¹ Laferrière, (Traité de la Juridiction Administrative, 1888, vol. ii, p. 533Google Scholar,) justly remarks that “if any one may complain of the jurisprudence of the council of state it is not private individuals but the administration itself.” If the council of state, he adds, had desired to favor the government at the expense of private individuals it could have done so by a strict interpretation of the laws of 1790 and 1872 from which its authority is derived; it could have denied recourse for excess of power for other reasons than incompetence; but it has not done this; on the contrary, it has constantly extended by interpretation the grounds of recourse to include violation of the law, vice of form and misuse of power; and, he might have added, it has constantly enlarged the number of persons to whom recourse is allowed.

² I use the word “jurisprudence” throughout this article not in the English and American sense of the word but as descriptive of the body of judicial precedent or case law.

³ For historical and juridical reasons which cannot be explained here “acts of management” (actes de gestion) which are largely contractual in character, are not open to recourse for excess of power. Only “acts of authority,” i.e., acts of command or injunction, acts which are not assimilable to those of private individuals may be attacked and annulled for excess of power. For a discussion of the distinction and the reasons therefor, see Jèze in the Revue du Droit Public, vol. 22, p. 105 and vol. 25, pp. 671 ff; Hauriou, , La Gestion Administrative, p. 33Google Scholar and Marie, , “de L'Avenir du Recours pour Excès de Pouvoir” in the Rev. du Droit Public, vol. 16, pp. 265 ff and 475 ff.Google Scholar

⁴ Nézard, , Le Contrôle Juridique des Règlements d' Administration Publique p. 6.Google Scholar

⁵ Ibid., pp. 6, 15.

⁶ Thus in 1834 the court of Nîmes refused to apply a royal ordinance of 1822, on the ground that “it was a constitutional principle that an ordinance could not derogate from a law and that the ordinance in question was beyond the legal power of the executive as given by the chamber.” The text of this decision may be found in Cahen's, La Loi et le Règlement, p. 376.

⁷ It is not true as is sometimes claimed, however, that article 471, section 15 mentioned above has reference only to police ordinances. It applies to all ordinances and the power to refuse to apply those which are illegal belongs to all judges, correctional, civil and commercial. Compare Garraud, , Traité de Droit Pénal, 2d ed., vol. i, p. 225Google Scholar and Nézard, , Le Contrôle Juridictionnel, p. 72.Google Scholar

⁸ Laferrière, , Traité de la Juridiction Administrative, vol. ii, p. 435Google Scholar explains the right of the judges to refuse to apply règlements illegally made, as a right inherent in the power of the courts to administer criminal justice. For the same view see Garraud, , Droit Pénal, vol. vi, p. 444.Google ScholarHauriou, (Précis de Droit Administratif et de Droit Public, 8th ed., p. 60)Google Scholar, points out that this power serves as a “corrective” of French administrative law because the administration is here made accountable to the judicial rather than to the administrative courts.

⁹ Jèze, , Principes Généraux du Droit Administratif, p. 89Google Scholar; compare also Hauriou, pp. 434 et seq.

¹⁰ On the whole question of the power of the judicial courts in respect to illegal ordinances see Nézard, , Le Contrôle Juridictionnel des Règlements d' Administration Publique (1910), pp. 6–7; 15–16Google Scholar; Cahen, , La Loi et le Règlement, p. 376Google Scholar; Moreau, , Le Règlement administratif, p. 261Google Scholar; Laferrière, Op. cit., bk. vi; Hauriou, p. 60; Duquesnel, , Le Jurisprudence comparée du Conseil d' Etat et de la Cour. de Cassation, pp. 9 ff. and 137 ff.Google Scholar

¹¹ M. Jèze, however, holds the contrary view and he quotes the opinion of M. Romieu, a distinguished member of the council of state, in the Durand case (1906) in favor of the view that in certain cases the council of state may pass upon questions of fact in proceedings for annulment. See his note in the Revue du Droit Public, vol. 28, p. 290. It would be a great advantage to suitors if when the council of state annuls an ordinance it could by the same decision award damages or furnish other redress without requiring the petitioner to bring a new action in the form of recours contentieux. Jèze, M. advocates this change, Principes Généraux, p. 96.Google Scholar

¹² This can be done by the council of state only by another proceeding known as ordinary contentious recourse or recours contentieux de pleine juridiction, as it is sometimes called. The council of state will refuse to entertain an action in annulment for excess of power when the result will have the direct effect of condemning the administration to indemnify the injured party or to compel it to do something in his behalf. Ordinarily it will say in substance to him “the purpose of recourse in annulment for excess of power is only to secure the nullification of the act; if you desire an indemnity or other reparation for wrongs suffered, another remedy is open to you, namely, the ordinary recours contentieux and you must use it.” But the rigor of this doctrine affirmed as recently as 1911 in the Desplegues case seems to have been relaxed if not abandoned in 1912 in the Lafage case where the council of state admitted an action in annulment against the decision of a minister refusing an allocation to a military surgeon. It annulled the decision of the minister thereby indirectly condemning the state to allow the indemnity claimed. See note by Jèze, M. in the Revue du Droit Public, vol. 29, pp. 266.Google Scholar

¹³ Compare Laferrière, vol. ii, pp. 444 et seq., see also an article by Marie, , “L'Avenir du Recours pour Excès de Pouvoir,” in the Revue du Droit Public, vol. 14, pp. 27 ff.Google Scholar

¹⁴ But it should be observed that it is not to satisfy his interest that recourse in annulation is allowed; it is to force the administration to observe and respect the law. Cf Berthélemy, , Droit Administratif, 6th ed., p. 930.Google Scholar

¹⁵ In order to avail of the recours contentieux, with a view to obtaining reparation For injuries he must, however, be able to show the violation of a right; mere interest is not sufficient as it is in the case of recourse in annulment.

¹⁶ See the Storch case, 1905, analyzed by Jèze, M. in the Revue du Droit Public, vol. 22, pp. 346 et seq.Google Scholar

¹⁷ The jurisprudence relating to the extension of the doctrine of interest is of very recent origin. In fact it first appeared in the Casonova case (1901) where a taxpayer was admitted to attack an ordinance of a municipal council appropriating 2000 francs for the support of a town physician. Since that date there has been an almost steady stream of decisions extending the right of recourse to new categories of persons. For a review of the more recent decisions see Jèze's, M. note in the Revue du Droit Public, vol. 22, pp. 346 et seqGoogle Scholar; vol. 23, pp. 254 et seq., also his Principes Généraux du Droit Administratif, pp. 217 ff. Compare also Laferrière, vol. ii, p. 409; Hanriou, p. 464; Berthélemy, , Droit Adminis tratif, p. 931Google Scholar and Moreau, , Le Règlement Administratif, p. 300.Google Scholar

¹⁸ Compare Hauriou, p. 437 and Laferrière, vol. ii, pp. 468 ff. M Jèze criticizes this classification as unscientific and inaccurate. Thus incompetence and violation of the law overlap and there are other grounds of recourse, he says, than those mentioned above. See his notes in the Revue du Droit Public, vol. 25, p. 682 and vol. 28, pp. 286 ff.

¹⁹ Hauriou, p. 456. Even the refusal of an officer to act when the law requires him to do so (e.g., where a mayor required to deliver a property alignment or a subprefect declines to issue a hunting permit, when the applicant is entitled to it) is construed as an act tainted with incompetence and its nullity will be pronounced.

²⁰ It is important to emphasize the fact here that the council of state annuls the acts of administrative authorities in violation of their own ordinances as readily as it annuls acts in violation of the statutes. A minister is, of course, free at any time to modify or revoke an ordinance but so long as it remains in force the council of state will insist that it be strictly observed. Thus acts appointing, promoting or removing public officers in violation of the ordinances relating to the civil service (and in France almost the whole law governing such matters is regulated by ministerial ordinances rather than by acts of the legislature), may be nullified and in fact are frequently nullified, by the council of state. The protection against favoritism and other forms of arbitrary action on the part of ministers which the council of state has thus created has gone far toward securing for the functionaries those guarantees which they have long demanded but which the legislature has refused to give them. The solicitude of the council of state for their rights and the frequency with which it has annulled arbitrary appointments, promotions and removals has done much to increase the respect and esteem in which it is held not only by the great body of functionaries but by the masses of the French people.

For a review of some recent important decisions on these points see Jèze, M. in the Revue du Droit Public, vol. 23, pp. 265 ff.Google Scholar

²¹ Compare Laferrière, vol. ii, pp. 453 ff and 521 ff.

²² Laferrière, vol. ii, p. 531.

²³ Compare Nézard, , Le Contrôle Juridictionnel, p. 17Google Scholar; Jèze, , Principes Généraux du Droit Administratif, p. 217Google Scholar; Moreau, , Le Règlement Administratif, p. 284Google Scholar; and Cormenin, , Questions du Droit Administratif, p. 64.Google Scholar

²⁴ Moat of the French jurists recognize two forms of règlements of public administration: first, those issued by the chief of state as a result of his constitutional power to oversee and assure the execution of the laws; second, those issued by him in pursuance of delegation by the legislature, as where he is charged by the legislature with regulating by decree some matter with which the law does not deal or where it charges him with completing the details of a law. Both types of règlements, however, are required to be submitted to the council of state.

²⁵ There has been much discussion in France as to whether such ordinances are the result of legislative delegation. The theory of delegation was sustained by most of the older writers like Rossi, Foucart, Aucoc, St. Girons, DuCrocq and Batbie. Most of the present day authorities, however, maintain the contrary view and hold to the principle that legislative power cannot be delegated. Such is the view of Esmein, (“de la delegation du Pouvoir Legislatif,” Rev. Pol. et Parl., vol. i, p. 209)Google Scholar; Berthélemy, , Droit Administratif, p. 90Google Scholar; Jèze, , Principes Généraux, p. 221Google Scholar; Nézard, Op. cit., p. 33; and Hanriou, , Droit ad ministratif, p. 150.Google Scholar Among contemporary authorities, however, who maintain the theory of delegation are Moreau, , (Le Règlement Administratif, p. 180)Google Scholar and Cahen, (La Loi et le Règlement, pp. 232 ff.Google Scholar

The decision of the council of state in 1907 admitting recourse for excess of power against this class of ordinances leaves the question one of academic interest only.

²⁶ Jèze, , Revue du Droit Public, vol. 25, p. 42.Google Scholar The court of accounts (1897) and the court of cassation (1900, 1905) asserted and exercised a similar control. The latter court held invalid a decree of the President issued in pursuance of a law of June 26, 1899, on the ground that he had “manifestly exceeded the powers which the said law delegated to the executive power—and thus encroached upon the domain reserved to the legislative power.” See also the note by Jèze, M. in the Rev. du Dr. Pub., vol. 23, p. 74.Google Scholar

²⁷ See Nézard, p. 21 and the authorities cited.

²⁸ This new theory has since been many times affirmed. See the cases cited by Jèze, , Principes Généraux, p. 222, n. 2.Google Scholar

²⁹ For a discussion of this now famous case see Jèze, in the Revue du Droit Public, vol. 25, pp. 51 ffGoogle Scholar and Nézard, , Le Contrôle Juridictionnel, pp. 22 ff.Google Scholar

³⁰ Compare Nézard, Op. cit., p. 23. The following recent examples may be cited in illustration; the law of 1894 concerning cheap tenement houses was completed by an ordinance of public administration of September 21, 1895; the law on associations of 1901 was completed by two ordinances issued in August of the same year; the law of 1904 concerning congregations was completed by two ordinances issued in January and June, 1905; the great law of 1905 on the separation of church and state was completed by the promulgation of three different ordinances. Many others might be cited.

³¹ See the examples cited in Nézard, pp. 27–31. Duguit, (Droit Const, i, p. 195Google Scholar, holds that all règlements entail restrictions upon the rights of individuals in respeet to their liberty or property and are therefore in effect material, if not formal laws.

³² This senatus-consultus of course lost its constitutional character with the downfall of the Second Empire but it still remains in force as a statute.

³³ Except in Martinique, Guadeloupe and Réunion.

³⁴ Compare Tessier, , de la Responsabilité de la Puissance Publique, p. 18.Google Scholar

³⁵ Such is the view of Jèze, , Principes Généraux, p. 216Google Scholar and Nézard, , Le Contrôle juridictionnel, p. 58.Google Scholar Even Laferrière, writing years before the decision of 1907, admitted that if the President should undertake to deal by decree with colonial matters, the regulation of which is reserved to Parliament, the council of state would be justified in treating such a decree as of no force (Traité, vol. ii, pp. 8, 9). Compare also Tessier, p. 18.

³⁶ Tessier, Op. cit., p. 42. Laferrière, vol. ii, p. 31 and Aucoc, Confèrences, vol. i, secs. 38, 39, make a somewhat similar distinction.

³⁷ Droit Administratif, vol. iv, p. 600.

³⁸ Brémond, , “Des Actes de Gouvernement,” in the Revue du Droit Pubic, vol. v, pp. 23–75.Google Scholar This article contains a very full and learned discussion of the whole subject. See also Courtois, , Théorie des Actes de Gouvernement (1899).Google Scholar There is a valuable bibliography of the subject in Moreau, p. 77.

³⁹ See Laferrière, vol. ii, p. 39; Aucoc, vol. i, sec. 289; and Du Crocq, vol. i, sec. 64. Laferrière mentions also, “measures of sanitary police” (p. 41).

⁴⁰ For example by Jèze, M., Principes Généraux, p. 232Google Scholar; Berthélemy, , Droit Administratif, 7th ed., pp. 101, 105Google Scholar; Brémond, article cited p. 23; Michoud, , Annales de l'Enseignement Supérieur de Grenoble, vol. i, p. 82Google Scholar; Hauriou, , Droit administratif, pp. 77 ff.Google Scholar Professor Jèze remarks that the distinction between “governmental” and “administrative” acts is most regrettable and is contrary to the spirit of modern French positive law. “There should be no acts of government which are free from judicial control and against which no recourse is allowed when they are illegal. It places the government above the laws upon the pretext that it acts are political.” Some writers apparently frightened at the possible consequences of the doctrine in the vague and arbitrary form in which they have stated it, have attempted to attenuate its rigor by laying down the rule that, while the courts may not annul such acts they may decline to apply them when illegal. Thus Dareste, , Justice Administrative, p. 222Google Scholar and Aucoc, , Conférences, vol. i, sec. 289.Google Scholar

Laferrière (ii, 40) recognizes that while general measures of the government for the protection of the public safety are not attackable for excess of power the individual acts in execution of those measures are. Thus a declaration of a state of siege cannot be made the object of recourse for excess of power but the act of the military commander who orders the imprisonment of an individual or the seizure of his property in pursuance of the decree may be. If this is true, what does the distinction avail the government? What is gained by exempting a decree of siege from judicial interference if the acts by which the decree are carried into execution are attackable? The theory of Laferrière, however, is followed by the council of state and the tribunal of conflicts. They refuse to recognize the right of recourse against decrees proclaiming a state of siege but they allow actions for damages sustained on account of individual acts in execution of the decrees. Thus the council of state has allowed recourse against any act suppressing a newspaper in execution of a declaration of siege although it refused to allow the declaration itself to be attacked. Compare Brémond, Op. cit., p. 64.

⁴¹ Jèze, , Principes Généraux, p. 236.Google Scholar A recent interesting case of the kind arose from the refusal of the French minister to Hayti to celebrate a marriage between two French subjects residing in that country, although there were no legal impediments to their marrying and there was no question as to the legal right of the minister to perform the ceremony. The parties thereupon returned to France and were married. The husband then brought an action for damages against the minister before the civil tribunal at Paris. The minister of foreign affairs induced the prefect to raise the question of conflict but the tribunal of conflicts affirmed the jurisdiction of the civil tribunal and ruled that all acts performed by a diplomatic representative in his character as an officer of the civil state were subject to judicial control. See the interesting comment on this case by Jèze, M. in the Revue du Droit Public, vol. 28 (1911), pp. 666 ff.Google Scholar But compare the cases of Bachatori, Vaudelet, Rasat, and Faraut in which the council of state held that certain acts of a purely diplomatic character were exempt from judicial control. This doctrine is criticised by Jèze, (in the Rev. du Droit Pub., vol. 21, p. 83).Google Scholar

⁴² Brémond, Op. cit., pp. 63–64.

⁴³ Ibid., p. 65. Laferrière, (ii, 37) admits that “this jurisprudence went too far” in attaching too much importance to the intentions of the government and to politiques mobiles. Until the downfall of the Second Empire the so-called mobile theory was applied by the courts in dealing with these cases, that is to say, the test of whether an act was “governmental” was made to depend upon the circumstances of the moment and the motives of the government rather than upon the nature of the act. See the comments of Hauriou, p. 78; Laferrière vol. ii, p. 31, and Berthélemy, p. 99.

⁴⁴ Laferrière, vol. ii, p. 38.

⁴⁵ This was the case of the prefect of the Rhone against the Société Immobiliére de St. Just. See the note by Jèze, in the Revue du Droit Public, 1911, p. 63.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ Tessier, , De la Responsabilité de la Puissance Publique, p. 15.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ Compare especially Esmein, , Droit Constitutionnel, pp. 475, 501Google Scholar; Larnaude, , Bulletin de la Société de Législation Comparée, 1902, p. 220Google Scholar; Nézard, , Théorie Juridique de la Puissance Publique, p. 17Google Scholar; Laferrière, , Traité, vol. i, p. 435Google Scholar; Duguit, , Droit Constitutionnel, vol. i, pp. 158–159.Google Scholar “The Parliament,” says Moreau, (La Règlement Administratif, p. 293)Google Scholar, “because it is elected by the nation is subject to no control other than that of the electors and of public opinion; its acts can not be referred to a tribunal of any kind whatever; rightly or wrongly, it is be lieved in France at present that this is the price of its independence and that its independence is necessary to liberty and the public welfare.”

⁴⁸ It may also be added that there is no indirect judicial control in the form of actions for damages on account of the unconstitutional exercise of legislative power. See Laferrière, vol. ii, p. 13. But Duguit, (Transformations du Droit Public, pp. 85, 241)Google Scholar thinks there are signs of a tendency to recognize the responsibility of the State for injuries resulting from the operation of unconstitutional laws.

⁴⁹ The case is reported in Sirey's, Recueil 33, 1, 357 (1833).Google Scholar See also the comments of Jèze, M. in an article entitled, “Le Contrôle des Délibérations des assemblées Délibérantes,” in the Revue Générale de l'Administration, 1895, p. 411.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ Seignorel, , “Le Contrôle du Pouvoir Legislatif,” Rev. Pol. et Parl., vol. 40 (1904), pp. 91–92Google Scholar; see also Larnaude, , Bul. de la Soc. de Lég. Comp., 1902, p. 219.Google Scholar

⁵¹ For example, Duguit, , Droit Const., vol. ii, pp. 6, 13Google Scholar, and Coumoul, Le Pouvoir Judiciaire, p. 229. These writers affirm that the principles of 1789 had become so firmly established that it was unnecessary to reaffirm them in the constitution of 1875. But compare Esmein, , Droit Const., pp. 496 and 501Google Scholar, to the contrary.

⁵² Cf. Duguit, , Droit Const., i, pp. 19, 20Google Scholar and Seignorel, p. 538.

⁵³ Such is the view of Jèze, M., Principes Généraux, p. 212Google Scholar (see also his note on the Ronaux case of 1903, Rev. du Dr. Pub., 21: 117); Laurent, , Principes de Droit Civil, vol. i, sec. 3Google Scholar; Duguit, , Droit Const., vol. i, p. 159Google Scholar; and apparently Larnaude, op. cit., p. 220.

⁵⁴ Tessier, for example, op. cit., p. 15.

⁵⁵ Contrat Sociale, bk. ii, Ch. 6.

⁵⁶ Notably Jèze, , Principes Généraux, p. 209Google Scholar; Duguit, , Transformations du Droit Public, p. 85Google Scholar; and Cahen, , Le Loi et le Règlement, p. 424.Google Scholar

⁵⁷ For example Larnaude, op. cit., pp. 225, 227 and Seignorel, (“Le Contrôle du Pouvoir Legislatif,” Rev. Pol. et Parl., 1904, p. 534).Google Scholar “With our ideas in respect to popular sovereignty,” says Seignorel, “we can never permit a single assembly composed of eight or ten judges to hold in check the will of the legislature, i.e., the will of the nation itself.” “Moreover,” he adds, “it is perilous to borrow from a foreign country an institution which would not be suitable to our customs, our national temperament or to our political organization.” Compare also Boutmy, , Elements d'une Psychologie Politique du Peuple Américaine, p. 256.Google Scholar

⁵⁸ Faustin Hélie one of the great jurists of the July monarchy was apparently such an advocate, for he says: “The application of the laws is the end of justice; but this application necessarily requires that the judge shall determine whether the acts invoked before him are law and what is their meaning. The tribunal of police cannot do other than exercise in regard to ordinances the right that all tribunals exercise in regard to the laws; they verify their legality and interpret them.” Traité de l'Instruction Criminelle, vol. vi, p. 182.

⁵⁹ Journal Officiel, Mar. 12, 1873, p. 1707.

⁶⁰ See his La Republique Radicale (1873), Ch. xi.

⁶¹ See his article in the Monde Economique, vol. ii, p. 411 (1894).

⁶² See his article in the Revue de Deux Mondes, July 15, 1902; also his Reforme Parlementaire, Chap. on “La Cour Suprème.” In 1903 M. Benoist introduced in the chamber of deputies a proposition to incorporate the declaration of rights into the constitution and to give the Court of Cassation power to annul all legislative acts in violation of the provisions of the declaration (Journal Officiel, Ch. des Deps., Apr. 29, 1903).

⁶³ Traité du Pouvoir Judiciaire, pp. 224.

⁶⁴ Transformations du Droit Public, pp. 97 ff.

⁶⁵ La Loi et le Reglement, pp. 377 ff.

⁶⁶ Le Règlement Administratif, p. 261.

⁶⁷ Droit Administratif et de Droit Public, 8th ed., p. 39.

⁶⁸ Principes Généraux, pp. 208, 224; “Contrôle des Délibérations des assemblées Délibérantes” in the Rev. Gen. d'Admin., 1895, pp. 401–415. See also his brief (in colloboration with M. Bethelémy) in a case before the supreme court of Roumania, in the Revue du Droit Public, vol. 29, pp. 139–156. Largely on the strength of their argument the court in 1912 declared unconstitutional a Roumanian statute. See the decision in the Rev. du Droit Pub., vol. 29, pp. 365–368.

⁶⁹ Bulletin de la Société de Lég. Comp., 1902, pp. 240–246.

⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 249.

⁷¹ Ibid., p. 253.

⁷² Same bulletin for the year 1900, p. 75; also his La Réforme Judiciaire, pp. 217–219.

⁷³ La Loi, Nov. 26, 1896. The arguments of MM. Jèze, Coumoul and Cahen in favor of the right of the courts to disregard unconstitutional legislative acts are especially full and convincing.

⁷⁴ This fact is especially emphasized by Jèze, Duguit, Cahen and Coumoul.

⁷⁵ Transformations du Droit Public, p. 97. For a similar line of argument see Coumoul, Ch. 6. Coumoul concludes his defense of the right of the courts to declare unconstitutional laws null and void as follows: “In reality therefore there are neither obstacles of law nor fact which prevent the judiciary from fulfilling its natural rôle in its relations with the legislative power—a rôle imposed by juridical logic, by the results of established principles and even by the force of things. The only reason for its inaction is its organic feebleness, its subordinate position, and, one may say, its inexistence as a great authority of the State” (p. 231).

⁷⁶ The argument from the analogy of judicial control of ordinances is developed at length by Cahen, pp. 383, 423.

⁷⁷ This opinion is held by Laferrière, , Traité, vol. ii, p. 9Google Scholar; and by Larnaude, op. cit., pp. 220–221.

⁷⁸ Transformations du Droit Public, p. 103.

⁷⁹ Bul. de la Soc. de Lég. Comp., 1902, p. 241.

⁸⁰ M. Jèze for example, commenting on the view of Moreau and Duguit that the decision of the council of state in the Winkel case in 1909 was in effect a refusal to apply a provision of the law of finances of 1905 in regard to the removal of public officers, says: “I do not believe anyone can cite a single case in which a court has declared a law unconstitutional, and I do not for my part see a single indication in favor of a change in the existing jurisprudence, however much it may be desired. Principes Généraux, p. 212.

⁸¹ “To speak truly,” says Cahen, (La loi et le Règlement, p. 424Google Scholar) “France has no true constitution; it has laws which fix the organic relations of the public authorities but it has no charter of public liberties in the absence of which the men of the revolution said there could be no constitution.” “In France I repeat,” says Seignorel, (Rev. Pol. et Parl., 1904, p. 536)Google Scholar, “we have no constitution; we have only laws relative to the functioning of the public authorities. In this respect we are in a condition of notorious inferiority as compared with other countries.”

⁸² Such was the opinion of ProfessorSaleilles, , Bul. de la Soc. de Lég. Comp., 1902, pp. 245–246.Google Scholar Compare also the comments of Prof.Dodd, W. F., “Political safeguards and judicial guarantees,” in the Columbia Law Review, April 1915, p. 12.Google Scholar

⁸³ Compare the remarks of Seignorel on this point, p. 519.