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Reconstruction in Central Europe

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 September 2013

Dinko Tomašić
Affiliation:
Indiana University

Extract

The area of small nations between the Baltic and the Mediterranean has always been exposed to the rivalries and pressures of the Great Powers, due to its strategic and commercial importance, and because of its location on crossroads of conflicting cultures, religions, political and economic systems. A like situation might again arise at the end of the present war when the peasant peoples of these regions find themselves faced with the growing strength of the Soviet socialism and an expanding Western capitalism, whose application of the principles of the Atlantic Charter and of the Four Freedoms might widely differ. The problem of reconstruction of this part of Europe should be examined, therefore, from the point of view of the possibility of reorganizing this zone of perennial friction and insecurity into a politically and economically balanced and stabilized unit, and into a constructive link between the two diverse worlds of ideas and of institutional practices.

The internal political difficulties of these countries, from Poland to Greece, have in the main resulted from the incompatibility of the feudal-like régimes with the growing political activation of the people. The states formed on the ruins of the Austro-Hungarian Empire inherited many of its feudal characteristics. In Poland, a military group, landed gentry, and state officials, supported by the Church hierarchy, ruled the country, while the parliament and the written constitution existed only nominally. In Hungary, the landed magnates and gentry were the actual ruling classes, and in Austria medieval scholasticism and clericalism were the ideological and political agents behind the authoritarian régime. Of all succession states, Czechoslovakia alone seemed superficially free of feudal remnants, because this industrially advanced country had an independent and liberal bourgeois class.

Type
International Affairs—Problems of Post-War Reconstruction
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1943

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References

1 Buell, Raymond L., Poland: Key to Europe (New York, 1939), pp. 13, 23, 96–97, 156, 181–185, 299.Google Scholar

2 South-Eastern Europe; A Political and Economic Survey (The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1939), pp. 57–59.

3 Winter, Ernst Karl, “Salvage for a Fourth Austria,” Journal of Central European Affairs (Apr., 1941), p. 68.Google Scholar See also Gedye, G. E. R., Betrayal in Central Europe (New York, 1939), Chap. 3.Google Scholar

4 Buell, Raymond L., Europe: A History of Ten Years (New York, 1939), pp. 313322.Google Scholar

5 Tomašić, Dinko, “Croatia in European Politics,” Journal of Central European Affairs (Apr., 1942), pp. 67, 72–73.Google Scholar

6 South-Eastern Europe, op. cit., pp. 68–73, 78, 88, 90–94, 99–104. Greece secured independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1830, Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro in 1878, Bulgaria in 1908, and Albania in 1913.

7 The clash in Yugoslavia between the “Chetniks” and the “Partisans” and “Green Cadres” is an expression of the sharp conflict which exists between the feudal and the anti-feudal tendencies in that country. This cleavage seems to have deepened as a result of differences in the attitudes taken on this issue by the Soviet Union and by some British and American official circles. The situation in underground Poland is not unlike that in Yugoslavia.

8 Tomašić, Dinko, “The Struggle for Power in Yugoslavia,” Journal of Central European Affairs (July, 1941), pp. 164165.Google Scholar

9 This would be in agreement with the Anglo-Soviet Treaty of Alliance of 1942 in which the two contracting parties expressed a desire “to unite with other like-minded states in adopting proposals for common action to resist aggression in the post-war period” (Art. III), and also “to work together in close and friendly collaboration after the reëstablishment of peace for the organization of security and economic prosperity in Europe” (Art. V).

10 Atlantic Charter, Point 3.

12 Handbook of Central and East Europe (Zurich, 1932), p. 360.

13 One-third of the agricultural population in Poland, Croatia, and Bulgaria represents a burden which prevents the further advance of agriculture in these countries. See Bićanić, Rudolf, “Excess Population,” The Report of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, European Agriculture (London, 1942), pp. 141142.Google Scholar

14 It is estimated that there are about forty million acres of unproductive land between the Baltic and the Mediterranean, consisting of marshes, flooded land, sandy ground, and land depleted by erosion. There are also about sixty-five million acres of forests, and a great part of this could be used for more productive purposes. Yet all the cultivable land which could be created in this way could absorb hardly more than one million surplus manpower. R. Bićanić, op. cit., pp. 142 f.

15 South-Eastern Europe, op. cit.; also R. Bićanić, op. cit., p. 144.

16 South-Eastern Europe, op. cit., p. 184.

17 At present, less than one-third of the available labor hours are used in the winter months.

18 This is, for instance, the case of Greece, whose standard of living is higher than in the neighboring countries because of the cultivation of industrial plants and the development of industries processing the agricultural products, especially tobacco and currants (South-Eastern Europe, op. cit., p. 158). This is also the case of the Dalmatian coast, where the peasants are engaged primarily in wine production.

19 In 1931, the number of inhabitants per square kilometer of cultivated land was 336 in Greece, 181 in Yugoslavia, 147 in Hungary, 140 in Bulgaria, and 128 in Rumania (South-Eastern Europe, op. cit., p. 158).Google ScholarPubMed

20 It is estimated that three to four acres of cultivated land per head would be necessary.

21 Meade, J. E., The Economic Basis of a Durable Peace (New York, 1940), pp. 112113.Google Scholar

22 The representatives of the “peasant communities” from central Europe met in London in 1942 and agreed on a common “Peasant Program” which stresses the necessity for providing the peoples of this area with democratic institutions (Preamble) and with sufficient land, agricultural coöperatives, credit, insurance, and stabilization of prices (Points 1–4); it proposes scientific improvement in land, machinery, seeds, and livestock breeding (Points 5–6), and demands development of agricultural industries, improvement in communications, lowering of tariff barriers (Points 9–11), and agricultural education and general rural welfare as essential parts of the common platform (Points 7–8).

23 Atlantic Charter, Points 2 and 3.

24 Herz, John H., “Power Politics and World Organization,” in this Review, Dec., 1942, pp. 1045–46.Google Scholar

25 Hoover, and Gibson, , The Problems of Lasting Peace (New York, 1943), pp. 230233.Google Scholar

26 Tomašić, Dinko, “The Struggle for Power in Yugoslavia,” op. cit., pp. 148159.Google Scholar

27 The Rumanian official figures for 1930 gave the following percentages for the inhabitants of Transylvania: Rumanians, 57.82, Hungarians, 24.38, Germans 9.81. Jews, 3.22, others, 4.77.

28 Bosnia-Herzegovina is settled by Croatian-Catholics (23 per cent), Croatian-Moslems (30 per cent), and Eastern Orthodox Serbs (43 per cent).

29 Tomašić, Dinko, “The Struggle for Power in Yugoslavia,” op. cit., pp. 161164.Google Scholar See the same writer's “Sociology in Yugoslavia,” American Journal of Sociology (July, 1941), pp. 66–69.

30 Polish-Czechoslovak Declaration of Nov. 11, 1940.

31 Ibid.

32 Tomašić, Dinko, “Croatia in European Politics,” op. cit., pp. 8185.Google Scholar See the same writer's “The Struggle for Power in Yugoslavia,” op. cit., pp. 148–165.

33 Wright, Quincy, A Study of War (Chicago, 1942), II., pp. 1334–35.Google Scholar

34 Ibid., p. 921.

35 On the importance of the quest for “justice” as a unifying symbol, see Lasswell, H. D., World Politics and Personal Insecurity (New York, 1935), pp. 249250.Google Scholar

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