¹ Recent volumes exploring this general perspective include Spiegel, Steven L., Dominance and Diversity: The International Hierarchy (Boston: Little, Brown, 1972)Google Scholar, and Singer, Marshall R., Weak States in a World of Powers: The Dynamics of International Relationships (New York: The Free Press, 1972)Google Scholar.

² This explication of the assumed relationship between rank and influence paraphrases Group Dynamics: Research and Theory, ed. Cartwright, Dorwin and Zander, Alvin, 3rd ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), p. 220Google Scholar.

The application of this idea to asymmetrical politics is exemplified by Litt, Edgar and Parenti, Michael, Democracy's Ordeal in America: A Guide to Political Theory and Action (Hinsdale, Ill.: Dryden Press, 1973), pp. 30–33Google Scholar.

³ The reader is referred elsewhere for a full exposition of the fundamental trade theory employed here. See, for example, Kindleberger, Charles P., International Economics, rev. ed. (Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, 1958), chapters 5 and 6Google Scholar, or Ellsworth, Paul T., The International Economy, rev. ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1958), chapters 4 through 7Google Scholar.

⁴ See Kelman, Herbert C., “Compliance, Identification, and Internalization: Three Processes of Attitude Change,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2 (March 1958), 51–60CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Kelman's compliance and conformity as overt behavior styles correspond to the expectations here. But they do not require “internalization,” behavior motivated by the intrinsic rewards of the acts for the actor. Also see Cartwright and Zander, p. 230.

⁵ Deutsch, Karl W. and Eckstein, Alexander, “National Industrialization and the Declining Share of the International Economic Sector, 1890–1959,” World Politics, 13 (January 1961), 267–299CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁶ Balassa, Bela A., Trade Prospects for Developing Countries (Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, 1964), p. 12Google Scholar, where the U.S., Canada, non-Communist Europe and Yugoslavia, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa are classified “developed.”

⁷ This same configuration is explored by Galtung, Johan, “A Structural Theory of Imperialism,” Journal of Peace Research, 8, No. 2 (1971), 81–117CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Perroux, Francois, L'économie du XX^e siècle (Paris: Presses Universitaires de Frances, 1961), pp. 27–56Google Scholar.

⁸ Data are from the United Nations, Statistical Office, Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, 1965 (New York: United Nations, 1967)Google Scholar.

⁹ Also note that nonindustrial economies often rely heavily upon agricultural exports, those very goods historically susceptible to dramatic price changes. See, for example, Cooper, Richard N., The Economics of Interdependence: Economic Policy in the Atlantic Community (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), p. 80Google Scholar.

¹⁰ See Lloyd, Peter J., International Trade Problems of Small Nations (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1968), p. 46Google Scholar; Hirschman, Albert O., National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1945), pp. 30, 85–86Google Scholar; Singer, , Weak States, pp. 239Google Scholar, 222–223.

¹¹ David Vital, for example, asserts that economic dependence stems from several factors, including level of economic development, as well as the impact of foreign trade on the economy: “… the actual dependence of a given small power on foreign economic factors … will depend on the volume of foreign trade relative to total economic activity, on the rate and level of economic development, on the chosen fields of specialization, on the variety of the nation's domestic resources and the skill with which they are utilized ….” In The Inequality of States (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 55Google Scholar (emphasis added).

¹² Ibid., p. 47; Lloyd, pp. 21–22.

¹³ This paraphrases Truman, David, The Congressional Party (New York: Wiley, 1959), p. 13Google Scholar, as quoted in Alker, Hayward R. Jr. and Russett, Bruce M., World Politics in the General Assembly (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), p. 23Google Scholar. Also see Hovet, Thomas Jr., Bloc Politics in the United Nations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), p. 113CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁴ Hovet, p. 14.

¹⁵ The Changing United Nations (New York: Random House, 1967), p. 53Google Scholar. The same thesis is documented in case studies by Stoessinger, John G., The United Nations and the Superpowers (New York: Random House, 1965)Google Scholar.

¹⁶ Keohane, Robert O., “Political Influence in the General Assembly,” International Conciliation, No. 557 (March 1966), p. 19Google Scholar. Empirical support for this proposition includes Wittkopf, Eugene R., “Foreign Aid and United Nations Votes: A Comparative Study,” American Political Science Review, 67 (September 1973), 868–888CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Singer, Marshall R. and Sensenig, Barton III, “Elections Within the United Nations: An Experimental Study Utilizing Statistical Analysis,” International Organization, 17 (Autumn 1963), 901–925Google Scholar. Wittkopf found some positive connection between U.S. foreign aid allocation and its recipients' Assembly and committee agreement with the donor in 1963 and 1966. Singer and Sensenig, accounting for nations' economic, military, perceptual, and communications ties with the superpowers, discovered these bonds to be associated with voting agreement on cold war questions from 1946 to 1959, though more so for interdependencies than for dependencies.

¹⁷ Alker and Russett, World Politics in the General Assembly, chap. 10, present interesting evidence on nations' issue “intensities” in the General Assembly. Tabulating the numbers of speeches made in that body by different nations, they conclude that by 1961 (the last session they examined), the United States and the Soviet Union had become increasingly intense regarding their “East-West” confrontations, of which cold war issues were a major component.

¹⁸ A similar argument is expressed in Bruce M. Russett's theoretical discussion of economic interdependence; see his International Regions and the International System: A Study in Political Ecology (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966), chap. 8, especially p. 124Google Scholar.

¹⁹ A well-known measure, “relative acceptance” (RA), was developed by Savage, Richard I. and Deutsch, Karl W., “A Statistical Model of the Gross Analysis of Transaction Flows,” Econometrica, 28 (July 1960), 551–572CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Measures which divide trade by a nation's gross national product have been used by Russett, International Regions, and by Singer, Weak States. Cal Clark and Susan Welch have come to the conclusion that investigations such as the present one should more appropriately use a trade/GNP measure than one resembling RA. See their “Western European Trade as a Measure of Integration: Untangling the Interpretations,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 16 (September 1972), 353–382Google Scholar, especially p. 337. Marshall Singer, Weak States, combines these two indicators in the same multiplicative fashion used here to measure export dependence, although his ratios are based upon total trade and gross domestic product. The bases for the present choices appear in the following footnote. Singer's formula is presented in his pp. 237–240. Curiously, however, as Singer attempts to establish a threshold value to distinguish “dependent” nations from others, he first argues (p. 238) that an index value of 0.067 is a reasonable partition. But then he less explicitly makes a contrary case (p. 239): “… any state that derives even 10 per cent of its Gross Domestic Product from trade with one country is tied to that Power” (emphasis added). The ambiguity may revolve around whether he equates “dependent” and “tied.”

²⁰ The decision to use export figures rather than “trade” (roughly exports plus imports) is based on four considerations: (1) Degree of commodity concentrations in export trade is much less than in import trade, thus maximizing variance in the “active” variable, as indicated by Lloyd, p. 14. (For a lucid discussion of systematic, extraneous, and error variance problems in research design, see Kerlinger, Fred N., Foundations of Behavioral Research, 2nd ed. [New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973] chap. 17.Google Scholar) (2) Exports appear to be more insulated than imports from economic aid, particularly for the values of underdeveloped nations, thereby minimizing systematic extraneous variance, as indicated by Deutsch, and Eckstein, , “National Industrialization,” p. 274Google Scholar, Singer, , Weak States, pp. 248 and 256Google Scholar, and Sato, Masakatsu, “A Model of U.S. Foreign Aid Allocation: An Application of a Rational Decision-Making Scheme,” in Approaches to Measurement in International Relations: A Non-Evangelical Survey, ed. Mueller, John E. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1969), pp. 198–215Google Scholar. (3) Import values usually include the costs of transport and insurance, export values avoid the introduction of this sort of systematic extraneous variance; (4) Nations with relatively small shares of all international trade by virtue of their low resource and industrial base are also, by and large, nations whose exports are most commodity concentrated, according to Michaely, Michael, “Concentration of Exports and Imports: An International Comparison,” Economic Journal 68 (December 1958), 727CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²¹ See Ray, James Lee and Singer, J. David, “Measuring the Concentration of Power in the International System,” Sociological Methods & Research, 1 (May 1973), 403–437CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²² Banks, Arthur S. and Textor, Robert B., A Cross-Polity Survey (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1963), p. 63Google Scholar.

²³ Lijphart, Arend, “The Analysis of Bloc Voting in the General Assembly,” American Political Science Review, 62 (December 1963), 902–917CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Absences, as opposed to abstentions, are not coded in these data. As John E. Mueller puts it, an absent delegate is usually not present “for reasons which are best attributed to apathy or disinterest.” Approaches to Measurement, p. 139. Similarly, those delegates present but not voting are not included, since inferring their positions would be a dubious enterprise in terms of validity or reliability.

²⁴ Lijphart, p. 910.

²⁵ Alternative means of operationalizing “Cold War” voting are possible, of course. Analogous to Alker's and Russett's technique (World Politics), a factor analysis of roll calls could be used to identify those in which the United States and other “western” nations vote in opposition to the Soviet Union and other “eastern” delegations. A second alternative, however, is employed by Robert J. Mokken and Frans N. Stockman, , “A Theory and Method of Roll Call Analysis,” paper delivered to the Eighth World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Munich, 1970 (second mimeo, December 1971)Google Scholar. Mokken and Stockman (p. 2–2) operationalized “East-West confrontation” “… by taking those issues (key votes) in which the U.S.A. and at least nine other NATO countries oppose the U.S.S.R. and at least five other Warsawpact countries.” (Cited and quoted with the authors' permission.)

²⁶ United Nations, Statistical Office, Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, 1965 (New York: United Nations, 1967)Google Scholar.

²⁷ Taylor, and Hudson, , World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators, 2nd ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972), pp. 306–313Google Scholar.

²⁸ Acknowledgments to Robert Beattie for making these data available through the International Relations Archive, Inter-University Consortium for Political Research, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

²⁹ This is a frequent practice when dealing with such data. See Alker and Russett; Lijphart, , “Analysis of Bloc Voting,” p. 910Google Scholar.

³⁰ Social psychologist Kurt Lewin preferred interactional criteria to attributional ones for purposes of partitioning: “A group is best denned as a dynamic whole based on interdependence rather than on similarity,” in his Resolving Social Conflicts (New York: Harper, 1948), p. 184Google Scholar (emphasis in the original).

³¹ Singer, , Weak States, pp. 238–239Google Scholar. Also see note 19, above, regarding Singer's apparent indecision on this threshold level.

³² Nicaragua and Saudi Arabia are, by this measure, much more dependent on Japan than on the United States. Gabon is much more dependent on exports to its former metropole, France.

³³ Russett, , International Regions, pp. 133–143Google Scholar, finds that twelve of these fifteen Western Hemisphere dependencies were “interdependent” traders in his two clusters of American countries. His overlap with this study is reduced owing to his search for reciprocal trade ties.

³⁴ An Econometric Study of International Trade Flows (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1966)Google Scholar. In his study of foreign trade interdependencies, Russett, International Regions, shows the U.S. to be a key member of his “North and Central America” group in 1963.

³⁵ See Keohane, , “Political Influence,” p. 23Google Scholar.

³⁶ Bivariate correlation coefficients among all pairs of the four economic factors are so small that it is safe to interpret the partial associations between each of them and political compliance in a straightforward fashion; there is no significant multicollinearity among them.

³⁷ One example of the controlling assumption that geographically-defined subsystems are valuable and defensible is Brecher's, Michael “The Subordinate State System of Southern Asia,” World Politics, 15 (January 1963), 213–255CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³⁸ Vital, , Inequality of States, p. 90Google Scholar.

³⁹ See, for example, Franck, Thomas M. and Weisband, Edward, Word Politics: Verbal Strategy Among the Superpowers (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972), especially chapter 5Google Scholar.

⁴⁰ This distinction between domestic and international factors is pursued by Russett, International Regions, chaps. 4 and 5.