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The Influence of Ideas on Policies as Shown in the Collectivization of Agriculture in Russia

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

Barrington Moore Jr.
Barrington Moore Jr.*
Affiliation:
University of Chicago
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Extract

The relationship between ideas and social and political changes remains one of the major controversial questions in the social sciences. Certain groups, particularly the Marxists and the behaviorists in both psychology and sociology, relegate ideas to a very subordinate rôle. They claim that for the most part changes in ideas are the result of changes in material conditions or other concrete external factors to which men in society must adjust. At the other extreme are certain philosophers, historians, and philosophically inclined political scientists who assign to ideas an outstanding rôle in the development of economic, political, and social institutions.

The controversy is one that has immediate and practical significance, as well as purely scientific importance. If the United States is to achieve a successful adjustment in a world of rapid economic and political change, the country's leaders will need an accurate understanding of the factors behind these changes, and the probable directions of such change. Such understanding cannot be obtained without knowledge of the major factors involved, such as material conditions and abstract ideas, and the relative importance to be attached to each one. Such knowedge is particularly important in assessing changes in the power relationships among America's potential allies and competitors in the modern world. At the present time, if one may judge from the published diaries of our ambassadors, as well as from what is known of the operations of various intelligence agencies that have received a good deal of publicity since the end of the war, there is no general agreement concerning the procedures to be followed in evaluating symbolic and ideological data, such as statements by important foreign leaders, programs of political parties, and the like, as opposed to more concrete data, such as information on natural resources, economic trends, and similar matters.

Type
Foreign Government and Politics
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 41 , Issue 4 , August 1947 , pp. 733 - 743
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1947

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References

1 This article is a condensed version of one section of a longer study on the evolution of Soviet institutions and on contemporary factors working for and against change. A preliminary sketch of certain other aspects of the problem has appeared in the Journal of the History of Ideas, October, 1945, under the title, “Some Readjustments in Communist Theory.” The writer welcomes any critical comments that may lead to a more effective analysis of the theoretical and historical problems involved.

2 The omission for reasons of space of certain related problems in industry and foreign affairs also leads to an unavoidable over-simplification. For a valuable survey of the relevant Soviet statistics, see Ladejinsky, W., “Collectivization of Agriculture in the Soviet Union,” Political Science Quarterly, Mar., 1934, pp. 6–20Google Scholar.

3 See Lenin, V. I., “The Agrarian Program of Social Democracy in the First Russian Revolution, 1905–1907,” written in November–December, 1907, in Selected Works (New York, n. d.), III, 168Google Scholar, for his interpretation of the official figures on land distribution.

4 The commune (mir) was responsible for tax collections, and for determining the dates of ploughing, harvesting, and other agricultural processes, as well as the periodic redistribution of the land among the inhabitants.

5 Lenin, op. cit., pp. 279–280.

6 Ibid., p. 258.

7 Ibid., pp. 238–239. See also pp. 212, 220, 232, 234, 235, 266, 283.

8 “To the Rural Poor,” Selected Works, II, 293Google Scholar.

9 Lenin, , Selected Works, VI, 406–409Google Scholar.

10 On some occasions the Bolsheviks had opposed nationalization under Tsarist auspices as a measure that might strengthen the régime. With the Bolsheviks in power, this objection, of course, disappeared. The problem of nationalization and the competing views presented are analyzed in an illuminating but unfortunately rare brochure, Meshcheryakov, V., Natsionalizatsiya i Sotsializatsiya Zemli [“Nationalization and Socialization of the Land”] (Moscow, 1918), especially pp. 36–41Google Scholar.

11 “Kommuna sel'sko-khozyaistvennaya,” Bolshaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopedia [“Agricultural Commune,” Large Soviet Encyclopedia] (Moscow, 1928), XXXIII, 646Google Scholar.

12 Evmikhiev, I. I., Zemel'noe Pravo [Land Law] (Moscow, 1923), pp. 77–99Google Scholar, gives a convenient summary of the early land legislation. Unless otherwise indicated, the dates and contents of these decrees are taken from this source.

13 Lenin, , Selected Works, VIII, 142Google Scholar, note, gives a summary of these measures.

14 SirMaynard, John, The Russian Peasant and Other Studies (London, 1943), p. 123Google Scholar.

15 Lenin, , Selected Works, VIII, 140–141Google Scholar.

16 See Lenin, , Selected Works, VIII, 159, 195Google Scholar, and Vosmoy S'ezd R. K. P. (b), Stenografichesky Otchet, 18–23, Marta 1919 [Eighth Congress of the Russian Communist Party, March 13–23, 1919, Stenographic Report] (Moscow, 1933), p. 230Google Scholar, for repetitions of this argument.

17 For a survey of the various alternate solutions, see Dobb, Maurice, Russian Economic Development Since the Revolution (New York, 1928), pp. 152–165Google Scholar. Trotsky claimed that in February, 1920, he advanced a program similar to the NEP on the basis of his experience directing economic work in the Urals. See Trotsky, Leon, My Life (New York, 1930), pp. 463–464Google Scholar. For a similar suggestion by a non-party specialist, see Liberman, Simon, Building Lenin's Russia (Chicago, 1945), p. 93Google Scholar.

18 The Politburo decision was followed by a decree of the Council of People's Commissars published in Pravda and Isvestia on April 23, 1925. In 1923, the resolutions of the Twelfth Congress had recognized the increased use of hired labor and recommended certain safeguards to protect the poor peasants who were the source of this labor.

19 Text of the Central Committee directive in Savel'ev, M. i Poskrebishev, A., Direktivi V.K.P.(b) po Khozyaistvennim Voprosam [“Directives of the Communist Party on Economic Questions”] (Moscow, 1931), p. 220Google Scholar. For comment, see Dobb, op. cit., pp. 348–349.

20 Dvenadtsaty S'ezd Rossisskoy Kommunisticheskoy Partii (Bolshevikov), Stenografichesky Otchet [Twelfth Congress of the Russian Communist Party, Stenographic Report] (Moscow, 1925), p. 391Google Scholar.

21 Ibid., pp. 679–680.

22 Stalin, , XV S'ezd Vsesoiuznoy Kommunisticheskoy Partii (b) Stenografichesky Otchet [Fifteenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Stenographic Report] (Moscow-Leningrad, 1928), pp. 55 ffGoogle Scholar.

23 Ibid., pp. 1217–1222.

24 Ibid., pp. 1061–1062.

25 Ibid., p. 56; see also p. 59.

26 A decree of the party Central Committee, “On the tempo of collectivization and measures of government assistance in kolkhoz construction,” January 5, 1930, is usually regarded as the opening gun in this campaign. Text in Savel'ev and Poskrebishev, op. cit., pp. 662–664. The Communists deny that collectivization was forced upon the peasants, though this is the opinion of most observers.

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