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The End Game in Presidential Nominations

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

Donald S. Collat ,
Stanley Kelley Jr.  and
Ronald Rogowski
Donald S. Collat
Affiliation:
Yale University Law School
Stanley Kelley Jr.
Affiliation:
Princeton University
Ronald Rogowski
Affiliation:
Duke University and University of California, Los Angeles
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Abstract

This study shows that a simple, empirically derived rule accounts well for the outcome of multi-ballot, majority-rule conventions in the period 1848-1948 and that the same rule would have enabled one to predict correctly the outcome of all contested presidential nominations since 1952 before any candidate had achieved majority support in the Associated Press'polls of delegates. The rule's success suggests two conclusions about the behavior of delegates: (1) that their guesses about outcomes are based on objective cues, similarly interpreted, and (2) that the trend in voting for candidates, in addition to the level of support they attract, is an important element of such cues. The study's findings also suggest that delegates in recent years do not contrast sharply with their predecessors in their predilection for bandwagon voting.

Type
Research Article
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 75 , Issue 2 , June 1981 , pp. 426 - 435
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1981

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