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Civilian Control and the Constitution

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 September 2013

Samuel P. Huntington
Samuel P. Huntington
Affiliation:
Harvard University
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Extract

“Civilian control of the military is a basic principle of the American Constitution”; so runs the commonplace. It is the thesis of this article that the cliché could hardly be more inaccurate, for actually the American Constitution in the twentieth century obstructs the achievement of civilian control. It is well known that civil supremacy was a major concern of the Framers. They provided for it in the only form in which they knew it. But civilian control in the eighteenth century is very different from civilian control in the twentieth century: the Constitution which was expertly designed to provide for it then, for this very reason, frustrates it now. In presenting this thesis, it is necessary: (1) to show how the meaning of civilian control has changed over the intervening years; (2) to describe the Framers' concept and show how it was embodied in the Constitution; and (3) to demonstrate how the provisions which they thought would guarantee it impair its effectiveness today.

Type
Research Article
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 50 , Issue 3 , September 1956 , pp. 676 - 699
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1956

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References

1 This discussion is purely in terms of land forces because it was these which gave rise to the issues of civilian control. What is said here about the eighteenth century standing army, however, could also apply, with slight modification, to the eighteenth century navy.

2 On the differences between subjective and objective civilian control, see this author's “Civilian Control of the Military: A Theoretical Statement,” in Eulau, Heinz, Eldersveld, Samuel J., and Janowitz, Morris (eds.), Political Behavior: A Reader in Theory and Method (Glencoe, 1956), pp. 379–85Google Scholar.

3 For fuller treatment of the professional character of modern officership, see chaps. 1 and 2 of this author's forthcoming volume, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations, to be published early in 1957 by the Harvard University Press.

4 See Boller, P. F. Jr., “Washington and Civilian Supremacy,” Southwest Review, Vol. 39, pp. 10–12 (Winter, 1954)Google Scholar; The Writings of Thomas Jefferson (Washington, Thomas Jefferson Memorial Association ed., 20 vols., 1905), IV, 218Google Scholar; Blackstone, William, Commentaries on the Laws of England (Oxford, 3rd ed., 4 vols., 1768), I, 407, 413–14Google Scholar.

5 See Farrand, Max (ed.), The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 (New Haven, 4 vols., 1911–1937), I, 380, II, 287–90Google Scholar; Elliott, Jonathan (ed.), The Debates in the Several Conventions (Washington, 4 vols., 1836,) III, 372–73Google Scholar. For the few instances in which the clause has been invoked in practice, see Hind's Precedents of the House of Representatives (Washington, 1907)Google Scholar, chap. XVI, and Cannon's Precedents (Washington, 1935), chap. 16Google Scholar.

6 Farrand, , Records, II, 326, 329–30, 563, 640, III, 207Google Scholar; Elliott, , Debates, I, 326, 328, 335, II, 77–80, 136–37, III, 381, 660, IV, 244Google Scholar; Warren, Charles, The Making of the Constitution (Cambridge, 1947), pp. 474, 483Google Scholar; Madison, James, No. 41, The Federalist (Modern Library ed.), pp. 262–63Google Scholar.

7 Farrand, , Records, I, 465, II, 385Google Scholar; No. 8, The Federalist, pp. 42–43; Elliott, , Debates, II, 520–21Google Scholar, III, 169, 378, 410–11. Patrick Henry said of the nationalist claim: “This argument destroys itself. It demands a power, and denies the probability of its exercise.”

8 Farrand, , Records, II, 136, 168, 182, 330, 385, II, 332Google Scholar; Elliott, , Debates, III, 382, IV, 422–24Google Scholar.

9 See Upton, Emory, The Military Policy of the United States (Washington, 1912), pp. 100–103Google Scholar; Wiener, F. B., “The Militia Clause of the Constitution,” Harvard Law Review, Vol. 54, pp. 192–93 (December, 1940)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; White, Leonard D., The Jeffersonians (New York, 1951), pp. 540–41Google Scholar. Cf. Washington's revolutionary difficulties, Scott, James B., The Militia (S. Doc. 695, 64th Cong., 2d Sess., 1917), pp. 25–26Google Scholar.

10 Todd, F. P., “Our National Guard: An Introduction to Its History,” Military Affairs, Vol. 5, pp. 73–86, 152–170, at pp. 162–63 (Summer, Fall, 1941)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Aside from these brief articles and a few law review pieces, little scholarly work has been done on the National Guard and the National Guard Association.

11 Official Proceedings of the Natl. Guard Assoc., 66th Annual Convention, 1944, pp. 28–29, 44; 1948, pp. 111, 242–44, 254–55; 1949, pp. 202–210. For the Gray Board recommendations, see Committee on Civilian Components, Reserve Forces for National Security (Washington, 1948), pp. 9–24Google Scholar.

12 Statement of Policy Adopted by the Natl. Guard Assn. and the Adjutants General Assn. in Joint Convention, Baltimore, May 4, 1944, pp. 1, 4Google Scholar; Proceedings, NGA Convention, 1944, p. 100; 1945, pp. 65–66; 1946, pp. 114–15; 1948, p. 65; Public Administration Clearing House, Public Administration Organizations, 1954 (Chicago, 1954), pp. 102, 119Google Scholar.

13 Proceedings, NGA Convention, 1943, pp. 89, 93–96; 1945, pp. 50–55.

14 Proceedings, NGA Convention, 1945, p. 47; 1946, p. 43; 1948, pp. 34, 66, 80–81; 1950, pp. 264–65; 1953, pp. 288–90.

15 Proceedings, NGA Convention, 1943, pp. 56, 67, 88; 1944, pp. 44, 53, 55, 58, 65, 69, 73, 74; 1945, p. 56; 1946, pp. 28–32; 1948, pp. 47–49, 57, 91–92; 1953, p. 28; Time, LXIII (Mar. 1, 1954), 18.

16 Proceedings, NGA Convention, 1948, pp. 33–34; 1950, p. 245.

17 For discussion of royal and parliamentary authority, see Blackstone, , Commentaries, I, 257–58, 262, 412–13Google Scholar; Omond, J. S., Parliament and the Army, 1642–1904 (Cambridge, 1933), pp. 7–8Google Scholar; Fortescue, John W., A History of the British Army (London, 13 vols., 1899–1930), II, 568Google Scholar. The Framers at first adopted in toto the language of the basic English statute, 13 Car. II, c. 6 (1661), but then realized that they could not make the President like the King commander in chief of the militia in peace as well as war. See Farrand, , Records, I, 139–140, II, 185, 426–27Google Scholar; No. 69, The Federalist, p. 448. For the continuing debate as to whether the war power was properly legislative or executive, see Farrand, , Records, I, 64–66Google Scholar; Hamilton, Alexander, Works (New York, 12 vols., Federal, ed., 1904), IV, 145–46Google Scholar; Madison, James, Writings (New York, 9 vols., 1900–1910), VI, 145Google Scholar; Berdahl, Clarence A., War Powers of the Executive in the United States (Univ. of Illinois, 1921), p. 79Google Scholar. Cf. Crosskey, W. W., Politics and the Constitution (Chicago, 2 vols., 1953), I, 422–28Google Scholar.

18 Fleming v. Page, 9 How. 603, 615, 618 (1850). The powers of the British King as general of the kingdom extended to many nonmilitary areas. Blackstone, , Commentaries, I, 262ffGoogle Scholar. For the views of Framers on the Commander in Chief power, see Farrand, , Records, I, 244, 292, II, 145, 319, 426–27, III, 624Google Scholar; Elliott, , Debates, IV, 114Google Scholar; The Federalist, pp. 448, 482.

19 For the boundaries between presidential and congressional military powers, see Corwin, Edward S., The President: Office and Powers (New York, 1948), chap, viGoogle Scholar; Ex Parte Milligan, 4 Wall 2 (1866); Berdahl, War Powers, passim; White, Howard, Executive Influence in Determining Military Policy in the United States (Urbana, 1924), chap. iiiGoogle Scholar.

20 The most notable instances have been the increase in National Guard funds mentioned above, a 1946 increase in research and development funds, the extra money voted for the 70-group Air Force in 1948 and 1949, the increase in Marine Corps appropriations in 1955 and in Air Force appropriations in 1956. In three of these instances, the President directed that the additional funds be impounded: a clearly unconstitutional action, as I think, arrogating to the President an item veto over appropriations bills. See Williams, J. D., The Impounding of Funds by the Bureau of the Budget, ICP Case Series: No. 28 (University, Alabama, 1955)Google Scholar. Congress, however, has yet to develop legal or political means of forcing the President to spend funds it appropriates. See Cong. Record, Vol. 95, p. 14922 (Oct. 18, 1949)Google Scholar; H. Rept. 1797, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 309–311 (1950); House Committee on Armed Services, Unification and Strategy, H. Doc. 600, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 49–50 (1950)Google Scholar; Hearings before House Armed Services Committee on National Defense Program—Unification and Strategy, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 97–99, 300–301 (1949); Hearings before House Committee on Appropriations on Department of Defense Appropriations for 1951, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 50–62 (1950).

21 Vinson, Carl, Cong. Rec., Vol. 95, p. 3540 (March 30, 1949)Google Scholar.

22 Sec. 202 (c) (6), National Security Act, 63 Stat. 578 (1949).

23 H. Doc. 600, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 10–12, 45, 52.

24 Hearings before Senate Committee on Appropriations on Dept. of Defense Appropriation Bill for 1955, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 43–44 (1954); Hearings before Senate Committee on Appropriations on Dept. of Defense Appropriation Bill for 1956, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 211–12, 215–19 (1955).

25 See Farrand, , Records, I, 244, III, 217–18, 624. IV, 53Google Scholar; Elliott, , Debates, II, 408, 412, 522–523, III, 59–60, 496–98Google Scholar; White, Leonard D., The Jeffersonians, p. 220Google Scholar, and The Jacksonians (New York, 1954), pp. 51–57Google Scholar; Herring, Pendleton, The Impact of War (New York, 1941), pp. 146–47Google Scholar.

26 The theoretical rationale of the balanced pattern was developed in Mahan, A. T., “The Principles of Naval Administration,” Naval Administration and Warfare (Boston, 1908), pp. 3–48Google Scholar, and Spenser Wilkinson, Preface to the 2d edition of The Brain of an Army (London, 1913)Google Scholar. Mahan's essay and Wilkinson's preface are brilliant analyses of executive military organization and are basic to an understanding of the subject.

27 See U. S. Navy Dept., Naval Administration: Selected Documents on Navy Department Organization, 1915–1940, passim; Coontz, R. E., From the Mississippi to the Sea (Philadelphia, 1930), p. 400Google Scholar; King, Ernest J. and Whitehill, Walter, Fleet Admiral King: A Naval Record (New York, 1952), pp. 261 ff., 471–478Google Scholar; Hammond, Paul Y., “The Secretaryships of War and the Navy: A Study of Civilian Control of the Military” (Ph.D. Thesis, Harvard University, 1953), pp. 223–246, 293–305Google Scholar.

28 Secretary of Defense, Semiannual Report, July 1 to December 31, 1954, p. 58; New York Times, January 13, 1956, p. 6Google Scholar; New York Herald Tribune, November 22, 1953, p. 1Google Scholar. November 20. 1955, Sec. 2, p. 3.

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