¹ “'tis not without reason that he [man] seeks out and is willing to join in society with others who are already united, or have a mind to unite for the mutual preservation of their lives, liberties, and estates, which I call by the general name, property.” Second Treatise on Civil Government (1690), para. 123.

² Burke, of course, asserted the need for a means of change, but it is not clear how this is to function, and he does not appear to conceive of rationally determined action by the state.

³ Hegel was not reactionary, as is sometimes asserted, but was gently conservative. If the philosopher were successful enough to achieve an understanding of society, his reflections would be of little use to the practical politician who must proceed in a somewhat hand-to-mouth fashion. Hegel was really a sceptic in politics.

⁴ I am thinking, for example, of Professor Oakeshott, for whom political ideals can never guide the politician, and attempts by him to follow anything but intimations are sure to end in catastrophe; the only healer of social complaints worth considering is time. Cf. articles on rationalism in politics in Cambridge Journal, 1947. T. E. Utley also shows a similar scepticism based on complexity; cf. Essays in Conservatism (1947).

⁵ Herbert Spencer, as we shall see, falls into both camps; he was an extreme individualist, and believed as well that “the social organism cannot be dealt with in any one part, without all other parts being influenced in ways that cannot be fore-seen.” “Over-Legislation” in Essays Scientific, Political and Speculative (1868 ed.), ii, p. 63Google Scholar.

⁶ The possible exception is Bosanquet, whom we shall discuss at a later stage, but in many ways was hardly a liberal at all.

⁷ I understand the two words “liberty” and “freedom” as synonymous and they will be used indiscriminately; efforts to distinguish between them appear to me not to have met with much success. In the following essay the terminology I shall use will, even when discussing the views of others who use different terminology, be my own as defined in the text, except when the contrary is explicitly stated.

⁸ de Ruggiero, G. in his History of European Liberalism (1927), pp. 350fGoogle Scholar, divides conceptions of freedom in roughly the same way as this, but names them differently, as does Professor SirBerlin, Isaiah, Two Concepts of Liberty (1958)Google Scholar. Both these thinkers fail to distinguish the notion of positive liberty which it is the purpose of this essay to examine. The former tends to confound it with what he calls positive freedom—and what I call the realist conception of liberty, from which, as we shall see, it can fairly clearly be distinguished. The latter confuses it with what he calls negative freedom—what I call empiricist freedom in general, of which it is merely one variety. Professor Berlin seems to assume that only a fool could hold to what I call negative freedom without seeing that this implies positive freedom; it is certainly possible if one conception of society be held, and the distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic barriers be ignored, to slide from one to the other. Nevertheless, Professor Berlin ignores the fact that many eminent thinkers from Hobbes to Spencer have been negative liberals without believing that this implies a positive element. Ruggiero, on the other hand ignores our positive liberals, and seems to assume that all forms of empiricist liberty imply realist liberty, though not in its most rigorous form. Berlin sees that negative and positive liberty have something in common and shows sympathy with the more positive elements in the empiricist notion of freedom (op. cit., p. 8), yet he goes on to quote with evident approval Bentham's dictum that “every law is an infraction of liberty” (ibid., p. 35). If what Berlin says on p. 8 is correct, then some laws increase the total liberty in a society (though not, of course, to the person coerced) and Bentham's statement is misleading. Thus Berlin's terminology leads -to confusions, and to the idea that all laws decrease human freedom—implying a laissez faire attitude.

⁹ “A free man is one who lives under the guidance of reason, who is not led by fear but who directly desires that which is good.” Ethics, 4 Prop. 67. For Spinoza a man is free when led solely by reason (4 Prop. 68) and when self-determined (I. Def. 7.)

¹⁰ Passions, however, cease to be passions when reason is applied to them and when we get a clear idea of them (5 Prop. 3).

¹¹ Cf. esp. du Contrat Social, 4:2.

¹² Op. cit., 1:7.

¹³ For his influence on Kant and Hegel, cf. Bosanquet, , Philosophical Theory of the State (1951 ed.)Google Scholar, ch. 9 and also for his influence on the author. For Greens, debt to Rousseau, cf. Principles of Political Obligation, paras. 64f.Google Scholar

¹⁴ Hegel attacked the Platonic state in which people were pushed around, into jobs which they had no particular desire to do, and had no say in the matter, Philosophy of Right, Add. to para. 262; subjective freedom, which takes into account the desires and the aptitudes of individuals is essential to the ethical life, and it was, in his opinion, Christianity which first introduced this subjective element (Add. to para. 185). He attacked the view which tries to ignore passions in man and declared that all great actions have demanded an element of private interest and of self seeking desires, Philosophy of History (E. T. 1894), pp. 24f.Google Scholar

¹⁵ Liberty is “not … the power of doing what we like, but the right of being able to do what we ought,” wrote Acton, The Rambler (1860), p. 146Google Scholar (my italics). Cf. also; “By liberty I mean the assurance that every man shall be protected in doing what he believes his duty against the influence of authority and majorities, custom and opinion.” The History of Freedom, p. 3 (my italics). This latter definition is somewhat more subjective than the former. De Ruggiero declared that by “recognizing as the only form of freedom the freedom to do right” we should destroy this freedom itself (op. cit., p. 356). T. H. Green ap-pears to have held a somewhat similar position; cf. pp. 120., infra.

¹⁶ “A free agent is he that can do if he will, and forbear if he will; and … liberty is the absence of external impediments.” Of Liberty and Necessity, English Works (1840), iv, pp. 275–6Google Scholar. The concept of liberty applies in Hobbes's thought to inanimate as well as to animate bodies, and an object which is tied down is to that extent unfree; Leviathan, ch. 21. The constraint, however, must be external. If a man is sick, Hobbes does not say that he is unfree to get up; water is not unfree when it cannot go uphill; Liberty and Necessity, E.W., iv, p. 174. There is no opposition between freedom and necessity, the will is determined in its decisions as all things are, and a man is free when he can carry out these decisions; Leviathan, ch. 21. He is clear that if a body lacks the power to do something it is not to be called unfree, but if this power—perhaps financial means—could have been supplied by the state and was not, would Hobbes say that a poor man was constrained in this matter? Probably not.

¹⁷ It is bad, he thought, “that there should be more laws than necessarily serve for the good of the magistrate and his subjects.” De cive, in E.W., ii, p. 178.

¹⁸ “The liberty of a subject lieth therefore only in those things, which in regulating their actions, the sovereign hath praetermitted.” Leviathan, ch. 21.

¹⁹ “Extrinsical causes that take away endeavour, are not to be called impediments.” Liberty, Necessity and Chance, E.W., v, p. 352Google Scholar. Thus, for Hobbes, ignorance is not an impediment, and education not a means of increasing liberty.

²⁰ Leviathan, ch. 21. Efforts to prove that Hobbes was a liberal are not particularly successful. It is true that Hobbes's sovereign might decide to be liberal, and Hobbes hoped that he will, but there can be no moral obligation upon him to do so. Hume is another sceptical liberal, who saw liberty as something which might as well be allowed, because there are some things which governments just cannot enforce; it is not for him a positive value in politics. The world is too young declares the sceptic, to discover truth or right, and politics must be conducted as a matter of pure convenience; cf. “Of Civil Liberty,” in Essays, 1:12. Liberty is “attended with so few inconveniences” that it might as well bo granted as not; cf. ‘Of the Liberty of the Press; in ibid., 1:2. This distinction between dogmatic and sceptical liberalism is a vital one and is too often ignored.

²¹ Principles of Ethics, para 380 (1900 ed., ii, p. 251)Google Scholar.

²² The question of time has sometimes been ignored in this context. The empiricists were right in saying that a man cannot be forced to be free; freedom is an ability to choose, and if you coerce a person you cannot at the same time increase his freedom: I think, though, that it is possible to coerce a person at time t and by doing so increase his freedom at time t′. An illustration might help. You can coerce a man by preventing him from going to a hypnotist, or from taking drugs, which in itself is an infringement of his liberty; yet this action might increase his freedom at a later date, because if he had been hypnotised or taken the drugs, he would not be in the position to make any choices at all. This is not, however, to say that restrictive action will always (a) increase the total freedom, and (b) work. This argument is distinct from the realist argument, which allows that a man would be following his real will in not going to the hypnotist, and thus would be forced to be free at the same time as he was being coerced.

²³ A. D. Lindsay pointed out that an increasingly interdependent society would manifest the need for more state intervention, even under the old conception of the state as the protector of negative liberty. “The State in Recent Political Theory,” The Political Quarterly, 02 1914, p. 143Google Scholar.

²⁴ The title was The Sphere and Duties of Government. Herbert Spencer claimed not to have read this book; “Specialized Administration,” in Essays Scientific Political and Speculative (1874), iii, p. 166Google Scholar.

²⁵ Op. cit., p. 44.

²⁶ “Every edition of Mill's book [Principles of Political Economy] became more and more Socialistic. After his death the world learned the personal history, penned by his own hand, of his development from a mere political democrat to a convinced Socialist.” Fabian Essays (1889), p. 58Google Scholar; cf. also p. 56, and Webb, Sidney, Towards Social Democracy? (1919), p. 38Google Scholar. It is true that Mill declared that the ideas of himself and of Mrs. Taylor “would class us decidedly under the general designation of Socialists.” Autobiography (Classics, World ed.), p. 196Google Scholar. A glance at the much vaunted fourth part of the Principles, however, confirms the suspicion that in many ways he was only a socialist in the sense that all late Victorians were said to be.

²⁷ Cf. his reply to the charge in The Man versus the State (1940 ed.), pp. 52–3Google Scholar.

²⁸ He had a great influence in the United States, of course; cf. Hofstadter, R., Social Darwinism in American Thought (1955 ed.), pp. 31f.Google Scholar

²⁹ None of his works, for example, appear in the syllabus of the “Theories of the Modern State” paper in the Cambridge history tripos.

³⁰ Cf. “Over-Legislation,” in Essays, ii, p. 71Google Scholar; also Principles of Sociology, paras. 213f (1877 ed., i, pp. 466f)Google Scholar and “The Social Organism,” in Essays, i, pp. 386f.Google Scholar

³¹ “The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant.” On Liberty, ch. I.

³² Cf. “Over-Legislation,” in Essays, ii, p. 55Google Scholar.

³³ Man can be under either a human or a natural master. “When he is under the impersonal coercion of Nature, we say that he is free; and when he is under the personal coercion of someone above him, we call him, according to the degree of his dependence, a slave, a serf, or a vassal.” “From Freedom to Bondage,” in Mackay, T., ed., A Plea for Liberty (1891), p. 6Google Scholar.

³⁴ Principles of Sociology, para. 564, ii, p. 697Google Scholar.

³⁵ “Progress: its Law and Cause,” in Essays, i, p. 50Google Scholar.

³⁶ “Over-Legislation,” in Essays, ii, pp. 67f.Google Scholar

³⁷ Cf. Principles of Sociology, para. 438, ii, pp. 240f.Google Scholar

³⁸ Cf. The Man versus the State, p. 78.

³⁹ “Society in its corporate capacity, cannot without immediate or remoter disaster interfere with the play of these opposed principles under which every species has reached such fitness for its mode of life as it possesses, and under which it maintains that fitness.” Ibid., p. 80. For another example of the conservative influence of evolutionary theory reference can be made to Sir Henry Maine, who praises “the strenuous and neverending struggle for existence, the beneficent private war which makes one man strive to climb on the shoulders of another and remain there through the law of the survival of the fittest.” Popular Government (1890 ed.), p. 50Google Scholar.

⁴⁰ Cf. “Prison Ethics,” in Essays, ii, pp. 212–3Google Scholar.

⁴¹ “There seems,” he wrote, “good reason to think that the degree of liberty a people is capable of in any given age, is a fixed quantity; and that any artificial extension of it in one direction, simply brings about an equivalent limitation in some other direction.” “Parliamentary Reform: the Dangers and the Safeguards,” in Essays, ii, p. 378Google Scholar.

⁴² Address to the members of the Liberty and Property Defense League in Political Letters and Speeches (1896), p. 183Google Scholar.

⁴³ Principles of State Interference (1902 ed.), p. 57nGoogle Scholar.

⁴⁴ Donisthorpe, however, in the first place, only suggested the voluntary system for non-essentials, while there would be a system of compulsory taxation for such things as defense. Herbert embraced the idea with his usual radical enthusiasm, advocating the abolition of all but voluntary taxes; cf. his The Right and Wrong of Compulsion by the State (For Liberty) (1885), pp. 43fGoogle Scholar. Donisthorpe explained his own position in Law in a Free State (1885), p. 13Google Scholar.

⁴⁵ “The Limits of Liberty,” in T. Mackay ed., op. cit., p. 64. Another negative liberal wrote in the same vein, “It cannot be too carefully remembered that almost every clause of an act of parliament, if it have any force or effect at all, takes away a liberty from somebody, because it must of necessity speak of something which shall or shall not be done where before it was optional.” Smith, Bruce, Liberty and Liberalism (1887), p. 252Google Scholar. He went on to say that the situation in Britain was as good as could be expected, and that the policy of liberalism should be “to preserve that state of things.” Ibid., p. 253.

⁴⁶ The Earl of Pembroke, Liberty and Socialism, pp. 82fGoogle Scholar, and Stephen, J. F., Liberty, Equality, Fraternity (1874 ed.), Preface to 2d. ed., p.xGoogle Scholar.

⁴⁷ “The Limits of Liberty,” op. cit., pp. 70f. Mill, of course, realized this; his distinction was rather between those things which affect others directly and those which only affect them indirectly.

⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 75.

⁴⁹ Herbert, op. cit., p. 14.

⁵⁰ “The Limits of Liberty,” p. 91; cf. also “I have recently examined the rules of some of the principal London clubs, and I find that they are, many of them, [presumably he means the rules and not the clubs!] largely socialistic.” Ibid., pp. 91–2.

⁵¹ Ibid., p. 92.

⁵² “From Freedom to Bondage,” in T. Mackay, ed., op. cit., pp. 20f.

⁵³ Cf. G. Howells, “Liberty for Labour,” in T. Mackay, ed., op. cit., p. 110.

⁵⁴ E. S. Robertson, “The Impracticability of Socialism,” in ibid., p. 31.

⁵⁵ Introduction to Political Science (1902 ed.), p. 119Google Scholar.

⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 121.

⁵⁷ Cf. For Liberty, pp. 5–6.

⁵⁸ Law in a Free State, p. 17; cf. also “But liberty and lawlessness should not be confounded, one with the other; they are separate and distinct, legally and morally. Individual liberty is consistent with law and order, and the ideal of a State is reached in proportion to the individual liberty attained, and the order which is maintained, in the commonwealth of a free people.” George Howell, “Liberty for Labour,” in T. Mackay, ed., op. cit., p. 109.

⁵⁹ Principles of Political Obligation, para 31.

⁶⁰ Ibid., para. 30.

⁶¹ Ibid., para. 99. “There is no right ’but thinking makes it so’,” para. 136.

⁶² “Liberal Legislation and Freedom of Contract,” in Works (1885), iii, p. 371Google Scholar.

⁶³ “… the mere removal of compulsion, the mere enabling a man to do as he likes, is in itself no contribution to true freedom … the ideal of true freedom is the maximum of power for all members of human society alike to make the best of themselves.” Ibid., pp. 371–2.

⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 372.

⁶⁵ “I was born,” he wrote, “in Llangernyw in 1852, and born again in 1876 in Edward Caird's classroom.” Hetherington, H. J. W., Life and Letters of Sir Henry Jones (1924), p. 20nGoogle Scholar.

⁶⁶ Jones, Henry and Muirhead, J. H., The Life of Edward Caird, p. 20Google Scholar.

⁶⁷ Jones, Henry, The Working Faith of the Social Reformer, pp. 262f.Google Scholar

⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 10. This can also be seen in an earlier essay, “The Social Organism,” in Seth, A. and Haldane, R. B., eds., Essays in Philosophical Criticism, p. 201Google Scholar.

⁶⁹ The Limits of Individual Liberty (1885), p. 122Google Scholar.

⁷⁰ “Put together Hegel's resuscitation of the Hellenic conception of the State with his declaration in the Philosophy of History, that the end of the modern State is to realize the positive freedom of all, and it becomes obvious enough that, though the advocate of laissez faire will not relish Hegel's politics, he will have more reason to blame him for (unconsciously it may be) begetting socialism than for supporting the old régime.” Mind, Vol. 13 (1888), p. 434Google Scholar.

⁷¹ Principles of State Interference, pp. 86f., though he does not accuse Mill of holding a theory of the real will without knowing it.

⁷² Philosophical Theory of the State, pp. 64f.

⁷³ Ritchie, D. G., Natural Rights (1895), pp. 139–40Google Scholar.

⁷⁴ Ritchie, D. G., The Moral Function of the State (1887), p. 9Google Scholar; cf. also “Evolution and Democracy,” in Coit, Stanton, ed., Ethical Democracy (1900), p. 27Google Scholar.

⁷⁵ The Working Faith, pp. 143–4.

⁷⁶ “Practical Freedom involves much more than the absence of legal and social restraint; every limitation of power is an abridgement of positive liberty. A man is not free to go from Shropshire to London … if the journey is too long and expensive for him; nor is he actually free to develop a powerful intellect if education lies beyond his reach.” “The Individual and the Crowd,” in Essays in Political and Moral Philosophy (1879), pp. 19–20Google Scholar.

⁷⁷ One of them rejected the idea in explicit Hobbist terminology: “No one now-a-days would seriously contend that one citizen should possess better opportunities than another. It is admitted, on all hands … that every citizen should be free to attempt anything which his fellow-citizens are allowed to do…. There is a great difference between giving a man the liberty to do anything, and supplying him with the means with which to do it. This distinction has been clearly stated by Hobbes …. True Liberalism would give to every man the liberty to do anything which his fellow-citizens are allowed to do; but Socialism is not content with liberty only: it wants the state to confer the power also, that is to say the means.” Bruce Smith, op. cit., p. 434. The distinction between opportunity—in any substantial sense of the term—and means or power is prodigiously deep.

⁷⁸ Studies in Political and Social Ethics (1902), p. 58Google Scholar; cf. “Arbitrary freedom (of the individual) and arbitrary despotism (of Caesar or the State) are not mutually exclusive. They are only a dual phenomenon of the same situation. They may struggle with each other more or less, but by nature they are allies.” Tönnies, F., Community and Association (E. T. 1955), p. 235Google Scholar.

⁷⁹ Principles of State Interference, pp. 137–8.

⁸⁰ Ibid., pp. 7–8.

⁸¹ “Is it,” demanded Sir Henry Jones of the new idea of the positive state, “a mammoth State, a Leviathan, gradually absorbing its citizens into itself, annihilating their private wills and all the good and evil which springs therefrom …? Or is it a country whose people are more free, whose private wealth is greater, whose individual enter-prises are more farreaching …? It is possible that the State as a single organism grows in power, even as its citizens acquire freedom.” The Working Faith, pp. 103–4.

⁸² Life and Letters of Sir Henry Jones, p. 232.

⁸³ A Study of Ethical Principles (1908 ed.), p. 291Google Scholar; cf. also Jones, , The Working Faith, p. 105Google Scholar.

⁸⁴ The Working Faith, p. 96.

⁸⁵ Principles of State Interference, pp. 60–1.

⁸⁶ “Every careful biologist (the qualification is unfortunately necessary) recognizes that evolution ia not identical with what we mean by progress. Even in the biological sphere, success in the struggle may be attained by degeneration as well as by advance.” Ritchie, , International Journal of Ethics, Vol. 5 (1894–1895), p. 110CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁸⁷ Principles of State Interference, p. 50. This is not to say that a study of evolution is unnecessary. By studying what has been we are able to see the possibilities for the future, and are able to make use of them; cf. The Moral Function of the State, pp. 5–6.

⁸⁸ Darwinism and Politics (1889 ed.), p. 82Google Scholar; cf. also Natural Rights, p. 64.

⁸⁹ Philosophical Studies (1905), p. 334Google Scholar.

⁹⁰ The Moral Function of the State, p. 7. Spencer seems to have recognized the distinction between the fittest and the best. “Very often,” he wrote, “that which humanly speaking is inferiority, causes the survival.” “Mr. Martineau on Evolution,” in Essays, iii, p. 242Google Scholar. Yet he continued in his political writings to argue as though they were the same.

⁹¹ “It is because man is a spirit and not an animal that history is the record of a progress to which the biologist expert has no key. Civilization is not the result of the forces of nature, but the issue of a struggle with them.” University Addresses (1898), p. 259Google Scholar.

⁹² “Evolution and Ethics,” in Collected Essays (1895), ix, p. 81Google Scholar.

⁹³ Ibid., p. 115.

⁹⁴ Ibid., p. 82. Huxley was by no means a socialist; cf. “Government: Anarchy or Regimentation,” in Collected Essays, i, p. 402Google Scholar.

⁹⁵ The Descent of Man (1871), ii, p. 404Google Scholar.

⁹⁶ Mind, Vol. 10 (1885), p. 136Google Scholar. “Whether our ideals of goodness are due to natural selection (of individuals and societies and usages) or partly to natural selection and partly to use-inheritance may be an interesting historical problem; but it has no direct bearing on the problem of what meaning there is in calling anything ‘good’ at all.” “Heredity and Ethics,” in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, iii: I, p. 147Google Scholar.

⁹⁷ Darwin and Hegel (1893), p. 29Google Scholar, and Natural Rights, p. 104.

⁹⁸ Spender, J. A. and Asquith, H., Life of the Earl of Oxford and Asquith, i, p. 36Google Scholar.

⁹⁹ Introduction to Samuel, H., Liberalism (1902), pp. ix–xGoogle Scholar. Asquith was for a time Member of Parliament for the Fifeshire Burghs, in which constituency was situated the University of St. Andrews, whose Professor of Philosophy was Sir Henry Jones. The professor wrote of the politician, “I like the statesman in him and believe in his cause.” Life and Letters of Sir Henry Jones, p. 55.

¹⁰⁰ Memories and Reflections of the Earl of Oxford and Asquith, i, p. 113Google Scholar.

¹⁰¹ Speeches of the Earl of Oxford and Asquith (1927), p. 308Google Scholar.

¹⁰² I.e., by saying that a man who is drunk, like a man who is hypnotized, is not in a position to take decisions; thus it is possible to restrict his freedom at time t in order to increase it at time t′. In this matter, however, it should be borne in mind that present freedom is worth more than future freedom, and on the question of liquor laws the position of Archbishop Magee is perhaps more attractive to the liberal than that of the restrictionists; “I would,” he declared, “distinctly prefer freedom to sobriety.” House of Lords Debates, May 2, 1872, quoted in Speeches and Addresses, p. 120Google Scholar.

¹⁰³ Liberalism, p. 28.

¹⁰⁴ Memories (1945), p. 25Google Scholar.

¹⁰⁵ Samuel records going to hear Huxley's Romanes Lecture, ibid., p. II.

¹⁰⁶ “I never felt laissez faire inherent in Liberalism, or I could never have remained as long as I did in the Liberal Party.” Trevelyan, Charles, Preface to Langshaw, H., Socialism and the Historic Function of Liberalism (1925), p. viGoogle Scholar.

¹⁰⁷ “The Difficulties of Individualism,” reprinted in Socialism and Individualism (1908), p. 22Google Scholar.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., pp. 26–7.

¹⁰⁹ Cf. Webb, Sidney, Socialism in England (1890), p. 13Google Scholar.

¹¹⁰ Fabian Essays, p. 59.

¹¹¹ The Metaphysical Theory of the State (1918), p. 134Google Scholar.

¹¹² Liberalism, p. 143. “Liberalism is the belief that society can safely be founded on this selfdirecting power of personality.” Ibid., p. 123. “The central principle of Liberalism is selfgovernment.” Democracy and Reaction (1904), p. 47Google Scholar.

¹¹³ Democracy and Reaction, p. 127.

¹¹⁴ Social Evolution and Political Theory (1911), p. 203Google Scholar; cf. also, “Hence in the main the extension of control does not impair liberty, but on the contrary is the means of extending liberty and may and should be conceived with that very object in view.” Ibid., p. 202.

¹¹⁵ The Crisis of Liberalism (1909), pp. 92–3Google Scholar.

¹¹⁶ The Civilization of Christendom (1893), p. 379Google Scholar.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., p. 368.

¹¹⁸ Liberalism, p. 23.

¹¹⁹ The Metaphysical Theory of the State, p. 36. Cole, G. D. H. similarly attacked the idealists, Labour in the Commonwealth (1918), p. 194Google Scholar, although only a year previous he appears to have held much the same notion of freedom himself, Self-Government in Industry (1917), p. 227Google Scholar.

¹²⁰ Democracy and Reaction, p. 77.

¹²¹ Ibid., p. 79.

¹²² Ibid., pp. 84–5.

¹²³ The Labour Movement (1893), p. 91Google Scholar.

¹²⁴ “The Ethical Basis of Collectivism,” in International Journal of Ethics, Vol. 8 (1898), pp. 145, 147Google Scholar.

¹²⁵ “I was never one of those who think that the general fact of progress may be readily assumed, or that mankind constantly advances to higher things by an automatic law which can be left to itself.” Development and Purpose (1913), p. xxiGoogle Scholar.

¹²⁶ Social Evolution and Political Theory, p. 80.

¹²⁷ Development and Purpose, p. 207, cf. also Democracy and Reaction, pp. 99–100 and 115–6.

¹²⁸ Social Evolution and Political Theory, p. 43.

¹²⁹ Liberalism, pp. 24, 29. “Is a man free, “demanded J. A. Hobson, “who has not equal opportunity with his fellows of such access to all material and moral means of personal development and work as shall contribute to his own welfare and that of his society?” The Crisis of Liberalism, p. 93.

¹³⁰ Democracy and Reaction, pp. 37–8.

¹³¹ Liberalism, p. 91.

¹³² “The Problem,” in Hobson, J. A. and Ginsberg, M., L. T. Hobhouse, p. 273Google Scholar.

¹³³ The Crisis of Liberalism, p. 94.; cf. also Hobson, , The Social Problem (1901), pp. 10, 96Google Scholar.

¹³⁴ The Civilization of Christendom, p. 338. In the Preface to this book the reader is told that the C.O.S. conception of thrift is very different from the individualist idea; as to exactly now, he is left in the dark.

¹³⁵ “Nothing undermines character so much as these chance interferences.” “The Principles and Chief Dangers of the Administration of Charity,” in International Journal of Ethics, Vol. 3 (1892–1893), p. 324Google Scholar.

¹³⁶ The smug way in which these organizers of charity used to speak of helping people to help themselves (Bosanquet, , The Social Criterion [1907], p. 29Google Scholar) would be amusing if it were not that this attitude held up efforts towards real social reform for many years.

¹³⁷ Cf. Hobson and Ginsberg, op. cit., p. 63.

¹³⁸ Ibid., p. 66.

¹³⁹ Hobson, , The Crisis of Liberalism, p. 93Google Scholar.

¹⁴⁰ Political Education (1951), pp. 9f.Google Scholar

¹⁴¹ Political Thought from Gerson to Grotius (1916 ed.), p. 1Google Scholar.