¹ Brecher, M., Steinberg, B. and Stein, J., “A Framework for Research on Foreign Policy Behavior,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 13, no. 1 (03 1969), 75–101.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

² For a macro-analysis of that system during the first two decades of independence see the author's The Foreign Policy System of Israel: Setting, Images, Process (New Haven: Yale University Press, and London: Oxford University Press, 1972).

³ This analysis of Israel's decisions on reparations (1950–2) is based upon both written and oral sources. Written material will be cited in the notes. Oral sources will be cited as the name of the person interviewed; the date (year) will be indicated as well. A list of all persons interviewed appears in the Appendix following this paper. The formal post indicated beside the names of persons interviewed refers to the 1951 Strategic decision. Unless otherwise indicated, the empirical data cited in this paper are based upon reports in Ha'aretz and Jerusalem Post. The dates and substance of the two basic government decisions (3 January and 30 December 1951) were made known to the author by participants.

⁴ An analysis of Israel's response to the Korean War is contained in another paper on images, process and feedback in Israel's foreign policy towards China, pending publication.

⁵ The great majority of speakers following Foreign Minister Sharett's presentation of the 12 March Note to the Knesset supported the government's approach to the Four Powers, though some doubted its practicality. The main criticism, by Rabbi Mordekhai Nurock and others, was that Israel had waited too long in asserting her claim. Divrei Ha-knesset (Official Records of the Knesset) (Jerusalem/Tel Aviv: Government Printer), VIII, pp. 953–6.

⁶ Ha'aretz was at that time closely associated with the Progressives; its editor was to become a member of the third Knesset on that party's list. The Post has always reflected Mapai views. And the two evening newspapers were staffed overwhelmingly by Herut members, in fact, the editor of Yedi'ot Aharonot signed the Declaration of Independence for the Revisionists.

⁷ Appendix Table 9, “Unilateral Transfers: 1949–65,” in Halevi, N., and Klinov-Malul, R., The Economic Development of Israel (New York: Praeger, 1968) pp. 294–5.Google Scholar

⁸ Appendix Table 50, “Balance of Payments on Current Account: 1949–65,” Halevi and Klinov-Malul, p. 141.

⁹ Patinkin, D., The Israel Economy: The First Decade (Falk Project for Economic Research in Israel) (Jerusalem: Jerusalem Post Press, 1960), p. 31.Google Scholar Israel's economic plight during the gestation period of her strategic and tactical decisions on reparations is described in detail in Balabkins, N., West German Reparations to Israel (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1971), Ch. 5.Google Scholar

¹⁰ This, the second government of Israel, was a short-lived one—from 1 November 1950 to 14 February 1951, when it resigned; it continued until 7 October 1951 as a caretaker government. Not all ministers were present at the Cabinet meetings when discussions took place and decisions were taken on the issue of reparations. The participants in crucial meetings will be specified later.

¹¹ It did so in all governments from 1948 to 1965. In 1966, after the Alignment was formed, Mapai and Ahdut Ha'avoda held a combined majority of 11 out of 18 ministers. After 5 June 1967 they comprised 12 of 21 members of the “National Unity Government.” In the 16th government, formed after the Seventh Knesset elections in October 1969, the Labour Alignment (including 2 from Mapam) comprised 15 of 24. And in August 1970, with the departure of Gahal from the government, 13 of 18 ministers represented the Labour Alignment.

¹² The following five extracts are from Avner, Shinnar, Horowitz, Eytan and Meir interviews.

¹³ In his memoirs Goldmann wrote: “In all the campaigns I have participated in … I never had a chance to plan and lead one so definitely from its very start….” Goldmann, N., The Autobiography of Nahum Goldmann: Sixty Years of Jewish Life (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969), p. 277 (emphasis added).Google Scholar

¹⁴ There were, however, numerous earlier and concurrent discussions in the Knesset pertaining to Germany, especially the debate on the rearming of Germany, in October 1950, and again, by way of approving a resolution of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security, on 10 January, 1951, a week before the dispatch of the first Note. Nothing was then said on the Note and no Cabinet member participated. See Divrei Ha-knesset, vols. I–VII.

¹⁵ Pearlman, M., Ben Gurion Looks Back in Talks with Moshe Pearlman (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1965) p. 162 (emphasis added).Google Scholar

¹⁶ Rosen interview, 1971 (emphasis added). Ben Gurion's closest aides, like Navon and Peres, confirmed this consistent perception. Interviews 1965–6.

¹⁷ Ben Gurion interview, 1966.

¹⁸ The original text is in Divrei Ha-knesset, X (2), 1951–2, 38th Sitting, 2nd Knesset, Jan. 7, 1952, pp. 895–6, and in State of Israel, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Documents Relating to the Agreement Between the Government of Israel and the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany (Jerusalem: Government Printer, 1953) pp. 57–60Google Scholar (emphasis added), (hereafter cited as Documents…).

¹⁹ Ben Gurion interview, 1966.

²⁰ Navon interview, 1965.

²¹ Rosen interview, 1971.

²² Yahil interviews, 1966, 1971. The belief that Bonn would not fulfil its obligation was deeprooted in Israel's high-policy and technical elites: It stemmed from experience with German default on debts in the interwar period—another striking illustration of the effect of historical legacy on the psychological environment of decision makers.

²³ Avner, Eytan, Horowitz, Shinnar interviews, 1966–71.

²⁴ Rosen interview, 1971.

²⁵ General Assembly Official Records, 5th Session, 286th Plenary Mtg., 27 Sept. 1950, p. 136. The same theme was reiterated in GAOR, 6th Session, 341st Plenary Mtg., 13 Nov. 1951, p. 87, and in the ad hoc Political Committee, 15th–16th Mtgs., 4 Dec. 1951, pp. 77, 86.

²⁶ Statement on 13 March 1951, in Documents …, 6, p. 28.

²⁷ Divrei Ha-knesset, X (2), 1951–2, 40th Sitting of the 2nd Knesset, Jan. 9, 1952, pp. 953–6. The following four extracts are taken from Sharett, pp. 7, 20–1, 12, 30.

²⁸ Yediot Ha-Netziguyot (News to Representatives) (Jerusalem: Ministry for Foreign Affairs, no. 473, 14 March 1952), p. 1. Horowitz, Shinnar and others recalled to the writer how important was the economic component in Sharett's image.

²⁹ Rosen interview, 1971.

³⁰ Horowitz interview, 1971.

³¹ Divrei Ha-knesset …, Jan. 8, 1952, p. 941.

³² Meir interview, 1966.

³³ Joseph interview, 1960.

³⁴ Joseph interview, 1971.

³⁵ Shapira interview, 1968. He added in retrospect: “I don't know whether Ben Gurion thought that Germany would be an important Power with consequences for Israel in the future. He did so later.”

³⁶ Divrei Ha-knesset …, Jan. 8, 1952, p. 913.

³⁷ The following half dozen extracts are taken from Goldmann, Shinnar, Eytan, Avner, Bartur, and Horowitz interviews, 1965–71.

³⁸ Interviews in Israel in 1960, 1965–66, 1968, 1969–71.

³⁹ Ratification by Israel was a formality. The sixmonth struggle for German ratification, which culminated in that act by the Bundesrat on 20 March 1953, was a German foreign policy decision—though not without the pressure of Israeli inputs. On this point see note 95 below.

⁴⁰ Goldmann, N., The Autobiography of Nahum Goldmann, p. 250.Google Scholar

⁴¹ Robinson, N., Indemnification and Reparations (New York: Institute of Jewish Affairs, 1944), p. 83Google Scholar, as cited in Documents …, 5, p. 20.

⁴² See Moses, S., Die Judischen Nachkriegsforderungen (Tel Aviv: Bita'on Verlag, 1944)Google Scholar and Landauer, G., Der Zionismus in Wandel Dreier Jahrzeiten (Tel Aviv: Bita'on Verlag, 1957).Google Scholar Among others who suggested a claim to compensation for German material destruction and plunder was Shalom Adler-Rudell, also of the Jewish Agency in Jerusalem (F. A. Shinnar, Letter to the Author, 24 January 1966).

⁴³ Documents …, 1, pp. 9–12.

⁴⁴ Adenauer's interview with Karl Marx first appeared in the Allgemeine Wochenzeitung der Juden in Deutschland, Issue 33, 25 Nov., 1949. An English version, from which the above extracts are taken, is in The German Path to Israel, ed. Vogel, R. (London: Oswald Wolff, 1969), pp. 17–18.Google Scholar See also Deutschkron, I.. Israel und die Deutschen: Zwischen Ressentiment und Ratio (Köln: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1970), pp. 33–34.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ Noted by Balabkins, , West German Reparations to Israel, p. 86Google Scholar, from an unpublished account by Noah Barou.

⁴⁶ Blankenhorn interview with Deutschkron, 8 March 1958. Deutschkron, pp. 36–37. Goldmann also noted Barou's role in bringing him into contact with German officials in 1950. Goldmann interview, 1966 and The Autobiography of Nahum Goldmann, p. 254.

⁴⁷ Adenauer, K., Erinnerungen, 1953–1955 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1966), Ch. III.Google Scholar

⁴⁸ Livneh, like his predecessor, Haim Hoffmann (Yahil), was accredited to the United States Military Government in Munich, not to a German governmental authority. Altmaier was one of Adenauer's key links to the opposition Social Democratic Party, to world Jewry, and to Israeli officials.

⁴⁹ Yahil interview, 1971.

⁵⁰ As cited in Vogel, pp. 21–26. The extract is from pp. 25–26.

⁵¹ Horowitz interviews, 1966 and 1971.

⁵² Joseph interview, 1971.

⁵³ Nine of the 12 ministers were present: Kaplan and Meir were abroad; Rosen was absent. Secretary to the Government, Ze'ev Sharef, and Horowitz also attended the meeting.

⁵⁴ Interview, 1971.

⁵⁵ Interview, 1971.

⁵⁶ In the interim (November), Shazar left the Cabinet, while Lavon and Geri became ministers forming a Cabinet of 13, which made the first basic decision. Of the 13 ministers, three were absent—Kaplan, Rosen and Share. Sharef and the Head of the Foreign Ministry's Economic Department, Gershon Meron, were also present.

⁵⁷ Present at that formally decisive meeting were 12 of the 13 ministers (Sharett was abroad), Sharef, Attorney-General Haim Cohen, and Foreign Office legal specialist, Eli Nathan.

⁵⁸ Identical Notes were sent to the US, UK, and France, and a similar one to the Soviet Union, on 16 January, those to France and the USSR in French. Identical Notes were later sent to the Four Powers, to France on 11 March, to the others the following day. Documents …, 3–5, pp. 13–24.

⁵⁹ Many persons confirmed Kohn's primary drafting role—Ben Gurion, Eytan, Horowitz, Meir, Shinnar, etc.

⁶⁰ Documents …, 5, p. 24.

⁶¹ The Western Powers' replies to Israel's Notes of 16 January and 12 March 1951 are in Documents …, 7–12, pp. 28–41. The extract is from p. 37.

⁶² Sharett, M., Problems of the State: German Reparations (Jerusalem: Government Information Services, 1952), pp. 8–9.Google Scholar

⁶³ Joseph interview, 1971.

⁶⁴ He added, in an interview with the New York Jewish magazine, Aufbau, that “it will take a long time,” but he was confident that “love between one human being and another will form a bridge between the two groups….” Reported in Jerusalem Post, 20 July 1951.

⁶⁵ Horowitz interview, 1966. His written account, in unpublished memoirs of the period, 1948–70, which was shown to the author in 1971, is substantially the same but more detailed. The Horowitz-Adenauer meeting, a vital input into the decision process for the tactical decision, was first recorded in Shinnar, F. A., Be'ol Kora Ouregashot: Yahasei Yisrael-Germania 1951–1966 (Tel Aviv: Schocken Publishing House, 1967) p. 18.Google Scholar

⁶⁶ Shinnar, p. 18.

⁶⁷ Schmid's tape-recorded account is in Vogel, The German Path to Israel, pp. 19–20.Google Scholar

⁶⁸ For the German text and Hebrew translation see Documents …, 13, pp. 41–43. An English version, from which the above extracts are taken, is in Grossmann, K. R., Germany's Moral Debt: The German Israel Agreement (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1954), Appendix IV, pp. 59–60Google Scholar (emphasis added). A somewhat different English translation, along with statements by representatives of all German parties, is contained in Vogel, pp. 32–35. Adenauer, , in his memoirs, devoted a paragraph to this development, Erinnerungen, 1953–1955, p. 136.Google Scholar

⁶⁹ Government of Israel Statement, 27 Sept. 1951, in Documents …, 14, p. 45.

⁷⁰ Shinnar interview, 1965: Barou, N., “The Origin of the German Agreement,” Congress Weekly, 19, 24, (13 10, 1952) pp. 6, 7Google Scholar; Goldmann, p. 56. On Baron's role see Fraenkel, and Goldmann, in Essays in Jewish Sociology, Labor and Cooperation in Memory of Dr. Noah Barou, 1889–1955, ed. Infield, M. F. (London: Yoseloff, 1962), pp. 7, 11.Google Scholar Goldmann also recalled (interview, 1966) that Jacob Altmaier brought the Adenauer draft to him for approval and that some of his proposed changes were accepted.

⁷¹ Adenauer, p. 136.

⁷² Goldmann sought only an acknowledgement of the German people's “responsibility for Nazi crimes,” not of “guilt.” Goldmann interview, 1966.

⁷³ The Chancellor mistakenly identified Barou as Israel's Ambassador to the UK, present under an assumed name. For his account of the meeting and the German text of his letter see Adenauer, pp. 137–9. An English translation of Adenauer's letter, from which the above extract is taken, is in Grossmann, Appendix V, p. 61. The English version in Vogel, The German Path lo Israel, is slightly different. More significant and unsubstantiated is Vogel's remark that “Konrad Adenauer's generous offer … was made against the will of the Allied powers”; p. 36.

In perspective, Israel had committed a major error in directing her original claim to both German states—in a 2:1 ratio—$1 billion from West Germany and $.5 billion from East Germany, for Bonn claimed to represent all of Germany in all foreign policy issues. It was the only time that Bonn acquiesced in representing part of Germany! And East Germany peremptorily rejected Israel's claim.

Before the meeting, Goldmann demanded full authority from Ben Gurion to speak in the name of Israel, as well as of world Jewry. Goldmann believed he had received such authority. This point and the above account of their meeting is based upon the Goldmann interview, 1966. Adenauer, too, perceived Goldmann's dual representative role. In his letter to Finance Minister Schäffer on 29 February 1952, urging that “negotiations be prepared and conducted in a spirit appropriate to the moral and political weight and uniqueness of our obligations,” the Chancellor referred to Goldmann as “chairman of the Conference on Jewish Claims against Germany and delegate of the government of the State of Israel …” Vogel, pp. 37–38. Adenauer had conferred with his financial adviser, the prominent banker, Hermann Abs, in London on 3 December, just before his scheduled meeting with Goldmann. Abs urged the Chancellor not to incur any new obligations. Abs later declared that he did not know of Adenauer's 6 December commitment to Goldmann until 29 February 1952, when an Israeli diplomat mentioned it to him. Only on 8 March was he informed, in Bonn, of the forthcoming Wassenaar talks. He wished to resign but was dissuaded by Adenauer. (Abs interview with Balabkins, 21 July 1966; Balabkins, p. 126.)

⁷⁴ The text of the main Claims Conference resolution is in Grossmann, p. 17.

⁷⁵ Shinnar, pp. 19–20. Shinnar had served in several economic posts in the Israeli bureaucracy from 1948 to 1951. On 1 July 1951 he became Adviser to the Foreign Ministry on the reparations issue.

⁷⁶ Meir interview, 1966.

⁷⁷ This account is based upon a participant's recollection; Yahil interview, 1971. Zalman Aranne, then a member of the Knesset Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security, was also reportedly opposed to direct talks, Shinnar, Letter to the Author, 24 January 1966. Three days earlier the issue was discussed before the Young Mapai Circle. The party newspaper reported that emotional objections were strongly voiced, but that “correct information … [provided by speakers Yahil and Shinnar] will do much to cancel unbiased suspicions.” Ha-dor, 26 November 1951.

A reading of the Mapai press which reported all party meetings of any consequence, indicates that the reparations issue was not a topic of frequent discussion and debate in party organs. During the entire period of the decision process, the daily Ha-dor carried three editorials (17 Jan., 28 Sept., and 9 Dec. 1951) and three articles (13 July and 5, 16 Oct. 1951). The party weekly, Ha-po'el Ha-tza'ir, carried only one editorial on reparations (30 Oct. 1951) and two advocacy articles (18 Dec. 1951 and 15 Jan. 1952).

⁷⁸ Meir interview, 1966. All of the 13 ministers except Pinkas were present at the 30 December 1951 meeting, along with Sharef, and Abba Eban, then Ambassador to the US and Permanent Representative to the UN.

⁷⁹ Joseph interview, 1971.

⁸⁰ It can be argued that the de facto decision to enter into direct talks with Bonn was taken before Adenauer's Declaration of 27 September 1951, on the grounds that he would not have made it without an advance, though informal, positive response from Israel. Adenauer and others, as noted, confirmed these consultations. Yet in terms of the decision flow this was a predecisional act. The decision itself was not taken by the Government until 30 December (the date was explicitly foreshadowed by the Mapai newspaper, Ha-dor, 26 Dec. 1951); and it was not confirmed until after the Knesset and its Foreign Affairs and Security Committee authorized the Government to act, in mid-January 1952. Moreover, as late as 30 November 1951 Israel had approached the three Western Powers once more, seeking their intervention to “impress on the … Federal Republic of Germany the urgent and compelling necessity to give effective satisfaction to its claims …” (Note to the United Kingdom). The text of the three similar Notes is in Documents …, 16–18, pp. 47–56. Only after Adenauer's letter to Goldmann on 6 December and after the Western Powers reaffirmed their policy in favor of direct negotiations (their replies were sent in midand late January, after the Israeli decision was made (Documents …, 23–24, pp. 62–3), but their view was communicated informally in December 1951) were all of the external inputs present in Israel's foreign policy system. It then proceeded to generate the tactical decision

⁸¹ Maki, the Communist Party of Israel, was a legal organization, but being outspokenly anti-Zionist it was beyond political legitimacy in Israel. That pariah status changed in 1965 when Maki split into two, and Dr. Moshe Sneh led the Jewish remnant to a nationalist stance. See Brecher, M., The Foreign Policy System of Israel …, pp. 166–8.Google Scholar

⁸² Herut, 5 Jan. 1952.

⁸³ M. Sharett, Problems of the State: German Reparations, pp. 3, 4, 12, 22–24, 25, 31 (emphasis added).

⁸⁴ That motion was unique in the annals of Israel's parliamentary history: The Plenary was not to decide anything on substance except to leave everything in the hands of its Foreign Affairs and Security Committee. This was designed to evade another expected storm in the House. Of course, the party composition of that Committee assured the government motion a majority.

⁸⁵ This account was based upon Divrei Ha-knesset, X (2), 38th, 39th, and 40th Meetings of the 2nd Knesset, pp. 895–964, supplemented by the detailed reports in Ha'aretz and Jerusalem Post, 8–10 Jan. 1952.

⁸⁶ The Hebrew text is in Documents …, 22, p. 61.

⁸⁷ Ben Gurion later wrote that “the request for and acceptance of [direct negotiations] created a tremendous storm in the Knesset and the newspapers, the like of which had never before been seen in Israel.” Further, “… this stormy debate [7–9 Jan.] 1952 … had no precedent in the annals of the Knesset …” Gurion, D. Ben, Medinat Yisrael Ha-mehudeshet (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1969), pp. 421–3.Google Scholar A slightly different English translation is contained in Gurion, D. Ben, Israel: A Personal History (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1971), pp. 399–400.Google Scholar

⁸⁸ Ben Gurion interview, 1966. The tension did not abate quickly. On 19 January 1952, after the decision was authorized, Begin threatened to advocate nonpayment of taxes if German money were accepted. The following day he was suspended by the Knesset (56 to 47) for the rest of the session for “threatening the Knesset with acts of violence.” Jerusalem Post, 22 Jan. 1952.

⁸⁹ Meir interview, 1966.

⁹⁰ Bartur interview, 1966. Many other observers and participants agreed.

⁹¹ The official name of the Agreement was “Agreement Between the State of Israel and the Federal Republic of Germany. Signed on 10 September 1952, at Luxembourg.” Documents …, pp. 125–72. The basic text is also in Grossmann, , Germany's Moral Debt: The German-Israel Agreement, Appendix II, pp. 37–57Google Scholar, and in Vogel, , The German Path to Israel, pp. 56–68.Google Scholar See also Balabkins, , West German Reparations to Israel, pp. 143–7.Google Scholar On the legal aspects see Honig, F., “The Repaiations Agreement Between Israel and the Federal Republic of Germany,” American Journal of International Law, 48 (1954, pp. 564–78).CrossRefGoogle Scholar For a cursory general analysis see also Giniewski, P., “Germany and Israel: The Reparations Treaty of September 10, 1952,” World Affairs Quarterly, 30 (1959–1960), pp. 169–85Google Scholar, and Prittie, T., Konrad Adenauer 1876–1967 (London: Tom Stacey, 1972), pp. 203–8.Google Scholar

⁹² On the signing ceremony see Adenauer, pp. 155–6; Goldmann, pp. 273–4; Shinnar, pp. 43–46; and Balabkins, pp. 137–8.

⁹³ Goldmann, p. 274.

⁹⁴ A comment in 1962. Vogel, p. 87.

⁹⁵ The vote was 239 to 35, with 86 abstentions. There was a marked dissent in Adenauer's own party (for example Finance Minister Schäfer voted against the Christian Democrats) in contrast to the overwhelming support by the Social Democrats. Ratification by the Bundesrat (Upper House) on 20 March came just before the end of the parliamentary session. Any further delay would have meant the loss of a year (1953 to 1954) in the beginning of the flow of reparations payments—at a time of grave economic distress for Israel. The struggle for ratification in West Germany is discussed at length in Balabkins, pp. 147–50; Goldmann, pp. 275–6; Grossmann, pp. 27–29, 31–35; Shinnar, pp. 49–56; and Vogel, pp. 69–87.

⁹⁶ Eytan interview, 1971.

⁹⁷ Interview, 1960.

⁹⁸ “Address by the Prime Minister, Mr. David Ben Gurion, in the Knesset, July 1, 1959.” (Jerusalem: Government Press Office, 1959), p. 14.

⁹⁹ Prittie, T., Konrad Adenauer 1876–1967, p. 207Google Scholar, based upon a conversation with Hans Globke, then one of the Chancellor's closest political confidants. Prittie also reported that Adenauer asked US Ambassador David Bruce to sound out Washington's attitude. “American advice was allegedly against this proposal.” A knowledgeable Israeli source, too, related to this writer the German offer of diplomatic relations in 1953. Yahil interview, 1966.

¹⁰⁰ Eytan interview, 1971.

¹⁰¹ These decisions were analyzed in the author's The Foreign Policy System of Israel, Ch. 16.

¹⁰² “Review of Economic Conditions,” Bank Leumi Le-Israel, No. 36–37 (May, 1962).

¹⁰³ Taped comments in 1962. Vogel, p. 88.

¹⁰⁴ According to the Federal German Finance Ministry, reparations payments to the end of 1966 comprised the following:

Federal Indemnity Law DM 21,400 million

Federal Restitution Law DM 2,750 million

Reparations Agreement DM 3,450 million

General treaties with 12 German States DM 1,000 million

Other payments (public service, etc.) DM 2,700 million

Total DM 31,300 million

Of this approximately DM 19,500 million was allocated through the Federal Budget. Not all of these payments went to Israel or Israelis. The sum of $5 billion is an estimate. (As cited in Vogel, p. 99.) On the implementation of the Luxembourg Agreements see Balabkins, , West German Reparations to Israel, pp. 169–88Google Scholar, 256–69, and Chs. 10, 11. See also the report of the delivery of goods under the agreement by the Federal Minister of Economic Affairs, Bonn, March 1966, in Vogel, , The German Path to Israel, pp. 89–99.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁵ Comment to Vogel, p. 55.

¹⁰⁶ Hypothesis A, is from Verba, S., “Assumptions of Rationality and Non-Rationality in Models of the International System,” World Politics, 14 (10, 1961), 99.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁰⁷ Pruitt, D. G., “Definition of the Situation as a Determinant of International Action,” in International Behavior, ed. Kelman, H. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966), p. 411.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁸ Brecher, M., “Elite Images and Foreign Policy Choices: Krishna Menon's View of the World,” Pacific Affairs, 40 (Spring-Summer, 1967), 91.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁰⁹ Jervis, R., “Hypotheses on Misperception,” World Politics, XX, 3 (04, 1968), p. 455.Google Scholar

¹¹⁰ Hypotheses D₁ and D₂ are from Milbrath, L. W., “Interest Groups and Foreign Policy,” in Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy, ed. Rosenau, J. (New York: Free Press, 1967), pp. 249, 250.Google Scholar

¹¹¹ Hypotheses E_1–4 are from Brecher, , Steinberg, , and Stein, , “A Framework for Research on Foreign Policy Behavior,” pp. 92–93.Google Scholar

¹¹² Hypotheses F_-3 are from Brecher, , Steinberg, , and Stein, , “A Framework for Research on Foreign Policy Behavior,” pp. 92–93.Google Scholar

¹¹³ Hypothesis F₄ is from Stein, J., Elite images and Foreign Policy: Nehru, Menon, and India's Policies (Unpublished Doctoral Dissertaton, McGill University, 1969), p. 408.Google Scholar