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The Military and the Government in Japan

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 September 2013

Chitoshi Yanaga
Affiliation:
University of California

Extract

After fifty years of experimentation in constitutional government, Japan finds herself today on the threshold of a new era of revolutionary changes. For the greater part of the past half-century, the Japanese political system functioned well. But in recent years many Western features have been found rather awkward and ill-fitting, if not actually obstructive. For some time now, the nation has been discarding many of the foreign trappings which once served so well, but are no longer worth preserving. This casting-off process has been gaining momentum steadily since 1933 and was greatly accelerated by the voluntary liquidation of political parties in July and August, 1940. Thus, a political renovation of a scope heretofore unknown is now in full swing with a new national structure rapidly taking form to meet the dynamic changes in all phases of the Empire's national life.

Type
Foreign Government and Politics
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1941

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References

1 Only two articles in the constitution pertain to the military. Article XI merely states: “The Emperor has the supreme command of the Army and the Navy.” Article XII reads: “The Emperor determines the organization and peace standing of the Army and the Navy.” Neither article guarantees independence of the military.

2 Those who enjoy direct access to the Emperor are: chiefs of staff of the Army and the Navy, supreme war councillors, field marshals and fleet admirals, inspector general of military education, inspector general of military aviation, war and navy ministers, commanders of army divisions and army corps, and commandants of naval stations and fleet commanders.

3 Watanabé, I., “Tōsuiken Dokuritsu no Shiteki Kõsatsu,” Kaizõ, Sept., 1940, p. 22.Google Scholar

4 See Minobé, T., “Waga Kokuhōjō ni okeru Gumbatsu to Seifu to no Kankei,” Kaizō, June, 1930, pp. 1926.Google Scholar Also S. Sasaki, ibid., p. 109.

5 The following are some of the important organs of the supreme command which are independent of the government because of their purely military functions: General Staff Office, Naval Board, Office of the Grand Chamberlain, Board of Field Marshals and Fleet Admirals, Supreme War Council, Wartime Imperial Headquarters, Army Corps Headquarters, and Fleet Headquarters.

6 Education in the navy is placed under the jurisdiction of the navy minister, who supervises the Naval War College, whereas, in the army, the Army War College is under the inspector general of military education. Thus there is a difference between the army and the navy with regard to educational administration. Penal administration in the armed services is considered a general state function, but the court martial is entrusted with carrying it out.

7 In actual practice, a decision is first reached in a conference of the supreme-command organs, including the Supreme War Council and the war or navy minister, who submits the proposal of the military to the cabinet for deliberation and decision. If approved by the cabinet, it is referred to the Privy Council by the Emperor for advice before it can become a law.

8 Generals Akiyoshi Yamada, Aritomo Yamagata, and Iwao Ōyama were engaged in law codification, local administration, and police administration, respectively, while Admiral Tsugumichi Saigō was active in the Ministry of Education. See Miyaké, S., “Gumbatsu Gaikō no Seibai,” Chuō Kōron, Apr., 1919, pp. 7580.Google Scholar

9 Beginning in 1922, able party men relentlessly assailed the independence of the supreme command on the floor of the Diet. Ikuzo Ōoka, who made a speech in the Diet on Feb. 7, 1922, was one of the earliest men to criticize the army. In the 45th Diet (1922), a bill to permit civilian appointments to the army and navy portfolios was passed in the lower house, but failed to become a law.

10 Penalties are provided for in the Army Penal Law (Law No. 46, 1908), Arts. 103 and 104, and the Navy Penal Law (Law No. 48, 1908), Arts. 104 and 105.

11 For an appraisal of the political parties in the 1930's, see Yanaga, Chitoshi, “Recent Trends in Japanese Political Thought,” Pacific Affairs, June, 1940, pp. 130131.Google Scholar

12 His death, which resulted from wounds received at the hands of an enraged assailant in Nov., 1930, foreshadowed the eventual collapse of the parties and the triumph of the military.

13 Among those marked for assassination were Prince Saionji, Prince Tokugawa, Privy Seal Count Makino, Count Miyoji Itō; party leaders such as Suzuki, Tokonami, Wakatsuki, and Shidehara; financiers like Mitsui, Iwasaki, Sumitomo, Yasuda, Ikeda, Goh, and Kagami.

14 Those who escaped assassination were Premier Okada, Prince Saionji, Count Makino, Grand Chamberlain Admiral Suzuki, and several business and financial leaders. Some 1,400 troops of the 1st and 3rd Infantry Regiments of the First Division were involved.

15 The seven cardinal policies of the Hirota cabinet were:

1. Realization of adequate national defense.

2. Renovation and improvement of education.

3. Adjustment of national and local taxation.

4. Stabilization of national livelihood.

a) Extension and perfection of health facilities.

b) Rehabilitation and promotion of rural economy, and encouragement of middle and small scale business and industry.

5. Expansion of industries and foreign trade.

a) Strengthening of control of electric power.

b) Self-sufficiency of liquid fuel and steel.

c) Assistance and control of foreign trade.

d) Encouragement of aviation and ocean transportation.

e) Encouragement of overseas settlements.

6. Firm establishment of major policies regarding Manchukuo, including emigration policy and encouragement of investments.

7. Revamping and improvement of administrative machinery.

16 Enacted as Imperial Ordinance No. 63 and No. 64 for the Army and the Navy, respectively, under date of May 16, with the countersignature of the Premier and the ministers of war and navy, and effective May 18, 1936, the date of publication in the Official Gazette. See Kampō, May 18, 1936. No. 2810, p. 509.

17 Tokyo Asahi Shimbun (evening edition), July 20, 1940, p. 1.

19 The six-point program of the Konoyé cabinet is as follows:

1. Establishment of a “national defense state.”

2. Establishment of autonomous diplomacy in East Asia.

3. Establishment of an East Asia economic bloc comprising Japan, Manchukuo, and China as a single unit.

4. Establishment of a new national structure.

5. Revamping of education.

6. Revamping of foreign trade and transportation policies.

20 The members are General Senj ūro Hayashi, Admiral Kiyotané Abo, Chuji Machida, Fusanosuké Kuhara, Chikuhei Nakajima, Kenzō Adachi, Kazue Shōda, Seihin Ikeda, Baron Seinosuké Goh, and Kōzui Ōtani.

21 Tokyo Asahi Shimbun (evening edition), Nov. 29, 1940.

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