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The Missing Leader: Japanese Youths' View of Political Authority*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

Joseph A. Massey*
Affiliation:
Dartmouth College

Abstract

Before 1945 Japan was the epitome of a nation whose political regime was based on the presence of a “benevolent leader,” the Emperor. The postwar democratic regime, however, was founded in explicit repudiation of this central role of the Emperor in the political life of the nation. This study, based on two surveys of Japanese children and adolescents, investigates their images of political authority figures and the consequences of those images on support for the institutions of the present regime. The first part of the paper focuses on younger children's images of possible contenders for the role of benevolent leader. The data reveal indifference toward the emperor and strong negative affect toward the prime minister. Comparison of the images of prime minister and local leader suggests that the leader's personality and leadership style, characteristics of the institutional structure of politics, and children's conceptions of the meaning of “politics” combine to the detriment of the prime minister's image. The second part of the paper centers around the question of whether there occurs in later years a spill-over of negative affect from the prime minister's image onto the other major institutions of the regime. The data indicate that a selective political cynicism emerges in adolescence, in which negative feelings toward the authoritative, output institutions of government are coupled with support for those institutions which mediate popular participation in politics. The paper concludes with a consideration of the significance that the historical origins of a political regime have for popular images of national leaders.

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1975

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Footnotes

*

The author wishes to express his appreciation to Fred Greenstein, David Titus, Howard Erdman, James Bartholomew, Lewis Austin, Jeffrey Pressman and numerous others for their helpful comments on the manuscript, and also to the Foreign Area Fellowship Program, which supported the research for the larger study of political socialization in Japan from which this paper is drawn. Neither the Foreign Area Fellowship Program, nor any of the scholars named, bears any responsibility for the contents of the paper.

References

1 See Greenstein, Fred I., “The Benevolent Leader: Children's Images of Political Authority,” American Political Science Review, 54 (December, 1960), 934943CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Children and Politics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965)Google Scholar.

2 See Hess, Robert D. and Easton, David, “The Child's Changing Image of the President,” Public Opinion Quarterly, 114 (Winter, 1960), 632644CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Easton, David and Dennis, Jack, Children in the Political System (New York: McGraw Hill, 1969)Google Scholar: and Hess, Robert D. and Torney, Judith V., The Development of Political Attitudes in Children (Chicago: Aldine, 1967)Google Scholar.

3 Jaros, Dean, Hirsch, Herbert, and Fleron, Frederic J. Jr., “The Malevolent Leader: Political Socialization in an American Subculture,” American Political Science Review, 62 (June, 1968), 564575CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

4 Edward S. Greenburg, “Black Children and the Political System: A Study of Socialization to Support,” paper delivered at the 1969 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association.

5 Greenstein, Fred I., Herman, V. M., Stradling, Robert, and Zurich, Elia, “Queen and Prime Minister-The Child's Eye View,” New Society, 14 (October 23, 1969), 635638Google Scholar; Fred I. Greenstein, “French, British and American Children's Images of Government and Politics,” paper delivered at the meeting of the Northeastern Political Science Association, 1970; Greenstein, Fred I. and Tarrow, Sidney, “Political Orientations of Children: The Use of a Semi-Projective Technique in Three Nations,” Sage Professional Papers in Comparative Politics, Series 01-009, 1 (Beverley Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1970), 479588Google Scholar; Dennis, Jack, Lindberg, Leon, and McCrone, Donald, “Support for Nation and Government among English Children,” British Journal of Political Science, 1 (January, 1971), 2548Google Scholar; and Abrahamson, Paul R. and Inglehart, Ronald, “The Development of Systemic Support in Four Western Democracies,” Comparative Political Studies, 2 (January, 1970), 419442CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

6 Verba, Sidney, “The Kennedy Assassination and the Nature of Political Commitment,” in The Kennedy Assassination and the American Public, ed. Greenberg, Bradley S. and Parker, Edwin B. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1965), pp. 348360Google Scholar. For a summary of many of the findings on which the argument rests as well as provocative criticism of the possible normative consequences of benevolent leadership, see Lipsitz, Lewis, “If as Verba says, the State Functions as a Religion, What are We to do Then to Save Our Souls?American Political Science Review, 62 (June, 1968), 527535CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

7 Sato, the first Japanese to win the Nobel Peace Prize (in 1974, for his efforts toward nuclear nonpro-liferation and international reconciliation in the Pacific area), held office from 1964 to 1972. His name, and all Japanese names appearing here, are given in their Japanese fashion, family name preceding surname.

8 The schools were chosen to maximize the demographic representativeness of the sample with regard to socioeconomic status and urban-rural residence. They were located in central and suburban Tokyo, and in two small cities and two farm communities in Tochigi Prefecture, about 120 miles north of Tokyo. Each student's parents were also surveyed, with nearly identical instruments which the students took home (in sealed envelopes) and returned to the school when their parents had completed them. The student response rate was effectively 100 percent; the parental response rate was likewise high, with more than 80 percent of both parents responding.

I myself conducted most of the interviews, which lasted from forty minutes to an hour. But because Japanese have a strong consciousness of the difference between themselves and foreigners, I took several measures to reduce the impact of my foreign nationality. First I had several Japanese college students carry out a number of the interviews; upon analyzing the transcripts I was able to determine that my presence as interviewer had not produced appreciably different responses than those elicited by the native interviewers. A second tactic was to talk with two students in the same session. This not only helped the students to relax and feel less anxious, but permitted me to stimulate and record political interchanges between them. Often one student's reply or remark would lead to an interesting follow-up or counter-reply from the other. For further methodological details, see Massey, Joseph A., “Political Socialisation in a New Democracy: Emerging Patterns of Political Culture in Japan” (Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1973), 2130Google Scholar.

9 Although our two surveys were conducted independently, Prof. Okamura and I did consult with each other, and participate in the construction and revision of each other's questionnaires. As a result of our parallel interest and of this partial collaboration, we decided to exchange data and to give one another the right to use those data in our respective countries. I would like to thank Prof. Okamura and to note that he bears no responsibility for the interpretations I have placed upon his data in this paper. Prof. Okamura has published several articles in Japanese based on these data and one in English; see The Child's Changing Image of the Prime Minister,” The Developing Economies, 6 (December, 1968), 566586CrossRefGoogle Scholar. In Jananese, see “Gendai nihon ni okeru seijiteki shakaika” (Political Socialization in Contemporary Japan), Nenpo seijigaku, 1970; “Seiji ishiki no kitei to shite no soridaijinzo” (The Prime Minister's Image as the Foundation of Political Consciousness), in Ken, Taniuchi, Bakuji, Ari, Yoshinori, Ide, and Masaru, Nishio, eds., Gendai gyosei to kanryosei (Contemporary Administration and Bureaucracy), (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1974)Google Scholar; and “Seijiteki shakaika ni okeru ‘minshushugi’ to ‘heiwa’” (“Democracy” and “Peace” in Political Socialization), Shakai kagaku janaru, 1969.

10 Leighton, Alexander and Opler, Morris, “Psychological Warfare and the Japanese Emperor,” in Personalities and Cultures, ed. Hunt, Robert C. (Garden City: The Natural History Press, 1967), pp. 255256Google Scholar.

11 Greenstein et al., “Queen and Prime Minister.”

12 Ibid., p. 639.

13 Greenstein, , “French, British and American Children's Images,” Table 3 p. 40Google Scholar.

14 Ibid. pp. 19 and 40.

15 Dennis, , Lindberg, , and McCrone, , “Support for Nation and Government,” p. 37Google Scholar.

16 Kazuo, Kawai, Japan's American Interlude (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), p. 57Google Scholar.

17 Burkes, Ardath, The Government of Japan (New York: Crowell, 1961), p. 30Google Scholar.

18 Okamura, 1968 Survey, unpublished data.

19 Abrahamson, and Inglehart, , “The Development of Systemic Support,” p. 432Google Scholar.

20 See, for example: Takeshi, Ishida, “Popular Attitudes toward the Japanese Emperor,” Asian Survey, 2 (April, 1962)Google Scholar; and Titus, David, “Emperor and Public Consciousness in Postwar Japan,” Japan Interpreter (Summer, 1970)Google Scholar.

21 Shigeru, Harada, “Atarashii aikokushin to wa nani ka” (What is the New Patriotism?), Seinen shinri, 7 (February, 1956), 32Google Scholar.

22 See Titus, , “Emperor and Public Consciousness,” 189190Google Scholar; also, Yoshida Yoshiaki, David Titus, and Agata Yukio, “Shocho tennosei no ishiki kozo” (The Mentality of the Symbolic Emperor System), Meiji daigaku hosei kenkyujo kiyo, n.d. Note that the percentages mentioned refer to responses rather than to respondents, since multiple answers to the items were permitted.

23 The generation gap in affect toward the emperor is pointed up dramatically by the results of a nation-wide poll conducted by the Mainichi shinbun in 1971. Only 4 per cent of the respondents in their teens responded that what made them conscious of being Japanese was being near the emperor or the imperial palace, as compared to 50 per cent of those sixty years of age and older. That even today, one-half of the older group in the sample chose to identify the emperor so clearly with their own sense of national identity gives us some idea of the impact his benevolent leadership once had. See Mainichi shinbun, January 1, 1972.

24 See Titus, , “Emperor and Public Consciousness,” p. 193Google Scholar.

25 Okamura, 1968 Survey, unpublished data.

26 The Development of Political Attitudes …, p. 35.

27 Children in the Political System, Table 8-4, p. 179. These and all following figures on American children's affect toward the president are of pre-Watergate vintage. At this date there is very little evidence regarding the overall intensity and permanence of the impact of the Watergate revelations on American children's images of the president. In a follow-up study done in June 1973 during the period of the televised Senate hearings on Watergate, Greenstein found only a slight diminution in children's tendency to idealize the president in comparison with pre-Watergate samples of children. “Children's Images of Political Leaders in Three Democracies,” paper delivered at the 1973 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New Orleans, Louisiana. See also Tolley, Howard Jr., Children and War: Socialization to International Conflict (New York: Teachers College Press, 1973)Google Scholar for evidence that the Vietnam War may have caused a decline in American children's perceptions of the president as an unerringly wise and infallible leader.

28 Hess, Robert D.et al., Authority, Rules, and Aggression: A Cross-National Study of the Socialization of Children into Compliance Systems (Chicago: University of Chicago, March, 1969, for the Bureau of Research Office of Education, U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare), Part IGoogle Scholar; see “Part B, Chapter 5: Japanese Data” by Hoshino Akira, and “Part C: Cross-National Comparison and Conclusions” by Maria Tenezakis et al.

29 See Hess, Robert D., “The Socialization of Attitudes toward Political Authority: Some Cross-National Comparisons,” International Social Science Journal, 15 (1963), 542559Google Scholar; and Tadao, Okamura, “Political Socialization of Upheavals: A Case in Japan,” unpublished paper, Department of Political Science, University of Chicago, 1962Google Scholar.

30 Tanaka has been excluded from consideration because he took office after the study being reported here was conducted. He entered office on a crest of popularity, receiving the highest support ever attained by a prime minister in the Asahi poll (62 per cent in July 1972). His early support in the Mainichi poll was also very high (53 per cent in September 1972, the second highest on record after that recorded by Yoshida). But his support rapidly dwindled, reaching a low of 22 per cent in both polls at the end of 1973. To complete the comparison with the figures in the table, Tanaka's average support in the five polls taken by the Mainichi so far (up to June, 1974) is 34 per cent. See Mainichi shinbun, June 21, 1974 and Asahi shinbun, December 16, 1973.

31 Similar polls of adult support for the French premiers of the Fourth Republic show them to have been even less popular than their Japanese counterparts. On the other hand, De Gaulle in the early years of the Fifth Republic enjoyed about as high a level of support as the American presidents. See the comparative data presented in Shigeki, Nishihira, Nihonjin no iken (The Opinions of the Japanese), (Tokyo: Seishin Shobo, 1963), Fig. II, p. 81Google Scholar.

32 This echoes a comment made by a sophisticated journalist in the Asahi shinbun, July 9, 1971: “… it is a question of whether to call the government ‘us’ or ‘them.’ In Japan the government is always ‘them,’ and the prime minister sounds as if he is speaking in a different dimension from that of the people.”

33 Asahi shinbun, July 9, 1969.

34 His words reflect the feeling of many youths. One sample of college students chose to describe politicians with the adjectives dark, dirty, cold, elderly, unintel-lectual, empty, closed and conservative. See Naoki, Nishihira, Gendai seinen no ishiki to kodo 1 (The Attitudes and Behavior of Contemporary Youth), (Tokyo: Dai Nibon Tosho, 1970), p. 103Google Scholar.

35 Richardson, Bradley M., “Urbanization and Political Participation: The Case of Japan,” American Political Science Review, 67 (June, 1973), Table 7, 443CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

36 Thus, among incumbents in office in January, 1973, nonpartisans (mushozoku) accounted for only three of the 743 members of the two houses of the national Diet, but were overwhelmingly predominant among both urban and rural mayors, and constituted the largest group of prefectural governors as well. Nonpartisans comprised 94 per cent of the 2,634 town and village mayors, and 82 per cent of the 620 city mayors, including those of eight of the nine largest cities, excluding Tokyo which, as a metropolitan prefecture, has a governor rather than a mayor. Tokyo's Minobe was among seven nonpartisan governors in office in the eight most populous prefectures. Of the total of 47 governors, nonpartisans outnumbered partisans 23 to 22, and the remaining two posts were occupied by men who had run as candidates of local groups (shoha) as distinct from the five major parties. Ministry of Local Autonomy figures cited in Asahi nenkan 1974 (The Asahi Yearbook. 1974), (Tokyo: Asahi Shinbunsha, 1974), pp. 229 and 415460Google Scholar.

37 Okamura, , “The Child's Changing Image of the Prime Minister,” p. 581Google Scholar.

38 Greenstein, , “French, British and American Children's Images …,” Table 3, p. 40Google Scholar.

39 Hajime, Shinohara, quoted in Yomiuri shinbun, October 13, 1970Google Scholar.

40 Kishi was adopted from the Sato family into the Kishi family, a common practice among traditional Japanese families who lack a male heir to carry on their lineage.

41 Greenstein, , “French, British and American Children's Images …,” p. 20Google Scholar.

42 Research in American electoral politics has shown that candidate appeal becomes more important in nonpartisan systems. See Greenstein, Fred I., The American Party System and the American People (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1963), pp. 5859Google Scholar.

43 “The Benevolent Leader,” p. 935.

44 The “black mist” was the label attached by the press to a highly publicized series of scandals involving Liberal Democratic Party Diet members in 1966. The scandals included the indictment of a Diet committee chairman on eight charges of extortion, fraud, and tax evasion; alleged kickbacks by a sugar refining company to 11 LDP Diet members who had pressured government banking agencies to lend the firm huge sums; the forced resignation of the Speaker of the House of Representatives for alleged collusion with a stock brokerage official under indictment for fraud; the resignation under fire of the Minister of Transport, who had revised National Railway schedules so as to have express trains stop in his electoral district; and related cases involving the Ministers of Education and Agriculture and Fisheries, as well as the head of the Defense Agency. For full details see Asahi Nenkan 1967 (The Asahi Yearbook: 1967), (Tokyo: Asahi Shinbunsha, 1967), pp. 251–257, and 572Google Scholar.

45 Okamura, 1968 Survey, unpublished data.

46 Easton, David, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965), pp. 286 ff.Google Scholar

47 In his discussion of means for creating legitimacy, David Easton points out that abstract ideologies and ideas per se are usually ineffective in eliciting mass support. Rather, he says, “Typically, this has been achieved in part by the emergence of vigorous and trusted leaders who … embody the ideals and stand for the promise of their fulfillment. They are the personal bridges acting as ties to the new norms and structures of authority.” Ibid., pp. 304–305.

48 That authorship was symbolized in a most concrete fashion by the dominating presence of General Douglas MacArthur, head of the Occupation.

49 Tomitaro, Karasawa, Asu no nihonjin (Tomorrow's Japanese), (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shinbunsha, 1964), pp. 5253Google Scholar.

50 Ibid., p. 64.

51 Kenzo, Owaki, “Chugakusei no seiji ishiki,” (The Political Consciousness of Middle-School Students), Ide, 77 (February, 1968), 38Google Scholar.

52 Asahi shinbun, November 24, 1968. Tanaka Kakuei, who had not yet become prime minister, was also mentioned, sharing twentieth place with Ito and two foreign leaders. The only living Japanese politician to be among the ten names most frequently cited by the students was Nakasone Yasuhiro, who shared fifth place with Yoshida and De Gaulle. Nakasone is a leading contender to succeed Tanaka as Liberal Democratic Party President.

53 See Greenstein, , Children and Politics, pp. 137 ff.Google Scholar for an interesting discussion of evidence indicating that the tendency of American children to choose political figures as heroes has shown a marked decline between the early 1900s and the present.

54 See Chapter 3, “Symbols of Consensus: Democracy and Peace,” in Joseph A. Massey, Political Socialization in a New Democracy.

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