¹ The programs or platforms of the deputies elected in 1910 have been collected and printed by the state under the title: Programmes, Professions de Foi et Engagements Électoraux de 1910, No. 385 (Annexe) ch. des Déps., Dixième Lég. ses. extra. de 1910. Paris 1910, pp. 1267. A summary and analysis of these programs may be found in the parliamentary document entitled: Programmes et Engagements Électoraux, by Camille Foquet, No. 385, ch. des Déps. Dixième Leg., ses. extra, de 1910.

² See historical summaries in Benoist, , La Réforme Électorale (1908), p. 121Google Scholar, and the Revue du Droit Public, etc., vol. 25, pp. 183–194.

³ For discussions of the methods which Napoleon employed to control the elections see Lefèvre-Pontalis, , Les Lois et, les Moeurs Électorales (1885), pp. 61–140Google Scholar; Ferry, Jules, La Lutte Électorale en 1863 (1863), pp. 3–104Google Scholar (valuable illustrative documents appended); and Weil, , Les Elections Legislatives Depuis 1789 (1895)Google Scholar, ch. ix.

⁴ For the history of this amendment see Magne, , Étude sur le Scrutin de Liste et le Scrutin Uninominal (1895), p. 38Google Scholar, and Chardon, , Réforme Électorale (1910), p. 63.Google Scholar

⁵ Of the 232 Deputies who voted in favor of “scrutin de liste” in 1885 only 85 voted to retain it in 1889.

⁶ It should be remembered that the system of 1885–89 was what the French call “scrutin de liste” “pure and simple,” proportional or minority representation constituting no part of the scheme. The result was to give to the majority party in each department all the deputies to which the department was entitled.

⁷ Faure, , “La Legislature qui Finit et la Reforme Electorale” Rev. Pol. et Parl. v. 62, p. 433.Google Scholar

⁸ Programmes, de Foi et Engagements Électoraux, cited above. See also Groussier's, Rapport, No. 826 Ch. des Deps., 1911 p. 3Google Scholar, and Le Temps for May 24, 1910.

⁹ For the statistics see Groussier's, Rapport sur l'election des deputes, etc., p. 4.Google Scholar Also Bonnet's, J. L.Report to the 10th Cong. of the Rad. and Rad. Soc. party, 1910, p. 2Google Scholar; and Tronqual, , La Répresentation Proportionnelle, 1910, pp. 60–61.Google Scholar

¹⁰ Chatelier, (Réforme Republicaine, 1911, p. 94)Google Scholar emphasizes this point and declares that the “scrutin d'arrondissement” method of election has made the chamber a body of mediocres. See also Moreau, , Pour le Régime Parlementaire, 1903, p. 319Google Scholar; Champs, DesLe Malaise de la Democratie, 1899, p. 51Google Scholar; Chaudordy, La France en 1899, p. 89Google Scholar; Goblet, in the Revue Politique et Parlementaire for 1905, p. 254 ff.Google Scholar; Buisson, , La Politique Radicale, 1908, pp. 137 ff.Google Scholar; Fouillée, , La Democratie Politique et Sociale, 2 ed. 1910, pp. 25 ff.Google Scholar; Poincarè, , Questions et Figures Politiques, 1907, pp. 95–103Google Scholar; Hilleret, , La Réforme Électorale, 1910, pp. 15 ff.Google Scholar; Cloarec, , La Réforme Électorale, 1911, p. 5 ff.Google Scholar

¹¹ Scherer, M., La Democratie en France, pp. 35–36Google Scholar, remarks that so great is the feeling that the deputy must look after the local needs of his constituents that they sometimes call upon him to procure Parisian nurses for their families; others write letters describing their physical ailments and requesting him to consult a medical specialist at the Capital for them. One deputy declared that he received an average of two letters of this kind every day during his term. Some want appointments as venders of tobacco; others charge him with doing their shopping, etc.

¹² Reinach, , Du Rétablissement du Scrutin de Liste, p. 21.Google Scholar

¹³ The actual relation between the deputy and his constituents and between the deputy and the minister is well described by M. Sabatier in an article in the Revue Politique et Parlementaire, for November, 1911, pp. 201 ff. The existing parliamentary régime, he says, is a counterfeit. Its true name should be “deputantism.” Between a ministry which does not desire to be overthrown and deputies who wish at all hazards to be reëlected, an accord is soon entered into. The deputies promise the ministers the necessary votes of confidence and a free hand in the administration of the government. In return the ministers agree to appoint the friends of the deputies to office, give them decorations, and advance their supporters who are already functionaries. Thus the deputies surrender their control over the ministry and the ministers abdicate into the hands of the deputies their power to appoint, and control the functionaries. “The ministers are dependent upon the deputies,” says Moreau, “and the deputies upon the electors and the electors are more concerned with local interests than with the general interests… The deputy desirous of retaining his seat occupies himself with local interests, harasses the ministers, enters into deals with them; the ministers absorbed with this traffic are prevented from considering weighty affairs of state.” Pour Le Régime Parlementaire, p. 319.

¹⁴ Chantovire, , En Province, 1910, p. 11.Google Scholar

¹⁵ La Democratie en France, pp. 25–36.

¹⁶ Henry Leyret, in several interesting books, has dwelt upon the baneful effects of the present system of electing deputies; of the rôle which they play as political masters of their districts; and of the petty local influences to which they are subject. See especially his Tyrans Ridicules, 1910, pp. 15 ff.; his La Republique et les Politiciens, 1909, and La Tyrannie des Politiciens, 1910.

¹⁷ “Vues Politiques,” La Revue de Paris (1910), v. 18, p. 849–851. For further criticism of the scrutin d'arrondissement, see an article by “X” entitled the “Sophistication du suffrage universel” in the Revue des Sciences Politiques, 25, 344–363; Bonnets, Report to the 10th Radical Congress; Ferneuil, , “La Réforme Électorale et le Parti Progressiste,” in Rev. Pol. et Parl. 40: 507 ff.Google Scholar; “Rev. du Droit public, 25, 183–194; art. by Goblet, ibid, 32: 417–430; Rev. Pol. et Parl, June, 1902, pp. 418–432; July, 1905, pp. 5–13.

¹⁸ An illustration of the possibilities of government intervention was afforded by the election of 1885. The government at first instructed the prefects to abstain from all activity in behalf of particular candidates. At the first balloting the reactionaries elected 177 deputies and the republicans only 131, leaving 266 seats to be filled at the second balloting. The government, greatly alarmed at the prospect of being left in the minority, hastened to give the prefects new instructions and the result was the election of 241 republicans and only 25 monarchists at the second balloting.

¹⁹ “Forty years,” says Picot, M., “have separated us from the white placards (posters used by the government during the second empire for making known to the voters its candidates) but the official candidature has lost nothing but its etiquette.” Revue des Deux Mondes, 1906, p. 542.Google Scholar

²⁰ Compare Lefèvre-Pontalis, Les Lois et les Moeurs Électorales, pp. 47, 97Google Scholar; see also his Les elections en Europe a la Fin du XIX Siècle, ch. I.

²¹ The Temps of November 28, 1912, speaking of the subprefect remarks that “it is no secret today that the subprefect owes his appointment to the deputy and counts on his influence to secure promotion. How, under such circumstances could he fail to be devoted to the interests of his master? Political agent of the government, the protégé of members of parliament he will pass his life in serving them and in being served by them.”

²² Jéze, , Elements du Droit Public et Administratif, 1910, p. 138.Google Scholar It is a saying in France that a good prefect is one who makes a good electioneering agent and a good minister of the interior (the minister who appoints and controls the prefects) is one who successfully carries the elections for the government. Indeed the selection of this minister is often made with reference to his qualifications as a manager of elections (cf. Leyret, La Tyrannie des Politiciens, p. 115Google Scholar). M. Leyret tells of a prefect who in 1906 not only prepared the electoral placards of a certain candidate but wrote articles in his behalf each day for two newspapers. (Ibid., p. 124).

²³ Problèmes Politiques du Temps Present (1900), p. 27.

²⁴ ProfessorMoreau, , in his Pour le Régime Parlementaire (p. 294)Google Scholar, speaks of the unjustifiable curiosities of a law which allows 100,000 people in one community a deputy and a few thousand somewhere else a deputy; which allows 20,000 electors to chose a deputy here and 2,000 to chose one somewhere else; and which produces a parliament that does not represent a majority of the voters of the country.

²⁵ For discussions and statistical tables regarding the existing inequalties of representation, see Chardon p. 12–13; Magne, pp. 82–86; Clement, , La Réforme Électorale, pp. 9–14Google Scholar; Roszner, , “Le Suffrage Universel en France,” the Revue de Hongrie, July, 1912Google Scholar; Groussier's Report, cited above pp. 199 ff.; Marquart, “Comment Nous Sommes Representées,” in the Journal de la Societie de Statistique de Paris. 1905Google Scholar; Tronqual, pp. 75 ff; Hilleret pp. 18–19; Bonnet's, Rapport, pp. 248 ff.Google Scholar See “Lectures Pour Tous,” April, 1902, for a popular and suggestive article entitled “Les Français sont-ils Egaux devant le Bulletin de Vote?”

²⁶ Rapport par A. Groussier fait au nom de la Com. du Suff. Universel sur l'Election des Deps., etc., 1911, No. 826, p. 11.

²⁷ Duguit, , Droit Constitutionnel, 1911, vol. 1, p. 380.Google Scholar

²⁸ See Fouquet, , Programmes et Engagements Électoraux, Paris, 1911, pp. 22 ffGoogle Scholar; also Demartial, , La Réforme Administrative, Paris, 1911, p. 73.Google Scholar

²⁹ “Under the system of scrutin d'arrondissement,” says Poincarè, M. Raymond, “the deputy enters the chamber with chained feet. He cannot take a step without hearing the noise of chains which reminds him of his slavery. He desires to be the representative of France; but he is the courtier of an arrondissement. Ask him for administrative or financial reform; propose to him a law for the public interest and he will turn toward his petty ‘chef-lieu’ an interrogating look and an anxious thought. Perhaps he will consent to abolish for twenty-four hours the sub-prefectures because he knows with certainty that tomorrow the government will demand with insistence their immediate reëstablishment. But you must not expect him to sacrifice for the good of the country an unoccupied ‘guarde generale’ or a sleeping tribunal.” “Vues Politiques” in the Revue de Paris, vol. 17 (1910), p. 849.Google Scholar

“Why is it,” asks M. Hilleret, “that there are in France today prefects who administer nothing, judges who decide only 20 or 30 cases a year, collectors and other functionaries who have little or nothing to do.” The answer is, the deputy needs this patronage to maintain control of his petty circumscription—Réforme Électorate, p. 21.

It is true that for some years past the chamber has with a few exceptions annually stricken from the budget the appropriation for the maintenance of the subprefects, but each time, upon the demand of the government, the amount has been restored. See the speech of M. Pierre Leroy-Beaulieu in the chamber, November, 30, 1911, Journal officiel, p. 3140; also the Temps for November 28, 1912.

³⁰ Compare Breton, La Réforme Électorale, pp. 13–15Google Scholar; Chardon, , La Réforme Électorale en France, p. 277.Google Scholar

³¹ It should be remarked however that the bill which passed the chamber in July, 1912, differed from the law of 1885 in that it provided for the division into smaller electoral circumscriptions of departments which elect more than seven deputies, so that no elector would be called upon to vote for more than seven candidates.

³² To Professer Duguit this is an argument in favor of the system of “scrutin de liste.” “The deputy,” he says, “is not the agent (manditaire) of the elector, but of the country, and consequently there is no reason why either should be personally acquainted with the other; on the contrary personal acquaintanceship between them tends to make the deputy a mere commissioner of the elector and obliges him to pass his time in the ministerial anti-chambers soliciting places and favors.” Droit Constitutionnel, vol. i, p. 376.

³³ “Vues Politiques” in La Revue de Paris, April 15, 1910, vol. 17, p. 851. See also Ferneuil, , “La Réforme Électorale,” Rev. Pol. et Parl, vol. 59, p. 465.Google Scholar

³⁴ Thus in the department of the Seine the Radical and Radical Socialist party with 216,000 votes would elect the 50 deputies to which the department is entitled while the votes of the 197,000 Socialists Unifiés and those of the 188,000 Progressists, Nationalists, and Clericals would count for nothing, whereas under the system of proportional representation the Seine would today be represented by 12 Conservatives, 15 Socialists Unifiés and 23 Radical Republicans. J. L. Bonnet, in his report to the 10th Radical and Radical Socialist Congress of 1910, asserted that under the system of “scrutin de liste” pure and simple uncombined with proportional representation the republicans would lose more seats than they would gain, as actually happened in 1885 when more than 200 reactionaries were elected to the chamber. With this system in force the Republicans, he says, would have no representatives today from the departments of Loire-Inferieure, Maine-et-Loire, Morbihan, Calvados, Vienne and the other reactionary departments. According to another writer there are 25 departments in which the anti-government bloc would have the majority.

³⁵ Cited by Chardon, p. 210, and by Breton, , Réforme Électorale, p. 82.Google Scholar

³⁶ “Les Radicaux et la Representation Proportionnelle,” Rev. Pol. et Parl. (1906), vol. 50, p. 63. See also his “La Representation Proportionnelle et les Parties Politiques,” 1904, p. 58.

³⁷ Le Temps, October 12 and 13, 1912.

³⁸ See Bonnet's Report to the 10th Radical Congress, cited above.

³⁹ Lavergne, “La Réforme Électorale jugée au point de Vue de ses Resultats Statistiques,” Revue Pol. et Parl., January 1913, p. 80.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ That the radical party would be benefited by proportional representation is affirmed by La Chesnais, in an article entitled “Les Radicaux et la Representation Proportionnelle,” Rev. Pol. et Parl., vol. 50. pp. 50–78.Google Scholar

⁴¹ See on this point Bonnet's Report; Lavergne's article cited above; Chesnias, La, Representation Proportionnelle, pp. 75–85Google Scholar; Chapelle, La, “La discuss. du projet de Rêf. Élect.” Rev. Pol. et Parl., May, 1912.Google Scholar

⁴² This is the opinion of many writers and publicists, cf. especially, Leroy-Beaulieu, Pierre, Moeurs Electorales, p. 3Google Scholar; also his address in the chamber of deputies, March 15, 1912 (Journal officiel, pp. 715 ff.); Fouillée, La Democratie Politique et Sociale en France (1910) p. 50Google Scholar; and Moye, , Droit public, p. 63.Google Scholar

⁴³ Esprit des Lois, Book I, ch. 2.

⁴⁴ Compare, on this point, Ruau, , Rapport sur le Secret et la Liberté du Vote, etc., No. 1170. Ch. des Deps. 3. Ses. 1903, p. 6.Google Scholar Instances are alleged in which bodies of voters thus conducted to the polls were forbidden to put their hands in their pockets and of others who were required to dress especially for the occasion in clothes without pockets.

⁴⁵ Sometimes ballots are cut obliquely by the printer or a corner is clipped off or they bear the name of the trademark of the printer, or a cross, or a flower petal, all of which serve as identifying signs. See on this point an anonymous article entitled “La sophistication du suffrage universel” in the Annals des Sciences Politiques, vol. 24, pp. 461 ff.

⁴⁶ Cf. Roszner, “Le Suffrage universel en France,” Revue de Hongrie, July 15, 1912, p. 415.Google Scholar Waldeck-Rousseau speaking in 1901 declared that one only needed to pass a polling place to be convinced that the candidates for whom the votes were being deposited were clearly recognizable. Annales des Ch. des Deps., 1901, ii., 1913. M. Ruau in his report of 1904 on secrecy and liberty of voting refers to the case of a mayor in one department (Garde) who was able to advise the government before the ballot box was opened of the number of votes received by each candidate.

⁴⁷ This unlawful marking is usually done by means of a short pencil concealed in the president's hand or by the dipping of his finger in ink or some substance concealed in his pocket and then impressing it on the ballot.

⁴⁸ Reinach, , Report on Secrecy and Liberty of Voting, etc. No. 1674, Ch. des Deps., 1912, p. 3.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ The tables are so arranged during the counting that the voters may freely circulate among them.

⁵⁰ On these several points, see Charbonneaux, op. cit., 57 ff.; Moye, op. cit., pp. 60 ff.; Leroy-Beaulieu, op. cit.; Lefèvre-Pontalis, , Les Elections en Europe a la Fin de dixneuvième Siècle,” 1902Google Scholar; also his Lois et les Moeurs Electorales (1885); Leyes, , Le Secret du vote (1889)Google Scholar; Bonnet, , Étude sur Le secret du Vote et les Moyens d l'Assurer (1901)Google Scholar; Benoist, , Réforme Électorale, Appendix, pp. 275–309Google Scholar; LaCroix, “Le Secret du vote Devant le Parlement Francaise,” Rev. Pol. et Parl., 47, 307–320Google Scholar; Art. by “X”, entitled “Le Sophistication du suffrage universel” in the Annales des Sciences Politiques, 24: 445–483; Revue du Droit public, 21, 125 ff., and 24, 126–127.

⁵¹ Charbonneaux, pp. 74–75. For a review of the movement in favor of envelope voting, see Ruau's report cited pp. 10 ff., and Lintilhac's, Report on Secrecy and Liberty of Voting, etc., No. 62, Senate, 1905, pp. 10 ff.Google Scholar

⁵² Waldeck-Rousseau, , Politique Française et Etrangere, 1903, pp. 41–45.Google Scholar

⁵³ Waldeck-Rousseau in 1901 vigorously opposed the proposal to allow candi-the dates to have representatives at the polls on the ground that it would “organize the battle at the urn.”

⁵⁴ For examples of fraudulent registrations, see the speech of Pierre Leroy-Beaulieu in the Chamber, Feb. 29, 1912. Journal Officiel pp. 538 ff. Heretofore there has been no prohibition upon registration by the elector in more than one commune, but the new law passed in July of this year contains such a provision.

⁵⁵ Thus in the department of Ariége there are 74,788 electors on the registration list, whereas the total male population over 20 years of age is but 66,998; in the department of Tarn, the figures are 113,071 and 110,876 respectively. In one commune where the total population, including women and children was but 345, there were 350 registered voters.

⁵⁶ In Herault, M. Paul Leroy-Beaulieu the well known economist, was twice the victim of these frauds. See his brochure “un chapitre des moeurs Electorales en France, dans les années 1889 et 1890.” More recently his son, Pierre, has had a somewhat similar experience. See his own account of how elections are held in Herault, , in Moeurs Electorales en France au XX^e Siècle (Paris, 1902).Google Scholar M. Beaulieu recently related to me some of the ingenious methods employed in France to falsify the elections.

⁵⁷ Concerning this insufficiency, see Delpech, “Corruption et Dépenses Electorales,” Rev. du Droit Pub. 22, 65 ff.Google Scholar; 23, 97ff.; 26, 314–331. By the law passed in 1902, heavy penalties were imposed upon election officers found guilty of fraudulent acts. The new law recently enacted increases these penalties and provides that in case the offender is a public functionary the penalty shall be doubled.