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Senate Rules and the Civil Rights Bill: A Case Study

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 September 2013

Howard E. Shuman
Affiliation:
Washington, D. C.

Extract

The rules of the Senate of the United States are only 40 in number and comprise only 49 of the 832 pages of the Senate Manual. Yet, when literally invoked they can bring Senate business to a standstill. They are most often ignored or circumvented by unanimous consent in order that the Senate may operate conveniently as a deliberative and parliamentary body. To pass legislation when they are invoked is a formidable enterprise.

Just as the law is said to be no better than the procedures by which it is carried out, so the substance of legislation is shaped and modified by the procedures that may be required under the Senate rules, or by the mere threat to invoke those procedures, for they are compelling. The procedures preceding and surrounding the passage of the first civil rights bill in over 80 years illumine and illustrate the effect of the rules on the substance of legislation as have few other legislative controversies in recent years.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1957

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References

1 The Senate has no similar form of “majority” cloture which could end debate and bring a vote on the substance of a bill or an amendment.

2 Since 1917, or for 40 years, cloture has been successful on only four of twenty-two attempts and never on a civil rights bill. Sixty-four votes have been forthcoming only three times, all in the period 1917 to 1927. Thus, no cloture motion has successfully prevailed in the last 30 years.

3 It has been asked why, if the Vice President believed section 3 was unconstitutional, Senators did not press the issue later in the session. The answer is that the Vice President's position was that it was unconstitutional to the extent that it bound one Senate by the actions of a previous Senate. However, if the new Senate agreed to be bound, i.e., acquiesced in the old rules as it did when the tabling motion was successful, section 3 would remain in effect throughout the 85th Congress.

4 The steps involved in suspending the rules in order to place the bill on the calendar run as follows: (1) When the bill arrives from the House, either a motion that it be laid before the Senate, or a wait until the presiding officer laid it before the Senate in order to object to the second reading of the bill on the same day. (2) Simultaneously giving notice of an intention to move to suspend the rules, and reading or placing in the Record the terms of the motion. (3) Gaining an adjournment to bring a new legislative day. (4) On the new legislative day and after the reading of the Journal, either calling up the motion to suspend the rules, or waiting until the presiding officer laid the bill before the Senate for a second reading. At this time, and prior to the customary referral to committee, gaining recognition to prevent such a reference by calling up the motion to suspend the rules. Since no motion to proceed to the consideration of that motion would be necessary, one potential filibuster is avoided at this point. (5) Securing a vote on the motion to suspend the rules, which is debatable and would require cloture to stop a filibuster. An affirmative two-thirds vote of those present and voting on this motion would send the bill to the calendar. (6) From this stage on the procedure is the same as with the discharge method—an adjournment to bring a new legislative day, when a motion to proceed to the consideration of the bill would be in order; a vote on this motion, which is debatable and would require cloture; disposition of amendments and a vote on final passage, which again is debatable and would require cloture.

5 There were only a few examples of a bill going to the calendar under Rule XIV prior to 1946. Since then procedures under this rule were followed once on May 3, 1948 when Senator Downey of California objected after second reading to further proceedings on the Tidelands Oil bill, which then went directly to the calendar. Immediately following that action and on the same day Senator Fulbright attempted to do the same thing to the oleomargarine tax repeal bill. However, the chair (then the President pro-tempore, Mr. Vandenberg) had first recognized Senator Wherry, who raised the issue of committee jurisdiction before Senator Fulbright made his objection. In a series of parliamentary questions and votes the bill eventually went to committee, but it is quite clear from a thorough reading of that incident that it did not conflict with Senator Downey's action. Senator Vandenberg stated not only that it did not conflict but that the issue turned finally “‣ upon the pure question as to who is first recognized by the Chair to assert his rights under these conflicting rules.” He said specifically:

There is no collision whatever between the precedent of yesterday and the precedent of today…. It is the view of the Chair that the question of precedence in a case of this character depends entirely on who raises the point first. Since the question of jurisdiction has been raised first it is the view of the Chair that the question of jurisdiction takes priority.

6 Congressional Record, August 30, 1957, p. 15171Google Scholar (daily ed.).

7 Ibid., p. 15172.

8 Ibid., p. 15171.

9 Ibid., p. 15171–2.

10 Ibid., p. 15172.

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