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The New Strategy of International Communism*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 September 2013

John H. Kautsky
Affiliation:
University of Rochester

Extract

Communist international organizations and Communist parties the world over tend to follow a single strategy, which is always determined primarily by the needs of Soviet foreign policy paramount at the time. Corresponding to the requirements of the Soviet Union's “cold war” against the United States, a new strategy has gradually been adopted by international communism since 1947. Often non-Communist observers and sometimes even the Communists themselves seem unaware of the novelty of this strategy and they frequently obscure it by the use of terms more descriptive of older strategies, such as “united front” and “popular front.” It is the purpose of this essay to distinguish sharply between the various Communist strategies with a view to clarifying the characteristic features of the new strategy. It would, of course, be both easy and tempting to document and enliven such an attempt with innumerable examples from history and quotations from Communist literature. However, it would go beyond the intended scope of this brief analysis to do more than draw the broadest generalizations from the record of thirty-five years of international communism.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1955

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References

1 It may also be noted that to a large extent Communist terminology is used in the following discussion of the distinguishing characteristics of the various Communist strategies, since it is both derived from and intended to be applied to the analysis of Communist writings. It must be remembered that, though quotation marks will be omitted for the sake of simplicity, the meaning to be attached to such terms as imperialism, feudalism, bourgeoisie, socialism, or national liberation is that given to them by the Communists.

2 Used particularly while one strategy was in effect to condemn as deviationists the followers of the other one.

3 The “popular front” was broad enough to embrace both of these, while the “united front from above,” in the narrower sense of this term, was an alliance of the Communist party only with a labor or socialist party. In practice this distinction is not too important, for the really difficult decision for Communists was to ally themselves with any strong party and particularly with their most hated enemies, the democratic socialists. Since these latter are, in any case, regarded as lackeys of the bourgeoisie, once this decision was made, it was easy and usual to extend the alliance to at least some left-wing bourgeois parties. We may therefore overlook the distinction here and refer to both the popular front and the united front from above by the latter term.

4 Cf. particularly Tse-tung, Mao, On the New Democracy (January 19, 1940)Google Scholar, extracts in Brandt, Conrad, Schwartz, Benjamin, and Fairbank, John K., A Documentary History of Chinese Communism (Cambridge, Mass., 1952), pp. 263–75CrossRefGoogle Scholar. This important pamphlet is reprinted in full as China's New Democracy in U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee No. 5, National and International Movements, The Strategy and Tactics of World Communism, Supplement III, Country Studies (House Doc. 154), C. China, Appendix, pp. 67 ff. The attempt, by ex post facto rationalizations, to fit the Eastern European “People's Democracies” and the Chinese “New Democracy” into the Marxian scheme of two revolutions has brought some confusion into this subject and resulted in the expectation of varying numbers of stages or sub-stages of the revolution, always, however, more than one stage, under the new strategy.

5 Sections of the bourgeoisie are first explicitly included and strikingly pro-capitalist statements appear in Tse-tung, Mao, On Coalition Government (April 24, 1945)Google Scholar, extracts in Brandt et al. op. cit., pp. 295–318, especially pp. 303–6. For a useful summary of the Chinese Communists' attitude toward the bourgeoisie, with several long quotations from Mao, see Huai, Yu, “On the Role of the National Bourgeoisie in the Chinese Revolution,” People's China, Vol. 1, pp. 710 (Jan. 1, 1950)Google Scholar.

6 The terminology used in Communist literature to describe the various sections of the bourgeoisie is not always consistent. Those capitalists who are only slightly or not at all tied to imperialism and can thus help form the “bloc of four classes” are generally called the “national,” “medium,” “middle,” or “liberal” capitalists or bourgeoisie (although the term “national” may also be used simply as a synonym for “native”), while that section of the bourgeoisie which is regarded as a firm ally of imperialism is referred to variously as “comprador,” “bureaucratic,” “big,” or “monopolistic.”

7 For an excellent discussion of this point, see Schwartz, Benjamin I., Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao (Cambridge, Mass., 1952), especially pp. 72–78 and 189204Google Scholar.

8 A simple and perhaps oversimplified test to determine which of the three strategies the Communists pursue at any one time consists of the following one or two questions: Are the Communists making a serious attempt to form an alliance with the top leadership of the socialist party? If the answer is yes, they are following the “right” strategy; if it is no, a second question must be asked: Are there any capitalists among the groups to whose interests the Communists are appealing? If the answer to this question is no, they are following the “left” strategy; if it is yes, they are adhering to the new strategy.

9 The only conceivable further extension of this anti-imperialist alliance could be made by adding feudal elements to the bloc of four classes. Since the immediate goal is presumably an anti-feudal, though not an anti-capitalist revolution, this is an even more extraordinary step than the inclusion of capitalists. Yet even it has been taken: “The scale of this national front [of the Chinese people] embraces workers, peasants, intellectuals, the petty-bourgeoisie, the national bourgeoisie and even the progressive gentry,” Shao-chi, Liu, Internationalism and Nationalism (Peking, 1948)Google Scholar. “The motive forces of the Viet-Nam revolution at present are the people comprising primarily the workers, peasants, petty-bourgeoisie and national bourgeoisie, followed by the patriotic and progressive personages and landlords.” Platform of the Viet-Nam Lao Dong Party,” People's China, Vol. 3 (May 1, 1951)Google Scholar, Supplement. “The right of patriotic landlords to collect land rent in accordance with law shall be guaranteed,” “Manifesto of the Viet-Nam Lao Dong Party,” ibid.

10 This point is developed and documented in the author's research paper, shortly to be published as a book, Moscow and the Communist Party of India: A Study in the Postwar Evolution of Communist Strategy, Chs. 3 and 4. This work also contains numerous quotations to document the advocacy of the new strategy with its appeal to the bourgeoisie by Soviet, Chinese, and Indian Communists.

11 “Speech by Liu Shao-chi at the Conference of Trade Unions of Asia and Oceania,” For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy!, Dec. 30, 1949, p. 2Google Scholar, also translated from Pravda of Jan. 4, 1950, in Soviet Press Translations, Vol. 5, pp. 168–72 (March 15, 1950)Google Scholar. The phrase has since come into frequent use in Communist literature on Asia. For a more recent corresponding Western expression of the new strategy, see the statement of the French Communist Party's Central Committee of October 22 and 23, 1953: “We Communists declare that we are ready, with all Frenchmen, whoever they may be,—we say advisedly, whoever they may be—who, like us, do not want a new Wehrmacht, to take part in all political activities which can and must be organized in a mighty campaign throughout the length and breadth of France.” Duclos, Jacques, “France Moves,” Labour Monthly, Vol. 36, pp. 6370, at p. 70. (Feb., 1954)Google Scholar.

12 While, as we mentioned, the approach of the new strategy to other parties is generally one “from below” (i.e., antagonistic), this can, in conformity with the dominant anti-American motive behind the strategy, be changed to one “from above,” where a party becomes sufficiently anti-American and pro-Soviet, as has happened in Indonesia and under the Arbenz regime in Guatemala, thus constituting a return to the “right” strategy in relation to that party. The Communist party's direct appeal to the bourgeoisie, however, is likely to continue in any case.

13 For discussion and documentation, see the author's study, cited above, Chs. 5 and 6, and also his article, Indian Communist Party Strategy since 1947,” Pacific Affairs, Vol. 28 (June, 1955)Google Scholar.

14 For some fairly recent statements, see articles by the leaders of the Communist parties of Brazil, Chile, and Argentina in the Cominform journal, For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy!, June 5, 1953, p. 3Google Scholar, Dec. 18, 1953, p. 3 and Jan. 15, 1954, pp. 3–4, respectively, and especially the “Draft Program of Communist Party of Brazil,” ibid., Feb. 26, 1954, p. 3. See also James, Daniel, “Lessons of Guatemala,” The New Leader, Vol. 37, p. 3 (July 12, 1954)Google Scholar, who says: “… what we think we have been fighting is classic Leninist-Stalinist Communism, whereas what we really had to contend with in Guatemala, and must now face throughout the Hemisphere, is the more formidable doctrine of Maoism.”

15 “In view of the policy of expansion pursued by the American monopolies, the struggle for national independence and economic development has now become a necessity not only for the peoples of the colonial and semi-colonial countries but also for those in the developed capitalist countries.” “Decisions of Third World Trade Union Congress,” For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy!, Oct. 30, 1953, p. 2Google Scholar.

16 For Western Communist statements explicitly including sections of the bourgeoisie among potential allies see Jacques Duclos, “Historic Example of October Revolution and Middle Strata,” ibid., Nov. 2, 1951, reprinted with a highly relevant and perceptive introductory note in the experimental issue of Problems of Communism, and the speeches by Duclos and Thorez at the more recent 13th Congress of the French Communist party in For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy!, June 11, 1954. Recent statements making the same point implicitly by the Italian Communist leaders Palmiro Togliatti and Luigi Longo, the Austrian Johann Koplenig, and the West German Max Reimann may be found ibid., Dec. 18, 1953, p. 2; May 7, 1954, pp. 3–4, May 21, 1954, p. 3; and July 2, 1954, p. 3, respectively. Even in the United States, the Communist party is now appealing to some “groups of capital” to join its “popular coalition movement.” “New U. S. Red Line Seeks ‘Coalition’,” The New York Times, March 7, 1954, p. 1Google Scholar.

17 This point is well made by Watnick, Morris, “Continuity and Innovation in Chinese Communism,” World Politics, Vol. 6, pp. 84105, particularly pp. 94–96 (Oct., 1953)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.