Office” of the Secretary of Defense, although the term is commonly used today.
7 The act also permits the President to designate, as additional members of the Council, heads of the other executive departments, the chairman of the Munitions Board, and the chairman of the Research and Development Board.
8 For discussions of the British defense organization, see White Paper on Defense(Cmd. 6743), Feb., 1946, and Central Organization for Defense (Cmd. 6923), Oct., 1946.
9 The National Security Act, Sec. 202.
10 Ibid., Sec. 202 (a).
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid., Sec. 204 (a).
13 It is interesting to speculate upon what would have happened had the Collins plan of unification been in operation and the “Secretary of the Armed Forces” forced to transmit budget estimates of the Joint Chiefs of Staff unchanged to the President. It might well be that a President would have some hesitation to challenge the united opinion of the military.
14 Directive of the Secretary of Defense, July 23, 1948.
15 See particularly Forrestal's, testimony, Hearings on the National Security Act of 1947, Com. on Expenditures, House of Representatives, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., Apr. 24, 1947, p. 99.Google Scholar
16 Civilian Production Administration, Industrial Mobilization for War, p. 222.Google Scholar
17 Eberstadt, F., Report to James Forrestal, op. cit., p. 75.Google Scholar
18 Note Forrestal's, James comments on his return from Europe. New York Times, Nov. 18, 1948, p. 1.Google Scholar
19 National Security Resources Board, National Security Factors in Plant Location. July 22, 1948.Google Scholar
20 New York Times, Dec. 17, 1948, p. 18.
21 Ibid., Dec. 30, 1948, p. 10.
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