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Central Issues of American Administrative Law
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 September 2013
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During the last decade the principal issues of American administrative law have been presented within a framework largely dominated by the recruitment and administration of a military establishment far beyond our normal peacetime complement, by the application of emergency economic controls to that part of our civilian economy normally left to the freedom of the market place, and by the development of security techniques designed to guard against real or fancied dangers of espionage, sabotage and divided loyalties. In such an atmosphere, it is not surprising that many of the burning issues of the thirties which aroused leaders of the American Bar Association to storm the citadels of bureaucratic power have seemed to pale into relative insignificance beside the sweep of discretionary authority exercised in the name of national emergency. A society which had scarcely freed itself from the controls born of the Second World War before the threatening clouds brought a re-emergence of the familiar pattern of selective service, priorities and allocation, price regulations and wage orders, could derive small comfort from the niceties of the Administrative Procedure Act as bulwarks for the defense of ancient liberties. Nevertheless, emergency controls account for only a part of the machinery of government, and it is still our hopeful assumption that they are temporary phenomena.
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References
1 Public Law 404, 79th Cong., 2nd sess. (1946); 5 U.S.C.A. §1001–1011 (1950). For background and general comments, see Brown, Ray A., “The Federal ‘Administrative Procedure Act,’” Wisconsin Law Review, Vol. 1947, pp. 66–87 (Jan.)Google Scholar; Nathanson, Nathaniel L., “Some Comments on the Administrative Procedure Act,” Illinois Law Review, Vol. 41, pp. 368–422 (Sept.-Oct., 1946)Google Scholar; and Warren, George (ed.), The Federal Administrative Procedure Act and the Administrative Agencies (New York, 1947)Google Scholar.
2 See “Report of the Special Committee on Administrative Law,” American Bar Association Reports, Vol. 61, pp. 720–727 (1936)Google Scholar.
3 Administrative Procedure in Government Agencies; Final Report of Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, S. Doc. 8, 77th Cong., 1st sess.; hereafter cited as Report. For general comments, see Jaffee, Louis L., “The Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure,” University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 8, pp. 401–440 (Apr., 1941)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Frankfurter, Felix, Feller, A. H., Dulles, John Foster and Davison, J. Forrester, Symposium on the Report, Columbia Law Review, Vol. 41, pp. 585–645 (Apr., 1941)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Nathanson, , “Separation of Functions Within Federal Administrative Agencies,” Illinois Law Review, Vol. 35, pp. 901–937 (Apr., 1941)Google Scholar.
4 Report, pp. 55–60.
5 Ibid., pp. 203–209.
6 Ibid., pp. 45–55.
7 See particularly Section 5(c) of the Act entitled “Separation of Functions.” The fullest discussion of the problems involved in application of this provision is to be found in Davis, Kenneth Culp, “Separation of Functions in Administrative Agencies,” Harvard Law Review, Vol. 61, pp. 389–418, 612–655 (Feb., Mar., 1948)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
8 The Administrative Procedure Act did not make entirely clear just what the role of the Civil Service Commission was to be with respect to the selection of examiners. Section 11 provides only as follows: “Subject to the civil-service and other laws to the extent not inconsistent with this Act, there shall be appointed by and for each agency as many qualified and competent examiners as may be necessary for proceedings pursuant to sections 7 and 8….” The statute was more explicit with respect to removal, stating that “Examiners shall be removable by the agency in which they are employed only for good cause established and determined by the Civil Service Commission … after opportunity for hearing and upon the record thereof.”
9 The large number of incumbent examiners disqualified by the Board of Examiners brought forth a storm of protest, including charges of bias from some of the agencies concerned. After threat of Senate investigation had developed, the Commission reviewed and set aside, in large part, the recommendations of the Board of Examiners, the members of which resigned in protest. The story is fully told and the implications are explored by Fuchs, Ralph F., in “The Hearing Examiner Fiasco under the Administrative Procedure Act,” Harvard Law Review, Vol. 63, pp. 737–768 (Mar., 1950)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and by Morgan, Thomas in “The Selection of Federal Hearing Examiners; Pressure Groups and the Administrative Process,” Yale Law Journal, Vol. 59, pp. 431–475 (Feb., 1950)Google Scholar.
10 339 U. S. 33 (1950).
11 Ibid. at p. 46.
12 Public Law 843, 81st Cong., 2nd sess. (1950), a Supplemental Appropriations Act, provides, in Ch. 3, the following: “Proceedings under laws relating to the exclusion or expulsion of aliens shall hereafter be without regard to the provisions of Sections 5, 7 and 8 of the Administrative Procedure Act.” The immigration and naturalization service, did, however, pay some respect to the views expressed in Mr. Justice Jackson's opinion by providing in its rules that no person should serve as a hearing officer in a case with respect to which he had performed investigative or other enforcement functions (15 Fed. Reg., p. 7637 [Nov. 10, 1950]).
13 This question of interpretation of Section 5 of the Administrative Procedure Act turned upon the provision making its requirements applicable to “every case of adjudication required by statute to be determined on the record after opportunity for agency hearing….” The government contended that this did not include deportation proceedings because there was no express requirement of hearing in the statute authorizing deportation, although it conceded that a hearing was required as a matter of constitutional right. Mr. Justice Jackson answered this argument as follows: “But the difficulty with any argument premised on the proposition that the deportation statute does not require a hearing is that, without such a hearing, there would be no constitutional authority for deportation. The constitutional requirement of procedural due process of law derives from the same source as Congress's power to legislate, and, where applicable, permeates every valid enactment of that body” (339 U. S. at p. 49). The applicability of Section 5 of the Administrative Procedure Act in turn makes Sections 7 and 8 applicable to the same proceedings, because of the provision of Section 5(b) to that effect. Cf. Riss & Co. v. United States, 71 S. Ct. 620 (1951).
It was also argued that deportation proceedings were exempted by virtue of the provision of Section 7(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act which provides that “nothing in this Act shall be deemed to supersede the conduct of specified classes of proceedings in whole or part by or before boards or other officers specially provided for by or designated pursuant to statute.” The argument was that immigration inspectors were “other officers specially provided for by or designated pursuant to” Section 16 of the Immigration Act (39 Stat. 874, 885 [1917]; as amended, 8 U.S.C.A. [1942] §152). Mr. Justice Reed placed his dissent on this ground (339 U. S. at pp. 53–55).
14 The history of the conflict is set forth in the “Minority Views” of members of the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments stated in S. Rept. 1516, to accompany S. Res. 248 [which rejected Reorganization Plan No. 12 of 1950 for Reorganization of the National Labor Relations Board], 81st Cong. 2nd sess., pp. 24–27; and in the remarks of Senator Humphrey in the Senate debate on Reorganization Plan No. 12, Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 2nd sess., Vol. 96, pp. 6798–6811 (May 10, 1950)Google Scholar.
15 Task Force Report on Regulatory Commissions (Washington, 1949), pp. 139–141Google Scholar. See also Pritchett, C. Herman, “The Regulatory Commissions Revisited,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 43, pp. 978–989 (Oct., 1949)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
16 H. Doc. 516, 81st. Cong., 2nd sess.
17 See S. Rept. 1516, pp. 29–30 (Minority Views).
18 Ibid., p. 8.
19 Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 2nd sess., Vol. 96, p. 6886 (May 11, 1950)Google Scholar.
20 See New York Times, Oct. 6, 1950, p. 18Google Scholar.
21 On June 30, 1949, the Senate approved amendments to the Taft-Hartley Act which would have abolished the independent status of the General Counsel. But more recently Senator Taft has introduced a bill, S. 3339, 81st Cong., 2nd sess., which places prosecution under an Administrator even more independent than the General Counsel.
22 The Report stated that “the Committee had been impressed in the course of its inquiries not only by the need for dissimilarities in administrative procedures … but also by the possibilities for greater uniformity in many subordinate particulars” (p. 123). Its suggestion was that the office of Administrative Procedure would aid in the development of uniform procedures in so far as that proved desirable.
23 Ibid., p. 214.
24 Ibid., p. 215.
25 Section 7(c), Administrative Procedure Act. The Labor Management Relations Act now has an apparently stricter provision requiring, that unfair labor practice proceedings shall “so far as practicable be conducted in accordance with the rules of evidence applicable in the district courts of the United States under the rules of civil procedure” (Section 10[b]). There may be some doubt as to whether this is really any stricter than the APA provision in the light of the development of the discretionary power of federal district judges with respect to the application of rules of evidence. See generally Davis, , “Evidence Reform; The Administrative Process Leads the Way,” Minnesota Law Review, Vol. 34, pp. 581–609 (June, 1950)Google Scholar.
26 326 U. S. 135 (1945).
27 The opinion of the Court stated that the Attorney General conceded that the evidence was admitted in violation of the rules, but the dissent interpreted the Attorney General's opinion merely as refusing to rule upon the question on the ground that it was raised too late.
28 Section 7(c).
29 338 U. S. 269 (1949). The language of the postal statute is not entirely clear as to whether a hearing in the conventional sense is required, since it provides that the Postmaster General may issue fraud orders “upon evidence satisfactory to him” (26 Stat. 466 [1890]; 39 U.S.C.A. §259 [1940]). As a matter of constitutional right, however, hearing is probably required. See Pike v. Walker, 121 F. 2d. 37 (App. D.C. 1941), cert, denied; 314 U. S. 625 (1941). And under the Wong Yang Sung case there is little doubt that Sections 5, 7 and 8 of the Administrative Procedure Act are applicable.
30 338 U. S. at p. 276.
31 The Administrative Procedure Act recognizes a distinction along somewhat similar lines in this provision of Section 7(c): “In rule making or determining claims for money or benefits or applications for initial licenses any agency may, where the interest of any party will not be prejudiced thereby, adopt procedures for submission of all or part of the evidence in written form.”
32 Section 5(a).
33 Section 8(a) and (b).
34 Morgan v. United States, 304 U. S. 1 (1937).
35 In rule-making or initial licensing, the agency head or any of its responsible officers may issue a tentative or recommended decision in lieu of an initial or recommended decision by the hearing officer. See Davis, , “Institutional Administrative Decisions,” Columbia Law Review, Vol. 48, pp. 173–201 (Mar., 1948)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
36 Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 71 S. Ct. 456 (Feb. 26, 1951). Justices Black and Douglas dissented from this ruling for the reasons given by Judge Learned Hand in the court below, 179 F. 2d. 749, 753. Judge Hand had considered it clear, from the legislative history, that the examiners rulings were not to have the weight of the findings of a master in chancery; and short of that he could not tell what weight to give them. It will be interesting to see what he does in the light of the Supreme Court's opinion.
37 71 S. Ct. at p. 469.
38 Report, pp. 75–95.
39 Ibid., p. 91.
40 Ibid., pp. 209–212.
41 Ibid., pp. 210–11. See, too, Stason, E. Blythe, “‘Substantial Evidence’ in Administrative Law,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 89, pp. 1026–1051 (June, 1941)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Stern, Robert L., “Review of Findings of Administrators, Judges and Juries; A Comparative Analysis,” Harvard Law Review, Vol. 58, pp. 70–124 (Nov., 1944)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
42 Report, p. 246.
43 Section 10(e).
44 S. Rept. 752, 79th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 30–31.
45 Section 10(e), Labor Management Relations Act.
46 71 S. Ct. 456 (Feb. 26, 1951).
47 Ibid. at p. 453.
48 Ibid. at p. 464.
49 Idem.
50 Ibid. at pp. 465–466.
51 179 F. 2d 749.
52 71 S. Ct. at p. 466.
53 National Labor Relations Board v. Pittsburgh Steamship Co., 337 U. S. 656, 661 (1949). The Court of Appeals had set aside the order on the ground that the record disclosed bias on the part of the trial examiner (167 F. 2d 126). The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Rutledge, unanimously concluded otherwise, but Mr. justice Jackson reserved judgment as to whether there was substantial evidence by any standard of review.
54 180 F. 2d 731.
55 71 S. Ct. at 454–445.
56 Five other courts of appeals had expressed the same views as the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. These included the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which had once been attacked by the Solicitor General for substituting its judgment for that of the Board in a series of cases, and which had been reversed on that ground by the Supreme Court in National Labor Relations Board v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 309 U. S. 206 (1940). The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit might now feel that its position in the Waterman and similar cases has been vindicated and might try to recapture its former attitude.
57 Section 10(e) includes the provision that administrative action, findings and conclusions shall be set aside if “found to be … contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege or immunity or … unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial de novo by the reviewing court.”
58 Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U. S. 276 (1922).
59 Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22 (1932).
60 Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 212 U. S. 287 (1920).
61 Even this requirement was somewhat relaxed by the opinion of Chief Justice Hughes for the Court in St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U. S. 38, 51 (1936), in which he said: “This judicial duty to exercise an independent judgment does not require or justify disregard of the weight which may properly attach to findings upon hearing and evidence.” For general discussion, see Davis, , “Scope of Review of Federal Administrative Action,” Columbia Law Review, Vol. 50, pp. 559–612 (May, 1950)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
62 The Natural Gas Act provides that findings of fact by the Federal Power Commission “if supported by substantial evidence shall be conclusive” (52 Stat. 821; 15 U.S.C. 717r). In recent cases reviewing orders of the Commission there is no suggestion that this standard of review is not properly applicable to all questions of fact involved. See Federal Power Commission v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U. S. 575 (1942); Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U. S. 591 (1944). These cases indicate that the crucial issues in public utility rate regulation are no longer treated as questions of fact so much as questions of judgment with respect to what the relevant facts are.
63 See Schwartz, Bernard, “Does the Ghost of Crowell v. Benson Still Walk?” University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 98, pp. 163–182 (Dec., 1949)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
64 See above n. 58.
65 285 U. S. at p. 90, n. 26.
66 298 U. S. at p. 77.
67 Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134, 140 (1944).
68 314 U. S. 402, 413 (1941).
69 322 U. S. 111, 131 (1944).
70 320 U. S. 489, 507 (1943).
71 For general discussions of the problem, see Benjamin, Robert M., “Judicial Review of Administrative Adjudication: Some Recent Decisions of the New York Court of Appeals,” Columbia Law Review, Vol. 48, pp. 1–36 (Jan., 1948)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Davis, loc. cit., above n. 61; Nathanson, , “Administrative Discretion in the Interpretation of Statutes,” Vanderbilt Law Review, Vol. 3, pp. 470–492 (Apr., 1950)Google Scholar; and Stern, loc. cit., above n. 41. And cf. O'Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, Inc., 71 S. Ct. 470 (1951).
72 See Dickinson, John, “The Judicial Review Provisions of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act (Section 10) Background and Effect,” in Warren, (ed.), Federal Administrative Procedure Act and Administrative Agencies, pp. 582–585Google Scholar.
73 See Moss, Thayer D., “The Administrative Interpretation of Statutes,” Georgetown Law Journal, Vol. 39, pp. 244–262 (Jan., 1951)Google Scholar.
74 320 U. S. 549 (1944). Mr. Justice Murphy dissented.
75 Ibid. at p. 554.
76 327 U. S. 114 (1946).
77 Ibid. at p. 125.
78 Ibid. at p. 132.
79 Ibid. at pp. 121–122.
80 Ibid. at pp. 143–144.
81 Examples of review by habeas corpus are provided in Eagles v. Samuels, 329 U. S. 304 (1946) and Eagles v. Horowitz, 329 U. S. 317 (1946), where the Court examined and rejected claims that the hearings had been unfair and that there was no evidence to support the board's finding.
82 332 U. S. 442 (1947).
83 Ibid. at p. 445.
84 Ibid. at pp. 457–458.
85 327 U. S. at p. 122. Mr. Justice Douglas also said that this was “the scope of review in deportation cases where Congress has made the orders of deportation final” (p. 123, n. 14). Apparently it is also the same scope of review as was practiced in Eagles v. Samuels and Eagles v. Horowitz, above n. 81.
86 56 Stat. 23 (1942); 50 U.S.C.A. App. §901–946 (1944).
87 For discussion of the operation of those provisions, see Hyman, Jacob D. and Nathanson, , “Judicial Review of Price Control: The Battle of the Meat Regulations,” Illinois Law Review, Vol. 42, pp. 584–634 (Nov.-Dec., 1947)Google Scholar; and Nathanson, , “The Emergency Court of Appeals,” in Problems of Price Control: Legal Phases, U. S. Office of Price Control, Historical Reports on War Administration, Vol. 11 (Washington, 1947)Google Scholar.
88 321 U. S. 414 (1944).
89 Ibid. at p. 467.
90 Mr. Justice Rutledge suggested that this presented a question of “separation and independence of the powers of government and of the constitutional integrity of the judicial process” as well as “one of individual right or due process of law” (ibid. at p. 468).
91 Ibid. at pp. 446–447.
92 Ibid. at p. 447.
93 A companion case to Yakus was Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U. S. 503 (1944), which involved civil proceedings for an injunction on account of violation of a rent regulation. Here, as in Yakus, the defendant attempted to present the defense that the regulation was invalid, and once again the Court held that the exclusive jurisdiction provisions of the statute effectively barred the defense. This time, however, Mr. Justice Rutledge and Mr. Justice Murphy concurred, because civil rather than criminal proceedings were involved.
94 Stabilization Extension Act of 1944, Public Law 383, 78th Cong., 2nd sess.
95 Public Law 774, 81st Cong., 2nd sess. (1950). See Field, Richard H., “Economic Stabilization under the Defense Production Act of 1950,” Harvard Law Review, Vol. 64, pp. 1–26 (Nov., 1950)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
96 Second War Powers Act, 56 Stat. 178 (1942); 50 U.S.C. App. §633 (1944).
97 322 U. S. 398 (1944). Mr. Justice Roberts dissented without opinion.
98 See the testimony of Robert P. Patterson, Undersecretary of War, J. A. Krug, Chairman, War Production Board, and H. S. Hensel, General Counsel, Navy Department, in the Hearings before Subcommittee No. 4 of the Committee on the Judiciary, 78th Cong., 2nd sess., on H. R. 4993 (Washington, 1944), pp. 90–108.
99 56 Stat. 765 (1942); 50 U.S.C.A. §961–971 (1944).
100 Termination Report, War Labor Board (Washington, 1947), Vol. 1, pp. 415–441Google Scholar.
101 57 Stat. 163 (1943); 50 U.S.C.A. §1501–1511 (1944).
102 Employers Group of Motor Freight Carriers v. National War Labor Board, 143 F. 2d 145 (C.A. D.C. 1944), cert, denied, 323 U. S. 735 (1944); National War Labor Board v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 144 F. 2d 528 (C.A. D.C. 1944), cert, denied, 323 U. S. 774 (1944); National War Labor Board v. United States Gypsum Co., 145 F. 2d 97 (C.A. D.C. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U. S. 856 (1945).
103 49 Stat 2036 (1936); 41 U.S.C.A. §35 (1943).
104 310 U. S. 113 (1940).
105 Ibid. at p. 127.
106 Cf. Dickinson, loc. cit., above n. 72, pp. 562–567; Davis, loc. cit., above n. 61, pp. 755–783.
107 189 U. S. 86 (1903).
108 198 U.S. 253 (1905).
109 338 U. S. 537 (1950).
110 335 U. S. 160 (1948).
111 1 Stat. 577 (1798); 50 U. S. C.A. §21 (1928).
112 335 U. S. at p. 173. Some of the considerations involved in the Ludecke case are very similar to those involved in Chicago & Southern Airlines v. Waterman S. S. Co., 333 U. S. 103 (1948), where the Court—Justices Douglas, Black, Reed and Rutledge dissenting—held non-reviewable the denial of a certificate to engage in foreign air transportation because the order of the Civil Aeronautics Board required the approval of the President, whose decision involved considerations of foreign policy not necessarily reflected in the record of the hearing before the Board.
113 335 U. S. at p. 186.
114 These questions also suggest the unanswered question underlying the deportation cases in general. Do aliens have any constitutional rights to remain in this country or may Congress deport for any reason it deems sufficient, or for no reason? In Bridges v. Wixon, only Mr. Justice Murphy discussed these fundamental questions, asserting that the statutory grounds of deportation, affiliation with the Communist party, constituted a violation of the First Amendment (326 U. S. at 157–166). If there is no constitutional right to remain in the country, the explanation of The Japanese Immigrant Case must be that there is, nevertheless, a constitutional right to equality of treatment as compared with all other aliens, when the deportation power is exercised—just as Mr. Justice Rutledge and Mr. Justice Murphy asserted in the Estep case that, although there was no constitutional right to exemption from the draft, there was a constitutional right that the statutory exemptions be equally applied.
115 335 U. S. at p. 187.
116 12 Fed. Reg. 1935 (1947). For outstanding general discussions, see particularly Emerson, Thomas I. and Helfeld, David M., “Loyalty Among Government Employees,” Yale Law Journal, Vol. 58, pp. 1–143 (Dec., 1948)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Donovan, William J. and Jones, Mary Gardiner, “Program for a Democratic Counter Attack to Communist Penetration of Government Service,” Yale Law Journal, Vol. 58, pp. 1211–1241 (July, 1949)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
117 The decision of the Supreme Court, affirming without opinion the decision of the Court of Appeals, was rendered on April 30, 1951. The decision of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, Judge Edgerton dissenting, is reported at 182 F. 2d. 46.
118 The cases were Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, National Council of American Soviet Friendship, Inc. v. McGrath, and International Workers Order, Inc. v. McGrath, all decided by the Supreme Court on April 30, 1951. The Supreme Court Opinions are reported in United States Law Week, Vol. 19, pp. 4232–4260 (May 1, 1951)Google Scholar.
119 Executive Order 9835, Part V, 2f.
120 5 U. S. C.A. 652 (1950). Section 5 of the Administrative Procedure Act specifically excepts from its requirements “the selection or tenure of an officer or employee of the United States other than examiners appointed pursuant to Section 11,” but the exemption is probably unnecessary in view of the explicit provision of the Civil Service Law that “No examination of witnesses nor any trial or hearing shall be required….”
121 See, e.g., Eberlein v. United States, 257 U. S. 82 (1921); Keim v. United States, 177 U. S. 290 (1900).
122 Executive Order 9835, Part V, 1.
123 Part IV, 2.
124 Part II, 2a.
125 Quoted in Brief for Petitioner in the Supreme Court, pp. 8–9.
126 In Chicago & Southern S. S. Corp. v. Waterman, above n. 112, the significance of confidential information was one of the factors mentioned by Mr. Justice Jackson, in the opinion for the Court, as militating against reviewability of the order (333 U. S. at p. 111). Cf. Haydock, Robert Jr., “Evidentiary Problems Posed by Atomic Energy Security Requirements,” Harvard Law Review, Vol. 61, pp. 468–491 (Feb., 1948)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
127 United States v. Lovett, 328 U. S. 303 (1946).
128 Cf. United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U. S. 75 (1947).
129 See p. 374 above and n. 109; 338 U. 8. at p. 549.
130 Cf. Van Hooke v. Hines, 122 F. (2d) 207 (C.A.D.C. 1941), certiorari denied; 314 U. S. 689 (1941), with Pike v. Walker, above n. 29.
131 See Hand, Augustus N., Stason, Fuchs, et al. , Symposium on State Administrative Procedure, Iowa Law Review, Vol. 33, pp. 193–375 (Jan., 1948)Google Scholar.
132 See Fuchs, , “Administrative Determinations and Personal Rights in the Present Supreme Court,” Indiana Law Journal, Vol. 24, pp. 163–194 (Winter, 1949)Google Scholar; Schwartz, , “Procedural Due Process in Federal Administrative Law,” New York University Law Review, Vol. 25, pp. 552–578 (July, 1950)Google Scholar.
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