¹ Cf., for instance, Wilson, G. G., Handbook of International Law (3rd ed., St. Paul, 1939), p. 18Google Scholar: “Only states in the strict sense of the word are recognized as full legal persons in international law.”

² For the term “body politic” as applied to America, cf. the Mayflower Compact, November 11, 1620, in Commager, H. S., Documents of American History (2 vols., New York, 1935), Vol. 1, p. 15Google Scholar: “In the name of God, Amen. We, whose names are underwritten, … Do by these Presents, solemnly and mutually in Presence of God and one another, covenant and combine ourselves together into a civil Body Politick, for our better Ordering and Preservation, and Furtherance of the Ends aforesaid.” For a synonymous use of “body politic” and “state,” see the reference in the constitution of Massachusetts (1780) to “a free, sovereign, and independent body politic, or state, by the name of the commonwealth of Massachusetts.” Text in Annotated Laws of Massachusetts, Vol. 10 (1933), p. 44.

³ Cf. Hobbes, Thomas, The Elements of Law (1650)Google Scholar; ed. by F. F. Tönnies (Cambridge, England, 1928), Part I, Ch. 19, §8 (Italics supplied); see also Hobbes, Thomas, Leviathan, Part II, Ch. 17Google Scholar: “… the multitude so united in one Person, is called a commonwealth, in latin civitas.”

⁴ “So also may there be amongst a multitude of those members, instituted a subordinate union of certain men, for certain common actions to be done by those men for some common benefit of theirs, or of the whole city…. And these subordinate bodies politics are usually called corporations.” Cf. Hobbes, The Elements of Law, op. cit., Part I, Ch. 19, §9. Cf. also Moore, J. B., A Digest of International Law (8 Vols., Washington, 1906), Vol. 1, pp. 15 f.Google Scholar

⁵ Cf. Pufendorf, De Iure Naturae et Gentium, Octo, Libri, in The Classics of International Law, ed. by Scott, J. B., Vol. I, text of 1688.Google Scholar Introduction by Walter Simons, Vol. II. Translation by C. H. and W. A. Oldfather, with a translation of the Introduction of Walter Simons (Oxford, London, 1934).

⁶ Ibid., Book VII, Ch. II, §13. (Translation, p. 984). Since the end of the seventeenth century the term persona moralis obtained, but restricted to personae compositae, while the persona simplex was held equivalent to persona physica. Cf. Gierke, O. v., The Development of Political Theory, translated by Frey, Bernard (New York, 1939), p. 229, n. 195.Google Scholar German legal terminology substituted later persona moralis through juristische Person. It is almost generally assumed—cf., for instance, Hallis, F., Corporate Personality (London, 1930)Google Scholar, op. cit., p. 6, n. 3—that the term juristische Person was coined by Savigny, C. F. v. in his System des heutigen römischen Rechts, (8 vols., Berlin, 1840), §§85, 86, vol. 2, pp. 235–245Google Scholar; but it certainly was used for the characterization of the state as early as the end of the eighteenth century. See Fichte, J. G., Grundlage des Naturrechts (1795/1796), in Sämtliche Werke (Berlin, 1845/1846), Vol. 3, p. 281Google Scholar: “der Staat …, der eine juridische Person ist.”

⁷ Ibid., Book VII, Ch. II, §14. (Translation, p. 985.)

⁸ Ibid., Book I, Ch. I, §12. (Translation, p. 985.)

⁹ Pufendorf tends to describe “moral persons” as modifications of natural substances; they are not “real” but may cause real effects: cf. Book I, Ch. I, §6: “Although moral entities do not exist of themselves, and consequently should in general not be classified as substances, but rather as modes, we nevertheless find many of them considered like substances, because other moral things appear to be directly founded in them.”

¹⁰ One can speak of moral persons only by analogy to real beings; see ibid., Book I, Ch. 1, §12: “Moral entities, regarded on the analogy of substances, are termed moral persons.”

¹¹ The term “corporate idea” is used throughout this study exclusively with respect to the state as a corporate entity; no reference is made to any peculiar state-type which tends to characterize itself as composed of corporations of a lower level than the state, such as the Italian Fascist state. For the development of the “corporation” concept in political theory since Hobbes, see Gierke, O. v., Natural Law and the Theory of Society, 1500–1800, translated by Barker, E. (2 vols., Cambridge, England, 1934), esp. Vol. 1, p. 114 f.Google Scholar For the corporation theory of Johannes Althusius (1557–1638) and its place in political theory, see Gierke, O. v., The Development of Political Theory, translated by Freyd, B. (New York, 1939).Google Scholar See also C. J. Friedrich's Introduction to his edition of Althusius, Johannes, Politica methodica digesta of Johannes Althusius, in Harvard Political Classics (Cambridge, Mass., 1932).Google Scholar

¹² Cf. Maitland's, F. W. Introduction to Gierke's, O. v.Political Theories of the Middle Age (Cambridge, England, 1922, esp. p. xi f.).Google Scholar “The law's old habit of coördinating men and bodies politic as two kinds of Persons seems to deserve the attention of the modern philosopher, for, though it be an old habit, it has become vastly more important in these last years than it ever was before.” Cf. ibid., Maitland's remarkson the relationship between Staatslehre and Genossenschaftslehre.

¹³ Among the English publications, see especially Hallis, F., Corporate Personality (London, 1930)Google Scholar; E. Barker's introduction to his edition of Gierkę, op. cit., Vol. 1, esp. pp. 62, 81, 83; and Duff, P. W., Personality in Roman Private Law (Cambridge, England, 1938), p. 220 f.Google Scholar See especially the excellent comment on the conflicting constructions of the term “corporate personality,” pp. 206–236. See also Pinney, H., “The Nature of the Corporation,” in Temple University Law Quarterly, Vol. 14 (1939–1940), pp. 443–447Google Scholar; although Pinney does not consider the state as a corporation, and seems inclined to advocate Gierke's and Maitland's theory of the reale Verbandsperson as to private corporations. For the French institutional approach to related problems, see Clemens, R., Personnalité morale et personnalité juridique (Paris, 1935)Google Scholar, and Renard, R. G., La philosophie de l'Institution, 2 vols. (1930, 1939), esp. Vol. 2, pp. 133–157.Google Scholar For recent German monographs in this field, cf. Schnorr v. Carolsfeld, L., Geschichte der juristischen Person, Vol. 1 (München, 1933)Google Scholar, and Wolff, H. J., Organschaft und juristische Person (2 vols., Berlin, 1933/1934).Google Scholar

¹⁴ See Recueil des décisions des Tribaunaux Arbitraux Mixtes (Paris, 1922 f.), Vol. 5 (1926), pp. 887 f., 896. Translation from the French by the writer.

¹⁵ For the term “states in the sense of international law” as a synonym for international personality, see Briggs, H. W., Law of Nations (New York, 1938), p. 63.Google Scholar See also Kunz, J. L., “Die Staatenverbindungen,” in Handbuch des Völkerrechts (Stuttgart, 1929), p. 19.Google Scholar Whenever the term “state” appears in this paper without qualification, it refers to the “state” in the sense of international law.

¹⁶ For the legal personality of the Holy See, cf. Fur, L. Le, Le Sainte-Siège et le Droit des Gens (Paris, 1930), p. 12Google Scholar: “Le Saint-Siège est d'abord une personne du droit des gens….” See also ibid., p. 17 f. See also Hochfeld, H., Die Rechtspersönlichkeit des Heiligen Stuhles (Hamburg, 1930)Google Scholar; Falco, M., The Legal Position of the Holy See Before and After the Lateran Treaties (London, 1935)Google Scholar; Verdross, A., Völkerrecht (Berlin, 1937), p. 60Google Scholar; Pallieri, G. Balladore, Diritto Internazionale Pubblico (Milano, 1937), p. 181 f.Google Scholar

¹⁷ Cansacchi, G. P., La personalità di diritto internazionale del S.M.O. Gerosolomitano detto di Malta (Roma, 1936).Google Scholar Cf. also the case Nanni e Pace c. Sovrano Militare Ordine di Malta (1935), in Rivista di diritto internazionale, Vol. 27 (1935), pp. 369–374.

¹⁸ See Codex Iuris Canonici, Can. 100, §1, “Catholica Ecclesia et Apostolica Sedes moralis personae rationem habent ex ipsa ordinatione divina; alterae inferiores personae morales in Ecclesia earn sortiuntur sive ex ipso iuris praescripto sive ex speciali competentis Superioris ecclesiastici concessione data per formale decretum ad finem vel religiosum vel caritativum.” (Italics supplied.). Cf. also Can. 99 and Can. 100, §2, Can. 101, 102.

¹⁹ See below, p. 225.

²⁰ The description of the state as a “corporate person” of a hierarchic structure appears for the first time, according to Gierke, in the writings of J. H. Boehmer. Cf. Gierke's notes to §16 of his Natural Law and the Theory of Society, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 318, n. 166. For “J. H. Boehmer, a societas means a complexus plurium personarum unitarum inter se ad certum finem: it constitutes a ‘moral body,’ and the spiritus of that body is a union of the wills of all, in one will, such as that conjunctim considerati unam in moralibus repraesentent personam. In an ‘equal society,’ this ‘union of wills, is based upon ‘simple obligation’; but just for that reason it remains imperfect. In an ‘unequal society’—though the ground or basis is still an ‘association of equals’—the factors of imperium and subjectio are superimposed, by the ‘submission of all wills to the single will of one man or of a whole council,’ with the result that voluntas omnium in voluntate hujus ita concentratur, ut quod imperans summus in negotiis ad finem civitatis spectantibus vult, omnes, velle moraliter censeantur.” Cf. Jus. publ. univ. P. gen. c. 2, §4; c. 2, §§1–18; c. 3, §1.

²¹ See Baty, T., “Can an Anarchy be a State?,” American Journal of International Law, Vol. 28 (1934), pp. 444–454, esp. p. 451.CrossRefGoogle Scholar “The point remains that a state must have a government. This is so elementary a proposition that it is little discussed by authors.” See also Hyde, C. C., International Law (2 vols., Boston).Google Scholar

²² Cf. supra, n. 2.

²³ Cf. Establishment of Czechoslovak State Case (1925), in McNair-Lauterpacht, , Annual Digest of Public International Law Cases, Years 1925–1926 (London, New York, Toronto, 1929), Case No. 8, p. 13 f.Google Scholar

²⁴ See Taft, W. H., as sole arbitrator in Arbitration between Great Britain and Costa Rica, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 18 (1924), pp. 147–174, esp. p. 154.Google Scholar “The question is, has it [the de facto government] really established itself in such a way that all within its influences recognize its control, and that there is no opposing force assuming to be a government in its place? Is it discharging its functions as a government usually does, respected within its own jurisdiction?”

²⁵ See Burnet v. Chicago Portrait Co. (1931), 285 U.S. 1, 5 f. Italics supplied.

²⁶ As to imputation, cf. Pufendorf, op. cit., Book I, Ch. V, §§4–6, and ibid., Ch. IX.

²⁷ For clear distinctions with regard to the double aspect of the problem, see Eagleton, C., The Responsibility of States in International Law (New York, 1928), esp. pp. 26–94.Google Scholar

²⁸ Cf. supra, p. 218.

²⁹ See S. Pufendorf, De Iure Naturae et Gentium, Book I, Ch. 1, §13 f. Latin text op. cit.: “Persona moralis composita constituitur, quando plura individua humana it inter se uniuntur, ut que vi istius unionis volunt aut agunt, pro una voluntate, unamque actione, non pro pluribus censeantur.” See also Translation, p. 13 f.

³⁰ Cf. Pufendorf, ibid., Book I, Ch. 1, §12.

³¹ Cf. ibid.; see also Book VII, Ch. VI, §4, where Pufendorf expressly refutes any differentiation between the sovereignty of the state and the sovereignty of the ruler: “If one inquires in a general way where the supreme sovereignty (ubinam summum imperium reperiatur) lies, the reply is made that it lies in the state; if one inquires more specifically what person in the state holds the sovereignty, the reply is made, the King, or senate, or assembly. But who would infer from this the existence of two distinct sovereignties, of which the real one is vested in the state, the personal one in the King? It would be just as absurd for a man to try to imagine two distinct sights in a man, one which resides in a man as a common subject, a second which resides in the eye as in a proper subject.” Cf. the Latin original: “Sicuti ineptus fuerit, qui duos distinctos visus in homine fingere velit; unum, qui sit in homine tamquam in subjecto communi, alterum qui in oculo tamquan in subjecto proprio.” For this problem, see also Gierke (ed. by Barker), op. cit., Vol. I, p. 137 f.

³² For the concept of supranational corporate persons, see Franckenstein, E., Internationales Privatrecht (Berlin, 1926), Vol. I, p. 505 f.Google Scholar See also Rühland, C., “Le problème des personnes morales en droit international privé,” in Recueil des Cours, Vol. 45 (1933), pp. 457–467Google Scholar; and the bibliographical notes, ibid., pp. 468–472. Cf. also Gierke, ed. by Barker, op. cit.

³³ The official English text of the Statute is misleading, because the phrase, “La Cour permanente de Justice internationale est un corps des magistrats independants, …” has been translated as follows: “The Permanent Court of International Justice shall be composed of a body of independent judges.” This translation distorts the original meaning, since, according to the French wording, the Court is not “composed of” but constitutes a corporate body. Article 3 of the Statute, which provides that “the Court shall consist of 15 members,” refers to the judges only. They are no doubt supposed to act in corporate capacity, but are entitled to majority decisions. (Article 55.) The immediate connection between Article 2 and Article 3 seems to stress the argument of the corporate personality of the Court, as far as its “normal” activity is concerned; for, as a matter of fact, the Court's personnel included far more than fifteen members. The registrar, for instance, was not considered a “member” of the Court. For the office of the Registrar, cf. Hudson, M. O., The Permanent Court of International Justice (New York, 1934), p. 289 f.Google Scholar Bustamente holds the question of the legal personality of the Court not settled, but adds: “This is an important question; some day or other it will be raised.” See Bustamente, A. S. de, The World Court (New York, 1925), p. 168.Google Scholar Hudson, on the other hand, is not willing to ascribe any importance to this problem. Speaking of the Court in its “private” relations, he says: “The question has been mooted whether the Court has a juridical personality, enabling it to hold, lease, and transfer property; but it seems quite unimportant for all practical purposes.” Ibid., p. 312, n. 75.

³⁴ Cf. supra n. 20.

³⁵ The mere quantitative analysis of group personality is not always decisive if the rank of a corporate person is in question. The state of the City of the Vatican with about 1,000 inhabitants, for instance, is a sovereign state, but India, with more than 300 million inhabitants, is not.

³⁶ For actions of the Council under Article 15, §6 of the Covenant, see Ray, J., Commentaire du Pacte de la Société des Nations (Paris, 1930), pp. 73, 77, esp. p. 225Google Scholar, and Göppert, O., “Der Völkerbund,” in Handbuch des Völkerrechts (Stuttgart, 1938), pp. 395 f., 472.Google Scholar For analogous competences of the Assembly, see Article 15, §9.

³⁷ See Greek Government v. Wulkan Werke, in Recueil des Décisiors des Tribunaux Arbitraux Mixtes, op. cit., p. 897: “il résulte de cette assimilation que l'expression ‘ressortissant’ comprend également l'État dans tous les cas où celui-ci agi en qualité de personne privé.” Also McNair, - Lauterpacht, , Annual Digest of Public International Law Cases, 1925, 1926Google Scholar, op. cit., Case No. 12, p. 19f. See also P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 7, p. 74, as to the nationality of a “Corporation de droit public” (Koerperschaft oeffentlichen Rechts) … The English translation is misleading in referring to “a corporation of municipal law.”

³⁸ For the relationship between legal personality and institutionalism, see R. Clemens, op. cit., and “Institution and personnalité,” in Rénard, R. G., La philosophie de l'institution, op. cit., Vol. 2, pp. 133–157.Google Scholar “Un groupement, c'est une unité dans une diversité; ce que traduit remarquablement le terme universitas; cette unité est quelque chose de réel; et elle imprime à chacun de ses membres un cachet qui le designe comme tel. Un groupement humain c'est une unité d'action dans une diversité d'agents; et cette unité d'action réagit sur les agents en déterminant entre eux une certaine manière d'être qui leur est commune.” Ibid., p. 138. This is the dynamism of the institutional theory of Mr. Rénard. See ibid., p. 149. “Le théorie de l'institution visé à incorporer dans le droit, le réel, le vivant tel qu'il se comporte.” Ibid., p. 149 f.

³⁹ See supra, p. 223.

⁴⁰ See, for instance, Llewellyn, K. N., “The Constitution as an Institution,” in Legal Essays in Tribute to Orrin Kip McMurray, ed. by Radin, M. and Kidd, A. M. (Berkeley, 1935), pp. 277–322Google Scholar; esp. pp. 292 f. and 302.

⁴¹ Cf. Hamilton's, W. H. article “Institution” in Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences (2nd ed., 1935), Vol. 8, pp. 84–89.Google Scholar “In a stable or slowly changing society, it [an institution] fits rather neatly into the cultural pattern.”

⁴² Cf. Llewellyn, op. cit., p. 292 f. “The existence of an institution lies first of all and last of all in the fact that people do behave in certain patterns a, b, c, and do not behave in other conceivable patterns d to w. And the probability that an institution will continue coincides with whatever probability there is that people will continue so to behave.” This quotation is not given with the intention to classify Llewellyn as a representative of a static school of institutionalism, but because of its clear wording.

⁴³ Cf., for instance, Ogg, F. A. and Ray, P. O., Introduction to American Government (New York, London, 1925), p. 12.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ Question 3 regarding recognition and Question 4—”Is the country freely governed?”—and their different interpretations cannot be dealt with in this context. See League of Nations. A. 91. 1921. VII.

⁴⁵ League of Nations Permanent Mandates Commission. Minutes of the Twentieth Session. June 9–June 27, 1931. Geneva, 1931. Annex 16, p. 229. Italics supplied. For the principle of efficacy (effectivité) in connection with the recognition of the government, see supra, p. 222, n. 24.

⁴⁶ Cf. Lammasch, H., “Die Lehre von der Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit in ihrem ganzen Umfange,” in Handbuch des Völkerrechts (Stuttgart, 1913), p. 55.Google Scholar “Am zutreffendsten scheint es mir, im Falle eines bloss für den konkreten Streit, für eine lis jam nata, eingesetzten Schiedsgerichts von einem isolierten, im andern Falle des für künftig entstehende Streitfälle berufenen Schiedsgerichts von einem institutionellen Schiedsgericht zu sprechen, denn das charakteristische Moment und der besondere Wert eines Schiedsgerichts der letzteren Art liegt darin, dass es nicht bloss für einen einzelnen, isolierten Fall berufen ist, sondern, dass es als eine für die ganze Dauer des Vertrages bestimmte Institution eingesetzt wird, auf deren Funktion man berechtigt ist, von vornherein zu rechnen.” See also ibid., p. 59.

⁴⁷ Cf. the French text, which refers to “une unité nécessaire,” in P.C.I.J., Series B. No. 14, p. 54; see also ibid., p. 43. “En prolongeant l'existence de la Commission européenne et en lui confiant le pouvoir de réglementer, les Parties au traités de Paris se sont bornées à assurer l'exercise, par un organisme international existant [by an existing international body] créé par elles-mêmes, d'un pouvoir essentiel qu'elles avaient en l'intention de confier à un organisme autre mais analogue.”

⁴⁸ See ibid., p. 64. Italics supplied.

⁴⁹ The term “private individual,” as applied in this study, designates, as a rule, simple persons. But also a private corporation can be considered a “private individual.” In the latter case, attention is focused on the rank within a hierarchy of corporate units, rather than on the difference in the corporate structure. See supra, p. 218, f or the differentiation between state and private corporation; for the distinction between “simple” and “composite” persons, see supra, p. 218.

⁵⁰ See supra, p. 225 f.

⁵¹ This legal situation is especially conspicuous whenever the responsibility of the state is at stake. Cf. Eagleton, C., The Responsibility of States in International Law, p. 44.Google Scholar “Externally regarded, the state is an individual unity, speaking with one voice, even if speaking through many mouthpieces.”

⁵² See supra, p. 221 f.

⁵³ Cf. Heilborn, P., Das System des Völkerrechts (Berlin, 1896), p. 58 f.Google Scholar For a clear distinction between these two groups of persons, see also S. Pufendorf, op. cit., Book I, Ch. 1, §12.

⁵⁴ For exceptions to this rule, see supra, p. 224 f. Cf. for instance, Gorovtsev, A., “La notion d'objet en droit international en son rôle pour la construction juridique de cette discipline,” Revue de droit international et de la législation comparée, 3rd Ser., Vol. 6 (1925), p. 183Google Scholar … “les individus ne possédant certainement des droits de souveraineté.”

⁵⁵ See below, p. 243.

⁵⁶ See below, p. 240 f.

⁵⁷ Cf. Hold-Ferneck, A. v., Lehrbuch des Voelkerrechts (2 vols., Leipzig, 1930 f.), Vol. 1, p. 251.Google Scholar Hold denies the legal personality of the individual with explicit reference to the time element: “Man bedenke doch auch: Deshalb, nur deshalb sollen einzelne Menschen, Herr X, Frau Y, Fräulein Z, als ‘Subjekte des Voelkerrechts’ den Staaten und der katholischen Kirche an die Seite gestellt werden, weil sie vielleicht, einmal in ihrem Leben bei einem gemischten Schiedsgericht auftreten duerfen. Es soll ein Voelkerrechtssubjekt denkbar sein, das ein einziges Recht hätte, sozusagen eine internationale Eintagsfliege.”

⁵⁸ Cf. Pintor, M. Siotto, “Les sujets du droit international autres que les Etats” in Recueil des Cours, Vol. 41 (1932), p. 255 f.Google Scholar See also Geffcken's comment on Heffter's classification of international persons, in Heffter, A. S., Le Droit International de l'Europe, 4th ed., by Geffcken, F. H. (Berlin-Paris, 1883), p. 44.Google Scholar “Il serait sans doute plus juste de dire que l'individu n'est que l'objet médiat du droit international.” Cf. furthermore, Heilborn, P., Das System des Völkerrechts (1912), p. 83Google Scholar; Borchard, E. M., The Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad (New York, 1915), p. 16 f.Google Scholar; and Borchard's, book review in American Journal of International Law, Vol. 31 (1937), pp. 748–750, esp. p. 749.Google ScholarOppenheim-Lauterpacht, , International Law (5th ed., London, New York, Toronto, 1937), Vol. I, p. 507Google Scholar; Quadri, R., La sudditanza nel diritto internazionale (Padova, 1936), esp. pp. 104–106.Google Scholar See also Dunn, F. S., “The International Rights of Individuals,” in Proceedings of the American Society of International Law, Vol. 35 (1941), p. 14.Google Scholar

⁵⁹ See Verdross, A., Völkerrecht, op. cit., p. 51 f.Google Scholar

⁶⁰ See supra, p. 221.

⁶¹ See P. Heilborn, op. cit., p. 58.

⁶² Cf. Gorovtsev, op. cit., p. 179. “Le côté faible de l'opinion qui envisage ces rapports comme objet en droit international, en tant qu'ils depassent les limites du droit national, c'est justement que ces mêmes rapports font simultanément l'objet des deux domaines du droit différent.” This insight, however, did not prevent Gorovtsev from undertaking to establish a new theory concerning “l'objet en droit international”; see ibid.

⁶³ See Scelle, G., Précis de droit des gens (2 vols., Paris, 1932–1934), Vol. 1, p. vii.Google Scholar “Pour nous, les rapports qu'il va s'agir de décrire et d'analyser sont des rapports entre individus.”

⁶⁴ Cf. ibid., p. vii, p. 9.

⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 9, “Si la qualité de sujet de droit n'appartient pas à tous les individus et ne leur appartient pas uniformément, elle ne peut cependant appartenir qu'à des individus. Elle est en effet un attribut social de la volonté. Il ne peut donc y avoir de sujet-de droit que là où il y un être doué de volonté personnelles … collectivités: états, provinces, associations, sociétés, syndicats, etc., … dans lesquels il est pourtant impossible d'apercevoir une volonté personnelle distincte de celles de leurs membres et ayant un support individualisé.”

⁶⁶ For a discussion of the standard theories concerning “juristic persons,” see Duff, P. W., Legal Personality, etc., op. cit., pp. 206–236.Google Scholar

⁶⁷ See Scelle, op. cit., p. 9. “Beaucoup de juristes admettent que la personne collective est en effet fictive mais que, si elle n'a point de réalité corporelle, elle a une réalité juridique, puisque le droit positif la créé et la fait vivre.” See also, ibid., p. 11. “Comme toutes les fictions, celle-ci recèle de graves inconvénients d'ordre technique et d'ordre pratique.” Ibid., p. 12.

⁶⁸ From the methodological viewpoint, Scelle's theory has at least two deficiencies. On the one hand, he arbitrarily identifies the psychological and the legal will; for this problem, see Kelsen, H., Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechstlehre (Tübingen, 1923), 2nd ed., p. 72 f.Google Scholar, and Aufricht, H., “Die dialektische Methode und der Stufenbau der Rechtsordnung,” Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht, Vol. 13 (1933), p. 83 f.Google Scholar On the other hand, Scelle is obviously mistaken if he infers from the fiction-character of a premise that it must be logically worthless. For the contrary view, see Vaihinger, H., The Philosophy of “As If,” translated by Ogden, C. K. (New York, 1924).Google Scholar

⁶⁹ Scott, J. B., Law, the State, and the International Community (2 vols., New York, 1939), Vol. 1, p. 25.Google Scholar

⁷⁰ See ibid., esp. p. 25, n. 69.

⁷¹ Ibid., p. 26.

⁷² See Suarez, Francisci, Tractatus de legibus ac Deo Legislatore (Londini, 1679)Google Scholar, Lib. I, Cap. VI, §2: “illud [read aliud?] est, legem imponi communitati, aliud probono, seu utilitate communitatis: nam praeceptum potest imponi particulari personae, & nihilominus imponi intuitu communis bono.” Italics inserted.

⁷³ See Verdross, A., Die Verfassung der Völkerrechtsgemeinschaft (Wien and Berlin, 1926), p. 117Google Scholar, and Verdross, A., “Règles générales du droit international de la paix,” in Recueil des Cours, Vol. 30 (1929), pp. 292, 293, 321, 322.Google Scholar See also Séfériades, S., “Principes généraux du droit international de la Paix,” in Recueil des Cours, Vol. 34 (1930), p. 294.Google Scholar “Les États étant … les … personnes normaux du droit international.” See also Pintor, M. Siotto, “Les sujets du droit international autres que les États,” in Recueil des Cours, Vol. 41 (1932), p. 255 f.Google Scholar

⁷⁴ See supra, p. 218 f.

⁷⁵ See Verdross, A., Völkerrecht, op. cit., p. 75Google Scholar: “Diese allgemeinen Rechtsgrundsätze mussen von den völkerrechtlichen Rechtsgrundsätzen im engeren Sinne klar unterschieden werden, da es sich hier um Grundsätze handelt, die unmittelbar im völkerrechtlichen Vertrags—oder Gewohnheitsrechte enthalten sind, während es sich dort um Rechtsgrundsätze handelt, die weder eine vertragliche, noch eine gewohnheitsrechtliche Anerkennung gefunden haben müssen.” See also Lauterpacht, H., Private Law Sources and Analogies of International Law (London, 1927), p. 29Google Scholar: “… whenever international tribunals have recourse to ‘general principles of law’ they apply, as a rule, a general principle of private law.”

⁷⁶ Cf. Verdross, , Die Verfassung der Völkerrechtsgemeinschaft, p. 156Google Scholar: “Ein Vertrag zwischen Staaten kann also den Einzelnen die Völkerrechtsubjektivität geben und sie ihnen dann wieder nehmen, so dass ihre völkerrechtliche Stellung durchwegs von ihrem Willen unabhängig ist.” See also below, p. 243.

⁷⁷ Cf. Article 38, sec. 4, of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice.

⁷⁸ Cf. Verdross, who states that by virtue of treaty-law the individual may become an immediate addressee of international law. In speaking of the legal situation established by virtue of Article 297e of the Treaty of Versailles regarding the rights of individuals to claim before a Mixed Arbitral Tribunal, Verdross writes as follows: “Dadurch werden aber die Einzelnen im Bereiche dieser Ansprüche völkerrechtsunmittelbar.” Cf. Verdross, , Die Verfassung der Völkerrechtsgemeinschaft, op. cit., p. 161.Google Scholar See also Spiropoulos, J., L'individu en droit international (Paris, 1928).Google Scholar

⁷⁹ Cf. P.C.I.J., Series B 15, p. 17.

⁸⁰ P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 40, p. 45. See ibid., p. 32: “The treaty would fail in its purpose if it were not to be considered as an established fact that persons who belonged de facto to such a minority must enjoy the protection which had been stipulated.” See, moreover, P.C.I.J., Series B 7, p. 20.

⁸¹ Cf. Lederer v. German Government, in Recueil des Décisions des Tribunaux Arbitraux Mixtes (Paris), Vol. 3 (1924), pp. 762, 768.Google Scholar

⁸² Cf. the analogous rules in the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United States: “The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State” (1798). See also Chisholm v. Georgia (1793), 2 Dallas 419, and Warren, C., The Supreme Court in United States History (2 vols., Boston, 1935), Vol. I, pp. 93 ff.Google Scholar

⁸³ P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 20, p. 17.

⁸⁴ See supra, p. 224. For proposals to admit also individuals to the Court, cf. Procès verbaux des Séances du Comité (La Haye, 1920), p. 205 f.; Spiropoulos, J., L'individu en droit international, op. cit., p. 50 f.Google Scholar; and Séfériades, S., “Le problème de l'accès des particuliers à des jurisdictions internationales,” in Receuil des Cours, Vol. 51 (1935), p. 46.Google Scholar

⁸⁵ See supra, Spiropoulos, p. 25. For cases decided by virtue of Article 304, see Recueil des Décisions des Tribunaux Arbitraux Mixtes (9 vols., Paris, 1922–1930). Cf. also Bluehdorn, R., “Le Fonctionnement et la Jurisprudence des Tribunaux Arbitraux Mixtes créés par les Traités des Paris,” Recueil des Cours, Vol. 41 (1932), pp. 144–146.Google Scholar

⁸⁶ Text of the Convention in American Journal of International Law, Vol. 2 (1908), p. 231 f.CrossRefGoogle Scholar See also Séfériades, “Le problème de l'accès des particuliers,” op. cit., pp. 42, 69.

⁸⁷ The most comprehensive examination of the related problems is to be found in the study of S. Sétériades cited in note 84, p. 238, supra, “Le problème de l'accès des particuliers.” The generalization of this procedure has been repeatedly recommended by the Institute of International Law. Cf., for instance, the following statement: “Nulle raison ni juridique ni politique ne peut être invoquée, à l'heure actuelle, contre la conception d'un système qui préconiserait la solution de tout différends entre un particulier et une État étranger par un Tribunal international special, constitué d'avance, devant lequel le particulier aurait un accès direct.” Cf. Séfériades, ibid., p. 55.

⁸⁸ For this distinction, see Spiropoulos, op. cit., pp. 44 and 65. See also Wright, Quincy, Human Rights and the World Order (New York, 1943), p. 30.Google Scholar

⁸⁹ See Steiner and Gross v. Polish State, Upper Silesian Arbitral Tribunal, March 30, 1928, digested in McNair, - Lauterpacht, , Annual Digest of Public International Law Cases, 1927–1928 (London, 1931)Google Scholar, Case No. 188.

⁹⁰ For material related to this conference, see American Journal of International Law, Supplement to Vol. 24 (1930).

⁹¹ Ibid., p. 10. Italics supplied.

⁹² This convention has been ratified by five states: Great Britain, Canada, China, Poland, and Sweden. Brazil, Norway, and Monaco adhered.

⁹³ For the legal status of stateless persons, cf. François, J. P. A., “Le problème des apatrides,” in Recueil des Cours, Vol. 53 (1935), p. 288 f.Google Scholar

⁹⁴ Ibid., p. 319. See also the reference to Article 5 of the Treaty of Berlin of July 13, 1878, and the analogous provisions referred to by François, ibid. See, too, the Special Protocol Concerning Statelessness drafted by the Hague Codification Conference, 1930, American Journal of International Law, Supplement to Vol. 24 (1930), p. 211 ff.

⁹⁵ For the interconnection between the inability of the traditional theory to solve the problem of statelessness, even in theory, and the denial of international personality to an individual, see François, ibid., p. 315 f., esp. p. 318.

⁹⁶ See supra, n. 236.

⁹⁷ For a thorough presentation of the various problems involved in piracy, see Research in International Law (Harvard Law School, Cambridge, 1932); American Journal of International Law, special supplement to Vol. 26 (1932), pp. 739–1013.

⁹⁸ Cf. Report of the Sub-Committee of the League of Nations Committee of Experts for the Progressive Codification of International Law, League of Nations. Document C. 196, M. 70, 1927, V, pp. 116–117. “According to international law, piracy consists in sailing the seas for private ends without authorization from the government of any state with the object of committing depredations upon property or acts of violence against persons.”

⁹⁹ Cf., for this problem, Research in International Law (Harvard Law School, Cambridge, 1932); American Journal of International Law, special supplement to Vol. 33 (1939), p. 619 f.; and Kunz, J. L., Kriegsrecht und Neutralitätsrecht (Wien, 1935), p. 140 fCrossRefGoogle Scholar., esp. p. 144.

¹⁰⁰ See article 38 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice.

¹⁰¹ See supra, n. 83.