¹ Kelsen, H., “Absolutism and Relativism in Philosophy and Politics,” The American Political Science Review, Vol. 42, p. 911 (October, 1948)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Russell, B., Philosophy and Politics (London, 1947)Google Scholar, makes the same assumption.

² Absolutists, empiricists, and even relativists agree that statements of logic and mathematics are analytic, i.e., true independently of sense experience. For a recent, concise exposition of empiricism, cf. Feigl, Herbert, “Logical Empiricism,” in Runes, D. D. (ed.), Twentieth Century Philosophy (New York, 1943), p. 373 Google Scholar.

³ Cf. Stevenson, C. L., Ethics and Language (New Haven, 1944)Google Scholar. The failure to distinguish between empirical statements connecting means to ends (instrumental value judgments) and intrinsic value judgments accounts for the following allegation: “If the scientific method itself, however, is proclaimed to be as a matter of fact more appropriate than any other for understanding physical and social phenomena, then this value judgement must be accepted by the positivist as at least one value judgement that is objectively true.” Hallowell, John H., “Politics and Ethics,” The American Political Science Review, Vol. 38, p. 648 (August, 1944)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. (Italics Hallowell's.)

⁴ This explains why the term relativism has been, misleadingly, applied to cover empiricism as well (e.g., by Kelsen, loc. cit.). It is true that empiricists are relativists in the sense that they consider the degree of confirmation of a theory as a function of the empirical evidence available at a given time. We, however, shall keep a clear distinction between empiricism and (ethical) relativism.

⁵ Kallen, H. M., “Freedom and Authoritarianism in Religion,” The Scientific Spirit and Democratic Faith (New York, 1944), p. 3 Google Scholar.

⁶ Dewey, J., “Challenge to Liberal Thought,” Fortune, Vol. 30, p. 188 (August, 1944)Google Scholar.

⁷ Blanshard, Brand, “The New Subjectivism in Ethics,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 9, p. 511 (March, 1949.)CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁸ Ibid., p. 510.

⁹ “That the positivist does in fact engage in making value judgements is as significant as his claim that he does nothing of the kind” (Hallowell, loc. cit., p. 646). The ethical relativist or positivist claims that it is impossible to validate intrinsic value judgements, but not that it is meaningless to utter them.

¹⁰ “The development of scientific societies and academies in the 17th century seems to indicate that corridors of free discussion adequate for the development of science may be cut across democracy and despotism.” McKeon, R., “Democracy, Scientific Method, and Action,” Ethics, Vol. 55, p. 253 (July, 1945.)CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹¹ Hallowell, loc. cit., p. 653.

¹² The Abolition of Man (London, 1944), p. 46 Google Scholar.

¹³ Adler, M., “God and the Professors,” Science, Philosophy, and Religion, A Symposium (New York, 1941), p. 136 Google Scholar.

¹⁴ Kelsen, H., “The Natural Law Doctrine before the Tribunal of Science,” The Western Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 2, p. 501 (December, 1949)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁵ Kelsen's statement is thus hardly compatible with his own thesis (quoted at the beginning of this paper from another article), according to which philosophical absolutism is linked to a particular value judgement, namely political absolutism.

¹⁶ H. Kelsen, “Absolutism and Relativism in Philosophy and Politics,” loc. cit. p., 911.

¹⁷ “Good and evil are names that signify our appetites and aversions” (Leviathan, Part I, Ch. 15). This quotation illustrates Hobbes' ethical relativism, even though he was in other respects a rationalist rather than an empiricist thinker.