Hostname: page-component-848d4c4894-wg55d Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-05-13T00:40:06.149Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

A New Theory of Congressional Compromise

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

James M. Enelow
James M. Enelow*
Affiliation:
State University of New York-Stony Brook
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

A new model of congressional compromise is constructed in which leadership, faced with a bill whose prospects are uncertain, is forced to compromise. Leadership has policy preferences of its own and seeks a compromise that will minimize its expected loss.

A reasonable expression for the probability of each outcome is assumed, and the form of the optimal compromise is derived based on two simple parameters. The solutions are quite revealing and support the expectation of compromises close to a 50-50 split under a broad range of conditions.

Type
Research Article
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 78 , Issue 3 , December 1983 , pp. 708 - 718
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1983

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Clausen, A.How congressmen decide: A policy focus. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1973.Google Scholar
Dodd, L. C., & Sullivan, T.Partisan vote gathering in the U.S. House of Representatives: Concepts, measures, models, and propositions. Revision of a paper presented at the American Political Science Association meetings, Washington, D.C., 08, 1979.Google Scholar
Dodd, L. C., & Sullivan, T.Majority party leadership and partisan vote gathering. In Mackaman, F. H. (Ed.). Understanding congressional leadership. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1981.Google Scholar
Enelow, J.Saving amendments, killer amendments, and an expected utility theory of sophisticated voting. Journal of Politics, 1981, 43, 1062–1089.Google Scholar
Enelow, J., & Koehler, D.The amendment in legislative strategy: Sophisticated voting in the U.S. Congress. Journal of Politics, 1980, 42, 396–413.Google Scholar
Fenno, R. F.The power of the purse: Appropriations politics in Congress. Boston: Little, Brown, 1966.Google Scholar
Ferejohn, J.Who wins in conference committee? Journal of Politics, 1975, 57, 1033–1046.Google Scholar
Jackson, J. E.Constituencies and leaders in Congress. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974.Google Scholar
MacRae, D. Jr.Dimensions of congressional voting. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958.Google Scholar
Poole, K.Dimensions of interest group evaluation of the U.S. Senate, 1969-1978. American Journal of Political Science, 1981, 25, 49–67.Google Scholar
Ripley, R. B.The party whip organizations in the United States House of Representatives. American Political Science Review, 1964, 58, 197–225.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Schneider, J. E.Ideological coalitions in Congress. Greenwood, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1979.Google Scholar
Sinclair, B.The speaker's task force in the post-reform House of Representatives. American Political Science Review, 1981, 75, 397–410.Google Scholar
Strom, G. S., & Rundquist, B. S.A revised theory of winning in House-Senate conferences. American Political Science Review, 1977, 71, 448–453.Google Scholar