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Constitutional Law in 1950–1951
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 September 2013
Extract
While the personnel of the Court remained unchanged during the 1950 term, it became abundantly clear that the Roosevelt Court was being supplanted by the Truman Court. Certainly the voting behavior of President Truman's last two appointees bore little resemblance to that of the men they replaced, the late Justices Murphy and Rutledge. Students of the Court were glad to note, during the period covered by the term under review, the publication of a number of biographical and analytical studies of different justices, particularly a first full-length history of Chief Justice Hughes. The increasing productivity of scholars in the field of judicial biography promises much in the way of an enhanced understanding of one of our most interesting, complex and powerful national institutions. In addition, attention should be drawn to the publication of a number of books dealing with important aspects of the Constitution.
Following the pattern of the previous year, the Court disposed of an unusually small number of cases during the 1950 term, and exercised its power of denying certiorari in a larger number of cases than has been customary in recent times.
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- Research Article
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- Copyright © American Political Science Association 1952
References
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6 In Hammerstein v. Superior Court of California, 341 U. S. 491 (1951), after argument, certiorari was dismissed on the ground that it had been granted improvidently.
7 The most important of the evenly divided cases was Bailey v. Richardson, 341 U. S. 918 (1951), which is discussed later in this article.
8 The number of dissenting opinions was, of course, much smaller. Justice Frankfurter wrote 16, Justice Douglas 15, and Justice Black 10. The Chief Justice wrote only one, and Justice Minton wrote two.
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14 United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U. S. 75 (1947).
15 American Communications Association v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382 (1950).
16 34 1 U. S. 494 (1951).
17 Dunne v. United States, 138 F. 2nd 137 (8th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320 U. S. 790 (1943), rehearing denied, 320 U. S. 814 (1943).
18 United States v. Foster, 9 F. R. D. 367, 391 (1949).
19 United States v. Dennis, 183 F. 2nd 201 (2nd Cir. 1950).
20 340 U. S. 863 (1950).
21 340 U. S. 887 (1950). The Court did not object to the Englishman, only to the delay.
22 “Nothing is more certain in modern society than the principle that there are no absolutes, that a name, a phrase, a standard has meaning only when associated with the considerations which gave birth to the nomenclature…. To those who would paralyze our Government in the face of impending threat by encasing it in a semantic straitjacket, we must reply that all concepts are relative” (341 U. S. 508).
23 Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147 (1939); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (1940); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U. S. 141 (1943); West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624 (1943); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516 (1945).
24 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652 (1925).
25 See his opinions in Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 252, 295 (1641) (dissenting); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U. S. 331, 353 (1946) (concurring); West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 663 (1943) (dissenting).
26 Pierce v. United States, 252 U. S. 239, 244 (1920). See Richardson, E. L., “Freedom of Expression and the Function of Courts,” Harvard Law Review, Vol. 65, pp. 1–54 (1951)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; McCloskey, R. G., “Free Speech, Sedition and the Constitution,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 45, pp. 662–673 (1951)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Note, “Clear and Present Danger Re-examined,” Columbia Law Review, Vol. 51, pp. 98–108 (1951)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
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28 Giboney v. Empire Storage and Ice Co., 336 U. S. 490 (1949); Building Service Employees International Union v. Gazzam, 339 U. S. 532 (1950); Hughes v. Superior Court of California, 339 U. S. 460 (1950); International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Hanke, 339 U. S. 470 (1950).
29 12 Fed. Reg. 1935.
30 On April 28, 1951, the President substituted the phrase “reasonable doubt” for “reasonable grounds” (Exec. Order 10241, 16 Fed. Reg. 3690). This makes discharge easier to justify, and gives the various loyalty boards greater latitude for taking into consideration past actions and not merely evidence of present loyalty.
31 182 F. 2nd 46.
32 339 U. S. 977.
33 341 U. S. 918. Justice Clark took no part in this case.
34 United States v. Lovett, 328 U. S. 303 (1946). See Wormuth, F. D., “Legislative Disqualifications as Bills of Attainder,” Vanderbilt Law Review, Vol. 4, pp. 603–619 (1951)Google Scholar.
35 In a companion case, Washington v. McGrath, 182 F. 2nd 375 (App. D. C., 1950), involving the dismissal of 26 employees of the Post-Office Department, the Court of Appeals reached a similar conclusion, Judge Edgerton dissenting. Again the Supreme Court affirmed by a 4–4 vote, 341 U. S. 923 (1951). These decisions were foreshadowed by Friedman v. Schwellenbach, 65 F. Supp. 254 (D. C. 1946), where dismissal was had under a war emergency order. The Supreme Court denied certiorari, Justices Black and Douglaa dissenting, 330 U. S. 838 (1947), rehearing denied, 331 U. S. 865 (1947).
36 Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. Clark, 177 F. 2nd 79 (App. D. C. 1949). Judge Edgerton dissented.
37 International Workers Order v. McGrath, 182 F. 2nd 368 (App. D. C. 1950). Judge Edgerton dissented.
38 Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123 (1951). Justice Clark did not participate.
39 Bontecou, Eleanor, “The English Policy as to Communists and Fascists in the Civil Service,” Columbia Law Review, Vol. 51, pp. 564–586 (1951)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also Seth W. Richardson, “The Federal Employee Loyalty Program,” ibid., pp. 546–563.
40 See Putzel, Henry Jr., “Federal Civil Rights Enforcement: A Current Appraisal,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 99, pp. 439–454 (1951)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Comment, , “The Civil Rights Act: Emergence of an Adequate Federal Civil Remedy?” Indiana Law Journal, Vol. 26, pp. 361–379 (1951)Google Scholar; Comment, , “Racial Violence and Civil Rights Law Enforcement,” University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 18, pp. 769–783 (1951)Google Scholar. See the suggestive article by Philip Marcus, “Civil Rights and the Anti-Trust Laws,” ibid., pp. 171–217
41 341 U. S. 367 (1951).
42 See Barrett, E. A. Jr., The Tenney Committee (Ithaca, 1951)Google Scholar. On the general subject, consult Carr, Robert K., “The Un-AmericaD Activities Committee and the Courts,” Louisiana Law Review, Vol. 11, pp. 282–326 (1951)Google Scholar; Yankwich, Leon R., “The Immunity of Congressional Speech—Its Origin, Meaning and Scope,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 99, pp. 960–977 (1951)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and the symposium on congressional investigations in University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 18, pp. 421–661 (1951)Google Scholar.
43 341 U. S. 651 (1951).
44 Now Section 242 of Title 18 of the newly-revised U. S. Code, and derived from Section 2 of the Civil Rights Act of April 9, 1866, and Sections 16 and 17 of the Enforcement Act of May 31, 1870. The present language dates from the adoption of the Criminal Code of 1909.
45 Screws v. United States, 325 U. S. 91 (1945).
46 Williams v. United States (No. 365), 341 U. S. 97 (1951).
47 Now Section 241 of Title 18 of the newly-revised U. S. Code, and originally Section 6 of the Civil Rights Act of May 31, 1870.
48 United States v. Williams (No. 26), 341 U. S. 70 (1951).
49 United States v. Williams (No. 134), 341 U. S. 58 (1951).
50 Note, “Self-incrimination and Federal Anti-Communist Measures,” Columbia Law Review, Vol. 51, pp. 206–219 (1951)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; McLaughlin, W. L. and Mendoza, J. F., “Privilege against Self-incrimination in Federal Courts: Problem of Communist Affiliation,” Notre Dame Lawyer, Vol. 26, pp. 68–81 (1950)Google Scholar; Inbau, F. E., Self-incrimination (Illinois, 1950)Google Scholar.
51 Sutherland, Arthur E. Jr., “Freedom and Internal Security,” Harvard Law Review, Vol. 64, pp. 383–416 (1951)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Meltzer, B. D., “Required Records, the McCarran Act, and the Privilege against Self-incrimination,” University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 18, pp. 687–728 (1951)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Comment, , “The McCarran Act—Detection or Defection?” Illinois Law Review, Vol. 46, pp. 274–291 (1951)Google Scholar; Note, “The Internal Security Act of 1950,” Columbia Law Review, Vol. 51, pp. 606–660 (1951)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
52 Patricia Blau v. United States, 340 U. S. 159 (1950).
53 Irving Blau v. United States, 340 U. S. 332 (1951).
54 340 U. S. 367 (1951).
55 Citing as authority United States v. White, 322 U. S. 694 (1944).
56 341 U. S. 479 (1951).
57 Jordan v. De George, 341 U. S. 223 (1951).
58 341 U. S. 114 (1951). See Note, “Recent Constitutional Developments on Eminent Domain,” Vanderbilt Law Review, Vol. 4, pp. 673–680 (1951)Google Scholar.
59 United States v. Tillamooks, 341 U. S. 48 (1951).
60 340 U. S. 42 (1950).
61 Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U. S. 506 (1937).
62 Compare, for example, the debate in United States v. Constantine, 296 U. S. 287 (1935).
63 340 U. S. 211 (1951). See Comment, , “Resale Price Maintenance and the Anti-Trust Laws,” University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 18, pp. 369–380 (1951)Google Scholar.
64 341 U. S. 593 (1951).
65 Justices Frankfurter and Jackson filed dissenting opinions, both arguing that the conditions of foreign trade are such that the restraints which were the basis of the complaint were reasonable. Under contemporary political conditions, they thought that many American industries could reach foreign markets only by organizing foreign subsidiaries, each limited to a particular market area.
66 340 U. S. 231 (1951).
67 Champlin Refining Co. v. United States, 329 U. S. 29 (1946).
68 United States v. Champlin Refining Co., 341 U. S. 290 (1951). Dissenting with great vehemence, Justice Black asserted that this decision “rides roughshod over clear statutory language,” overrules previous adjudications, and frustrates the purpose of the Hepburn Act. Although the majority decision avoided constitutional questions altogether, Justice Black thought that this nullification of the Hepburn Act was possibly due to “an un-articulated belief” that it is unconstitutional. He had no doubt of the the power of Congress to convert a private interstate carrier into a public carrier, and thought the matter had been settled in the Pipe Line Cases, 234 U. S. 548 (1914).
69 N.L.R.B. v. Denver Building and Construction Trades Council, 341 U. S. 675 (1951); International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. N.L.R.B., 341 U. S. 694 (1951); Local 74, United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners v. N.L.R.B., 341 U. S. 707 (1951). In all three cases, Justices Jackson, Douglas and Reed dissented on the theory that there was in each instance a legitimate strike for legitimate reasons, and that the right to strike cannot be made to depend upon fortuitous business arrangements that have no significance so far as the evils of the secondary boycott are concerned. On the general subject, see Gregory, C. O., “Constitutional Limitations on the Regulation of Union and Employer Conduct,” Michigan Law Review, Vol. 49, pp. 191–212 (1950)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
70 N.L.R.B. v. International Rice Milling Co., 341 U. S. 665 (1951).
71 Great Atlantic & Pacific Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp., 340 U. S. 147 (1950).
72 340 U. S. 128 (1950). See Wurfel, S. W., “Military Habeas Corpus,” Michigan Law Review, Vol. 49, pp. 493–528, 699–722 (1951)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Comment, , “Military Justice and the Constitution—Improvements Offered by the New Uniform Code of Military Justice,” Texas Law Review, Vol. 29, pp. 651–671 (1951)Google Scholar.
73 Whelchel v. McDonald, 340 U. S. 122 (1950).
74 341 U. S. 341 (1951).
75 It was upheld in St. Louis-San Francisco R. Co. v. Alabama Public Service Commission, 279 U. S. 560 (1929).
76 Alabama Public Service Commission v. Southern Bell T. & T. Co., 253 Ala. 1, 42 So. 2d 655 (1949).
77 The Court cited Washington ex rel. Oregon R. & N. Co. v. Fairchild, 224 U. S. 510 (1912).
78 Citing New York v. United States, 331 U. S. 284, 334–6 (1947), and Railroad Commission of Texas v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 311 U. S. 570, 576 (1941).
79 341 U. S. 6 (1951).
80 340 U. S. 474 (1951). See Jaffe, L. L., “Judicial Review: ‘Substantial Evidence on the Whole Record’,” Harvard Law Review, Vol. 64, pp. 1233–1261 (1951)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
81 N.L.R.B. v. Pittsburgh Steamship Co., 340 U. S. 498 (1951).
82 N.L.R.B. v. Highland Park Manufacturing Co., 341 U. S. 322 (1951). See Daykin, W. L., “The Operation of the Taft-Hartley Act's Non-Communist Provisions,” Iowa Law Review, Vol. 36, pp. 607–628 (1951)Google Scholar.
83 Radio Corporation of America v. United States, 341 U. S. 412 (1951). See Comment, , “‘Public Interest’ and the Market in Color Television Regulation,” University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 18, pp. 802–816 (1951)Google Scholar.
84 In Moser v. United States, 341 U. S. 41 (1951), the Court approved of an administrative interpretation of the Selective Service Act of 1940, in relation to future eligibility for naturalization, in an opinion which came perilously close to condoning the doctrine that executive agencies have a dispensing power, so roundly condemned in the Declaration of Independence.
85 McGrath v. Kristensen, 340 U. S. 162 (1950).
86 On the procedural point the Court leaned heavily on Perkins v. Elg, 307 U. S. 325 (1939).
87 Justice Jackson wrote a separate concurring statement because he had taken a contrary position in 1940, when he was serving as Attorney General and delivered an opinion on the same question for the Secretary of War. He characterized his earlier opinion, with becoming candor, as being “as foggy as the statute the Attorney General was asked to interpret.” And he gave away a trade secret when he remarked of his 1940 opinion that “it would be charitable to assume that neither the nominal addressee or the nominal author of opinion read it….” He said that he had changed his mind, and cited instances where Taney, Story and Baron Bramwell had as judges taken positions at variance with views held previously as lawyers.
88 340 U. S. 135 (1950).
89 United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U. S. 543 (1951). Justices Black and Douglas dissented without opinion.
90 See United States v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 338 U. S. 366 (1949).
91 For example, United States v. Sherwood, 312 U. S. 584 (1941).
92 See Saulson, L., “Municipal Control of Public Streets and Parks as Affecting Freedom of Speech and Assembly,” Michigan Law Review, Vol. 49, pp. 1185–1199 (1951)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Note, “Free Speech and the Hostile Audience,” New York University Law Review, Vol. 26, pp. 489–505 (1951)Google Scholar; Comment, , “Municipal Regulation of Free Speech in the Streets and Parks,” Illinois Law Review, Vol. 46, pp. 489–497 (1951)Google Scholar; Note, “Freedom of Speech v. Breach of the Peace,” St. John's Law Review, Vol. 25, pp. 295–305 (1951)Google Scholar. There is an interesting debate on this subject in Dembitz, N., “Free Speech vs. Free-for-All,” Nation, Vol. 173, pp. 29–31 (July 14, 1951)Google Scholar, and V. Countryman, “Freedom for Insulting Speech—a Reply,” ibid., pp. 50–52 (July 21, 1951).
93 340 U. S. 315 (1951).
94 340 U. S. 268 (1951).
95 340 U. S. 290 (1951).
96 Gerende v. Board of Supervisors of Elections of Baltimore, 341 U. S. 56 (1951). For a full discussion of the Ober Law, see Shub v. Simpson, 76 A. 2d 332 (Md. 1950). For a general discussion, see the superb annotation, “Validity of Governmental Requirement of Oath of Allegiance or Loyalty,” 18 A.L.R. 2d 268–347.
97 Garner v. Board of Public Works of Los Angeles, 341 U. S. 716 (1951).
98 Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277 (U. S. 1867); Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333 (U. S. 1867).
99 United States v. Lovett, 328 U. S. 303 (1946).
100 California Automobile Association v. Maloney, 341 U. S. 105 (1951).
101 Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104 (1911).
102 See Osborn v. Ozlin, 310 U. S. 53 (1940).
103 341 U. S. 428 (1951).
104 The escheat of abandoned bank deposits was recently approved in Anderson National Bank v. Luckett, 321 U. S. 233 (1944), and of unclaimed insurance money in Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Moore, 333 U. S. 541 (1948).
105 341 U. S. 50 (1951). The Court merely cited Cassell v. Texas, 339 U. S. 282 (1950). See Stone, R. L., “Discrimination in the Selection of Grand Juries: Theory and Practice,” Texas Law Review, Vol. 29, pp. 817–827 (1951)Google Scholar.
106 261 U. S. 86 (1923).
107 In Cassell v. Texas, 339 U. S. 282 (1950).
108 See his opinions in Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 252 (1941) (dissenting); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U. S. 331 (1946) (concurring); Craig v. Harney, 331 U. S. 367 (1947) (dissenting).
109 Dowd v. United States ex rel. Cook, 340 U. S. 206 (1951). See Note, “Federal Habeas Corpus and the Equal Protection Clause,” Indiana Law Journal, Vol. 26, pp. 248–259 (1951)Google Scholar.
110 341 U. S. 622 (1951). See Stern, R. L., “The Problems of Yesteryear—Commerce and Due Process,” Vanderbill Law Review, Vol. 4, pp. 446–468 (1951)Google Scholar.
111 319 U. S. 141 (1943).
112 Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District, 120 U. S. 489 (1887).
113 Nippert v. Richmond, 327 U. S. 416 (1946).
114 As in Wagner v. Covington, 251 U. S. 95 (1919).
115 Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299 (U. S. 1851).
116 340 U. S. 349 (1951).
117 Schwegmann Brothers v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U. S. 384 (1951). See Note, “Fair Trade Laws and Discount Selling,” Harvard Law Review, Vol. 64, pp. 1327–1338 (1951)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
118 340 U. S. 179 (1950). Justice Black thought that the alleged federal issues were so frivolous that the appeal should have been dismissed. A companion case, Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Oklahoma, 340 U. S. 190 (1950), was decided in the same way, although the commerce issue was not raised.
119 341 U. S. 329 (1951).
120 340 U. S. 383 (1951).
121 Consolidated Edison Co. v. N.L.R.B., 305 U. S. 197 (1938). See Cox, A. and Seidman, M. J., “Federalism and Labor Relations,” Harvard Law Review, Vol. 64, pp. 211–245 (1950)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
122 Norton Co. v. Department of Revenue of Illinois, 340 U. S. 534 (1951). See Barrett, E. L. Jr., “State Taxation of Interstate Commerce—‘Direct Burdens,’ ‘Multiple Burdens,’ Or What Have You?” Vanderbilt Law Review, Vol. 4, pp. 496–532 (1951)Google Scholar.
123 Spector Motor Service v. O'Connor, 340 U. S. 602 (1951). See Flanagan, J. P. Jr., “Taxation of Interstate Motor Commerce—Federal Occupation of the Field,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 100, pp. 71–92 (1951)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
124 340 U.S. 511 (1951).
125 U. S. Constitution, Article I, Section 10, Clause 2.
126 Western Maryland Railway Co. v. Rogan, 340 U. S. 520 (1951).
127 West Virginia ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, 341 U. S. 22 (1951).
128 See Frankfurter, F. and Landis, J. M., “The Compact Clause of the Constitution,” Yale Law Journal, Vol. 34, pp. 685–758 (1925)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For a recent survey see Zimmerman, F. L. and Wendell, M., The Interstate Compact (Chicago, 1951)Google Scholar.
129 Kentucky v. Indiana, 281 U. S. 163 (1930); Hinderlider v. La Plata River & C. Creek Ditch Co., 304 U. S. 92 (1938).
130 Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U. S. 581 (1951). Justice Frankfurter disagreed for the reasons given in his dissenting opinion in Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U. S. 343 (1948).
131 Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U. S. 609 (1951).
132 Missouri ex rel. Southern Railway Co. v. Mayfield, 340 U. S. 1 (1950).
133 Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Kepner, 314 U. S. 44 (1941); Miles v. Illinois Central R. Co., 315 U. S. 698 (1942). The Court held that neither of these cases limited the power of a state to deny access to its courts to persons seeking recovery under the federal act, if in similar cases, for reasons of local policy, the state denies resort to its courts and enforces its policy impartially.
134 On the remand, the Supreme Court of Missouri, now properly instructed, held once more that the trial court was obliged to hear the suit, because a nonresident citizen of Missouri would be allowed to bring such an action. State ex rel. Southern R. Co. v. Mayfield, 240 S. W. 2nd 106 (Mo. 1951), cert, denied, Nov. 5, 1951, 96 Law. Ed. Adv. Op. 51.
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