¹ Cf. Padgett, L. Vincent, “Mexico's One-Party System: A Re-Evaluation,” this Review, Vol. 51 (12, 1957) pp. 995–1008Google Scholar; Martin C. Needler, “The Political Development of Mexico,” ibid, Vol. 55 (June, 1961), pp 308–312; Taylor, Philip B. Jr., “The Mexican Elections of 1958: Affirmation of Authoritarianism,” Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 13 (09, 1960), pp. 722–744CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Scott, Robert E., Mexican Government in Transition (University of Illinois Press, Urbana, 1959)Google Scholar; Cline, Howard, Mexico: Revolution to Evolution, 1940–1960 (Oxford University Press, London, 1962)Google Scholar; Glade, William P. and Anderson, Charles W., The Political Economy of Mexico (University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1963)Google Scholar; Garza, David T., “Factionalism in the Mexican Left: The Frustration of the MLN,” Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 17 (09, 1964), pp. 447–60CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

² Cline, op. cit., p. 168.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Kling, Merle, “Area Studies and Comparative Politics,” American Behavioral Scientist, Vol. 8 (09, 1964), p. 10CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁵ Johnson, Kenneth F., “Causal Factors in Latin American Political Instability,” Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 17 (09, 1964), pp. 432–446CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁶ Several lesser groups that have been variously affiliated with PAN and UNS are Acción Católica Mexicana (which cannot legally call itself a party because of the constitutional prohibition against use of religious titles in political organization), Unión Nacional de Padres de Familia, and Partido Nacionalista de México.

⁷ Padilla, Juan Ignacio, El Sinarquismo (2d ed. Ediciones UNS, México, 1953), p. 25Google Scholar.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ On July 11, 1939, in Celaya, Guanajuato, a woman sinarquista, Teresita Bustos, was murdered while performing in a UNS rally. As a symbolic gesture of unity each outgoing national president of UNS delivers to his successor the flag which she was carrying at the time of her death (Orden, 31 de mayo, 1964, p. 2). The ceremony is repeated annually in the main plaza of León, Guanajuato, where the sinarquistas hold a mass pilgrimage, normally during March. Sinarquista leaders wear armbands bearing a geographic shape of Mexico. They march in a semi-military fashion that has given sinarquismo the largely erroneous appearance of being Fascist- or Nazi-oriented. Use of a Hitler-type hand salute reinforces this image. In an earlier work, Howard Cline developed the theme of fascism in sinarquismo, The United States and Mexico (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1953), p. 320Google Scholar. My own experiences in interviewing and knowing UNS members indicate that it could be easy to mistake religious vehemence and anti-semitism for a full-scale commitment to Nazi or Fascist doctrine. I take issue with Cline only in suggesting that branding this group as a “fascist type organization” does not give the sinarquistas credit for the truly progressive civic spirit which I have known them to demonstrate. See footnote 10, below.

¹⁰ Sinarquistas and their sympathizers have been instrumental in a number of civic protest movements throughout Mexico. Three recent examples are: Asociación Cívica de Usarios de Servicios Públicos de Chihuahua (formed in 1962 to protest unfair property taxation and public service scandals); Agrupación de Iniciativa Privada Pro-Morelos (formed in Cuernavaca during 1962 in protest over fiscal mismanagement of state funds); Unión Civica Defensora de los Intereses del Pueblo (formed in Tepic, Nayarit to protest abuses in meter reading and collection of water charges by the municipal government during 1964).

¹¹ Article 3 of the Constitution of 1917 prohibits priests, ministers, and ecclesiastics generally from participating in primary or secondary religious instruction. The Revolutionary regime has interpreted this to include the teaching of religion in public schools as well. Under the López Mateos regime (1958–64) a program of gratuitous distribution of textbooks was initiated by the national government. The texto único has preoccupied much of the right-wing attack on officialdom because it deliberately does not mention religion or the name of God.

¹² Taylor, op. cit., p. 741.

¹³ Garza, op. cit., passim.

¹⁴ See my “Political Alienation in Mexico: A Preliminary Examination of UNS and PAN,” The Rocky Mountain Social Science Journal, Vol. 2 (05, 1965), pp. 155–63Google Scholar.

¹⁵ The reformed electoral law was a major issue in the campaign and was stressed by PRI candidate Gustavo Díaz Ordaz and incumbent President Adolfo López Mateos as the Revolutionary party's guarantee of an honest and “clean” election (Novedades, 12 de junio, 1964, front page). The new law provided a “mixed system” of proportional representation for the Cámara de Diputados. A registered party could win either electoral districts or deputies at large known as diputados de partido, or both. For deputies at large, the party would have to win at least 2.5 per cent of the total national vote for deputies, a means of eliminating parties which contested in only a few states. Winning the 2.5 per cent vote meant an automatic receipt of five deputy seats. Then, one additional seat would be awarded for each one-half per cent of the national total, up to a limit of twenty seats. PRI, Primera Reunión Nacional de Programación (México, 1963), pp. 292–293Google Scholar.

¹⁶ In return for its guaranteed status as an “official opposition,” PAN leaders gave its pledge to support the official election returns. As an additional bonus, PAN was guaranteed twenty diputados de partido, less those elected from districts. Two panistas were declared district winners in Chihuahua and León and the total national vote for PAN candidates was sufficient to guarantee the remaining eighteen deputies. According to informed sources in both PRI and PAN, the official returns of the election were reported honestly but the official regime was prepared to keep its commitment to PAN regardless.

¹⁷ Novedades, 11 de julio, 1964, front page. On June 15 the same periodical carried a cartoon whose caption wryly summarized the plight of PAN as follows: “hay algo peor que no ganar . . perder, sin fraude.” [There is something worse than not winning … losing without fraud.]

¹⁸ The 1958 presidential campaign period was marked with severely alienated pronouncements by PAN's leadership. Luis H. Alvarez blamed all the ills of Mexico and of the world on the PRI. He cursed his defeat as an enormous fraud leaving strained relations between the two parties. There was certainly a great amount of fraud in the 1958 election, but not enough by itself to have taken the presidency away from Alvarez. However, the election was conducted in a tense atmosphere that involved the murder of one PAN campaign worker and several attacks on Alvarez himself. This writer interviewed Luis H. Alvarez after the election and did not find him to be the demagogue that Taylor pictured him, op. cit., p. 741. The violence of the opposition to his presidential candidacy undoubtedly accounted for much of PAN's extreme alienation in 1958. None of these misfortunes were visited upon José González Torres in 1964, which—in all likelihood due to the rapprochement of PAN and PRI—made the most recent campaign appear much less antagonistic. Significantly, the campaign's only reported violence of serious proportions was directed against the PRI. An attack by stone-throwers on Díáz Ordaz in Chihuahua city (see Índice, 7 de abril, 1964, front page) and a frustrated dynamite attempt in Nuevo Casas Grandes (see La Nación, 26 de abril, 1964, p. 11) were officially blamed by the regime on the leftist splinter group Frente Electoral del Pueblo. One of their leaders, Braulio Maldonado Sández (a former governor of Baja California Norte) was deported as a result of the incident. Similar happenings during the 1958 campaign were blamed exclusively (and in many cases unfairly) on Acción Nacional and the sinarquistas.

¹⁹ The questionnaire represented this author's second pilot attempt to devise an instrument for attitudinal measurement for use among a specialized Latin American clientele. The scalogram components yielded a coefficient of reproducibility of .63 in the instrumental items but failed to scale at all in the emotive or “High L” items (cf. Himmelstrand, Ulf, Social Pressures, Attitudes, and Democratic Processes, Stockholm, Almquist and Wiksell, 1960)Google Scholar. While insufficient to be reported here, these findings did provide insight into the problem of instrument construction in the Spanish vernacular.

²⁰ Taylor, op. cit., p. 729.

²¹ Lane, Robert E., Political Ideology (Glencoe, 1962) p. 80Google Scholar.

²² Ibid., pp. 346–363.

²³ Fuentes, Carlos, La Muerte de Artemio Cruz (México, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1962), p. 46Google Scholar.

²⁴ Política, 1 06, 1964, p. 19Google Scholar.

²⁵ Antonio Estrada, M.La Grieta en el Yugo (2d ed., México, no publisher cited, 1963)Google Scholar. The first edition was destroyed and the press that produced it wrecked by the government of San Luis Potosí. The work is a crude tabloid but contains photographs of documents and detailed accounts of events in San Luis Potosí which were largely corroborated by independent observers interviewed by this author.

²⁶ Based on interviews in Apaseo el Grande and on handbills and other printed propaganda bearing the insignia of both PAN and UNS that are currently in the author's possession.

²⁷ Based on confidential communications recently received from informants in Celaya. A founder of Unión Nacional Sinarquista and currently an important member of its national executive board, Juan Iguacio Padilla, was reportedly kidnapped from a public street in Ensenada, Befa., at gunpoint by members of that state's judicial police (see La Suegra de la Cotorra, 29 de noviembre, 1964, front page). There is little doubt that harassment of political restorationists continues throughout Mexico.

²⁸ The only other published effort to measure political attitudes among Mexican rightists is included in the recent work of Almond, Gabriel and Verba, Sidney, The Civic Culture (Princeton University Press, 1963)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Almond and Verba did not include UNS within their sample and they do not isolate alienated nuclei within the Mexican system. They do make the interesting broad contention that Mexicans generally are more alienated from governmental output than respondents of the other four nations (not Latin American) surveyed in their study (p. 495).