² For general works dealing with the learning theory that forms the basis of this article, see Keller, Fred S., Learning: Reinforcement Theory (Garden City: Doubleday, 1954)Google Scholar; Goldstein, Henry, Krantz, David L., and Rains, Jack D. (eds.), Controversial Issues in Learning (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1965)Google Scholar; Hill, Winfred F., Learning: A Survey of Psychological Interpretations (London: Methuen & Co., 1963)Google Scholar; Mednick, Sarnoff A., Learning (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1964)Google Scholar; Mowrer, O. H., Learning Theory and the Symbolic Process (New York: Wiley, 1960)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; The Kentucky Symposium, Learning Theory, Personality Theory, and Clinical Research (New York: Wiley, 1954)Google Scholar; and Hilgard, Ernest, Theories of Learning (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1956)Google Scholar.

³ See Easton, David, A. Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: Wiley, 1965), p. 278Google Scholar.

⁴ Lipset, Seymour M., Political Man (Garden City: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1960), p. 64Google Scholar.

⁵ Easton, op. cit., p. 286.

⁶ See Easton, ibid.; Deutsch, Karl, The Nerves of Government (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963)Google Scholar; Grinker, Roy (ed.), Toward a Unified Theory of Human Behavior (New York: Basic Books, 1956)Google Scholar; Mitchell, William C., The American Polity (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962)Google Scholar.

⁷ Deutsch, op. cit., p. 83.

⁸ For an outline of cognitive dissonance theory, see Festinger, Leon, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (Evanston: Row, Peterson and Co., 1957)Google Scholar; and Brehm, Jack W. and Cohen, Arthur R., Explorations in Cognitive Dissonance (New York: Wiley, 1962)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁹ Intermittent reinforcement is not an entirely necessary part of the paradigm to follow. However, it indicates the means by which a learning sequence may be maintained economically; as such, it is a relevant consideration for the rest of the paradigm.

¹⁰ The secondary reinforcement phenomenon produces most learning in both humans and lower animals through the process of “chaining.” On this point see Keller, op cit. pp. 22–27.

¹¹ Pavlov's famous experiments take us only through this second phase.

¹² For a good review of Hull's work, see Hill, op. cit., chap. 5.

¹³ On this point see Festinger, op. cit., ch. 2.

¹⁴ Blau, Peter, Exchange and Power in Social Life (New York: Wiley, 1964), p. 208Google Scholar.

¹⁵ The term, originally drawn from the psycho-analytic theory of dreams, is adapted to our uses by Edelman, Murray, The Symbolic Uses of Politics (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964), p. 6Google Scholar.

¹⁶ Ibid., ch. 1.

¹⁷ Easton, op. cit., p. 307.

¹⁸ Greenstein's evidence is not conclusive on this point. He deals primarily with attitudes toward authorities rather than whole regimes. However, his data point toward this conclusion. See Greenstein, Fred I., Children and Politics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), ch. 3Google Scholar.

¹⁹ Easton, op. cit., p. 278.

²⁰ Lipset, op. cit., chs. 2 and 3.

²¹ See Weber, Max, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, ed. by Parsons, Talcott (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), pp. 341–58Google Scholar.

²² The differences between the poor's support of economic, social welfare liberalism and rejection of symbolic, civil libertarian liberalism is a case in point. See Key, V. O. Jr., Public Opinion and American Democracy (New York: Knopf, 1963), ch. 6Google Scholar.

²³ A very good example of this kind of relatively severe conflict occurred in the recent battle over government programs to aid in providing medical care for the elderly.

²⁴ Indeed, it is this kind of connotative overflow in the area of race relations that leads to the complaint on the part of recalcitrant whites that “the Negro is going too fast.”

²⁵ This point is implied by the discussion in the previous two sections.

²⁶ March and Simon call this kind of behavior in organizations “satisficing.” March, James and Simon, Herbert, Organizations (New York: Wiley, 1959), pp. 140–141Google Scholar. For a discussion of the phenomenon in psychological terms, see Bruner, Jerome, Goodnow, Jacqueline, Austin, George, A Study of Thinking (New York: Wiley, 1956), ch. 4Google Scholar.

²⁷ A fascinating example of this phenomenon occurred in the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961. Cuban exiles were mobilized largely through potent legitimacy symbols, but were not provided enough information to orient them properly. Hence, many became alienated from the operation. See the account of the behavior of exile pilots in the invasion in Wise, David and Ross, Thomas, The Invisible Government (New York: Random House, 1964), pp. 8–74Google Scholar.

²⁸ This formulation is similar to Dahl's. See Dahl, Robert A., “Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Role of the Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker,” in Polsby, Nelson, Dentler, Robert, and Smith, Paul (eds.), Politics and Social Life (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Co., 1963), pp. 359–70Google Scholar.

²⁹ Thurman Arnold's work, though not dealing specifically with elections, postulates this kind of process in regard to other political and legal processes. See especially his The Symbols of Government (New York: Harbinger Books, 1962)Google Scholar.

³⁰ Indeed, the structure of the American party system and the arithmetic of the electoral process combine to require successors to build on both the substance and the rhetoric of their predecessors, especially at the executive level.

³¹ For a good, concise discussion of these contexts, see Brown, Roger and Dulaney, Don E., “A Stimulus-Response Analysis of Language and Meaning,” in Henly, Paul (ed.), Language, Thought and Culture (Ann Arbor: Ann Arbor Paperbacks, 1965), pp. 51–54Google Scholar.

³² Hovland, Carl, Janis, Irving, and Kelly, Harold, Communication and Persuasion (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953), p. 74Google Scholar.

³³ Ibid., p. 80.

³⁴ On this point see Alexander, Franz, Fundamentals of Psychoanalysis (New York: Norton, 1948), pp. 96–100Google Scholar.

³⁵ See the discussion in Hilgard, op. cit., p. 474. One wonders about the relationship of this theory to the high incidence of recidivism among residents of penal institutions.

³⁶ As cited in ibid., 75.

³⁷ Such calculations will naturally be inexact, largely because the measures are not transitive. For a discussion of this problem in regard to measuring power, see Dahl, Robert A., “The Concept of Power,” Behavioral Science, 2 (July, 1957), 201–215CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³⁸ For a discussion of “rules of the game,” see Truman, David, The Governmental Process (New York: Knopf, 1955), passimGoogle Scholar.

³⁹ The charge that “creeping socialism” is taking over American politics represents, among other things, an attempt to suggest that meta-symbols in the United States are being changed. So far, few Americans have been convinced that the metasymbols are in significant danger.

⁴⁰ But my criterion of centralization implies the existence of some hierarchy and the mechanisms associated with it, as discussed by Dahl and Lindblom. My decentralized criterion approximates their discussion of bargaining. See Dahl, Robert A. and Lindblom, Charles, Politics, Economics, and Welfare (New York: Harper Torchback Books, 1953), chs. 8 and 12Google Scholar. Their emphasis on the interdependence of leaders in bargaining is not made explicit in my formulation.

⁴¹ This formulation does not speak to the severity of conflict. However, membership in a group may not guarantee the reduced severity of conflict. See the theory of Georg Simmel on this point in his Conflict and the Web of Group-Affiliations, trans, by Wolff, Kurt H. and Bendix, Reinhard (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1955), pp. 43–45Google Scholar.

⁴² For a look at the means by which this control may be maintained, see Zeman, Z. A. B., Nazi Propaganda (London, New York: Oxford University Press, 1964)Google Scholar.

⁴³ Feedback credibility, in psychological terms, involves the belief in and acceptance of communication sources. On the subject of this source credibility, see Hovland, Janis, and Kelly, op. cit., chap. 2.

⁴⁴ For a case study of this tactic see Thompson, Victor, The Regulatory Process in OPA Rationing (New York: King's Crown Press, 1950)Google Scholar.

⁴⁵ As partial custodian of legitimacy symbols, the Supreme Court in the American system is crucial in this area.

⁴⁶ Indeed, the concept of “side-payment” in game theory assumes that extra reward payoffs are possible in a bargaining situation. For a theory of bargaining behavior which assumes such a possibility as a rational strategy, see Buchanan, James M. and Tullock, Gordon, The Calculus of Consent (Ann Arbor: Ann Arbor Paperbacks, 1965), ch. 11Google Scholar.

⁴⁷ This view is shared by Potter, David: see his People of Plenty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), chs. 4 and 5CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴⁸ For a discussion of the uses to which polls are put and the validity of such polls on the legislative level, see Marascuillo, Leonard and Amster, Harriet, “Survey of 1961–1962 Congressional Polls,” Public Opinion Quarterly 28 (Fall, 1964), 497–507CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴⁹ I have deliberately chosen not to treat the effects of public attitudes and behavior on policy-makers. Although this subject has been excluded, it is obviously one of crucial importance in any full scale treatment of legitimacy. I have no intention of suggesting that, aside from the constraints treated in the discussion, policy-makers are wholly free to manipulate their populations at will.