¹ The Missouri budget act of 1921 was defeated on a referendum vote in 1922; the budget amendment, proposed by the recent constitutional convention, was rejected by the people in February, 1924.

² Useful discussions of the item veto are contained in the following: Fairlie, John A., “The Veto Power of the State Governor,” American Political Science Review, Vol. XI, No. 3 (1917)Google Scholar; Debel, N. H., The Veto Power of the Governor of Illinois (Urbana, 1917)Google Scholar; Carlson, K. E., The Exercise of the Veto Power in Nebraska (Lincoln, 1917).Google Scholar

³ In Holcombe's, A. N.State Government, it is stated (pp. 112, 113)Google Scholar that New Jersey adopted the item veto in 1844. This is an error due to a misleading caption in F. N. Thorpe's Federal and State Constitutions. The item veto in New Jersey dates from 1875.

⁴ Smith, Robert H. (the man who proposed the item veto in the constitutional convention of the Confederacy), Address to the Citizens of Alabama on the Con stitution and Laws of the Confederate States of America, pp. 7–11. (Mobile, 1861.)Google Scholar

⁵ An item veto amendment is now pending in Connecticut.

⁶ Debates, New York Constitutional Convention of 1867–63, II, pp. 1109–1126.

⁷ See Debel, op. cit., pp. 120–125, for the experience of Illinois on this point.

⁸ Commonwealth v. Barnett, 199 Pa. 161. Briefly, the facts of this case were as follows: In the general appropriation bill of 1899, there was one item appropriating $11,000,000 to the public schools of the state. The governor vetoed $1,000,000 of this item and approved the remaining $10,000,000. In sanctioning the reduction, the court was compelled to place a strained interpretation upon the item veto provision in the state constitution. Apparently, the judges feared that a contrary decision would invalidate the entire amount; they were also influenced by the argument from prescription since the practice had been used for fifteen years without being challenged in the courts.

⁹ Governor's Vetoes; Laws, 1901–1923.

¹⁰ State v. Holder, 76 Miss. 158 (1898); Regents of the University v. Trapp, 28 Okla. 83 (1911); Fulmore v. Lane, 104 Tex. 499 (1911); State v. Forsyth, 21 Wyo,. 359 (1913); Noweli v. Harrington, 122 Md. 487 (1914); Fergus v. Rüssel, 270 Ill. 304 (1915); Fairfield v. Foster, 213 Pac. 319 (Ariz. 1923); Peebly v. Childers, 217 Pac. 1049 (Okla. 1923); Wood v. Riley, 219 Pac. 966 (Calif. 1923); Strong v. People, 220 Pac. 999 (Colo. 1923); Mills v. Porter, 222 Pac. 428 (Mont. 1924).

The above cases either deny the power to reduce items, or contain obiter dicta denying that power, or evade passing upon the question. Thus, they differ from the affirmative decision of Commonwealth v. Barnett. A further difference lies in the fact that the Pennsylvania case involved a very large amount in a single item while the other cases involved minor reductions in relatively small items. In Colorado, items were first reduced in 1913, but the validity of this action was not judicially determined until 1923. In Strong v. People, the Colorado supreme court specifically rejected the prescriptive argument which had been successfully used in Commonwealth v. Barnett.

The fundamental question in many of these cases is “What constitutes an item?” Such an issue arises when the legislature appropriates a single item and then seeks to apportion that item either tentatively or directly into further divisions. This question particularly engaged the attention of the court in Regents of the University v. Trapp, and Peebly v. Childers. See also Martens v. Brady, 264 Ill. 178 (1914); People v. Brady, 277 Ill. 124 (1917); and Mitchell v. Lowden, 288 Ill. 327 (1919).

¹¹ By constitutional amendment in Louisiana.

¹² Public Papers of the Governor, 1899–1923.

¹³ Laws; House and Senate Journals, 1918–1922.

¹⁴ The amendment permits the legislature to increase judicial and legislative items.

¹⁵ The West Virginia budget amendment of 1918 is like that of Maryland except that the budget is not prepared by the governor but by the board of public works consisting of the governor and six other elective officers. This amendment likewise practically abolishes the item veto since the general appropriation bill is usually the only one itemized. The governor has but a limited influence in its preparation and no authority whatever to disapprove it. Of course, he may still negative other appropriation measures and items but, since 1918, none of these have been vetoed. The net result of the change is that the governor has less power than formerly to restrain expenditure.

The Nebraska budget amendment of 1920 is less drastic than those of Maryland and West Virginia. The governor formulates and presents the budget, any item of which the legislature may strike out or reduce, but no increases may be made except by a three-fifths vote of each house and such increases cannot be vetoed. Since a three-fifths vote is also required to override a veto, it was argued that this provision would not weaken the governor's negative. This, however, is scarcely true, for it is usually more difficult to obtain a three-fifths majority after the executive has clearly raised the issue through the disapproval of a bill or item. At any rate, this was the case in 1921 during the first year of the budget's operation. The legislature freely reduced or omitted items in the governor's estimates but these changes were more than offset by the increases which it made. The three-fifths vote prescribed for such increases was obtained without much trouble. The net result of the legislature's action was to raise the budget figures from $21,368,000 to $22,591,000. Not being able to veto the increase and strict economy being necessary, the governor called a special session in 1922 for the purpose of reducing the appropriations of the previous year. By repealing and reënacting the chief appropriation bill of 1921, a reduction of over $2,000,000 was secured. {Laws; House and Senate Journals, 1921–22.) The weakness of the Nebraska plan is evident; the executive is denied the item veto aa a means of defending his budget against legislative increases.

¹⁶ Laws; House and Senate Journals; Legislative Documents, 1919–1923.

¹⁷ Such a conflict did, in fact, develop in California, the only state which has copied (1922) the Massachusetts budget plan. The California session of 1923 was marked by friction between the governor and the legislature. The executive budget estimates called for a total appropriation of $79,754,000. The legislature did not reduce this amount but rather tried to increase it, particularly the items for educational, charitable, and penal institutions. The increases thus made totaled $1,170,000. By reducing 21 items and vetoing 28 others, the governor entirely eliminated this increase and, after a hard fight in the lower house, his action was sustained. In addition to the budget bill, 67 other appropriation bills were passed by the legislature, of which 22 were negatived by the executive. (Laws; Assembly Journal, 1923.)